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Abstract
This PhD research investigates the effects of the key top management team (TMT) attributes
on the probability of a firm’s default. Specifically, the study pursues motivation, loyalty
and effectiveness as the key characteristics to analyse. Synthesising the Behavioural theory
of the firm, Upper Echelons theory, Resource Based View, Agency theory and Seasons
of tenure alongside other key TMT theories this research develops a theoretical model.
The literature on TMT and financial distress has focused mostly on the role of the CEO or
different definitions of the TMT, however, the role of the CFO is very rarely studied. This
research argues that the role of the CFO is extremely important when a firm faces financial
difficulties and is key to the definition of TMT that influence the financing decisions of
the firm. In addition, this research uses both accounting based measures and market based
measures for predicting the likelihood of default while a majority of the literature in this
field has used either accounting based measures or market based measures. This research
uses multilevel modelling on a hierarchical dataset to address some of the limitations of
previous research by modelling for the variability of regression intercepts and slopes and
addressing the violation of the independence assumption. Using a sample of UK listed
companies, on the FTSE 100 index for the period 2013 to 2016, this research uses OLS
regression, Polynomial regression, Random Intercept model and Random Intercept and
Random slope models as robustness checks to test the theoretical model developed. The
study concludes that there is a relationship between key TMT attributes and the likelihood
of default. The effect of the attributes varies for the short-term, long-term and accounting
measures of the probability of firm financial distress. The study provides models that will
be key to future governance ensuring a financially healthier corporate environment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The beginning of (quarter 1) 2018 saw the number of company insolvencies in England
and Wales at the highest level in the first quarter of a year since 2014 (McDaid, 2018).
Between January and March 2018, there were 4,462 company insolvencies as opposed to
3,964 during the same period in 2017. Fig. 1.1 shows the number of company insolvencies
in England and Wales since 1985 and highlights the two main recessions faced by the
UK economy. It shows that immediately after the two previous recessions the number of
corporate insolvencies peaked.
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Fig. 1.1 Company Liquidation rate in England and Wales (Source: McDaid, 2018)
The global financial crisis (2007/2008) proved to be a difficult trigger point for many
companies and eventually played a big role in the collapse of many. The landscape of
the UK high-street retailers has been continuously changing with each year providing a
further challenge to these companies. The years that followed, the financial crisis has seen
big retail brands, such as Woolworths, Comet, JJB and Phones4U, file for administration
(Ruddick, 2015). The British Retail Consortium also warned that closures of retail outlets,
2 out of 3 town shops, further caused a loss of 800,000 jobs (Tugby, 2015). In a study
undertaken, by Riley et al. (2014), to assess the impact of the global financial crisis on the
supply side of the UK economy, found that bank lending to businesses had declined.
However, they did not find much evidence to support that the banking sector impairment
and the lack of reallocation of resources to businesses had been the key factor in holding
back productivity growth. This could lead to the argument that the companies that kept
afloat compared to the companies that failed, within this difficult environment, was as a
result of strong management skills and management decisions relating to various aspects
of the business before and during the crisis.
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A company going through insolvency or nearing default has far-reaching effects beyond the
company itself. It has an effect on the workforce, customers, the economy, the taxpayers
etc. There have been countless examples where corporate failure has led to the taxpayer
paying redundancy costs for the failing business. One such example was the insolvency
of Comet, which left taxpayers with a £49.4m bill (Neville, 2012). Recently the discount
chain Poundworld announced the closure of nearly 100 stores putting over 1,500 jobs at
risk as part of an insolvency procedure (Cahill, 2018). TPG Capital (owners of Prezzo
restaurants) went through a similar procedure of closing nearly a third of their stores losing
around 500 jobs. The impact of corporate insolvency was further noted in one of UK’s
biggest collapse in a decade, Carillion a FTSE 350 construction business. The collapse
of this construction business led to over 2,300 job losses, it had a knock-on effect on the
entire sector and caused financial difficulty for firms within its supply chain (Thompson,
2018).
The case of Carillion is especially interesting as currently, the government is investigating
the behaviour of its directors and the corporate culture that existed within the business.
The directors of the firm were accused of driving the company off a cliff and making
a relentless dash for cash by taking low-margin contracts, which did not make money
(Thomas, 2018).
Trends in corporate failure show that firms that fail to perform are usually followed
by Top Management Team (TMT) turnover and it is seen that firms performing above
expectation usually reward their TMT. Firms in financial distress usually did not prepare
for management succession (Dua and Singh, 2010). In addition, the most significant causes
of financial distress identified by Memba and Job (2013) can be attributed to the TMT
of a firm. They also found that the most likely impact of financial distress was the TMT
turnover or replacement. This shows that responsibility of firm performance is given to
the TMT of the firm and therefore supporting a hypothesis that there are key management
attributes that have a significant relationship with the performance of a firm.
3
1.1. Background
There has been considerable academic and professional debate in the recent years around
the role of the TMT and their relationship with the performance of a firm. There is
evidence to show that there was considerable improvement in the performance of a firm
once incumbent management was replaced (Denis and Denis, 1995; Huson et al., 2004).
High levels of management turnover have also been associated with fraud (Sun and Zhang,
2006) and default or bankruptcy (Gilson, 1989, 1990; Ofek, 1993). There have been
various studies investigating different management attributes and their relationship with
the performance of a firm. However, only a few studies have focussed on the relationship
between the TMT and the probability of firm default. A majority of the focus within the
TMT has been on the CEO and Chairman with only a few studies focusing on the role of
the CFO.
The primary financial objective of a public listed company is the maximisation of Share-
holder wealth (Watson and Head, 2013). When a company becomes insolvent the share-
holders have everything to lose and nothing to win and maybe the culture of maximisation
of shareholder wealth in return has led to the management of companies not being keen to
accept insolvency. It was noted in a study by Franks and Sussman (2000a, 2000b), that
bankruptcy is considered as an option of last resort by management. Therefore posing
the question, when should a company’s primary objective change from ‘maximisation of
shareholder wealth’ to ‘maximisation of creditor wealth’? This conflict has given rise to
what Harner and Griffin (2013) call the ‘Ostrich Syndrome’. They noted that management
of troubled companies often bury their heads in sands until it is too late to remedy. But is
this syndrome a result of the management trying all possible options to work towards its
primary goal of shareholder wealth maximisation? This could also possibly be a conflict
between the agency theory and the stakeholder theory i.e. when should the managers work
towards the interest of the shareholders and when should they shift their focus to another
stakeholder’s interest.
This study develops a theoretical model emerging from key management theories: Resource
Based View, Resource Dependence Theory, Knowledge Based View, Entrenchment Theory,
Agency Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Stewardship Theory, Transaction cost theory, Political
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theory, Upper Echelon Theory, Seasons of Tenure, Ostrich Syndrome, Animal Spirits,
Hubris and Narcissism. These theories have been selected through the literature review
undertaken in order to provide a model of the TMT of the firm.
This research aims at exploring the relationship between key TMT attributes and the
probability of default of a firm. A significant relationship and theoretical model will help
understand specific reasons attributable to management for the failure of an organisation.
In addition, it will provide specific reasoning to ensure that firms are able to work towards
reducing their probability of default by addressing the key attributes.
1.2 Recent UK Corporate Insolvency cases
Ralph (2018) reported that a string of bankruptcies in the UK was driving up costs of credit
insurance. The Association of British Insurers identified that over £340bn of UK trade was
covered by trade credit policies. In the article, it was further highlighted that the collapse
of Carillion, Toys R Us, HMV, Game and Woolworths had led to large losses across the
trade credit insurance industry.
Below are a few recent cases of corporate insolvency that highlight a range of causes but
most importantly the effect of administration on the employees of the company in the UK.
These are summarised in Table 1.1 where some key points are listed that were discussed in
the media.
• Conviviality (Rovnick, 2018) - The previously AIM-listed owner of Bargain Booze,
employing approximately 2500 employees, filed for administration in March 2018.
Just prior to the administration, the company had provided two profit warnings,
declared that they found a forgotten tax bill and failed to raise additional funding from
shareholders. The CEO, who was previously decorated for the above-market growth,
resigned just prior to the administration announcement. The FT article further
highlights, the reservations of investors that stemmed from the lack of confidence in
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the management team and specifically the chairman. Conviviality forecasted a profit
of around £50m and days later made the administration announcement.
• Countrywide (BBC, 2018) - Countrywide Farmers PLC, employing approximately
700 people, filed for administration in March 2018. The company had been looking
at restructuring options for a 12-month period and successfully sold its LPG business.
The company had identified a purchaser for its retail business, however, this was
referred to phase 2 by the Competition and Markets Authority. The sale could not
be completed due to the referral and given the company had an ongoing trading
difficulty and cash flow pressure the only option left was to file for administration.
This has led to a number of staff redundancies as the company had to make cost
savings. The Chief Executive of the firm quit in January 2018 (Rovnick, 2018)
following a profit warning that caused a sharp decline in its shares.
• Maplin (Wood, 2018) - Maplin, a UK electronics retailer employing approximately
2300 employees, filed for administration in March 2018. The company was owned
by private equity investors and had been looking for a buyer for 12 months. The
company felt a financial squeeze after the credit insurance on the suppliers was
removed. The company made 63 people redundant with significant effects to its
headquarters in London and Rotherham.
• Toys R Us (Ralph, 2018) - Toys R Us UK, a giant toys retailer, collapsed in February
2018 which led to the closure of all its stores and approximately 2000 employees
made redundant. The collapse caused a shortfall of approximately £1.1 billion which
included £23.7 million owed to suppliers, approximately £22.1 million of unpaid
VAT, £8.4 million in redundancy payments, £80 million of pension scheme deficit
and £2.5 million in gift cards. Similar to Maplin, the loss of credit insurance was a
factor in the failure of Toys R us as the company failed to find a buyer.
• Carillion (Davies, 2018) - Carillion, a FTSE 350 construction business employing
approximately 19,500 employees, collapsed in January 2018. The company relied
on large contracts with very low margins and when the contracts underperformed
the company felt a financial squeeze. It was unable to raise further funds and had to
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enter liquidation rather than file for administration. This was due to the lack of cash
to continue trading in administration and the funding for the public services contracts
funded by the government could only be received by an official receiver which was
only possible in a liquidation. Recklessness, Hubris and Greed among directors
were noted in reports compiled by two select committees. The big-four accounting
firms were also blamed in this report as they enjoyed a parasitical relationship with
their clients. The committee specifically identified and criticised the Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman and recommended
that they are banned from holding future directorships.
• Palmer and Harvey (Vandevelde, 2017) - Palmer and Harvey PLC, a food wholesaler
employing approximately 3400 employees, entered administration in November
2017. A combination of cash squeeze and the Booker-Tesco merger meant that P&H
was struggling and this eventually led to a loss of 2,500 jobs.
• HMV (Robinson, 2013), an entertainment retailer employing 4,500 employees, filed
for administration in January 2013 which led to the closure of more than 100 stores
and a loss of more than 1,400 jobs. Banks and suppliers refused to provide additional
funding which led to a cash squeeze and the company eventually collapsing. Hilco
UK purchased the £176m debt of HMV for around £40m from Lloyds and RBS in
order to take control of the retailer and eventually to become the new owner.
• Jessops (BBC, 2013), a high street camera retailer employing over 2,000 staff, filed
for administration in January 2013. The company struggled to meet its profit targets
and due to substantial cash outflows relating to rent, they got into a financial squeeze
leading to the firm filing for administration.
• Comet (BBC, 2012a), an electrical retailer employing over 6,500 employees, filed
for administration in November 2012 due to stiff competition. The company had
been struggling for some time and was sold for £2 to OpCapita a year before its
collapse.
• Clinton Cards (Felsted and Thompson, 2012), a greeting cards retailer employing
over 8,000 staff, filed for administration in May 2012 as a result of high levels of
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debt and high rents from its large store portfolio. This resulted in 3,000 job losses
and a closure of 350 stores.
• Game (BBC, 2012b), a video game retail company employing over 8,000 employees,
filed for administration in March 2012 which led to an immediate closure of 277
stores and redundancy of 2,104 employees. The company suffered from high fixed
costs relating to rents and ambitious international expansions which led to a cash
squeeze.
• Zavvi (BBC, 2008b), a music, games and DVD chain employing over 3,400 staff
filed for administration in December 2008. It was hit by the default of Woolworths
(its main supplier) which led to the firm struggling to source stock through new
arrangements adding to the working capital pressure.
• Woolworths (BBC, 2008a), a store chain and supplier (entertainment UK) employing
over 30,000 staff through 815 stores filed for administration in November 2008. The
company struggled with mounting amounts of debt and a liquidity squeeze brought
on by the lack of trade credit insurers prepared to insure Woolworths.
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Table 1.1 Recent cases of UK Corporate Insolvency (Source: Author’s own collection adapted
from various news sources listed above)
Company Key points relating to Insolvency
Conviviality Profit warning; Discovered forgotten tax bill; failed to raise
emergency funds; CEO stepped down shortly before admin-
istration
Countrywide CMA referred takeover of retail arm; which meant business
could not be sold
Maplin Failure to find new buyer
Toys R us Failure to find new buyer
Carillion Recklessness, hubris and greed among directors; Blamed
big-four accounting firms; Criticised specifically CFO, CEO
and Chairman
Palmer and Harvey Failed to sell business; impact of Booker and P&H takeover;
HMV Failed online technology; bank debt; too many stores and
expensive leases
Jessops CEO joined just before collapse; too many stores and expen-
sive leases
Comet Decline in additional income; Outstanding debt to parent
company
Clintons Biggest supplier forced company into administration
Game Suppliers stopped doing business; high fixed costs; ambi-
tious international expansion
Zavvi Demise of woolworths
Woolworths £385m debt; high rents
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1.3 Scope
The research focuses on the probability of default measured, as a measure of firm perfor-
mance, by the Bloomberg 1-year, Bloomberg 5-year and Altman Z-score probability of firm
default for UK public listed companies. The Bloomberg default probability is developed
using the Merton (1974) model and is a market based measure of default prediction and
the Altman (1968) Z-score is an accounting based measure of default prediction. The TMT
from the perspective of this research is the CEO, Chairman and CFO. The Executives of
the firm from the perspective of this research are the CEO and the CFO. The key TMT
attributes the research focuses on are Motivation, Loyalty and Effectiveness. Motivation is
broken down into short-term motivation, measured by average Salary paid to the executives
and Long-term Motivation, measured by average Bonus paid to the executives. Loyalty is
measured by the average tenure of the TMT. Effectiveness is broken down into effective-
ness at board level, measured by the number of directors on the board, and effectiveness at
the firm level, measured by the average number of employees.
1.4 Rationale
A majority of previous literature in the context of the TMT and firm performance focussed
on different measures of profitability. There has been little research undertaken on the
effect of TMT on the probability of firm default. The research has focussed on the US
(Schultz et al., 2017) or East Asian (Ting, 2011) markets and research in this field from the
context of the UK listed companies is almost non-existent. In addition, the TMT has been
previously defined mostly only as CEO and Chairman or the entire board of directors. The
focus of this research is on the CEO, Chairman and CFO as the TMT. The CFO would
play a key role in corporate finance strategies and decisions, which would have a direct
impact on the probability of a firm default.
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There is a lack of an existing theoretical model addressing the relationship between TMT
attributes and the likelihood of default for UK listed companies. This research will provide
a theoretical model developed from previous theories to explain the relationship of key
TMT attributes and the probability of default. A majority of the research studying the
relationship between different TMT attributes and the likelihood of firm default uses a
single measure i.e. either accounting or market based measures for the likelihood of firm
default. This research develops empirical models using both accounting and market based
measures of probability of firm default which allows a much better understanding of the
relationship.
A large amount of research within the TMT and the probability of firm default has used
regular regression for time series or cross-sectional data. This research uses multilevel
modelling on a hierarchical dataset which allows the research to address some of the flaws
of the earlier models when the independence assumption of linear regression is broken.
It would be of importance to regulators and academics to compare the theoretical and
empirical model with key current corporate governance initiatives. It would also be useful
to shareholders and the management to consider how this theoretical model may be applied
in practice and would it generate results as predicted by the model. The principal argument
behind the existence of this relationship is that the increase in default probability increases
the TMT turnover. This would lead to the argument that there must be distinct attributes
that distinguish the TMT of a firm with a high default probability and a firm with a low
default probability within the same industry.
1.5 Aim
The overall aim of the research is to explore the relationship between the TMT attributes
and the probability of firm default.
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1.6 Objectives
The key objectives of the research are:
1. To critically review and synthesise the literature on key TMT theories.
This objective aims at establishing the scope of the TMT and reviewing the literature
on key theories to understand the different attributes of the TMT.
2. To critically review and synthesise the literature on the TMT and firm performance.
This objective undertakes a critical review of the recent academic literature on the
relationship between various attributes of the TMT and various measures of firm
performance. It helps in clearly identifying the research gap the thesis addresses and
the relevance of the research to key stakeholders.
3. To critically review and synthesises literature: establishing the scope, conceptualising
and classifying the determinants of the probability of firm default.
This objective provides a framework of definitions within which the focus on the
probability of default operates. It primarily aims at reviewing academic literature
on the key determinants and key measures of the probability of firm default. To
critically review and synthesise literature comparing and contrasting accounting
based probability of default vs market based probability of default.
4. To develop a Theoretical model to test the relationship between TMT and the
probability of firm default.
This objective provides a theoretical model developed from the critical review of
literature that explains the relationship between the TMT and the probability of firm
default. The theoretical model then provides the research with key hypothesises that
allow for it to be tested within the context of UK public listed companies.
5. To empirically test the theoretical framework model using the UK FTSE 100 listed
companies.
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6. To identify future corporate governance recommendations for listed companies
facing financial distress. And, to provide recommendations based on the analysis of
the key findings.
Finally, this objective aims at bringing the above objectives together in order to
provide some key recommendations of relevance to key stakeholders to the research.
1.7 Research Questions
• Is there a relationship between key TMT attributes and the likelihood of firm financial
distress?
– Is there a relationship between executive motivation and the likelihood of firm
financial distress?
– Is there a relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of firm financial
distress?
– Is there a relationship between TMT effectiveness and the likelihood of firm
financial distress?
13
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1.8 Hypotheses
This research identifies key hypotheses to test through the review of theoretical and
empirical literature. The hypotheses tested are as follows:
Hypothesis 1a There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 1b There is a negative relationship between executive long-term motivation
and the likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 2 There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of
firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3a There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3b There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the likelihood of firm financial distress
1.9 Contribution
There is lack of clarity on the relationship between key TMT attributes and the probability
of firm default within the UK. There is considerable academic literature on the impact of
the TMT on the profitability or performance of a firm and a majority of this research is
within the US context. This research aims to contribute to existing literature by developing
a theoretical model that explains the relationship of the TMT and their impact of the
probability of firm default. The research further introduces a new key management role
in the TMT definition i.e. the CFO that has previously not been studied within a similar
context. The findings of this research answers some key questions and raises some further
questions about the regulatory constraints on the TMT. The findings of the research will
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be of primary relevance to Investors (Shareholders and Debtholders), TMT of a firm,
regulators and other researchers with an interest in the subject.
This research uses a multilevel modelling approach on a hierarchical dataset which helps
overcome breaking the independence assumption of linear regression. The research uses
multidisciplinary theories to develop a theoretical model on TMT and the likelihood of
default. This model is then developed empirically using a dataset of UK listed companies.
The empirical model is then tested on an out of sample case to test its reliability and validity.
The model would help in future identification of strengths and weaknesses within a firms
TMT and allow the firm to specify its key management attributes to the firms required
level of the probability of firm default.
The findings contribute to the UK corporate governance code by undertaking a further
scrutiny and providing a better understanding of the role of the CFO. In addition, the
findings provide some further clarity on the debate around board size, salary and tenure as
indicated by the corporate governance code and previous literature.
This research argues that the role of the CFO is extremely important when a firm faces
financial difficulties and is key to the definition of TMT, which has rarely been addressed
in the prior literature. In addition, this research uses both accounting based measures and
market based measures for predicting the likelihood of default whereas a majority of the
literature in this field has used either accounting based measures or market based measures.
There is very little literature on the effect of TMT attributes on financial distress or the
likelihood of financial distress for the UK, which is addressed by this research. The most
important contribution is the contribution of the research to the UK corporate governance
code to ensure a better understanding of the effect of the key management attributes and
the role played by the CFO.
The model developed in this study allows stakeholders to identify the likelihood of default
based on key management attributes earlier than that indicated by the accounting and
market based measures and address any concerns earlier. This will also be key to future
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governance to ensure a financially healthier corporate environment, designing optimal
executive contracts and remuneration, and timely response to signs of financial weakness.
1.10 Some Key terminology in the study
TMT: The TMT for the purpose of this study refers to the position of the CEO, the CFO and
the Chairman. The research does refer to other studies and definitions used by researchers
of the TMT and this will be clarified in those instances.
The probability of firm default: This is the likelihood that a firm will default on its debt and
enter into a formal insolvency process. This term is interchangeably used with financial
distress. A company gets into financial distress if it is unable to pay its debts as they fall
due. Once a company is in financial distress, insolvency law starts casting its shadow. In
the UK the insolvency law imposes collective governance mechanisms on the insolvent
company and its creditors. The insolvency laws provide a range of choices between a
liquidation procedure for an orderly winding up of the insolvent company’s affair and a
rescue or reorganisation procedure. (Armour et. al., 2008)
Executives: The executives for the purpose of this study refers to the position of the CEO
and the CFO. The research does refer to other studies and definitions used by researchers
of the executives and this will be clarified in those instances.
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1.11 Structure
This thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 Theoretical Literature Review This chapter develops a theoretical model by undertak-
ing a review of the literature on key TMTs. This chapter identifies the hypotheses to
be tested and establishes the concepts in the research emerging from the theoretical
model.
Chapter 3 Empirical Literature Review This chapter undertakes a critical review of the literature
on determinants of firm default and its relationship with corporate governance and
the TMT. This chapter further explores prior literature within the context of the
theoretical model developed in the previous chapter and critiques its findings within
the context of this study.
Chapter 4 Methodology This chapter identifies the measures used for each of the individual con-
cepts identified in chapter 3 through a discussion of the various measures previously
used in academic literature and in practice.
Chapter 5 Presentation of results This chapter presents the results of the empirical models
developed by introducing the theoretical model to a sample dataset.
Chapter 6 Analysis and Discussion This chapter analyses the results of the models developed
and discusses the key results within the broader context of existing prior literature.
In addition, this chapter also presents an out of sample test of the empirical model
on a recently failed listed company.
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Recommendations This chapter summarises the key findings of the
study, critiques some of the key limitations of this research, provides recommenda-
tions for further research and provides a thesis summary.
Bibliography
Appendices
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews key theories used in Top Management Team (TMT) research and
critiques them using theories from other disciplines to develop a theoretical framework.
This framework identifies three broad categories of TMT attributes namely: Motivation,
Loyalty and Effectiveness. The sections that follow identify a key theory for each of
these attributes and reviews other theories that further develop our understanding of the
key theory and the TMT attributes. Finally, the theoretical framework underpinning this
research is presented.
2.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this study is developed through the review of these key
theories discussed above and how they are categorised within the different aspects of the
behavioural theory of the firm. A diagrammatic representation of the theoretical framework
is presented in Fig. 2.1. The behavioural theory of the firm is the key underpinning theory
of this research. The four attributes within this theory are categorised into developing four
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broad attributes of the TMT. Hence, this research argues that firstly the TMT of a firm set
the goals and make key strategic decisions to achieve these. Secondly, the TMT are leaders
of a coalition of individuals within a group i.e. the organisation. Thirdly, the TMT are
provided with compensation in excess of what would be deemed sufficient for the efficient
running of the organisation. And finally, the TMT of a firm may undertake behaviour or
actions that may be deemed as "good enough" as opposed to undertaking behaviour or
actions to maximise the wealth of the shareholders or the returns to the organisation. These
four arguments relate to the four attributes of the behavioural theory of the firm and are
broadly categorised as TMT effectiveness at board level, TMT effectiveness at the firm
level, TMT Motivation and TMT Loyalty.
The framework underpins further four key theories for each of the four attributes of the
Behavioural theory of the firm. These are Resource Based View for Decision Making
Process, Knowledge Based View for Coalition of groups, Agency Theory for Organisational
Slack and Seasons of Tenure for Satisficing Behaviour. In addition to these four key
theories, additional relevant theories are attached to help better understand each of the four
attributes. These are the Stakeholder Theory for Decision Making Process, Social Identity
Theory for Coalition of Groups, Entrenchment and Stewardship theory for Organisational
Slack and Service Profit Chain and Upper Echelons Theory for Satisficing Behaviour.
Using the Resource Based view, the framework argues that the TMT is a VRIN resource
within the organisation that make key decisions which give the organisation a sustained
competitive advantage. The stakeholder is a further combination of the Resource Based
view and the market based view which identifies key stakeholders to the firm beyond the
shareholders and the TMT are one of these key stakeholders.
Using the Knowledge Based view, the framework argues that knowledge within the
organisation gained by the individuals within the organisation is the most important
resource available that allows a firm to gain a sustained competitive advantage. This within
the context of the social identity theory further develops as individuals within a group take
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pride and self-esteem by their membership in the group and identifying differences from
other groups.
Using the agency theory, the framework argues that due to the existence of the agency
problem within organisations executives have to be compensated more than what would
be considered an appropriate amount for the successful running of the firm. The excess
amount that is paid is to ensure that the executive directors do pursue own objectives
and goals but instead pursue the objectives and goals of the shareholders. This is further
supported by the Entrenchment theory, which argues that executives will ensure that
the firms or its resources are more valuable under their control, therefore, making them
indispensable. However, the stewardship theory is an alternative to the agency theory as
this argues that the executive directors are responsible stewards to the shareholders and do
not need to receive excess compensation.
Finally, using the seasons of tenure the framework argues that the TMT of an organisation
goes through different seasons the length of which would be different based on the
individual, team and organisations. The strategy and action adopted by the TMT are
influenced by the season they are currently in and as the tenure of the team increases the
seasons could change. This importance of tenure within the theory is further highlighted by
using the Service-Profit Chain as a theory which clearly links employee satisfaction within
a firm to employee loyalty to the firm which is further linked to employee productivity
for the firm. Finally, the Upper Echelons theory, the roots of which can be drawn back
to the behavioural theory of the firm, further argues that TMT experiences and expertise
influences their interpretation of situations and in turn affects their choices.
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2.3 Behavioural theory of the firm
The behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958)
emphasises the role of individuals within the economic theory of the firm. It acknowledges
that organisational goals are often conflicting as they are defined at the individual level
rather than at the organisational level. The theory further stresses the limitations of human
rationality and stresses that individuals do not always strive to maximise their utility but
attempt to attain realistic goals. The alternative solutions available to problems faced by
the firm are limited to the definition of the problem and the individuals understanding of
these definitions. This is how human limitations affect firm decision making and behaviour.
Kaczmarek (2017) argued that there has been an increase in the utilisation of multiple
and cross-disciplinary theories in corporate governance research, specially the behavioural
theory of the firm which draws from both social psychology and sociological theories.
March and Simon (1958) state that the managers bring their own set of “given” skills or
knowledge to a decision-making situation. This is further supported by Sutton (1987) who
states that this decision-making is based on the managers “construed reality” rather than a
“real” situation. A key distinction of the upper echelons theory is that the focus is solely
on the TMT of the firm. A key criticism of the research developing on upper echelons
theory was highlighted by Cannella and Holcomb (2005), i.e. as the upper echelons theory
relates to the TMT, “team” being the focus, a majority of the research fails to focus on this
element and only focusses on the individual perception element.
The behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) suggests that managerial
decisions are not always based on rational motives but are influenced by the natural
limitations of managers as human beings. This is the root of the upper echelons perspective
and in order to study the complex psychological dimensions of managers, one can use their
demographic attributes as proxies (Hambrick and Mason, 1984).
Nielsen (2009) undertook a review of literature on TMT over a 22 year period and found
that upper echelons theory was the most common theoretical perspective used, often
22
2.4. Theoretical perspective for Executive Motivation
combined with social psychological theories and in some cases, it was combined with
strategy process or firm internationalisation. The research also found that only a few studies
applied agency, entrepreneurship, change, signalling, firm growth, Resource Based view
and social network theories. Nielsen (2009) found that in almost half the studies reviewed
the dependent variables were organisational level outcomes (firm innovation, strategic
reorientation, the degree of diversification and internationalisation, and organisational risk
and crisis). In addition, it was found that performance was the most common outcome
variable and that only 3 of the articles reviewed theoretically modelled and empirically
tested upper echelons outcomes.
Pettigrew (1992, pg163) introduces the term ‘managerial elites’ to TMT and therefore
includes those who occupy a formally defined position or those at strategic positions in
the definition of TMT. Hambrick and Mason (1984, pg193) define TMT as the ‘powerful
actors in an organisation’ and Finkelstein and Hambrick (1994, pg 8) define the TMT as
the most influential executives at the head of an organisation the ‘. . . top three to ten’.
Origins of the Upper echelon and firm process Internationalisation perspectives can be
traced back to the Behavioural Theory of the Firm. This theory highlights the relevance of
the role played by individuals in the firm by introducing the social aspect to the economic
theory of the firm and argues that organisational goals are defined at the individual level
rather than at the firm level. The Behavioural Theory argues that management, as hu-
mans, do not have rational motives and maximising behaviour, instead they have bounded
rationality (Simon, 1947) which influences their decision-making.
2.4 Theoretical perspective for Executive Motivation
This section reviews theories relating to TMT loyalty and its relationship to organisational
outcomes. It commences with a discussion of the agency theory which is the key theory
underpinning this attribute. This is then followed by a critique of the agency theory under
the light of the entrenchment theory and stewardship theory.
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2.4.1 Agency Theory
“If both parties to the relationship are utility maximisers there is good reason to believe that
the agent will not always act in the best interest of the principal” (Jensen and Meckling,
1976)
Berle and Means (1932) in their book ’The Modern Corporation and Private Property’
highlighted the issue around monitoring of executive autonomy with an increase in the wide
dispersion of ownership. This idea was further developed by Jensen and Meckling (1976)
into a very widely used theory today, namely ’agency theory’. The key argument behind
this theory, as presented in Fig. 2.2, is that in modern day corporations the ownership
and control of the organisation is widely separated i.e. the principal (owner) employs the
agent (manager) to control or run the firm. The key assumption of the theory is that the
agent is likely to be self-interested and opportunistic in his behaviour as opposed to having
behaviour consistent with the interest of the principal.
Fig. 2.2 The Agency model (Source: Abdullah and Valentine, 2009)
“How does it happen that millions of individuals are willing to turn over a significant
fraction of their wealth to organisations run by managers who have so little interest in
their welfare” (Jensen, 2001)
The agency theory research has developed as corporations develop to reflect and understand
the true nature of the TMT. For example, Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia (1998) relax the
theory’s assumption that managers are purely economic agents, whilst Pepper and Gore
(2015) emphasise on internal governance as a key assumption and reevaluate the predictions
through the behavioural agency theory. Shi et al. (2017) emphasise on external governance
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mechanisms, such as external monitoring and control, to reevaluate the predictions of the
agency theory and what this means for intrinsic motivation to behave ethically.
In order to ensure the agent behaves and controls the firm in the best interest of the principal,
the principal needs to counter the problems. This action by the principal incurs costs, which
are known as the ’agency cost’. Agency theorist base their research on this very basic
assumption that all managers are self-interested opportunistic agents whose behaviour
would only be aligned to that of the principal by countermeasures such as, incentives.
There is little focus on the attitudes, conduct and relationships of board effectiveness
(Roberts and Young, 2005).
The agency theory states that employees are self-interested, individualistic, bounded
rationality and rewards and punishment are prominent in such firms (Jensen and Meckling,
1976). Zahra and Stanton (1988) argue against board composition and firm performance as
they find no relationship in their study. However, the agency theory argues that due to the
separation of ownership and control insider-dominated boards will aggravate the conflict
of interest of manager and therefore outside directors help in policing and monitoring
management behaviour.
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in their study, propose that good corporate governance
structures should be able to mitigate the conflict between management and stakeholders
and the conflict between shareholders and bondholders. The management that has superior
information and control of the firm compared to the other stakeholders are able to transfer
the firm’s wealth to themselves. Similarly, shareholders that control a firm when its solvent
are incentivised to transfer the firm’s wealth from the bondholders to themselves. In
addition, large shareholders influence the firm to create greater wealth for themselves at
the expense of other minority shareholders and bondholders. However, Kaczmarek (2017)
argued that there has been an over-reliance on agency theory as the main perspective for
research within corporate governance which has led to a lack of realism of context and
failing to unveil the board process and social context.
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2.4.2 Entrenchment Theory
The Entrenchment theory as proposed by Shleifer and Vishny (1989) revolves around
managers investing the firms’ resources in assets that are more valuable under them than
any other alternative management, even if this investment is not value maximising for
shareholders. This allows them to then make themselves valuable to the firm and demand
a higher compensation from shareholders to remain within the firm.
The entrenchment theory suggests that managers undertake decisions that increase their
own value to shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Guest (2009) found that CEO
compensation increased significantly in the year following the acquisition. Girma et al.
(2006) found the firm performance had an insignificant impact on executive compensation
but firm size has a positive effect. Similarly, Gregg et al. (1993), a UK study, found a
weak correlation between firm performance and director remuneration however firm size
was found to be an important determinant. Sun et al. (2016) find that managers with a
high percentage of own firm shares are in a better position to protect their private interests
from the risk of bankruptcy due to high leverage, therefore supporting the entrenchment
hypothesis.
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) argue that managers face pressures, such as monitoring by
the board (Fama and Jensen, 1983), managerial labour market (Fama, 1980), competition
(Hart, 1984) and threat of takeover (Ruback and Jensen, 1983; Scharfstein, 1988), to act
in the interest of shareholders. Managers counter these forces by entrenching themselves
i.e. making themselves valuable to the shareholders and costly to replace allowing them to
raise their wages in negotiations. Shleifer and Vishny (1989) further argue that a manager
collecting rents will do what it takes to continue keeping the rent. Anderson et al. (2018),
embed the entrenchment theory in the paper to argue that when ownership and control
are separated, the firm performance is dependent on having the right management and
incentivising them appropriately.
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2.4.3 Stewardship Theory
The stewardship theory is based on assumptions that oppose those made by the agency
theory. Critics of the agency theory see the assumptions relating to the self-interest and
self-serving motives of the TMT as pessimistic and suggest the pro-organisational motives
of the TMT supporting the stewardship theory. Stewardship theory states that the TMT
aims and motives are not opposed to those of shareholders instead both aim to maximise
the long-term stewardship of the firm and therefore all their aim and motives are well
aligned. In addition, the stewardship theory argues in favour of combining the roles of
the CEO and Chairman by highlighting the negative effects of separating the roles. The
stewardship theory suggests that independent directors offer counselling and advice rather
than monitor and control activities. This is further argued by Glinkowska and Kaczmarek
(2015) that the key motivating factor, as per the stewardship theory, for managers is job
satisfaction.
Davis et al. (1997) define stewardship theory as “a steward protects and maximises
shareholders’ wealth through firm performance because by so doing, the steward’s utility
functions are maximised”. Fig. 2.3 presents this relationship where the Shareholders
empower and trust their stewards who are intrinsically and extrinsically motivated. These
motivated stewards work towards protecting and maximising the wealth of their sharehold-
ers.
Fig. 2.3 The Stewardship model (Source: Abdullah and Valentine, 2009)
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This theory argues against the agency theory as it does not emphasise on the perspective
of individualism (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) instead that the TMT are stewards to
shareholders and aim to maximise the wealth of shareholders by integrating their goals
with those of the organisation. This theory further argues that the TMT will feel satisfied
and motivated as the firms’ success is attained. The agency theory treats the TMT as
economic beings (Argyris, 1973), whereas the stewardship theory recognises the TMT
autonomy built on trust (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Daily et al (2003) argued that the
TMT try to maximise firm performance and shareholder wealth as they wish to protect
their own reputation (Shelifer and Vishny, 1997). This argument is supported by Fama
(1980) who states that the TMT want to be good stewards as they manage their own careers
as effective stewards. Abdullah and Valentine (2009), liken the stewardship theory to the
working conditions in Japan where the employee takes ownership of their own job and
works at it diligently. They further add that combining the role of the CEO and Chairman
would reduce agency costs, as they would be better stewards safeguarding the interest of
shareholders. This argument is supported by the findings of Donaldson and Davis (1991)
as their evidence showed an increase in the ROE (return to shareholders) by combining the
two roles.
Agency theory argues that the objectives of the principal (shareholder) and the agent
(manager) are not aligned and mechanisms need to be in place to provide protection to
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, stewardship theory argues that the objectives of
the managers as stewards of the shareholders are aligned (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Roll
(1986) argues that managers intend to be honourable stewards for the shareholders however
hubris, which is overconfidence, leads to managers making incorrect decisions. Gregory
(1997) argues that within the M&A context, hubris and behavioural theories of management
are possible explanations for M&A outcomes. Stewardship Theory, unlike agency theory,
supports the argument that CEO duality will facilitate superior firm performance (Dalton
et al. 1998). The theory suggests that managers are highly motivated stewards of the
shareholders and there is no misalignment of interest. This was evidenced by Donaldson
and Davis (1991) where they examined 337 US firms (76% of which had CEO duality)
and found dual structures to outperform independent chair structures.
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2.4.4 Hypotheses linked to Executive motivation
Hypothesis 1a There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 1b There is a negative relationship between executive long-term motivation
and the likelihood of firm financial distress
2.5 Theoretical perspective for TMT Loyalty
This section reviews theories relating to TMT loyalty and its relationship to organisational
outcomes. It commences with a discussion of the seasons of tenure which is the key theory
underpinning this attribute. This is then followed by a critique of the upper echelons theory
and the service profit chain.
2.5.1 Seasons of Tenure
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) proposed a lifecycle in the form of the seasons of CEO
tenure. The different seasons give rise to different patterns of attention, behaviour and firm
performance under the individual executive. The authors referred to a study undertaken
by Eitzen and Yetman (1972), where they studied college basketball coaches and the
relationship between the tenure of the coach and team performance. The findings suggested
that the longer the coaching period the better the team performance however after an
average period of 13 years the team performance steadily declined.
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) provide 5 stages of the CEO’s tenure, from commencement
to departure, in the seasons of tenure theory. They further argued that a CEO’s peak
performance will be in the ‘Convergence’ stage and during the ‘Experimentation’ stage,
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depending on earlier success, a CEO may undertake actions significantly different to the
mandate they received on commencement.
Hoskisson et al. (2017) highlight that executive tenure is the most studied attribute of
executives within risk-taking literature (Boeker 1997; Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991;
Hambrick et al. 1993; Miller 1991) i.e. long-tenure executives take fewer risks as they are
reluctant to make changes with the exception where tenure increases innovation (Kimberley
and Evanisko, 1981).
Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) primarily focussed on the CEO but argue that the theory
may be applied to other managerial positions in general. The key elements of this theory
are that the CEO’s paradigm is based on two elements i.e. the pre-existing knowledge
that the manager brings and their toolkit. In addition, another key element of the theory is
the conditions within the firm on the executive’s entry. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991)
argue that the CEO’s commitment to their paradigm, task knowledge, information diversity,
task interest and power evolves over their tenure which gives distinction to the seasons
proposed in the theory.
The five seasons proposed by the theory are Response to Mandate, Experimentation,
Selection of an Enduring Theme, Convergence and Dysfunction.
Fig. 2.4 The Five Seasons of CEO Tenure (Source: Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991)
As portrayed in Fig. 2.4, the seasons would commence with responding to a mandate given
by the board of directors or the predecessor, following which a season of experimentation
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may commence after gaining a strong political foothold. In the third stage, the executive
reflects on the first two seasons and selects the themes that work best or most comfortable
following which a period of actions is initiated to support and converge on the theme.
Finally, the positive effects of the executives continuing tenure are outweighed by the
negative effects. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) propose that CEOs whose tenure spans
all five seasons will experience their peak performance at some intermediate point and
performance very early and very late will be lower. A CEO’s tenure that does not span
all the five seasons may avoid a downturn or the curvilinear relationship to performance
may not be seen. In addition, the authors propose that the longer the tenure the stronger
the association between executive background attributes and attributes of the organisation
(significance to upper echelons theory) and the greater the executive’s discretion the greater
the manifestation of the seasons.
2.5.2 Upper Echelons Theory
The Upper Echelons Theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) is a key strategy theory that
links firm behaviour and performance with management attributes. The origins of which
can be traced back to the behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick (2007) argue that human limitations influence
management perception, evaluation and decisions relating to problems and therefore
influencing their choices and behaviour. These human limitations are accessing, processing
and using information (Holmes et al. 2011). This shows how deeply rooted this theory is to
the Behavioural Theory of the Firm. Sutton (1987) explains that management decisions are
based on their perceptions of reality ("construed reality") rather than on the "real" situation
as they apply their own value and cognitive base to a situation. This notion that managers
bring their own values and the cognitive base was proposed by March and Simon (1958)
which is the starting point of the Upper Echelons theory. This was further supported by
Dutton et al. (1983) who suggested that managers "cognitive maps" help them view a
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situation acting as a lens, hence they "construct, rearrange, single out, and demolish many
’objective features of their surroundings" (Weick, 1979:164).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) explain the Upper Echelons theory through the perceptual
model of strategic choice presented in Fig. 2.5. They argue that the manager’s perception
of the situation is influenced by their cognitive base and values. This results in a limited
field of vision of the situation further resulting in selective perception and interpretation.
Therefore, the strategic choice available to the manager is limited by their perception of
the situation.
Fig. 2.5 Perceptual Model of Strategic Choice (Source: Hambrick and Mason, 1984)
The behavioural theory of the firm (Cyert and March, 1963) states that choices made
by TMTs are not always following a rational motive but are increasingly influenced
by limitations of the TMTs as human beings. This is the basis of the upper echelons
theory. The strategic choices that TMTs make are influenced by their ‘behavioural factors’
which in turns impacts a firm’s performance. Managers have a complex psychological
dimension in their personalities as all humans and Hambrick and Mason (1984) and
Hambrick (2007) suggest that demographic attributes can be used as measures for these.
The organisational demography approach acknowledges the existence of intervening
variables between demographic composition and organisational outcomes, however, it is
not considered necessary to explore these, as they are mostly mental processes, which are
difficult to assess and measure reliably (Pfeffer, 1983: 351). Hambrick and Mason (1984)
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combined the strategic choice and organisational demography perspective to develop the
upper echelons theory.
Organisational demography is widely used in upper echelons research due to the difficulty
accessing psychological dimensions and their actual behaviour (Daily et al., 2003; Ham-
brick and Mason, 1984; Pettigrew, 1992). Studies have focused on the relationship between
demographics and organisational outcomes such as strategy and performance (Finkelstein
et al., 1996; 2009) and dispersion of group over specified categories are preferred as a
measure for demography than central tendencies, such as mean or median (Blau,1977;
Pfeffer, 1983). Wang et al. (2016) argue that due to the nature of the variables used in prior
upper echelons theory, research has provided mixed empirical findings.
Early empirical research has focused on TMT attributes heterogeneity (such as age, func-
tional track, career experiences, education etc.) and firm’s competitive behaviour (Ham-
brick et al., 1996), level of diversification (Michel and Hambrick, 1992), innovativeness
(Bantel and Jackson, 1989), Corporate Strategic Change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) and
performance (Michel and Hambrick, 1992; Murray, 1989; Norburn and Birley, 1988).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue a new emphasis for organisational research highlighting
the dominant grouping of TMT of an organisation. They view the firm’s outcomes as
reflections of the value and cognitive base of its ’actors’. They further argue that the upper
echelons theory would provide a greater probability to predict organisational outcomes,
support selecting and developing upper echelons and help predict a competitor’s moves
and counter moves. Hall (1980) argued that large organisations run themselves and are
flooded with events that drive their progress (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Hambrick and
Mason (1984) view organisational outcomes as reflections of the values and cognitive
bases of powerful actors within the organisation. The upper Echelons Theory states that
executive experiences, values and personalities affect their decisions (Hambrick, 2007).
Numerous studies have found support for the "upper echelons perspective" i.e. the re-
lationship between executive attributes and complex business problems (Dearborn and
Simon, 1958), organisational innovation (Hage and Dewar, 1973), structure (Miller and
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Tolouse, 1986), strategy (Boeker, 1989), subsequent company growth (Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1990) and effectiveness in implementing specific types of strategy (Gupta
and Govindarajan, 1984).
2.5.3 Service Profit Chain
The Service Profit Chain is a theoretical concept about how service companies make money
by linking employee, customer satisfaction and financial performance (Loveman, 1998).
The theory argues that employee and customer loyalty are primary drivers of profitability
rather than coming at the expense of profitability. It is further argued that this link is not
exclusive to service companies but non-service companies as well. The service profit chain
theory is a theory based on multiple disciplines with an application by many management
teams. The theory, as portrayed in Fig. 2.6, argues that internal service quality has a
link with employee satisfaction, which in turn has a link with employee loyalty. This
equates to external service quality which has a link with customer satisfaction further
linking with customer loyalty. All of which links together to influence, revenue, growth
and profitability.
Fig. 2.6 The Service Profit Chain (Source: Loveman, 1998)
This theory can be traced back to the work of Reichheld and Sasser’s (1990) work on
customer satisfaction and loyalty. Reichheld (1996) argues against the conclusion that
market share is the main factor impacting profit and instead argued that customer loyalty
is the main factor impacting profitability. Reichheld and Sasser (1990) and Schlesinger
and Heskett (1991) further argued on the linking between employee outcomes, customer
outcomes and financial results.
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Heskett et al. (1994) provide detail on the links in the service-profit chain by analysing
cases of service organisations at each individual stage. They identify that at an automobile
dealer’s the sales loss was as much as $36,000 monthly as a result of replacing a sales
representative with five to eight years of experience with someone with less than one year
experience. This was also seen at a brokerage firm where the cumulative losses of replacing
a broker were almost $2.5 million in commission as it usually took, a broker, 5 years to
rebuild relationships. This led to Heskett et al. (1994) concluding that employee loyalty
drives productivity.
Bowen and Schneider do agree that high-performing employees are more likely to lead to
external service quality through a positive service experience. Thus employee satisfaction
is associated with higher retention (Harrison et al., 2006). However, the Service Profit
Chain has been criticised for placing emphasis on employee satisfaction (Bowen and
Schneider, 2014) as employee satisfaction does not explain performance or customer expe-
rience. Kamakura et al. (2002) highlight the cost effects of this that would in turn reduce
profitability and Homburg et al. (2009) argue that there is a limit to improving customer
satisfaction. Hogreve et al. (2017) further indicate the need to integrate complementary
pathways to the Service Profit Chain framework and challenge the implicit rationale that
firms should always maximise employee satisfaction, external service quality to improve
firm performance.
2.5.4 Hypothesis linked to TMT loyaly
Hypothesis 2 There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of
firm financial distress
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2.6 Theoretical perspective for TMT Effectiveness
This section reviews theories relating to TMT loyalty and its relationship to organisational
outcomes. It commences with a discussion of the Resource Based View and Knowledge
Based View which is the key theory underpinning this attribute. This is then followed by a
critique of the stakeholder theory and social identity theory.
2.6.1 Resource Based View
The Resource Based View (RBV) of a firm is a theory that explains the competitive nature
of firms. It revolves around the manner in which firms utilise the set of tangible and
intangible resources at their disposal to produce goods/services to compete with each
other. Barney (1991) proposed that in order for firm’s resources to hold potential for a
sustained competitive advantage they must have the following attributes: (a) valuable, (b)
rare, (c) imperfectly imitable and (d) non-substitutable (VRIN). These resources need to
be non-homogenous and not perfectly mobile. If all the firms within a sector have the
same resource, then it is not possible for a firm to gain a sustained competitive advantage.
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988), mention the benefit gained by the so-called ‘first
movers’, i.e. a firm that makes the first move is able to gain a competitive advantage
compared to firms with similar resources. However, for a firm to be a ‘first mover’ it should
have prior knowledge and the opportunity to utilise the resources before other firms which
in itself is a resource (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney 1991). Alternatively, competing firms
would seek to erode another firm superior resources and capabilities through poaching,
imitation, replication or substitution (Sudarsanam, p63, 2012).
Fig. 2.7 presents the resources available to a firm under the RBV as defined by Sudarsanam
(2012). Tangible assets consist of plant, equipment, land and natural resources, raw
materials, semi-finished goods, waste products and by-products, and stock of finished
foods (Penrose, 1959). Human Resources in a firm are unskilled and skilled labour, clerical,
administrative, financial, legal, technical, and managerial staff (Penrose, 1959).
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Fig. 2.7 Firm Resources (Source: Sudarsanam, 2012)
Sudarsanam (2012) further defines the organisational capabilities, presented in Fig. 2.8,
available to a firm that allows it to gain a sustained competitive advantage.
Fig. 2.8 Organisational Capabilities (Source: Sudarsanam, 2012)
Penrose (1959) states that for some purposes human resources can be treated as tangible
assets, for example, some employees may be part of a substantial investment in the firm and
it may suffer a capital loss if such employees leave. Barney (1991) classified the numerous
resources into three categories as proposed by previous researchers: physical capital
resources (Williamson, 1975), human capital resources (Becker, 1964) and organisational
capital resources (Tomer, 1987). The focus here is on the human capital resources which he
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describes as the training, experience, judgement, intelligence, relationships and insight of
individual managers and employees. Becker (1962) whilst focusing on on-the-job training,
then further classified human capital into specific and general human capital. Teixeira
(2014) in a review of Becker’s work highlights that general human capital (training)
increased the productivity of the employee in other firms and therefore the firm would
pass this cost on to the employee. Whereas specific human capital (training)increased the
productivity of the employee more for in the firm providing it and hence the firm would be
willing to support this cost.
The TMT of a firm is one of the many resources that firms use to gain competitive advantage.
Arguably, the TMT is the only resource to implement the most suitable combination of
resources for a firm to gain a competitive advantage. As a human resource, the attributes
of the TMT of a firm are likely going to be dissimilar to other firms making them a
firm-specific, durable and scarce resource. The more a resource has these three attributes
the more valuable it is to the firm (Amit and Schoemaker, 1993).
". . . it is never resources themselves that are ’inputs’ in the production process, but only the
services that the resources can render. The services yielded by resources are a function of
the way in which they are used - exactly the same resource when used for different purposes
or in different ways and in combination with different types or amounts of other resources
provides a different service or set of services." (Penrose, 1959:25)
This quote by Penrose highlights that for resources to provide a service valuable to a firm
it is important to yield the right service from the resource, on its own, in combination and
this service may need to change over time. The identification and utilisation of the services
valuable to the firm depend on the strategizing by the TMT. Priem and Butler (2001) found
that RBV did not appear to meet the criteria to be a theory for strategic management. An
industry/sector where theories such as the RBV are adopted widely are not operating on
their efficient frontier and hence careful consideration needs to be given to this (Ryall,
1998).
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The RBV assumes that firm’s resources are heterogeneous to the firm and not easily trans-
ferable to another firm (Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) classified these firm resources into
three broad categories: ‘Physical’ (technology or plant and equipment); ‘Organisational’
(planning, reporting and coordinating systems); and ‘Human’ (knowledge, experience and
relationships). In order for a firm to have a sustained competitive advantage, it should
employ a value-enhancing strategy that is not being adopted or cannot be replicated by an
existing or potential competitor (Barney,1991).
Daft and Lengel (1983) defined firm’s resources as "all assets, capabilities, organisational
processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge. . . that enable the firm to conceive
of and implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness". Amit and
Schoemaker (1993:35), further differentiated capabilities from resources as "a firm’s
capacity to deploy resources." Firms may have similar resources but what helps them
differentiate themselves from competitors is the manner in which these resources are then
utilised within the production process. Lin and Wu (2014) further studied the dynamic
capabilities of resources in the resources based view and explored the relationship of
different resources, dynamic capabilities and firm performance. They argued that dynamic
capabilities can lead to a firms VRIN resources to improve firm performance.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) developed the Resources Dependence Theory based on the key
argument that the TMT can provide the firm with key resources. They stated that “when
an organisation appoints an individual to a board, it expects the individual will come to
support the organisation, will concern himself with its problems, will variably present
it to others, and will try to aid it” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978, pg. 173). Non-executive
directors can be viewed as a Valuable, Rare, Inimitable and Non-transferrable resource in
their differing roles within the firm. They can be a valuable source of expertise, in terms of
specific skills and provide advice and counsel in relation to firm strategy. Non-executive
directors can provide contacts, information and relationships to support the management
of the environmental uncertainties. Also, some individuals are able to increase reputation
and perceived legitimacy of TMT in their role as a symbolic resource.
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Roberts and Young (2005) highlight the relationship between Resource Dependence theory
and the life-cycle of the firm i.e. a young firm will look to its non-executive directors for
skill and expertise compared to a newly listed firm where the value of the non-executive
director is beyond skills and includes reputation and networks that provide access to
new markets or sources of finance. The authors also state that a more mature business
where the non-executive directors provide relevant market and managerial experience (past
experience) compared to formal independence. The resource dependence theory focuses on
the TMT as providers of access to resources for the firm through their existing relationships
within the external environment (Hillman et al., 2000).
The theory emphasises the relevance of outside directors as a means of gaining access
to those resources available through the director (Johnson et al., 1996). Firms require
access to a range of resources to function, perform and survive (Daily et al., 2003) and
these resources can be in the form of but not limited to information, skills, access to
suppliers, buyers, public policy makers, social groups and provide legitimacy (Hillman
et al., 2000). Abdullah and Valentine (2009) categorises the TMT into four categories:
Insiders (current and former executives of the firm), Business Experts (Current/Former
senior executives of other larger firms), Support Specialists (lawyers, bankers, insurance
company representatives, PR experts etc.) and Community Influentials (political leaders,
university faculty, members of clergy, leaders of social or community organisations etc.).
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) explained the relationship between the external resources of
organizations and the behaviour of the organization through the Resource Dependence The-
ory. They state, “...to understand the behaviour of an organization you must understand the
context of the behaviour – that is, the ecology of the organisations...” (Peffer and Salancik,
1978:1). The theory is integral in explaining why firms engage in mergers and acquisitions,
Pfeffer (1976) suggested three reasons for firms engaging in Mergers and Acquisitions:
to reduce competition by absorbing a key competitor, to manage interdependence with
sources of input or purchasers of output by absorbing them and diversify operations to
lessen dependence on the absorbed firm. Research on boards of directors has also involved
the use of the theory although not as much as the agency theory. However, Hillman et al.
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(2000) in a review of the Resource Dependence Theory, find that empirical evidence has
suggested the theory to be a more successful lens for understanding boards than the agency
theory.
Pfeffer (1972) found a relationship between the board size and the firm’s environmental
needs and firms with greater interdependence require a higher ratio of outside directors.
Sanders and Carpenter (1998) further provided evidence to support the findings and
concluded that board size depended on the firm’s level of internationalisation. Pearce and
Zahra (1992) however advocate that board composition and size are also contingent on
the firm’s current strategy and prior financial performance. Boyd (1990) further add that
board size can be a hindrance and suggested that “resource-rich” directors should be the
focus of board composition. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) suggest directors provide four
benefits: advice and counsel, channels of information between the firm and environmental
contingencies, preferential access to resources and legitimacy.
2.6.2 Knowledge Based View
The Knowledge Based View of the firm is an extension of the Resource Based View
where Knowledge is the most strategically significant resource of a firm (Grant, 1996;
Hill and Deeds, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 1999; Sveiby, 2001; Huizing and Bouman, 2002;
Balogun and Jenkins, 2003). Because Knowledge based resources are usually difficult to
imitate and socially complex, it makes it a major determinant of sustained competitive
advantage and superior corporate performance. This theory assumes that organisations
are heterogeneously loaded with knowledge (Hoskisson et al., 1999) and that the resource
base of the firm consists mainly of knowledge based assets (Roos et al., 1997; Stewart
and Capital, 1997; Sveiby, 2001; Marr, 2004). Kogut and Zander (1992) and Spender
(1996) stated that organisations exist to create, transfer and transform knowledge into a
competitive advantage.
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Chen et al. (2017) provide a framework combining scientific knowledge resources, techno-
logical capabilities and innovative performance and find that scientific knowledge influence
innovative performance through the impact of technological capability. Cabrera-Suárez et
al. (2018) develop their 2001 model for family-run firms where the successor acquires the
predecessor’s knowledge and skills to maintain and improve organisational performance.
The authors argue that the successor must undertake an effective knowledge construction
process which is influenced by building on their prior knowledge. Martin-de-Castro et al
(2011) argue that firms are giving increasing importance to knowledge and intellectual
assets when they face competition recognising that the effective implementation of these
resources as production factors can help maintain a competitive advantage (Galende, 2006).
2.6.3 Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder theory challenges the agency theory as it argues that a company should
be managed in the interest of all its stakeholders. The theory suggests that there are
stakeholders beyond shareholders that have a direct interest (employees, suppliers and
customers) and indirect interests (local communities, the environment and society) in the
firm’s performance. One of the key arguments against the stakeholder theory is that it
is hard to operationalise the proportion of interest for each of the key stakeholders and
on occasions where executives were responsible to all key stakeholders they would be
accountable to none.
Abdullah and Valentine (2009), state that the stakeholder theory is not so much a theory but
a broad research tradition that incorporates philosophy, ethics, political theory, economics,
law and organisational science. The stakeholder theory is different from the agency
theory as it revolves around the relationships of the TMT with a range of stakeholders
of the organisation as opposed to the relationship between the manager and shareholder.
Donaldson and Preston (1995) show the wider range of stakeholders that have a relationship
with the firm in Fig. 2.9. The importance of the broad range of relationships was argued
as being more important than the narrow shareholder-manager relationship (Freeman,
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1999). Academics and researchers have argued the relevance of the theory as groups
of stakeholder deserve and require management attention (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004),
stakeholders participate in the organisation to benefit (Donaldson and Preston, 1995) and
the purpose of the organisation is to create wealth for all its stakeholders (Clarkson, 1995).
The theory is criticised for the impact of the large network of relationships on the decision-
making process of the management (Freeman, 1984) and no sets of interest (from different
stakeholders) are assumed to dominate (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
Fig. 2.9 The Stakeholder model (Source: Donaldson and Preston, 1995)
Coase (1937) described the nature of a firm as a middleman that is created to reduce
transaction costs between the consumers and the suppliers of inputs. This is supported
by many scholars and Cornell and Shapiro (1987), highlight that from this perspective, a
firm’s claimants go beyond stockholders and bondholders to include all stakeholders i.e.
suppliers, customers, providers of complementary services and products, distributors and
employees.
Academics have discussed and debated issues revolving around the costs associated with
financial distress as these affect all stakeholders. Opler and Titman (1994) suggest that
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financial distress is seen as costly because it creates a tendency for firms to do things that
are not in the best interest of the stakeholders and these tendencies arise due to the conflict
of interest between borrowers and lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Stulz,
1990), between firms and their non-financial stakeholders and managers (Baxter, 1967;
Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1990) and between shareholders and managers
(Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993).
The Stakeholder theory suggests that the costs of financial distress are likely to be more
than the direct shortage of cash as it would make it difficult for a firm to sell implicit
claims. Cornell and Shapiro (1987) focussed on the distinction between explicit contracts
and implicit claims and how this would influence the financial policy of most firms i.e. if
only explicit contracts are considered then the stakeholder will not play an important role
in the financial policy of most firms whereas the prices stakeholders pay for implicit claims
depends on the condition of the firm, including its financial policy. Later some scholars
argued that financial distress can improve firm value by forcing managers to make difficult
value maximising choices which they would otherwise avoid (Jensen, 1989; Wruck,1990).
Jensen (2017) argues that the stakeholder theory leaves managers with a theory that makes
it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions and makes them unaccountable for
their actions. He argues that the theory does not identify how the necessary trade-offs
between different stakeholder interest should be made.
Opler and Titman (1994) in their study found that highly leveraged firms lose market
share to their less leveraged counterparts in industry downturns and suggested the losses
were customer-driven, competitor driven or manager driven. The evidence indicating
manager driven losses supported the prior study by indicating that more leveraged firms
were quicker to efficiently downsize in response to the industry downturn. But this could
simply be due to the fact that a highly leveraged firm is required to make higher amounts
of interest payments and in order to continue operating need to ensure quick availability of
payments. The performance of a firm during financial distress can also be highly impacted
by the number of creditors and its relationship with its creditors. Hoshi et al. (1990) found
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that financial distress is costlier when the claims are spread among many creditors and
a financially distressed firm performs better than other financially distressed firms if its
financial structure makes it relatively easier to renegotiate its liabilities.
Coase (1937) described the nature of a firm as a middleman that is created to reduce
transaction costs between the consumers and the suppliers of inputs. This is supported
by many scholars and Cornell and Shapiro (1987), highlight that from this perspective
a firm’s claimants go beyond stockholders and bondholders to include all stakeholders
i.e. suppliers, customers, providers of complementary services and products, distributors
and employees. Academics have discussed and debated issues revolving around the costs
associated with financial distress as these affect all stakeholders. Opler and Titman (1994)
suggest that financial distress is seen as costly because it creates a tendency for firms to do
things that are not in the best interest of the stakeholders and these tendencies arise due to
the conflict of interest between borrowers and lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers,
1977; Stulz, 1990), between firms and their non-financial stakeholders and managers
(Baxter, 1967; Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and Titman, 1990) and between shareholders
and managers (Gilson and Vetsuypens, 1993).
2.6.4 Social Identity Theory
Social Psychology deals with human relations and interactions by focusing on individuals
(Gergen and Gergen, 1986). Social Identity Theory (Turner, 1982) and Social Categorisa-
tion Theory (Tajfel, 1979; Tajfel, 1981; Turner et al., 1987) state that based on personal
and social identity individuals strive towards pride and self-esteem. Social Identity theory
states that people categorise others into groups to differentiate between in groups and out
groups based on observable attributes such as age, race etc. (Veltrop et al., 2015). The
theory also suggests that individuals further classify themselves based on the organisation
they work for which influences the individual’s self-concept (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).
Social Categorisation Theory further states that people view in group individuals positively
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and out-group individuals negatively (Goethals, 2003) creating discrimination (Eiser, 1986)
leading to a negative effect on team functioning and performance.
The central focus of the theory is that individuals in a group will identify negative aspects
of individuals out of a group, thus enhancing their self-image. Tajfel (1979) argued that
stereotyping is part of normal cognitive processing and the tendency is to group things
together. By grouping things together individuals exaggerate the difference between and
similarities within groups. Turban and Greening (1997) argued, underpinning on the
social identity theory and signalling theory, that a firm’s corporate social performance is
positively related to their reputation and attractiveness as an employer. Thus, allowing
firms to attract applicants and giving them a competitive advantage. Carmelli et al. (2017)
contributed to social identity theory by finding that identification within an organisation is
a key socio-psychological mechanism.
Veltrop et al (2015) underpin their research on outside director task involvement and
outside director tenure using the social identity theory. Ashforth et al. (2008) and Ashforth
and Mael (1989) show that individuals that strongly identify with their organisation are
highly motivated to contribute to the success of that organisation.
2.6.5 Hypotheses linked to TMT effectiveness
Hypothesis 3a There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3b There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the likelihood of firm financial distress
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2.7 UK Corporate Governance
A number of large UK public company failures in the late 1980s resulting from large-scale
fraud by their directors led to a decline in public confidence in the existing financial
reporting and auditing processes. This, in turn, led to an increasing demand for efficient
and consistent corporate governance systems within the UK and the formation of the
Cadbury Committee. The UK Corporate Governance code (summary of the key principles
of the code is presented in appendix A.1) today has been influenced by a number of
recommendations put forward by a range of committees over the years reflecting the need
to develop the ‘code’ as firms and its directors develop. The 1998 combined code was
a combination of the accepted principals of the Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995) and
Hampel (1998) committees, these were then further influenced by the Turnbull, Higgs
and Smith reports to give us the new combined code (revised in 2003, 2005, 2006, 2008,
2010, 2011, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018). The UK corporate governance code (main
principles listed in the appendix) is a principal based approach rather than rules-based
approach (Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) in the US). Therefore, giving the freedom to the directors
to ‘comply’ in their own way as best suited to the firm or ‘explain’ to their shareholders
if they fail to implement the principles of the code. The SOX is a law that applies to all
companies listed on the US stock exchange, this includes foreign companies and therefore
has an impact on UK firms listed on the US stock exchange.
Whilst the revision in 2016 focussed on the changes needed for the implementation of
the EU Audit Regulation and Directive the revision in 2014 focussed on the quality of
information and the remuneration section. The 2014 revision focussed on the design of
executive remuneration in order to promote the long-term success of the company and to
demonstrate how this is being achieved to shareholders. Another key recent revision to
the corporate governance code was in 2012 where the focus was on better reporting by
Audit committees, confirmation by the board that the annual report and accounts are fair,
balanced and understandable and most importantly the companies report on their policies
on boardroom diversity.
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2.7.1 Stewardship Code
The responsibility of stewardship within a public limited company is shared by the board
of the company and the investors in the company. The Board oversees the tasks carried
out by the management and the investors play an important role in holding the board
accountable for the fulfilment of its responsibilities. The UK Corporate governance
code outlines principles in order to have an effective board and the UK Stewardship
Code sets out principles of effective stewardship by investors. The code originated from
‘The Responsibilities of Institutional Shareholders and Agents: Statement of Principles’
published by the Institutional Shareholders Committee (ISC) in 2002. In 2010 the first
version of the stewardship code was published by the FRC which very closely mirrored
the ISC code. This code is also applied on a ‘comply or explain’ basis as it is not a rigid
set of rules but principles and guidance. Below is a brief summary of the key principles of
the code, Institutional Investors should:
1. Publicly disclose how they will discharge their stewardship responsibilities
2. Have a robust policy to manage conflicts of interest and publicly disclose any
3. Monitor their companies
4. Establish clear guidelines to escalate their stewardship activities
5. Be willing to act collectively with other investors
6. Have a clear policy on voting and disclosure of voting activity
7. Report periodically on their stewardship and voting activities
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2.8 Conclusion
This chapter reviewed key theories used in TMT research and critiqued them using theories
from other disciplines to develop a theoretical framework. This framework identified three
broad categories of TMT attributes namely: Motivation, Loyalty and Effectiveness. The
theoretical framework utilised the Behavioural theory of the firm as the key underpinning
theory for this research. The framework identified the Agency theory as the key theory
for executive motivation which is critiqued in the light of the entrenchment theory and the
stewardship theory. Seasons of tenure is identified as the key theory for TMT loyalty which
is critiqued using the upper echelons theory and service profit chain. The Resource Based
View and the Knowledge based view are identified as the key theories for TMT effectiveness
which is critiqued through the understanding of stakeholder theory and the social identity
theory. The chapter provides a link between these theories and the development of the
hypotheses under each characteristic. Some other key theories reviewed in this study are
presented in appendix A.2. These links and how the hypotheses further develop through
the review of empirical literature is now discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Literature Review
3.1 Introduction
There is little research on the relationship between management attributes and firm default
risk. Significant accounting scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, have brought firm
default risk into the more public light. The few studies linking Top Management Team
(TMT) attributes and financial distress showed some interesting results. This chapter starts
by reviewing background on TMT research, followed by a focus on the literature on the
development of the role of the CEO and the role of the TMT. The chapter then reviews the
literature on the relationship between Corporate Governance and Credit risk followed by a
critical review of the relationship between TMT and Financial Distress. The focus is then
on reviewing literature within the context of the TMT framework introduced in the earlier
chapter i.e. within Executive motivation, TMT loyalty and TMT Effectiveness. Finally, the
chapter focusses on critically reviewing corporate default prediction models and the UK
Corporate Insolvency regime.
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3.2 UK Corporate Insolvency
Since the recent global financial crisis (2007-08), the UK economy has witnessed a large
number of companies undergo business failure, file for administration and become bankrupt.
This is clear from Fig. 3.1 showing an increase in the number of corporate insolvencies
in England and Wales from 2007 to 2012. The figures in appendix B, Fig. B.1, Fig. B.2
and Fig. B.3 provides some further evidence. These companies are no longer able to
honour their loan commitments and hence have to start looking at restructuring, workouts
or liquidation. The crisis has provided the economy with a consistent number of failures,
if not increased the supply.
Fig. 3.1 Annual Company Liquidations in England and Wales (Source: The Insolvency Service,
2014)
According to the R3 Association of Business Recovery Professionals (2008:3), in the UK
corporate insolvency is legally defined as follows:
"A company is insolvent (unable to pay its debts) if it either does not have enough assets
to cover its debts (i.e. the value of assets is less than the amount of liabilities) or if it is
unable to pay its debts as they fall due."
Statistics showing corporate insolvencies in the calendar year 2013 in England and Wales,
published by the Insolvency Service, show that there were 14,982 compulsory liquidations
and creditors voluntary liquidations in total. This was made up of 3,624 compulsory
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liquidations and 11,358 creditors voluntary liquidations. Additionally, there were 3,859
other corporate insolvencies, comprising 917 receiverships, 2,365 administrations and 577
company voluntary arrangements.
Fig. 3.2 also shows that in the 12 months ending Q3 2013, the highest number of total
liquidations was in the construction sector followed by the wholesale and retail trade sector.
This could be explained as the after effect of the global financial crisis that started in
2008. In order to analyse liquidation under different sectors some further work needs to be
undertaken to adjust these figures based on the total number of companies liquidated under
each sector compared against the total number of companies in each sector.
Fig. 3.2 Number of Liquidations by Sector in Q3 2013 (Source: The Insolvency Service, 2014)
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Historically, regulatory and legal decisions have had a great impact on distressed debt
hinting towards a strong relationship between the two. An example of this was The
Enterprise Act 2002, which provided stronger regulatory support for the reorganisation of
companies rather than liquidation. This resulted in an increase in opportunities to manage
(distressed) debt.
There are various arrangements under which a company may choose to restructure, a few
examples: Chapter 11 in the USA, London approach (administration/CVA) in the UK
and in Japan the Hausbank model (the company’s main banker assumes responsibility for
putting in place a rescue package). In the UK secondary trading of distressed corporate
debt is a fairly recent phenomenon, which provided lenders with the option to sell their
holding if they did not wish to participate in a restructuring. Kent (1997) noted that banks
wanted the Bank of England to ban distressed debt trading for good or at least during
restructuring when it initially arrived in the UK.
Insolvency theorists such as Rasmussen (1992) and Schwartz (1998) in the past have
argued against insolvency laws mandatorily imposing particular collective procedures on
insolvent companies and suggested that companies should be free to contract ex-ante over
how control rights will be allocated in the event of default. But this theory was strongly
criticised by other scholars and LoPucki (1999) highlighted the scope this would give
to concentrated lenders, like banks, to pursue their own interest at the expense of other
stakeholders. In particular, critics are concerned that such a model may tend to result in
outcomes biased against the continuation of insolvent companies and towards piecemeal
liquidation, thus consistently failing to capture going concern value (Armour et al, 2008).
The Cork (1982) report highlighted the importance of a good modern corporate insolvency
law in order to provide the means to preserve viable commercial enterprises capable
of making a contribution to the economy essentially leading to the introduction of the
Insolvency Act 1986. The introduction of this Act was expected to reduce the number of
companies going into liquidation by allowing them to enter administration. But Armour
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et al. (2008) pointed out that the Insolvency Act 1986 was structurally biased towards
concentrated lenders holding floating charge securities i.e. banks.
A study carried out by Liu and Wilson (2002), to analyse the impacts of the 1986 Insolvency
Act on corporate failure rates, showed that whilst there was a decrease in the number of
companies going into bankruptcy in the first few years the impact did not persist from a
long-term point of view, pointing to the one time change in law levelling off over a period
of time. They suggested alternative approaches (to insolvency laws) to reduce corporate
failure i.e. by controlling interest rates and inflation. But this levelling off could also
be due to the findings provided by Cuthbertson and Hudson (1996) i.e. higher level of
start-ups eventually leads to higher level of company liquidations.
The Enterprise Act 2002, aimed further to improve the prospects of corporate rescue and
make the formal rescue procedures fairer and more cost effective. Armour et al (2008)
in their study on the impact of the Enterprise Act 2002 on corporate insolvency provided
evidence that both gross realizations and direct costs were higher under the streamlined
administration procedure than under receivership. Simply implying that concentrated
creditor control of corporate insolvency (as in receivership) may be no worse for unsecured
creditors than control by dispersed creditors (as in administration) due to the costs being
controlled less effectively.
3.2.1 Creditors and Bank
A comparative study of US and UK corporate insolvency codes (Franks et al., 1996) found
that corporate insolvency codes should remain essentially creditor controlled, the objective
of corporate insolvency should be the maximisation of the value of the assets of a firm
for the benefit of all its creditors and some consideration should be given to improving
the possibility of a workout. Critics such as Adler (2004), argues that increased creditor
control destroys corporate value and frequently forces entities to liquidate. But a study
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by Harner (2008) found that increased creditor control promotes efficiency in corporate
reorganisations.
The main objective of the US Bankruptcy code and UK corporate insolvency code as
described by Franks et al. (1996) is whilst the former is to maintain the business as a going
concern even if that reduces the proceeds available to creditors the later aims at repayment
of creditor claims. Under the UK code, the distressed firm comes under the control of an
Insolvency practitioner who represents the interest of creditors. An insolvent firm may
have both secured and unsecured creditors (also commonly known as trade creditors but
there can be exceptions).
Many banks and debt funds are becoming major equity holders of corporates they previ-
ously were creditors to, due to corporates making debt to equity swaps as they are unable to
meet their debt obligations (Euromoney,2009). This leads to heavily regulated institutions
(banks, mutual funds etc.) wanting to offload the security, either before the swap or after, to
remain within the regulatory requirements i.e. the likes of the Basel III or the U.S. Volcker
Rule (Schultze, 2012).
Different corporate insolvency codes are tackled in different manners and this was noted
by Davydenko and Franks (2008). Their findings showed that banks adjusted their lending
and reorganisation practices to mitigate costly aspects of bankruptcy, but bank recovery
rates in default remained sharply different across the sample countries. This reflected
the different levels of creditor protection provided by the individual country corporate
insolvency codes.
Objectives of Banks and Distressed Debt Investors as creditors are quite different and
impact the distressed firm in differing manners. Franks et al. (1996) noted the problem
with control rights when creditors have different incentives they keep the firm as a going
concern and concluded that the UK code widely gave rise to ’inefficient liquidations’. A
study by Franks and Sussman (2000a), found that 75% of companies survive through the
corporate insolvency process in some form of a going concern but on many occasions,
banks either encourage or force them to restructure.
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3.2.2 Unsecured Creditors
The Insolvency Service defines unsecured creditors as ". . . creditors who are not secured
and do not have preferential status. . . ", although a preferential creditor who does not hold
a security, in the strictest definition, can be classed as an unsecured creditor but for the
purpose of this research they will be kept separately.
Fig. 3.3 Average Debt owed to different creditor groups (Source: Companies House, 2014)
The unsecured creditor group in the UK is a very important source of finance for businesses
and the economy as a whole. This can be seen in the above Fig. 3.3, however, Fig. 3.4
below shows how little their average recovery rate is. In a study carried out by the OFT
(2010), some unsecured creditors suggested they would extend more credit if their recovery
rate from corporate insolvencies increased. The report also suggested that the current
system of regulation is considered inconsistent and ineffective by a significant number of
Insolvency Practitioners due to the harm that is caused to the unsecured creditors.
Fig. 3.4 Average recovery rate for different creditor groups (Source: Companies House, 2014)
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3.2.3 Other Stakeholders
When a company becomes insolvent the shareholders have everything to lose and nothing
to win and maybe the culture of maximisation of shareholder wealth in return has led to the
management of companies not being keen to accept insolvency. It was noted in a study by
Franks and Sussman (2000a), that bankruptcy is considered as an option of last resort by
management. So when should a company’s primary objective change from ’maximisation
of shareholder wealth’ to ’maximisation of creditor wealth’. This conflict has given rise to
what Harner et al. (2014) call the ’Ostrich Syndrome’. They noted that management of
troubled companies often bury their heads in sands until it is too late to remedy. But is
this syndrome a result of the management trying all possible options to work towards its
primary goal of shareholder wealth maximisation? This could also possibly be a conflict
between the agency theory and the stakeholder theory i.e. when should the managers
work towards the interest of the shareholders and when should they shift their focus to
other stakeholder interest. Armour et al. (2008) noted that advocates of strong control
rights for secured creditors point to the benefits that a single, concentrated lender holding
all-encompassing security can bring to the governance of companies and in many ways
help reduce the agency problem as this creditor will directly control the mangers.
3.3 Background on TMT research
Nielsen (2009) undertook a review of empirical research on TMT diversity. Early TMT
research was dominated by organisational demography approach (Pfeffer,1983, pg302) and
primarily focussed on TMT demographics and various organisational outcomes. Pfeffer
(1985) claimed that the distribution of the firm’s demographics (age and tenure) could
significantly affect its functioning. Cannella et al. (2008) claimed that prior studies on
TMT functional diversity and firm performance provided inconsistent results; hence, they
studied the relationship between TMT diversity and firm performance for 207 U.S. firms
from 11 different industries. Nielsen (2009) identified that studies on TMT demographics
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and firm performance found a positive relationship (Barsade et al. 2000; Carpenter, 2002),
a negative relationship (Michel and Hambrick, 1992) and non-significant relationship
(Ferrier, 2001; West and Schwenk, 1996).
There have been various studies investigating different management attributes and their
relationship with the performance of a firm (Steinbach et al. 2016), such as the negative
relationship between the probability of management turnover with firm performance and
with stock returns (Kim, 1996; Warner et al., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Coughlan and
Schmidt, 1985). Performance of firms has been analysed using market-based measures
(Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007; Gregory, 1997; Agrawal et al. 1992) and accounting-based
measures (Dickerson et al., 1997). Early upper echelons theory provided inconclusive
results whether a more homogenous or heterogeneous team affected firm performance
(Sun et al., 2016; Finkelstein et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 1992). Hambrick and Mason (1984)
suggest that managers observable demographic attributes can be used as proxies for more
complex psychological dimensions of their personality. Early empirical research focussed
on firm’s competitive behaviour (Hambrick et al. 1996), level of Diversification (Michel
and Hambrick, 1992), innovativeness, (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) corporate strategic
change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), and firm performance (Michel and Hambrick, 1992;
Murray, 1989; Norburn and Birley, 1988) which did not reach conclusive findings with
regards to TMT composition and firm performance.
TMT have mostly been defined as top executives of the firm (Finkelstein and Hambrick,
1996; Hambrick, 1994). Pitcher and Smith (2001) found that actual decision-making
may not always lie with the top executives of the firm, which was supported by Roberto
(2003) who argued that the TMT composition changed with the decision-making situation.
However, Jackson (1992) argues that the TMT should only include individuals who are
actually involved in decision making which may not include some executives and instead
include managers and experts from other levels within the organisation. Pettigrew (1992)
further highlighted that inconsistency in findings may be due to inconsistent definitions
and size of TMTs.
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This has led to emerging studies focussing on board influence on firm’s strategic decisions
(Rindova, 1999; Goodstein et al., 1994; Hillman et al., 2000; Judge and Zeithaml, 1992).
It is rare for studies to include both the TMT and board of directors (Jensen and Zajac,
2004; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996) with the exception of entrepreneurial literature
which has seen this research develop more actively.
Some studies have assumed that different demographic and other attributes (sex, age,
tenure etc.) have uniform effects (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick and Mason,
1984), which was criticised by Jackson (1992) who stated that it is important to focus on
these attributes at an individual level. This is also supported by group effectiveness and
group diversity theories which conclude that the effects of individual dimensions should
be studied separately. This was further criticised by Jackson et al. (2003) who stated that
studying these attributes at an individual level assumes that the effects of each type of
attribute are independent of the presence of other attributes (Jackson and Joshi, 2004).
Based on these arguments and later findings, Carpenter et al. (2004) concluded that future
research should consider multiple dimensions of TMT diversity simultaneously when
studying firm-level decisions and behaviours.
3.4 Role of the CEO and the TMT
Early corporate executives gained considerable power economically and politically as
regulation was lax and corruption was rife (Josephson 1962, pp,347-58). This was followed
by the emergence of financial institutions as leaders in the US business community (Kotz,
1978; Moody, 1920) and further power within the hands of key executives such as J.P.
Morgan who played a major role in ending the financial crisis of 1907 (Yue, 2015). These
leaders were succeeded by their family or hand-picked successors who had the power but
not the individual stature of their predecessors (Bertrand, 2009). The further increase of
these firms in size led to the founding families increasingly finding it difficult to maintain
majority ownership or key minority ownership in the business leading to the separation
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of ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1991). Executive tenure was long and CEO
firing was rare(Herman, 1981). A study by Lieberson and O’Connor (1972), concluded
that factors outside the control of leaders have much more of an effect on the organisational
performance than the leadership has.
Useem (1993, pp. 20-21) highlights that declining firm performance in the early 1980s
could no longer be attributed to excessive regulation or overly assertive unions and the cases
were looked more inward towards management. The poor firm performance was attributed
to entrenched managers who failed to pursue shareholder objectives and the solution was
for shareholders to assert their authority. Manne (1965), a legal scholar, argued that a
firms share price is a reflection of the firm’s management skills and if a firm share price is
weak compared to peers it is by definition poorly managed. He further argued that these
managers should be replaced to increase firm’s share price, which was further developed
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who argued that owners should align the objectives of the
executives with their own and this should be done by aligning executive compensation
with firm share price/performance. Corporate logic viewed firm executives as autonomous
professionals’ agency logic viewed them as mere "hired hands" (Khurana, 2010). During
the 1980s, an increasing number of acquisitions, due to a change in regulation, of which
a majority were hostile acquisitions changed the corporate structure in the US and the
environment of the existing firm executives.
CEOs and managers were developing as celebrities popular to the larger public and in-
vestors. This led to firms searching for corporate saviours when recruiting CEO candidates
and increasingly looking outside the firm. Khurana (2002b) found that between 1980
and 1996, 27% of CEO appointments went to outsiders, which was double the rate in the
1970s (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004) and by 2000 this was nearly 50% of large public
companies. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) found that narcissistic CEOs experienced
greater fluctuations in performance presumably due to their efforts to take bold actions
that attract attention.
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Corporate CEOs play a very important role in developed societies; however, there is little
sociological research on this topic. Prior to the 1980s corporate executives were hardly
studied and most of the focus since then had been on executive tenure, the role of executives
on firm performance and executive compensation. Corporate CEOs today are compensated
at levels far beyond their predecessors; however, they experience less autonomy and more
scrutiny from boards and investors than their processors. Mizruchi and Marshall (2016)
argue that today’s CEOs are able to gain favours for their firms but are less capable of
acting collectively on issues that require collective solutions. Their research focuses on
US corporate executives as most of the work by sociologists has focussed on US firms,
however, some of the best work on corporate governance has been comparative research
between different corporate governance regimes.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue under the upper echelons theory that top executives
affect firm outcomes. An event study by Johnson et al. (1985) found a positive abnormal
return after the death of a founder CEO and negative abnormal return after the death of a
non-founder CEO. Bennedsen et al. (2006) found that the death of a CEO or relative of a
CEO reduced firm operating performance. Executives have empire-building preferences
(Baumol, 1959; Williamson, 1964) which could lead to poorly controlled managers and
which could increase the firm size beyond that which is optimal for shareholders. Hicks
(1935) argued that entrenched managers are likely going to prefer an easier life and
would avoid difficult decisions. This view was supported by Bertrand and Mullainathan
(1999, 2003) who found that there was little evidence of an increase in firm size after the
introduction of antitakeover legislation, i.e. empire building, however, they found patterns
of investment and divestment that are suggestive of the quiet life.
Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) categorised CEOs into rational and overconfident
groups due to them not diversifying their personal portfolios by selling the company’s
shares and exercising options "in the money". They found that CEOs held on to "in the
money" options beyond the vesting period and also often bought company shares rather
than sell. The researchers found overconfident CEOs were unwilling to issue new shares (as
they felt the company was undervalued) and used internal resources to finance new projects.
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They also found that CEOs categorised as overconfident were more likely to undertake
merger at any point in time and stock markets reacted negatively to announcements by
such CEOs. One argument towards using CEO personal portfolio for this categorisation
is that they may have access to private information which is why they are not exercising
the options or purchasing more shares. However, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) did
not find any abnormal returns for CEOs who hold too much equity in their firms. Another
measure for CEO overconfidence was the use of media portrayal of the CEO either as
"confident/optimistic" or "cautious/conservative".
Bertrand (2009) argued that a broader profile of those who will eventually become CEOs
is still needed. Are CEOs made or born? Oyer (2006) found that MBA graduates in a stock
market boom are more likely to begin their career and continue working on the Wall Street
many years after graduating. Are there specific personality traits related to becoming a
corporate leader? The role played by overconfidence and charisma, the process through
which boards select CEOs, how boards measure, identify and evaluate "talent", the role
of third parties such as media analyst. Bertrand (2009) argues that a change in researcher
attention to outside the US to various European countries should be undertaken.
3.5 Determinants of Default
Whitaker (1999) undertook a study to examine the early stages of financial distress and the
causes of firm financial distress. According to Wruck (1990), firms enter financial distress
due to economic distress, industry decline or incumbent management. Their research
agreed with Jensen (1989) i.e. financial distress forces management to deploy efficiency
enhancing actions which in return improves firm performance. However, well-managed
firms entering financial distress due to industry decline or economic distress would not
benefit from the corrective action. The author found poor management to be the most
significant cause for a firm to enter financial distress. In addition, he also found that firm
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performance declines sharply in the distressed year and then has a significant recovery in
the following year, however still remaining below pre distress levels.
Gonzalez-Aguado and Moral-Benito (2013), a US study, found four variables key in
predicting corporate default, the standard deviation of firm stock return, the ratio of
working capital to total assets, the ratio of retained earnings to total assets and the ratio
of total liabilities to total assets. Memba and Job (2013) identified a number of causes of
financial distress within companies which is presented in Fig. 3.5.
Fig. 3.5 Causes of Financial Distress (Source: Memba and Job, 2013)
The top seven (Most Significant) causes in Fig. 3.5 could easily be related to management
decisions showing the strong relationship between financial distress and the TMT of a firm.
Memba and Job (2013) further identified the effects of Financial Distress presented in Fig.
3.6.
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Fig. 3.6 Items Likely to be affected by financial distress (Source: Memba and Job, 2013)
The Fig. 3.6 shows some important impacts of financial distress and at the top of the
list is Management turnover/Management replacement. This strongly suggests that the
responsibility and impact of financial distress lie with the TMT. This indicates that the
TMT should help a financially distressed firm perform better (relative to another financially
distressed firm). Research shows that firms facing financial distress not only had a higher
probability of management turnover but there is an improvement in the firm’s performance
after a change in the TMT which in turn increases value. This was supported by the
findings of Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson et al. (2004), who found a substantial
improvement in firm performance after the TMT was replaced following a poor firm
performance. Assessing performance with the probability of default or default risk, Ting
(2011) found that the risk of default was higher prior to TMT turnover and lower than
other firms after the replacement.
There is research associating management turnover with fraud and the probability of firm
default. Sun and Zhang (2006) found that firms associated with fraud have higher manage-
ment turnover than a matched sample of non-fraud firms. This could be down to managers
of firms facing financial distress are likely to undertake accounting misrepresentation
to show the firm in a better light. A study of financially distressed firms showed that
the majority of the firms with TMT turnover were either in default on debt or declared
bankrupt. (Gilson, 1989 and Ofek, 1993).
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A majority of these studies only focused on financially distressed, bankrupt or fraudulent
firms. For stakeholders, it is more important to be able to accurately predict the probability
of non-financially distressed, bankrupt or fraudulent firms to default. And although there
are well-established measures for the measurement of the default its relationship with the
TMT is not clear.
Armour et al. (2008) noted that advocates of strong control rights for secured creditors
point to the benefits that a single, concentrated lender holding all-encompassing security
can bring to the governance of companies and in many ways help reduce the agency
problem as this creditor will directly control the mangers. Jacobs et al (2010b), found that
larger firms with higher liquidity and more secured debt in their capital structure are more
likely to follow a public resolution process whilst firms with a higher Z score and more
total leverage are less likely to follow a public resolution and attempt to resolve distress
privately. The Fig. 3.7 below further highlights some of the financial distress latent factors
and there is clear emphasis gained by the Finance factor, decisions relating to this are made
directly by the CFO and at position 2 is the Management Factor. The management factor
here is in its broadest sense across the organisation however, there is clear indication that
this is intensified at the C-suite.
Fig. 3.7 Latent Factors for Financial Distress identified by Memba and Job (2013)
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Memba and Job (2013), found that the most significant causes of financial distress in Kenya
were an improper capital decisions, the inadequacy of capital, access to credit, shortage of
skilled manpower, poor accounting records and poor internal management. They identified
the Finance factor as the main cause of financial distress in comparison to Management,
Accounting System, Policy Changes and Liquidity factors. Jahur and Quadir (2012), found
that the common causes of financial distress and business failure are often a complicated
mixture of problems and symptoms. The most significant cause in young companies is
capital inadequacy where the business did not start with sufficient capital. In addition,
they found that the probability that innovation will drive a firm to financial distress is high
especially where the competitor introduces innovative and competitive products.
Kallunki and Pyykko (2013), found that CEO’s and Director’s past personal default entries
increased the likelihood of the future financial distress of the firm in Finland. Kilborn
(2005) and Sullivan et al (1999) reported some personal traits that play an important role
in consumer’s over-indebtedness and credit default. These personal traits which could
play a role in the executive’s personal default also impact the organisation as the executive
carries the personal trait to work. Managerial traits such as overconfidence, over-optimism
and illusion of control were found to account for incorrect strategic decisions (Roll, 1986;
Malmendier and Tate, 2005; and Hackbarth, 2008). They also found that these personal
traits resulted in the bad managerial decision, which led to declining financial ratios
and then resulted in financial distress. The authors further claim that their results show
traditional Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models should include person related risk
attributes of the TMT. However, the authors recognise that there is a possibility for reverse
causality i.e. firms anticipating declining future prospects may appoint managers with
personal traits, which are also reflected in their payment default entries.
It was found that firms in financial distress usually did not prepare for TMT succession
(Galloway and Jones, 2006). Zwaig and Pickett (2001) highlighted the importance of
managerial and operation signals as indicators of financial health. They found that many
profitable businesses were in trouble due to the rapid expansion of a formidable competitor.
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Bottazzi et al (2010), undertook a study to investigate the relevance of financial and
economic variables as determinants of default in Italian firms. The findings show that firms
experiencing default are more financially exposed, less productive and less profitable in all
the years studied prior to default. The findings also show a positive relationship between
size and growth with default. The authors conclude that it is possible to distinguish between
firms to default and non-defaulting using non-financial variables. It is fair to assume that
financial factors should be able to, a major extent, accurately predict the probability of
default especially when the event is approaching closer in time. However, the authors
highlight two key limitations of the Distance to Default (a market-based probability of
default prediction model) model even though it is appealing theoretically. Firstly, the
computation of the measure in practice is quite complicated and secondly, Distance to
Default applies to publicly traded firms only, as it is based on the market value of equity.
Grunert et al. (2005), proposed an “augmented” version of a standard financial model
of default prediction using German firms, which also includes two “soft” non-financial
attributes (managerial quality and market position) among the regressors. The authors
find that the combined use of financial and non-financial factors leads to a more accurate
explanation of current and future default events than the single use of either one of the
factors.
Non-Financial variables = Management Quality and Market Position
In the broader sense, some further variables related to the likelihood of default have also
been studied. Sun and Cui (2014), undertook a study to examine the relationship through
which Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) helps firms reduce the risk of falling into
default. The findings show that there is a strong negative relationship between CSR and the
default risk of a firm. Jacobson et al. (2011), a Swedish study, examined the relationship
between macroeconomic fluctuations and probability of corporate defaults. The study
included both listed and private firms which the authors claim to provide results more
significant than ‘Merton-like’ models that are limited to listed firms. The findings of the
research show that a model with financial ratios augmented with macroeconomic factors is
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superior to models that exclude macro information. They further review key articles on
predicting corporate default and identify the key features of their research design which
is presented in Fig. 3.8. This summary shows that a majority of these articles included
profitability and leverage ratios in predicting corporate default.
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3.6 Corporate Governance and Credit Risk
Schultz et al. (2017), an Australian study, investigate the relationship between corporate
governance and the probability of default. The authors believe that studies exploring this
relationship face one of three key concerns. They claim that studies (e.g. Lee and Yeh,
2004; Chen 2008; Aldamen et al, 2012; Platt and Platt, 2012; Brédart, 2013, 2014) that
focus on firms that have failed as opposed to the likelihood of failure suffer from sample
selection bias. They also claim that there are studies (e.g. Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al, 2006; Elbannan, 2009) that incorporate the likelihood of failure
but fail to differentiate between firms and there are studies (e.g. Switzer and Wang, 2013a,
2013b) that do not employ econometric techniques that take account of all three endogeneity
concerns identified by Wintoki et al (2012). Their research overcomes these problems by
incorporating Merton’s (1974) probability of default model and the Generalised Method of
Moments (‘GMM’) econometric methodology. The authors find significant relationships,
similar to prior studies, between the probability of default and executive pay, board
structure and ownership structure using ordinary least squares regression and fixed-effects
panel. However, none of these significant relationships remains when the GMM approach
is employed. Concluding that there is not sufficient evidence to back a one-size-fits-
all approach to corporate governance. Their research focused on three broad corporate
governance mechanisms: board structure, remuneration and ownership structure.
Switzer et al. (2018), a US study, focussed on the relationship between default risk and
corporate governance using a sample of 117 financial firms outside North America. The
research used a 5-year CDS spread and the Black-Scholes-Merton type 5-year default
probability as calculated and reported by the Bloomberg database to measure the default
risk of the firms. In addition, the following five variables were used to measure the firm’s
governance mechanism: institutional ownership, insider ownership, board independence,
board size and CEO duality. The results showed that institutional ownership is negatively
related to the probability of default whereas insider ownership is positively related to
the probability of default, therefore pointing to the benefit of monitoring managers by
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institutional investors. In addition, they also find that CEO duality is associated with higher
default probabilities.
Switzer and Wang (2013a), a US study, explored the relationship between the credit risk
of financial and non-financial firms and their corporate governance structures. The study
used Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads as a measure for the firm’s likelihood of default
and found that governance attributes have different effects across firm types. The authors
found that board independence has a greater impact on financial firms than on industrial
firms and ownership structure is more important for industrial firms than financial firms.
The research also concludes that increased CEO ownership, for industrial firms, below
40% is associated with an increased likelihood of default and increased CEO ownership
above 40% is associated with a decreased likelihood of default. This the authors claim is in
agreement with the entrenchment theory as at lower levels of ownership the CEO interests
are more aligned with shareholders than bondholders. However, for financial firms CEO
ownership is associated with lower default probabilities only when the CEO has a large
shareholding.
Switzer and Wang (2013b) undertook a study of US commercial and savings banks to
explore the relationship between the credit risk and corporate governance structures of
the banks. The study in particular focussed on this relationship from the perspective of
the bank’s creditors. The authors used the following variables to measure governance
quality: board size, board independence, the separation between CEO and Chairman,
Institutional Ownership, Insider holdings and directors with CEO positions in private and
public organisations. The research found that corporate governance mechanisms affect
commercial banks more than savings institutions. For commercial banks larger boards,
more independent boards, lower ownership by institutional investors and older CFOs are
associated significantly with lower probabilities of default.
Adusei et al. (2014), a study of Ghana banks, investigate the predictors of the probability
of default in the universal banking sector. The authors use the argument provided by
Hassan and Sackley, (1994) and Corsetti et al., (1998) who highlighted that changes in
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the external variables in the financial markets, regulations and economic conditions affect
bank risk using the external variables theory. On the other hand, is the internal variables
theory which puts forward the argument that internal variables are key determinants for
the probability of default (Berger and DeYoung, 1997; and Angbazo, 1997).
Adusei et al. (2014) use the resource dependence theory, agency theory and stewardship
theory to hypothesise the relationship between a range of TMT attributes and bank default
risk. The findings of the research suggest that bank capital has no relationship to bank
credit risk and the model suggested, shows that leverage, asset size, loan loss provision,
board size, board independence, and the number of executives provide a strong predictor
for bank credit risks in Ghana. The resource dependence theory and agency theory argue
for the presence of independent directors. Researchers argue that outside directors provide
a firm with an important link to the external environment and access to resources and
information (Burt, 1983; Sutton and Callahan, 1987).
Daily and Dalton (1994), a US study, examined the relationship between various gover-
nance structures and corporate bankruptcy. Specifically, the authors examine the board
composition (ratio of independent directors to total directors) and CEO Duality. The
authors used the sample of firms used by Altman (1983) and used four indicators to assess
TMT quality, namely the total number of corporate directorships by board members;
total number of non-corporate directorships; number of CEO or Chairpersons on board;
and educational prestige i.e. undergraduate or graduate degrees from elite institutions
(Finkelstein, 1992). The findings showed that bankrupt firms had more dual structures
and more affiliated directors. However, prior to this, Chaganti et al. (1985) found no
relationship between board composition and bankruptcy in a study of 21 retail companies.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992), argued that dominant CEOs (ratio of CEO remuneration
to other directors) are more likely to be associated with bankruptcy than weaker CEOs.
One important thing to note is the different measures of board composition used in many
studies which could lead to very different results. Baysinger et al. (1991) and Goodstein
and Boeker (1991) used the ratio of inside directors to total directors. Alternatively, other
approaches are: the ratio of outside directors to total directors; a director who is not in
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direct employment of the firm (Kesner and Johnson, 1990a, 1990b; Kesner et al., 1986;
Singh and Harianto, 1989a, 1989b); and, independent-interdependent distinction (Wade et
al., 1990; Boeker, 1992).
The significant of corporate failure research and its relationship to the TMT is also key
to strategy research. “the reason why firms succeed or fail is perhaps the central question
in strategy” (Porter, 1991:95). Some of this key research was undertaken by D’Aveni
(1990), Fizel and Louie (1990), Gilson (1989,1990), Gilson and Vetsuypens, (1993) and
Wruck (1990). These papers focussed on the extent to which the officers and directors of a
bankrupt firm are likely to resign or to be replaced. Bonnier and Bruner (1989) explored
the reactions of investors to announced executive changes of bankrupt firms.
Corporate Governance argued in favour of separating the role of the CEO and Chairman to
ensure there is no power concentration at the top level of the firm. Anderson and Anthony
(1986) argued against separating the role of CEO and Chairperson as it would lead to con-
fusion within the organisation and in relationships with boards. However, the concentration
of the power would ensure there is no ambiguity in leadership or responsibility.
3.7 TMT and Financial Distress
Hambrick and D’aveni (1992), undertook a study of 57 bankruptcies and 57 matched cor-
porate survivors and examined the TMT attributes associated with major corporate failure.
They found that failing firms show significant annual, or cross-sectional, divergence from
survivors on several indicators of TMT composition but also those divergences become
more pronounced, even accelerated, over the last five years of the bankrupts lives. They
suggest that team deficiencies bring about or aggravate corporate deterioration, either
through strategic errors or stakeholder uneasiness with the flawed team and corporate dete-
rioration brings about team deterioration, through a combination of voluntary departures,
scapegoating and limited resources for attracting new executive talent. The study used the
following variables to study TMT attributes: Team size, outside directors, core function,
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expertise, team compensation, average firm tenure, firm tenure heterogeneity and CEO
Dominance. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) recommend that further study into the escape
from a downward spiral should be undertaken to answer, “Is there no escape from the
downward spiral?”
Organisational failure or bankruptcy has been viewed as a downward spiral i.e. as a
weakness develops there is a tendency for additional problems to occur (Staw et al., 1981;
Whetten, 1980; Starbuck et al., 1978). Hambrick and D’Aveni (1988) found that in a
sample of large bankruptcies, financial weakness signs (compared to matched survivors)
were present up to 10 years prior to failing and during these years the authors found that the
firms engaged in behaviour that only aggravated the conditions. Whetten (1980) argued that
managers behave erratically under stress and failure induces failure. Hambrick and D’Aveni
(1992) provide an alternative to the downward spiral and suggest that one possibility is
the composition of the TMT team of a failing organisation and their divergence from
the composition of the TMT team of a successful organisation. Numerous studies have
found support for the "upper echelons perspective" i.e. the relationship between executive
attributes and complex business problems (Dearborn and Simon, 1958), organisational
innovation (Hage and Dewar, 1973), structure (Miller and Toulouse, 1986), strategy
(Boeker, 1989), subsequent company growth (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) and
effectiveness in implementing specific types of strategy (Gupta and Govindarajan, 1984).
TMT’s of bankrupt firms have been found to be deficient in autocracy, to have uninvolved
board of directors, and weak finance expertise (Argenti, 1976). Miller and Friesen (1977)
studied the attributes of successful and unsuccessful businesses using cases and articles
and found two of the four unsuccessful firms to have power-hoarding CEOs and one a very
weak CEO.
Shahab et al. (2018) found that TMT gender diversity, foreign exposure and political
connection for Chinese firms had a moderating effect on financial distress. Hambrick
and D’Aveni (1992) examined the TMT attributes of 57 large corporate bankruptcies
and 57 matched corporate survivors. The failing firms showed a significant divergence
from surviving firms on several indicators of TMT attributes and these divergences were
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more pronounced and accelerating over the last five years of bankrupt firms lives. The
authors propose a two-way process is in play: (1) team deficiencies aggravate deterio-
ration either through errors or stakeholder lack of trust in the team; and (2) corporate
deterioration bring about team deterioration i.e. voluntary departures, scapegoating and
lack of resources to attract executive talent.
Fig. 3.9 The "Vicious Circle" of TMT Divergence and Poor Performance (Source: Hambrick and
D’Aveni, 1992)
Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggested an alternative possibility of the relationship between
TMT attributes and performance namely that the TMT deficiencies become visible to
stakeholders (suppliers, customers and creditors) causing them to restrict their support to
the organisation. Ashforth and Gibbs (1990) highlight that the stakeholders get uneasy
with a TMT that is not ’normal’ and may search for partners that are more conventional.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue that if TMT composition diverges from healthy firms
then two forces may contribute to poor organisational performance as shown in the Fig.
3.9 above namely strategic errors and stakeholder withdrawal. Arora( 2016) highlights
the relevance of independent directors to firms, the author finds that financially linked
independent directors enable firms to re-emerge from bankruptcy in the U.S.
75
3.7. TMT and Financial Distress
The counter-argument, to TMT deficiencies, lead to organisational decline, is that poor
firm performance causes TMTs to diverge from that of healthy firms. Researchers have
recognised that financially declining firms have limited resource, difficulty competing with
existing pay norms, to attract and retain executives (Hambrick and D’Aveni, 1988; Altman,
1983). In addition, as financial health declines, executive turnover is seen to increase which
heightens the likelihood of deterioration of the team (Wagner et al., 1984). The increase
in turnover is aligned to the more talented executives leaving for better pay and access to
resources (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1988; Hirschman, 1970) and some leaving to avoid
the stigma of being linked to a failed firm (Sutton and Callahan, 1987). In additions, firms
try to change the composition of the team when struggling with performance to bring in
more financial and cost-saving skills and less marketing and operational skills (Whitney,
1998).
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue that the two arguments, i.e. TMT composition impacts
firm performance and firm decline impact TMT composition, are not mutually exclusive.
They identify two major classes of TMT attributes: (1) Team resources - team size, outside
directors, functional expertise and team compensation (2) Team social structure - average
tenure, tenure heterogeneity and CEO dominance
They liken TMT size with that of a sports team size and argue that a sports team is at a
disadvantage if it has fewer than the number of allowed players. Steiner (1972) argued
that team size has a positive association with effectiveness for divisible and additive
tasks, which Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue is an apt characterisation of TMT work.
Goodman et al. (1986) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between group size and
effectiveness and found that small and large team sizes had their disadvantages. This is
why an expected relationship cannot be predicted. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used
the number of executives, with a title vice president and above, as a measure of team
size. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) found that CEO Dominance (t-5, t-4 and t-3) was
significantly higher for bankrupt firms, the average tenure was significantly shorter for
bankrupt firms and there were no differences in team heterogeneity. In addition, the team
compensation was substantially lower (from t-4) for bankrupt firms, the percentage of the
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team with core function was lower in the bankrupt firms and the failing firms had smaller
teams with fewer outside directors.
Argenti (1976), a UK study of bankruptcies, found TMT deficiencies such as autocracy,
the uninvolved board of directors, and weak finance expertise. Miller and Friesen (1977)
studied the attributes of successful and unsuccessful businesses using cases and articles
and found two of the four unsuccessful firms to have power-hoarding CEOs and one a very
weak CEO.
3.8 Empirical Evidence relating to Executive Motivation
This section critiques the empirical evidence from the prior literature on executive moti-
vation. It provides evidence on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation specifically exploring
the relationship between executive compensation and executive motivation. The section
commences by analysing the much-debated developments in executive compensation,
followed by evidence on its relationship with firm outcomes and specifically failing firms.
This section is then concluded by defining how executive motivation is operationalised
within this study and how the hypotheses of this study are further developed.
3.8.1 Development of Executive Compensation
Much of the research on CEO compensation has been US focussed due to the extreme
changes in CEO pay in the US and the availability of data. Conducting research on
executive compensation over a very long period would be extensively time-consuming due
to having to hand collect historical data on a company by company and year by year basis.
Frydman and Saks (2007) undertook research on approximately 100 publicly traded firms
with the largest value of total sales between 1936 and 1991 and hand collected the data
on executive salary, bonus and long-term incentive payments, stock options and excluded
pensions and other perks. They found that initially (the early 1950s) the pay declined,
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followed by a slow increase (1950s to 1970s) and only after the 1970s saw a sharp increase
in pay. They also found that the growth of CEO pay was significantly more rapid than the
other top-paid executives. Stock-options played a huge role in the sharp increase however
cash remuneration was also found to have tripled since 1970 (Murphy and Zaobjnik, 2004).
Frydman and Saks (2010) show that TMT executive compensation remained steady be-
tween 1940 and early 1970s and then showed a sharp upward trend more than quadrupling
between 1980 and 2000. DiPrete et al. (2010) found that between 1993 and 2005 real total
CEO compensation more than doubled. This increase in compensation was attributable to
market forces (Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Khurana, 2002b) and higher demand for more
generic skills rather than firm-specific skills from CEO candidates. As the competition, for
external candidates become intense this drove the compensation levels further.
It has been noted that CEO pay could be linked to the managerial power hypothesis (Be-
bchuck and Fried, 2005a, 2005b) or the rent extraction view. The hypothesis states that
some members of the board (even if some members have significant ownership of the firm)
prefer to work for the CEO rather than the shareholder. Shivdasani and Yermack (1999)
found that CEOs were able to influence the board appointment process i.e. firms where the
CEO was part of the nominations committee appointed fewer independent directors. Core
et al. (1999) found greater CEO compensation where the CEO was involved in the nomina-
tions committee and large decrease in CEO compensation where legislation (e.g. Sarbanes
Oxley) required majority independent directors to serve on the board (Chhaochharia and
Grinstein, 2009). In addition, the role of external consultants in the pay-setting process
was also studied. Jensen et al. (2004) identified external consultants were more likely to
recommend CEO pleasing compensation to get more lucrative companywide business as
these consultants are retained by the company management and not the remunerations
committee.
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) argue that CEOs may have always been interested in ex-
tracting rents, therefore, this view does not provide clear evidence for the sharp increase
in compensation evidenced post-1970. In addition, as corporate governance improved
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(Holmstrom and Kaplan, 2001; Hermalin, 2005) the influence of the CEO on the board
should have reduced and therefore their capability to extract rent should have reduced. One
argument is the relationship between tax laws and stock options which may have triggered
its rapid expansion (Hall and Murphy, 2003).
The agency problem explains this increase in executive pay where part of the pay was
aligned to performance to solve this principal-agent conflict. The argument was that as
the incentive contract exposed executives to the risk they would need to be compensated
for taking on the increased risk through base level compensation. The principal-agent
relationship and its link to increased pay have been criticised for its causal relationship to
CEOs exerting greater effort and their compensation for the additional effort. Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2001) undertook a study of oil companies whose performance is strongly
correlated to oil price. They compared the sensitivity of the CEOs compensation to the
performance of their firm and to the performance of the firm that is only due to fluctuation
in oil prices. They found that these two estimated sensitivities to be statistically the same
clearly against the view of performance related pay. In addition, CEOs are given the
freedom to sell the stock options they are given or hedge their positions negating the
position as laid out by the board.
Murphy and Zabojnik (2004, 2007) and Frydman (2007) argued that as increasingly CEOs
are appointed externally and as the demand has shifted from firm-specific skills to generic
skills the market has played an increasing role in the increase of CEO compensation.
Gabaix and Landier (2008) argue that the best managers should be appointed to the largest
firm in the economy as the managerial talent has a multiplicative effect on firm performance.
Whilst the findings fit the data they collected between 1980 and 2003 it was not a good fit
for the period 1970 -1980 or the pre-1970 period. Jensen (1986) argues how executives
strategically may alter firm size through acquisitions to increase compensation. This was
supported by Harford and Li (2007) who found that large acquisitions were followed by
a large increase in compensation at least one year following acquisition even when the
bidding company stock price declines post-merger (Bliss and Rosen, 2001). This was
further supported beyond just increase in firm size by acquisitions. Bebchuck and Grinstein
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(2005) also found that CEO pay increased as the number of shares or number of employees
increased, however, a reduction in size did not lead to a reduction in pay.
3.8.2 Executive compensation and firm outcomes
Kaplan (2008) found that CEO compensation is linked to firm performance and that the
compensation of athletes and hedge fund managers has increased at a higher rate than that
of CEOs. Sociologists view this high compensation as "rent extraction" by CEOs due to
the information asymmetry and the power they have over boards (Bebchuck and Fried,
2005a, 2005b; Sörensen, 2000).
Gabaix and Landier’s (2008) study found that a sharp increase in CEO compensation
accounted for an increase in stock market valuations. This was interpreted by Bertrand
(2009) and DiPrete et al. (2010) as being consistent with both the rent extraction and
market forces arguments. O’Reilly et al. (1988) further found that there was a positive
association between the pay levels of the executives on the compensation committee and
the CEOs compensation. DiPrete et al. (2010) identified that CEO compensation setting
was as a process of "leapfrogging" in which a CEO’s pay tends to move to the right tail of
the distribution. The authors explain that when setting CEO compensation the committee
uses benchmarking by looking at aspiration peer groups and once this process is put in
place this becomes self-perpetuating. Kim et al. (2015) further found that interlocking
directorships have an impact on CEO compensation rejecting the market-based model.
Critics of the market-based model, however, are reluctant to discount a key claim made
by Kaplan (2008) i.e. today’s CEOs are more vulnerable than their predecessors. CEO
turnover has increased and this has been associated with poor performance. The rise in the
CEO pay has been associated with increased intensity in shareholder monitoring.
MD-Rus et al (2013), a Malaysian study, found that ownership by executive directors,
family or all directors has the expected negative relationship with the likelihood of distress.
They found that Government Linked Indexed companies and Independent directors are not
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significant in explaining distress and ownership by Domestic Private Institutional Investors
is positively significant at 1. They suggested some further research around the subject area
was needed specifically: the effect of directors’ education and qualification on distress;
and the role of the audit committee i.e. the audit committee could foresee the financial
condition of the company.
Tykvová and Borrell (2012) undertook a study investigating the financial distress risk of
European companies around their buyout event. The findings supported the hypothesis that
private equity investors selected companies with lower financial distress risk. In addition,
they found that when buyouts were backed by experienced private equity investors their
bankruptcy rates were even lower than those of comparable non-buyout companies. The
findings also suggested that syndicates were better able to handle financially distressed
companies than stand-alone investors. Finally, companies backed by experienced investors
also had lower bankruptcy rates than companies that were financed by inexperienced
investors. The authors suggested further research analysing the impact of investors types
(i.e. independent private equity, bank related private equity etc.) on the bankruptcy rates,
since different investors differing goals, know-how and governance structures may have
important effects on the way in which they create value in their portfolio companies.
Corporate performance has been commonly studied in strategic management research
(Rumelt et al., 1994) including different level determinants of corporate performance and
differences between corporate and business unit effects (Adner and Helfat, 2003; Bowman
and Helfat, 2001; McGahan and Porter, 1997). Research on firm performance has focussed
on financial/accounting performance measures such as return on assets, return on equity
and return on sales (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993; McNamara, Luce and Tompson,
2002; Keck, 1997; Michel and Hambrick, 1992). Some studies have focussed on single
performance aspects such as firm growth (Peterson et al., 2003; Kor, 2003; Ferrier, 2001;
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1990) or multiple dimensions within a single study such as
stock market and accounting measures (Carpenter,2002) or accounting and growth (Smith
et al., 1994).
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Linking executive compensation to firm performance is a governance mechanism to
mitigate agency problems (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Mecking, 1976; Alchian
and Demsetz, 1972) and studies have found a positive relationship between the level of
CEO and executive compensation and firm performance (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989).
The presence of dominant CEOs has been criticised as the most common factor of an
unsuccessful firm (Miller and Friesen, 1977; Argenti, 1976; Ross and Kami, 1973). Miller
and Friesen (1977) found some of the failing firms had very ’weak CEOs’ which would not
make them dominant by definition. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the ratio of CEO
cash compensation to that of average executive compensation of executives to measure
CEO dominance.
3.8.3 Executive compensation and failing firms
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argued that after controlling for industry and firm size, there
is a relationship between executive calibre and pay (Frank, 1984; Becker, 1964). On the
other hand, it could be argued that failing firms are led by executives who reward themselves
heavily, taking resources from other uses and alienating employees and stakeholders
(Sorge, 1984). Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the total cash compensation paid to all
executives including outside directors as team compensation. In order to get average team
compensation, the authors removed the CEOs compensation and adjusted the compensation
for inflation.
The presence of dominant CEOs has been criticised as the most common factor of an
unsuccessful firm (Miller and Friesen, 1977; Argenti, 1976; Ross and Kami, 1973). Miller
and Friesen (1977) found some of the failing firms had very ’weak CEOs’ which would not
make them dominant by definition. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the ratio of CEO
cash compensation to that of average executive compensation of executives to measure
CEO dominance. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used t-tests for differences in yearly
means, MANOVA statistics for overall differences, logistical regression (LOGIT), and
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calculated 5-year least-squares slopes for each variable for each firm and then examined
the differences in the slopes on the bankrupts and survivors.
Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), a US study using a sample of US and European banks,
investigate the relationship between the probability of bank default and incentive mecha-
nisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses. The analysis of the research shows that as CEO
cash bonuses increase the default risk of the bank decreases. In addition, the authors
find that the risk-reducing effect of the cash bonuses disappears as the bank moves closer
to default. The authors use the Merton’s (1974) distance to default model to measure
bank risk as it has a high correlation (around 80) to the default frequency estimates by
the commercially applied Moody’s Kealhofer Merton Vasicek (KMV) model (Bharath
and Shumway, 2008). The authors conclude that CEO cash bonuses incentivise them to
avoid corporate failure and that payoffs from cash bonus plans are a linear function of firm
performance, therefore not risk-rewarding.
Chen et al. (2014), a UK study, examined the influence of financial distress risk on the level
and structure of executive compensation. In addition, they examine whether institutional
investors, as major shareholders of a firm, engage in determining the compensation of
executives of a firm with financial distress risk. The authors argue that the relationship
between financial distress risk of a firm and executive compensation could be positive or
negative, i.e. firms with a high financial distress risk will find it difficult to appoint new
executives, therefore, requiring the firm to provide a higher compensation to the newly
recruited executive. However, as the financial distress risk of the firm increases major
shareholders and creditors are more likely to increase monitoring and therefore pressurise
the firm to reduce the compensation of executives (Gilson, 1990). The authors also seek
to answer the question ‘Do firms offer a lower fraction of equity-based compensation if
they have high financial distress risk?’ (Chen et al., 2014; pg 5). The findings show that
financial distress risk has a significant negative relationship with the level of executive
compensation and that there is a negative relationship between financial distress risk and
the fraction of equity-based compensation. The research also provides evidence to support
the argument that institutional block holder concentration has a significant negative impact
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on executive compensation. In addition, they find that foreign institutional block holder
has a bigger negative relationship than domestic institutional block holders. The study
employs three measures of financial distress risk, first based on Black and Scholes (1973)
and Merton (1974), second a discrete time hazard model by Chava and Jarrow (2004) and
third the Altman (1968) Z-score model.
Aggarwal et al (2011) find that poor performing CEOs are more likely to be terminated
from firms with higher institutional ownership. Hence, Croci et al (2012) and Fernandes et
al (2012) find that executives are more likely to demand a higher risk premium at firms
with higher institutional investors. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) find that incumbent
management incurs significant personal losses when their firms are financially distressed.
Researchers have recognised that financially declining firms have limited resource, diffi-
cult competing with existing pay norms, to attract and retain executives (Hambrick and
D’Aveni, 1988; Altman, 1983). The increase in turnover for failing firms is aligned to the
more talented executives leaving for better pay and access to resources (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1988; Hirschman, 1970) and some leaving to avoid the stigma of being linked
to a failed firm (Sutton and Callahan, 1987).
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argued that after controlling for industry and firm size, there
is a relationship between executive calibre and pay (Frank, 1984; Becker, 1964). On the
other hand, it could be argued that failing firms are led by executives who reward themselves
heavily, taking resources from other uses and alienating employees and stakeholders
(Sorge, 1984). Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the total cash compensation paid to all
executives including outside directors as team compensation. In order to get average team
compensation, the authors removed the CEOs compensation and adjusted the compensation
for inflation.
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3.8.4 Operationalising Executive motivation
Jensen and Murphy (1990) argued that executive pay sensitive to firm performance might
reduce the agency conflict that exists within the firm. Cable and Vermeulen (2016) highlight
that it is not unusual for executives to receive 60-80% of their salary as bonuses however
research on incentive and motivation does not clearly identify why such a large amount
of their compensation would need to be variable. Ariely et al. (2009) found that the
higher the reward, the more productive people were on routine jobs and variable pay
can substantially enhance people’s performance. Cable and Vermeulen (2016), however,
argue that a top managers task is not a routine one and use the research by using research
undertaken by Kanfer and Ackerman (1989). The authors undertook a lab experiment on
Air Force personnel and found that when required to land a certain number of planes their
effectiveness did not increase when learning was required however on routine tasks where
learning was not required performance goals worked well.
Seijts et al. (2004) reviewed the literature on goal setting and orientation and concluded
that employees performed better when they framed their goals on learning rather than
around performance outcomes. Motivating CEOs through stock options could be counter-
productive. Harris and Bromiley (2007) undertook a study on the influence of executive
compensation and firm performance on financial misrepresentation. They found em-
pirical evidence to support the hypothesis that TMT incentive compensation and poor
organisational performance relative to aspirations increase the likelihood of financial
misrepresentation. The emphasis here is on ‘relative to aspirations’ which acts as a mo-
tivational factor to achieve the targets that reward. Peng and Roell (2007) found that
incentive pay for executives increased the probability of securities class litigation and gave
executives incentives to focus excessively on the short-term share price. Wowak et al.
(2014) undertook a study on the effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product
safety problems and found evidence to show that share options and incentive payments
promote a lack of caution in CEOs that leads to a higher rate of product safety problems.
Research on goal setting and ethical behaviour found that people with unmet goals are
more motivated to engage in unethical behaviour (Schweitzer et al., 2004).
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Executive salary, bonus, remuneration or compensation have been used in several TMTs
and corporate governance studies. Schultz et al. (2017) use remuneration as one of the
three broad types (board structure, remuneration and ownership structure) of internal
corporate governance mechanisms in their study of board attributes and the likelihood of
firm default. Corporate governance and default literature have commonly used the fixed
pay (salary) and variable pay (bonus, share options etc.) for executives, non-executives
or both in their study of corporate governance variables (e.g. Schultz et al., 2017; Cao
et al., 2015; Platt and Platt, 2012; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Ortiz-Molina, 2006). Jensen
and Murphy (1990) use CEO salary and bonus to assess the change in CEO wealth in
relation to shareholder wealth. Wright et al. (2007) use salary, options, and common
stock holdings of the TMT (CEO and next four highest paid executives) to analyse the
influence of these incentives on firm risk-taking. Mehran (1995) uses percentage of total
compensation in salary and bonus to study executive compensation structure and firm
performance. Carpenter and Sanders (2004) used a natural log of the sum of all forms of
compensation granted to the top four non-CEO executives in one year to study the effect
of TMT team pay and MNC performance. Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) used CEO cash
compensation and CEO ownership of stock options and common stock to analyse the
relationship between CEO compensation and firms facing financial distress. Balachandran
et al. (2010), undertook a panel data analysis of 117 financial firms from 1995 to 2008 to
study the role of executive compensation in creating excessive risk-taking.
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3.8.5 Operationalising the hypothesexss linked to Executive motiva-
tion
Hypothesis 1a There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
H1a (i) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
accounting measure for firm financial distress
H1a (ii) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
short-term market measure for firm financial distress
H1a (iii) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
long-term market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 1b There is a negative relationship between executive long-term motivation
and the likelihood of firm financial distress
H1b (i) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the accounting measure for firm financial distress
H1b (ii) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the short-term market measure for firm financial distress
H1b (iii) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the long-term market measure for firm financial distress
3.9 Empirical Evidence relating to TMT Loyalty
This section critiques the empirical evidence from the prior literature on TMT loyalty.
This section starts with a broad overview of TMT demographics and its relationship to
firm outcomes. This is then further narrowed down to TMT background, experiences
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and the firm performance. This empirical review further points towards the link between
TMT tenure and firm outcomes. This section is then concluded by defining how TMT
loyalty is operationalised within this study and how the hypotheses of this study are further
developed.
3.9.1 TMT Demographics and firm outcomes
Rajan and Wulf (2006) studied organisational changes in the US between 1986 and 1999
and found that the number of managers reporting to the CEO has increased over time
pointing to a flatter structure at the top and positions such as the COO were slowly being
eliminated. The move towards an increased demand for generalists skills from CEO
candidates have extended the search for these candidates external to the organisation
(Frydman 2007; Murphy and Zabojnik 2004, 2007).
Khurana (2002a) views the CEO market as not being efficient and argues that a lot of
managerial talent is being wasted. He states that the rise of the business press has meant
that a candidate’s ability to charm journalists and command their attention becomes a
relevant factor to be considered and previous association with a highly reputable firm
drives media admiration. Hence, firms are more likely to be fighting for the same limited
pool of candidates. Kaplan (2008) used a sample of 300 CEO candidates for firms involved
in private equity transactions, to study who gets selected and the successful candidate’s
subsequent performance as stated by the upper echelons theory by Hambrick and Mason
(1984). They found that CEOs who score highly on "softer" skills are associated with
negative subsequent performance. This, therefore, is an area for future research to gain a
better understanding of the process by which boards measure talent and select CEOs.
Under-representation of female CEOs has been documented by various researchers (Bertrand
and Hallock, 2001; Wolfers 2006; Bertrand, 2009). Bertrand and Hallock (2001) studied
the five highest-paid executives in Execucomp’s (S&P 1500) between 1992-1997 and found
that only 2.5% of their sample executives were female and only 0.5% CEO or Chairman
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Positions were held by women. Wolfers (2006) found that in a study, 1992 to 2004, the
number of female CEOs was increasing however it had plateaued in the early 2000s and
only represented 1.3% of the CEOs. Possible explanations have been provided for the
low numbers i.e. participation by women in MBA programmes is a recent phenomenon,
corporate and financial sectors are particularly prone to discriminating against women
(shareholders/boards are willing to sacrifice some profits to avoid promoting women to the
top echelons), male CEOs may prefer to groom other males as their potential successor,
some systematically downward biased beliefs about the ability of female CEOs (Wolfers
2006) and career-family trade-off women face (Bertrand et al., 2008). Wolfers (2006)
found large negative abnormal returns of -3% on average on the announcement of a new
female CEO as compared to a negative abnormal return of -0.5% on announcement of a
new male CEO. This is one area of further research as the recent study on female CEO
performance has not been conclusive due to the small sample of women-led firms.
The relationship between family management and firm performance is not very clear
(Bertrand and Schoar, 2006). Family member CEOs of a family-controlled business have
more incentive to succeed because of higher financial stakes, longer-term views (caring
about inheritance rather than image) (Stein, 1989) and superior business knowledge and
assets including social networks between family members. However, nepotism could lead
to the rejection of talented non-family members leading to the CEO not being the ideal
candidate. This has been supported by findings showing a negative relationship between
family management and firm performance when the CEO is a descendant of the business
founder (Morck et al., 2000; Villalonga and Amit, 2006). Bertrand et al. (2008) found that
multiple sons in the family business were associated with lower performance pointing to
value-destroying conflicts that existed within families and Bloom and Reenan (2007) found
that firms managed by descendants were poorly managed and practices correlated to lower
performance. An event study undertaken by Perez-Gonzalez (2006) found that firms that
announced non-family member CEO appointments experienced positive abnormal returns
compared to the announcement of a family member CEO appointment that experienced no
abnormal returns.
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Kallunki and Pyykkó (2013), a Finnish study, found that CEO’s and Director’s past personal
default entries increased the likelihood of the future financial distress of the firm. Kilborn
(2005) and Sullivan et al (1999) reported some personal traits that play an important role in
consumer’s over-indebtedness and credit default. Roll (1986), Malmendier and Tate (2005)
and Hackbarth (2008) found that managerial traits such as overconfidence, over-optimism
and illusion of control accounted for incorrect strategic decisions. The authors found that
these personal traits resulted in bad managerial decision, which led to declining financial
ratios and then resulted in financial distress. The authors further claim that their results
show traditional Altman (1968) and Ohlson (1980) models should include person related
risk attributes of the TMT. The authors suggested that there is a possibility for reverse
causality i.e. firms anticipating declining future prospects may appoint managers with
personal traits, which are also reflected in their payment default entries.
Ting et al. (2015), undertook a study of Malaysian firms, to investigate the impact of CEO
personal attributes on the financial leverage of firms. In addition, they also group certain
CEO attributes to make further comparisons of their impact on financial leverage. The study
uses the Upper Echelon Theory as an underpinning framework to explore this relationship.
Specifically, the following personal CEO attributes are selected: CEO overconfidence level,
Age, Education, Experience, Gender, Tenure, Network and Founder. The authors found
that: CEO overconfidence, measured by their profile photo, has a significant negative
relationship to leverage; CEO age has a significant negative relationship to leverage; as
CEO education increases the firm debt increases; CEO prior experience has a significant
negative relationship to leverage; CEO tenure has a significant positive relationship to
leverage; Female CEOs are greater risk takers than male CEOs; and Younger CEOs,
female CEOs and longer serving CEOs are risk takers and more aggressive.
3.9.2 TMT background, experience and firm performance
Bertrand (2009) found that most of the empirical evidence reviewed was US-based and
a majority of the research had been centred on CEOs of US PLC (due to the availability
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of good quality data). Previous researchers have tried to research both personal and
professional backgrounds of CEO using a range of directories ("who’s who in Business",
business press or through third parties involved in CEO selection process) however, the
knowledge of "what" makes a CEO is still limited.
The average age of executives was found to reduce by approximately 4 years in a study by
Cappelli and Hamori (2004) however the average age of a CEO did not show any specific
trend in the study by Murphy and Zabojnik (2006).
Frydman (2007) used a list of the 50 largest public traded firms from 1960 and collected
biographical data for the three highest-paid executives at these firms from 1936 to the early
2000s. She found that executives in firms with a MBA qualifications increased from 10%
to more than 50% (this was also confirmed by a larger study covering all S&P 500 firms
undertaken by Murphy and Zabojnik (2006) and CEOs in the early part of the study on
average had worked in only one sector whereas this later changed to an average of two
sectors. She also found that modern-day CEOs are more generalists similar to findings
from Lazear (2002, 2004) and that only one in four top executives had worked at the same
company their entire career.
Lindorff and Johnson (2013), an Australian study, found no relationship between CEO
education and firm performance. The study analysed 3 and 5-year shareholder return
measured by dividend and change in share price and CEO educational qualification. The
authors suggest a multinational longitudinal study to be undertaken on the relationship
between CEO business and other qualification and objective outcome. The study only
focused on one country and a firms financial performance.
Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argued the importance of TMT expertise should represent
core functional areas that involve the actual design, production and marketing of its goods
and services. However, prior qualitative research of failed firms showed that these firms
lacked financial expertise at the TMT level and therefore were unable to gauge the firm’s
difficulties, took on excessive risk and failed to deal with financial institutions appropriately.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the percentage of the team whose dominant function
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was marketing, sales, operations, production, research and development as functional
expertise (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980).
Mousa et al. (2016), a study of US high-tech firms, study the TMT that is in the process of
transforming their firms into public traded firms. They found that TMT choose to engage
in acquisition activity that if unsuccessful could lead to damage the firm and the team.
Specifically, it could lead to financial problems, divestiture, TMT turnover and affect the
reputation of the firm and the team. The authors selected the following demographic
variables to test the relationship between TMT attributes and acquisition activity for IPO
firms: TMT Directorships, TMT Education, TMT functional background (Wiersema and
Bantel, 1992; Zimmerman, 2008), TMT Organisational tenure (Hambrick et al 1996;
Michel and Hambrick, 1992), TMT Industry tenure and TMT prior IPO Experience. The
research found that executives’ board experience, senior level management experience,
organisational tenure and prior IPO experience have a significant impact on their firm’s
acquisition activity. The authors’ claim that their findings help explain the high failure rate
of IPO firms (Zeune 1993).
Nielsen (2010b), undertook a study to investigate TMT ability to deal with the challenges
of managing firm foreign operations. The author uses the upper echelons theory to focus
on individual rather than firm-level knowledge and experiences within an international
business context. The author uses cross-cultural psychology literature (Triandis and Suh
2002) to suggest that national origin influences individual personality. The author further
claims that TMT nationality provides them with the knowledge about economic and market
factors and institutions, culture, behaviour and norms of foreign countries. The study finds
that managers international backgrounds and experiences are positively related to foreign
market entry of the firm. However, the relationship between firm internationalisation and
performance is not clear. The results show that at high and low levels of internationalisation,
the degree of internationalisation has a negative relationship with firm performance. In
addition, at moderate levels of internationalisation, the degree of internationalisation has a
positive relationship with firm performance.
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Vo and Phan (2013), a Vietnamese study, found that female board members, the duality of
CEO, boards working experience and boards compensation all have a positive correlation
with firm performance. They further found that board size contributes negatively to firm
performance and there is no link between independent directors and firm performance. They
suggested that a non-linear relationship between corporate governance and board ownership
existed. The authors identified that some further research exploring the relationship
between other board attributes such as educational level of boards members and firm
performance would need to be undertaken as these conclusions cannot be made from the
study.
Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argued the importance of TMT expertise should represent
core functional areas that involve the actual design, production and marketing of its goods
and services. However, prior qualitative research of failed firms showed that these firms
lacked financial expertise at the TMT level and therefore were unable to gauge the firm’s
difficulties, took on excessive risk and failed to deal with financial institutions appropriately.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the percentage of the team whose dominant function
was marketing, sales, operations, production, research and development as functional
expertise (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980).
3.9.3 TMT Tenure and firm outcomes
Kaplan and Minton (2012) found that 1 in 6 CEOs lost their job between 1998 and 2005
compared to 1 in 10 during the 1970s. Mizruchi (2013) found a decline in the average
CEO tenure of between 24% and 30% between the early 1980s and the early 2000s. A
number of studies (Ocasio, 1994; Allen and Panian, 1982; Boeker, 1992; Cannella and
Lubatnik, 1993) indicate that CEO succession is a response to poor or declining firm
performance. Thornton and Ocasio (1999) further show that the effect of performance on
turnover increased over time. A long average tenure of the TMT reflects an acceptance
of certain norms or perspectives and team members are willing or allowed to continue in
position (Pfeffer, 1983), confers socialisation of teams and provides shared experiences
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(Katz, 1982) and reduces interaction costs (Williamson, 1975). Thus indicating that short
tenure could be associated with firm failure, alternatively longer tenures can be viewed as
a rigidifying effect on team interaction (Katz, 1982). Hence, there is no clear association
between tenure and corporate failure. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) used the mean number
of years in the firm for all executives as average tenure.
The spread of tenures within the team is an important factor to consider. Members of a
common tenure may have similar thinking (Wagner et al., 1984), may be prone to ’group
think’ (Gladstein, 1984; Janis, 1972). On the other hand, a very heterogeneous group
may lack shared values to work as an effective problem-solving team unit. Hambrick and
D’Aveni (1992) used the variance of member tenures divided by the mean tenure as a
measure for tenure heterogeneity. Bergh (2001), a US study, found a positive correlation
between target company executive tenure and post-acquisition performance, and the longer
the term of the executive the less likely the target firm was to be disposed of by the acquirer
and greater the retention rate of long-tenured executives than short-tenured executives.
Bergh (2001) and Simsek et al. (2005) view CEO tenure as a positive effect on firm
performance and in line with the Resource Based view theory.
Walsh (1988) noted that TMT turnover following a merger are significantly higher. Sharma
and Ho (2002) explain this relationship as the replacement of inefficient management
with efficient ones. Henderson et al. (2006), analysed firms in the computer and branded
foods industry and found that the firm performance steadily improved with tenure in the
branded food industry but started to deteriorate among CEOs in their tenure between
10-15 years. This relationship was further seen in the computer industry where the firms
performed better under CEOs in the early phase of their tenure. Hambrick and Mason
(1984) found that tenure of management influences strategic choice and performance.
Bergh (2001) found tenure to be the strongest attributes amongst executives as it reflects
unique knowledge and insights into the organisation (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991).
Bergh (2001) further found that retaining long-tenure executives enhances the performance
post-acquisition. Hubris (Roll, 1986) was found to influence managerial actions (Sharma
and Ho, 2002; Gregory, 1997) and narcissism (Higgs, 2009) or animal spirits (Akerlof
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and Shiller, 2009) was found to be a more dominant influence than hubris on managerial
behaviour.
Ting (2011), a Chinese study, focused on the relationship between TMT turnover and
firm default risk. Previous studies have found that the likelihood of TMT turnover has
a negative relationship with firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner et
al, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). The authors found that firms with a higher default risk are
more likely to change their TMT and firms that change their TMT have a lower subsequent
risk of default compared to other companies. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) in a study
of corporate bankruptcies found that weak TMTs (short-tenured or few outside directors)
fail to identify the seriousness of problems or fail to monitor the implementation plans.
Bergh (2001), a US study, found a positive correlation between target company executive
tenure and post-acquisition performance, and the longer the term of the executive the less
likely the target firm was to be disposed of by the acquirer and greater the retention rate
of long-tenured executives than short-tenured executives. Bergh (2001) and Simsek et
al. (2005) view CEO tenure as a positive effect on firm performance and in line with the
Resource Based view theory.
The counter argument to TMT deficiencies lead to organisational decline is that poor firm
performance causes TMTs to diverge from that of healthy firms. In addition, as financial
health declines, executive turnover is seen to increase which heightens the likelihood
of deterioration of the team (Wagner et al., 1984). In additions, firms try to change the
composition of the team when struggling with performance to bring in more financial and
cost-saving skills and less marketing and operational skills (Whitney, 1987).
3.9.4 Operationalising TMT Loyalty
Cao et al. (2015) use CEO tenure as a measure for CEO power in a study on the relationship
between corporate governance and default risk. Loveman (1998), tested the relationship
between employee satisfaction and loyalty, customer satisfaction and loyalty, and financial
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performance using panel data from the branches of a large retail bank. The author uses the
logic that enthusiastic employees deliver good customer satisfaction, which in turn makes
customers loyal which results in an increased purchase of goods or services, which then,
in turn, have an effect of financial performance. This research uses a similar logic to align
TMT loyalty as an effect of aligning their objectives to that of the shareholders, reducing
the agency problem, which in turn has the effect of reducing the probability of default.
An increase in the average TMT tenure could also lead to patriotism towards the firm,
which would, in turn, lead to them working towards reducing the likelihood of default.
The service profit chain (Service Management Interest Group, Harvard Business School)
proposes a theoretical concept that claims that employee loyalty and customer loyalty are
primary drivers of profitability (Heskett et al., 1994).
In order to measure employee loyalty, Loveman (1998) used the length of employment
as a variable. It is highlighted that the length of employment is possibly a function of
other factors such as personal preferences and other opportunities, however, Loveman
(1998) further highlights that loyalty is manifested in the variable. Hambrick and Fukutomi
(1991), argued that there are specific phases (or seasons) within an executive’s tenure which
give rises to patterns in executive attention, behaviour and organisational performance.
Executives are able to increase and solidify their power once in position (Pfeffer, 1981)
and as their tenure increases so do their power generally (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991).
Pfeffer (1981) and Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991) argue that as the CEOs tenure increases
they may be able to create a “personal mystique or aura, including unquestioned deference
or loyalty.” It is the final season (Dysfunction) within which Hambrick and Fukutomi
(1991) argue that the CEOs power is the strongest and continues to increase. In this stage,
the CEO may begin to disengage psychologically as job mastery gives way to boredom
however the power remains at an all-time high. Therefore, arguing that the season where
the executive feels the most powerful they will also have a feeling of increased loyalty
towards the firm as they receive increased loyalty from the firm.
Dunn (2004), in a study on the relationship between TMT duality and the decision to
release false financial information, controlled for TMT attributes and corporate governance
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structures by using tenure of the directors. Daboub et al. (1995) argue that smaller tenured
teams are more likely to actively participate in corporate crimes. Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1990) used the average number of years of employment in the firm of TMT members,
defined as all corporate officers who were also board members, in a specific year as a
measure for tenure in their study of the effect of executive-team tenure on strategy and
performance. Singh and Harianto (1989b) use the average tenure and relative tenure
as measures of TMT (top five executives) tenure in a study of TMT tenure, corporate
ownership and board composition as predictors of different aspects of golden parachutes.
Vainieri et al. (2017) used the number of years spent by GM (CEO) in health organisations
as a member of the TMT to measure tenure in order to study the relationship between TMT
competencies and organisational performance in public health care system. Hambrick et
al. (2015) controlled for TMT tenure by using average member (senior vice president or
higher i.e. CEO, COO executive vice president and senior vice president) tenure.
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3.9.5 Operationalising the hypothesis linked to TMT Loyalty
Hypothesis 2 There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of
firm financial distress
H2 (i) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the accounting
measure for firm financial distress
H2 (ii) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the short term
market measure for firm financial distress
H2 (iii) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the long term
market measure for firm financial distress
3.10 Empirical Evidence relating to TMT Effectiveness
This section critiques the empirical evidence from the prior literature on TMT effectiveness.
This section starts with critiquing empirical evidence on the relationship between CEO
duality, succession and firm performance. This highlights the changing role of TMT
and the section that follows discusses the empirical evidence on their reduced autonomy
and increased scrutiny. This then leads to the discussion of empirical work on board
attributes and its relationship to firm performance and financial distress. This section is
then concluded by defining how TMT effectiveness is operationalised at different levels
within the organisation for the purposes of this study and how the hypotheses of this study
are further developed.
3.10.1 CEO Duality, Succession and Firm Performance
Dalton et al. (1998) found that CEO duality had no systematic relationship with firm
performance irrespective of using market or accounting based measures for firm perfor-
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mance. Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), a UK study, found that CEOs received a higher
level of performance-related pay in firms that had a higher number of the executive to
non-executive directors. In addition, they found that large boards awarded significantly
higher bonuses to the CEOs post-M&A completion. These findings were consistent with
Core et al. (1999) who suggest that weak governance allows stronger power on the part of
the CEO leading to a negative relationship between CEO remuneration and stock return
performance.
Boyd (1995) undertook a study, using agency and stewardship theory to develop a frame-
work, to get a better understanding of the relationship between CEO duality and firm
performance. The author claims that a CEO-Chair would be able to respond quickly to
external events, have greater knowledge of the firm and its industry and greater commit-
ment than an external chair. The supporters of duality explain that the board chairman is
relatively less powerful and more ceremonial and symbolic than the CEO (Harrison et al.,
1988, pg214). Patton and Banker (1987, p12) undertook a survey of board members and
corporate executives and concluded that board leadership would improve if the chairman
were not part of the active management. Berg and Smith (1978), a study of fortune 200
firms, found a negative relationship between duality and ROI and no relationship with ROE
or change in stock price. Chaganti et al. (1985), a US study of the retail industry, found
no relationship with Duality and Corporate failure. Rechner and Dalton (1991) found
a negative relationship between Duality and ROE, ROI and profit margin. In contrast,
Donaldson and Davis (1991) found CEO duality was associated with significantly higher
levels of ROE. Boyd (1995) hypothesize that the agency theory would propose that the
combination of CEO and Chairman positions would weaken board control, and negatively
affect firm performance. The author also hypothesizes that the stewardship theory proposes
that CEO duality would facilitate effective action by the CEO, and consequently lead
to higher performance. The author further hypothesizes that the Resource Dependence
Theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) proposes that CEO duality might actually improve
performance in certain contexts. The findings of the study by Boyd (1995) indicated that
duality can help firm performance under the right circumstances. This is in contrast to the
school of thought of complete separation of CEO and Chairman in all circumstances.
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Georgakakis and Ruigrok (2017), a European study, analysed opposing perspectives on
CEO succession and examined the conditions under which the benefits of outsider CEO
succession outweighed the costs. The two opposing theoretical streams on whether or
not appointing an outsider CEO is beneficial to the firm are organisational adaptation
view (Helmich and Brown, 1972) and organisational disruption view (Vancil, 1987). The
organisational adaptation view implies that outsider CEO’s have more external knowledge
and information and therefore are better equipped to improve firm performance through
expansion, innovation and learning. The organisational disruption view advocates that
outsiders lack firm familiarity and therefore result in low firm performance due to disrupting
internal processes. The findings of the study show that the advantages of the organisational
adaption view only materialise under individual, organisational-, industrial-level conditions
that enable the outsider CEO to quickly familiarise with the firm and through effective
transfer of external knowledge and information. The findings further implying that both
views have merit and the adoption of one over the other depends on the succession context.
3.10.2 Reduced autonomy and Increased scrutiny
Dobbin and Zorn (2005) found that CEOs face increased pressure from financial analysts
who issue quarterly profit projections for their firms. If the firm fails to meet the projections,
the firm experiences a decline in market value pushing the CEOs to pursue more short-term
goals to achieve the forecasts. CEOs are in the strongest position in their initial years
immediately following their appointment when the shareholders and boards are more
forgiving of their decisions. This was supported by the findings of Marquis and Lee (2013)
who found that firm’s philanthropic contributions were the highest in the CEOs first year
of appointment and this then steadily declined. Walker (2013) further found that a firm’s
philanthropic contributions increased when the firms with which it shares board members
increase their contributions however as the number of outside directors increases and a
firms level of debt increases (pointing to increased monitoring) the CEO’s discretionary
spending decreases.
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Another area that is influenced by the reduction in autonomy and increased scrutiny is
Research and Development spending. When the CEO receives increased pressure to meet
short-term profits they are less likely to make R&D expenditures. The CEOmyopia theory
refers to the process where R&D spending was found to be negatively affected by increased
pressure to increase shareholder value (Institute, 2010; Hirschey et al. 2012). Lundstrum
(2002) concluded that the shareholders restrict long-term investments which require the
continued employment of the CEO as they found that the older the CEO the less R&D
expenditure they made. Graham et al. (2005) in a survey of CFOs found that these officers
were preoccupied with reporting relatively smooth earnings across quarters and reduce
uncertainty, which is consistent with Dobbin and Zorn (2005).
Are today’s CEOs a part of the upper class whose interests are aligned with the owners
of the property as opposed to hired bureaucratic managers of prior years (Freeland, 2012;
Winters, 2011)? In addition, there is an increased urgency to compare the views of today’s
CEOs with those of earlier decades (Mizruchi and Marshall, 2016).
3.10.3 Board attributes, firm performance and financial distress
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that outside directors supplement the team’s knowledge
base by providing additional inputs, perspectives and links to external parties (Goodstein
and Boeker, 1991; Vance, 1983; Pfeffer, 1972). On the other hand, outside directors may
politically influence the governance process (Mace, 1971), dilute the effective leadership
(Barnard, 1938) or have no material power and be merely a rubber stamp (Whisler, 1984;
Mace, 1971). Hence, its association with corporate default cannot be predicted. Hambrick
and D’Aveni (1992) used the number of executives that are not employees of the firm as
outside directors.
In a review of literature on Board activities, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found compo-
sition of internal and external directors was not correlated to performance (finding also
made by Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Dalton et al. (1998)), board independence declined
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as CEO performed exceptionally well, poor firm performance led to an increase in the
probability of adding independent directors and board independence declined as CEO
tenure increased.
Kiel and Nicholson (2003), an Australian study, found that on average non-executive
directors made up 69% of the board and 23% of firms had CEO duality (role of chairman
and CEO combined). Carson (2002), an Australian study, found that, 76% of firms had a
non-executive chairman, 69% of firms have non-executive board directors, average number
of executive directors was 1.97, 75% of firms were audited by ‘Big 6’, 84% of firms had
an audit committee, 57% had a remuneration committee and 17% had a nominations com-
mittee. He concluded that the audit committee was a developed governance mechanism,
remuneration committees were developing and nominations committee were underde-
veloped. Collier and Gregory (1999) found that CEO duality and presence of executive
directors on the audit committee had a negative effect on the audit committee activity.
Garrow et al. (2015) identified that there was little to no research on the relationship of the
joint tenure of Chairman and CEO and its effect on firm performance.
Fernau (2013), a German study, found that executive and director fixed effects are almost
equally important in explaining the variance in firm performance. Interpretation of manager
fixed effects as a proxy for the skills of an individual manager and the analysis on the
firm level showed that the impact of manager fixed effects on firm performance could
be attributed to the aggregate quality of the executive and supervisory board, but not to
the dispersion of skills within or between the two boards. He suggested some further
research on the impact of specific types of directors (former executives or employee
representation) on firm performance should be undertaken. In addition, the absolute and
relative importance of director fixed effects in explaining certain board actions such as
executive and CEO turnover would be another interesting field.
Salloum et al (2012), a Lebanese study using 276 non-listed family firms, composed of
138 financially distressed firms (experimental group) and 138 healthy firms (Controlled
group) conducted multiple logistics regression between the probability of financial distress
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and three attributes of board structure. They found that the presence of outside directors
on the board of directors has no effect on financial distress, insiders’ equity ownership
reduces the likelihood of financial distress and the CEO-board chair duality increases the
probability of financial distress. The findings relating to inside ownership concur with the
predictions of the Convergence of Ownership and Management in the model of Jensen
and Meckling (1976). Brunninge et al. (2007) could explain for the findings relating to
outside directors i.e. in family businesses they lack real power and do not contribute to
firm’s strategy due to their friendship/professional ties with the owners and management.
The authors suggested including other governance variables into their model to affect their
findings.
In a review of literature on Board activities, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) found compo-
sition of internal and external directors was not correlated to performance (findings also
made by Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Dalton et al. (1998)), board independence declined
as CEO performed exceptionally well, poor firm performance led to an increase in the prob-
ability of adding independent directors and board independence declined as CEO tenure
increased. Dalton et al. (1998) also found that CEO duality had no systematic relationship
with firm performance irrespective of using market or accounting based measures for firm
performance. Coakley and Iliopoulou (2006), a UK study, found that CEOs received a
higher level of performance-related pay in firms that had a higher number of the executive
to non-executive directors. In addition, they found that large boards awarded significantly
higher bonuses to the CEOs post-M&A completion. These findings were consistent with
Core et al. (1999) who suggest that weak governance allows stronger power on the part of
the CEO leading to a negative relationship between CEO remuneration and stock return
performance.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue that the two arguments, i.e. TMT composition
impacts firm performance and firm decline impact TMT composition, are not mutually
exclusive. They identify two major classes of TMT attributes:
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(1) Team resources - team size, outside directors, functional expertise and team compensa-
tion (2) Team social structure - average tenure, tenure heterogeneity and CEO dominance
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) liken TMT size with that of a sports team size and argue that
a sports team is at a disadvantage if it has fewer than the number of allowed players. Steiner
(1972) argued that team size has a positive association with effectiveness for divisible and
additive tasks, which Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) argue is an apt characterisation of
TMT work. Goodman et al. (1986) found an inverted U-shaped relationship between group
size and effectiveness and found that small and large team sizes had their disadvantages.
This is why an expected relationship cannot be predicted. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992)
used the number of executives, with a title vice president and above, as a measure of team
size.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argue that outside directors supplement the team’s knowledge
base by providing additional inputs, perspectives and links to external parties (Goodstein
and Boeker, 1991; Vance, 1983; Pfeffer 1972). On the other hand, outside directors may
politically influence the governance process (Mace, 1971), dilute the effective leadership
(Barnard, 1938) or have no material power and be merely a rubber stamp (Whisler, 1984;
Mace, 1971). Hence, its association with corporate default cannot be predicted. Hambrick
and D’Aveni (1992) used the number of executives that are not employees of the firm as
outside directors.
3.10.4 Operationalising TMT Effectiveness
The Resource Based view of the firm argues that human capital can be a source of key
resource to a firm to gain a sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Wright et al.,
1994; Huselid et al., 1997). This human capital can be broken down at board level and at
the firm level. The effectiveness of the TMT at a board level and the firm level is dependent
on the valuable, rare, inimitable and non-substitutable resource of human capital at board
level and at the firm level. Platt and Platt (2012) use board size as a key variable in their
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study of corporate board attributes and bankruptcy. A larger board brings different views,
skills, and experiences whereas a smaller board may benefit from its ability to move more
quickly and to avoid lengthy debate (Daily et al., 2003; Fich and Slezak, 2008).
Guest (2009) found no evidence that firm attributes that determine board size in the UK
have a positive board size-firm performance relation. In addition, it was found that larger
board sizes had a negative relation to firm performance. Guest (2009) concludes that larger
board sizes lead to problems of poor communication and decision making undermining
its effectiveness. It has also been argued in the prior literature that initially larger board
sizes facilitate key Board functions however eventually larger board sizes suffer from
coordination and communication problems leading to an ineffective board (Lipton and
Lorsch, 1992; Jensen 1993). Cao et al. (2015) also controlled for board size, defined by
the number of directors on the board. The TMT (CEO, CFO and Chairman) are unable to
operate effectively at a board level as coordination and communication problems increase.
Hence, board size would be an appropriate measure for TMT board level effectiveness.
Schultz et al. (2017) use board structure as one of the three broad types (board structure,
remuneration and ownership structure) of internal corporate governance mechanisms in
their study of board attributes and the likelihood of firm default. Dunn (2004), a study on
the relationship between TMT duality and the decision to release false financial information,
controlled for TMT attributes and corporate governance structures by using a number of
directors on the team/board. Large TMT are associated with ineffective decision-making
(Bacon, 1993; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992).
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), a study on TMT tenure and organisational outcomes,
use the number of employees as a measure of the size of the firm. Firms with many em-
ployees have difficulty effecting change (Aldrich, 1989) and face bureaucratic momentum
(Mintzberg, 1978). O’Reilly III et al. (1988), a study examining economic and psycho-
logical factors influencing CEO compensation, use the number of employees for firm
size. Richard and Johnson (2001) used the number of employees to control for firm size
in a study of strategic human resource management effectiveness and firm performance.
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Youndt et al. (1996) argue that large firms, as defined by a natural logarithm of the number
of full-time employees, are more likely to have well-developed HR practices. However, an
increase in firm size has also been associated with an increase in problems of coordination
and communication (Blau, 1968, 1970, 1972; Klatzky, 1970; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971).
It has also been argued that smaller board sizes can be more effective when a firm faces
greater information asymmetry, as the cost of collecting, distributing and understanding
information is greater (Cao et al., 2015; Boone et al., 2007; Linck et al., 2008).
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3.10.5 Operationalising the hypotheses linked to TMT effectiveness
Hypothesis 3a There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
H3a (i) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
accounting measure for firm financial distress
H3a (ii) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the short
term market measure for firm financial distress
H3a (iii) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the long
term market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3b There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the likelihood of firm financial distress
H3b (i) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the accounting measure for firm financial distress
H3b (ii) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the short term market measure for firm financial distress
H3b (iii) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the long term market measure for firm financial distress
3.11 Predicting the likelihood of Default
Econometric studies of business defaults started in the 1960s with work by Altman (1968,
1971, 1973, 1984) and co-authors . These influential papers focus on explaining bankrupt-
cies of publicly listed companies in a cross-sectional context using a small set of firm-
specific variables. Later work by Shumway (2001) attempts to account for the dynamic
nature of defaults for publicly listed firms. Bharath and Shumway (2008) evaluate the
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out-of-sample accuracy of the Merton (1974) model and find that the distance-to-default
measure is not a sufficient statistic for the probability of default.
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006; pg 238), discuss the evolution of different credit scoring
models (this can be seen in table 3.1)and highlight that a majority of the models today
focus on quantitative measures however the importance of qualitative measures should not
be underestimated. They identify that qualitative elements, such as the judgement on the
part of the risk officer, provide 30 to 50 per cent of the explanatory power of the scoring
model.
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Table 3.1 Different Default scoring models (Source: adapted from Altman and Hotchkiss, 2006)
Number Scoring System Scoring system sub category Specific Attribute
1 Qualitative Subjective
2 Univariate Accounting/Market
Measures
3 Multivariate Accounting/Market
Measures
3a Discriminant, Logit, Probit Models Linear, Quadratic
3b Non - Linear models - for example, Recursive Participating
Analysis (RPA) and Neural Networks (NN)
4 Discriminant and Logit
Models in Use
4a Consumer Models (e.g., Fair Isaacs)
4b Z - Score- Manufacturing
4c Zeta Score - Industrials
4d Private Firm Models (e.g. Risk Calc [Moody’s], Z"-SCore)
4e EM Score - Emerging Markets, Industrials
4f Other - Bank Specialised Systems
5 Artificial Intelligence
Systems
5a Expert Systems
5b Neural Networks (e.g., Credit Model [S&P]. Central dei
Bilanci [CBI] Italy)
6 Option/Contingent
Claims Models
6a Risk of Ruin
6b KMV Creditor Monitor Model
7 Blended Ratio/MArket
Value Models
7a Moody’s Risk Calc
7b Bondscore (CreditSights)
7c Z-Score (Market Value Model)
3.11.1 Altman Z-score
Altman (1968) undertook a study to assess the quality of ratio analysis. He applied a
set of ratios to approach the problem of corporate bankruptcy prediction. The findings
provided academic literature with the Altman Z-score, which has since been widely used
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for predicting the probability of corporate default. The Z-score model provided weightings
to ratios, such as Working capital/Total assets; Retained Earnings/Total Assets; Earnings
before Interest and Tax/ Total Assets; Market Value of Equity/ Book Value of total debt
and Sales/Total Assets, to predict the failure of firms. The findings showed promising
results in predicting the probability of bankruptcy for firms 2 years prior to the event.
However, the model is less useful when attempting to predict bankruptcy 3, 4 or 5 years
prior to the event. Nevertheless, the Z-score of firms is widely used by academics and
practitioners aiming to study corporate bankruptcies. One argument here is that by using
such models for predicting default, practitioners and academics are forcing the firms into
bankruptcy that would normally not have defaulted. The model showed an accuracy of
95% in predicting the default 1 year prior to the event, therefore the 5% of firms that
did not actually fail, would they now be forced into a bankruptcy event due to the heavy
reliance on prediction models.
The Altamn’z (1968) Z-score Model:
Z = 1.2X1 +1.4X2 +3.3X3 +0.6X4 +1.0X5
X1 =WorkingCapital/TotalAssets
X2 = RetainedEarnings/TotalAssets
X3 = Earningsbe f oreinterestandTaxes/TotalAssets
X4 = MarketValueo f Equity/BookValueo f TotalLiabilities
X5 = Sales/TotalAssets
Z = OverallIndexorScore
Altman et al. (1977) undertook a study to develop and test a new bankruptcy classification
model, which reflected developments with respect to business failures at the time. The
findings produced the ZETA® model for bankruptcy classification, which accurately
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predicted failure up to 5 years prior to the event. The ZETA® model is a 7 variable
model, using variables to measure: Overall profitability; stability in earnings; Debt service;
Cumulative profitability; Liquidity; Capitalisation and Asset size, to predict bankruptcy
for firms. The ZETA® Model provided better results to the results of the original Altman’s
(1968) model and to the Altman’s (1968) model applied to the ZETA® sample. However,
the findings of the Altman’s (1968) model applied to the ZETA® sample did improve in
comparison to the Altman’s original sample results. This could be related back to an earlier
argument on the application of prediction models on firms in practice and the probability
of pushing firms that would normally not have defaulted into a bankruptcy event due to the
reliance on the model’s prediction.
A range of variations on the Z-score model (Altman, 1968) has been developed to reflect the
varied firms being studied. For example, the original model has developed on a sample of
manufacturing firms hence the model’s accuracy to predict the probability of default would
alter when applied to non-manufacturing firms. Altman and Hotchkiss (2010) suggest that
ideally variations to the Z-score models should be developed for specific industries (i.e.
retailers, telecoms, airlines etc.). Altman (1993) developed the Z’ Score model for private
firms as one of the variables in the original Z score model required market value of equity.
This information is not available for private firms’ hence practitioners simply replaced the
market value of equity with the book value of equity. The author claims that this is not
ideal and would need to be followed by developing a new model with different weightings
for each of the original variables. Similarly, a revision to the Z’ score model was made to
adapt a probability of default model for non-manufacturing and Emerging Market firms.
Altman et al. (1995, 1998) developed the Z” model for emerging market firms, specifically
Mexican firms. This model was similar to the Z’ model i.e. it used the book value of equity
instead of market value of equity, however, the big difference was in the selection of the
sales/total assets variable. The Z” model replaces this variable with a constant term +3.25
and changes the weightings applied to the other four variables.
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3.11.2 Altman’s Z-score vs Merton’s probability of default
Black and Scholes (1973), developed a theoretical valuation formula for option pricing
based on the Capital Asset Pricing model. They suggested that the formula could be
used to derive the discount that should be applied to a corporate bond because of the
possibility of default. Robert Merton then applied the continuous-time portfolio theory
to show the results of the model as a consequence of ruling out arbitrage opportunities in
the financial markets. The model that resulted is popularly known as the Black-Scholes or
Black-Scholes-Merton Option Pricing model. Merton (1973) used the model to develop a
basic equation for the pricing of financial instruments and then applied it to corporate debt.
Merton (1974) developed a model, based on Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973),
to assess the creditworthiness of corporate debt. This model is popular in the credit
risk literature and more sophisticated credit risk models such as Moody’s KMV (Leland,
2002; Huang and Huang, 2012). Gharghori et al. (2006) found that option-based default
models significantly outperform accounting based default models however the difference
in performance between the different option based models is little. Moody’s purchased the
KMV corporation that developed a default prediction model based on the Merton’s (1974)
bond valuation model. This model is popularly known as the Merton’s distance to default
model. The basic principle of the model is that when the market value of the firm drops
below a certain liability level the firm will default on its obligations.
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006, pg 255) examined predictability of the Z-Score model and
KMV’s EDF for two popular US bankruptcies i.e. Enron and WorldCom. They found that
in the Enron case study neither model actually predicted the bankruptcy, however, both
models provided unambiguous early warnings that the rating agencies failed to provide.
The authors relate the failure of the two models in predicting bankruptcy in Enron’s case to
the ’bogus’ data provided by the firm. In addition, when the authors use the true liabilities
of the firm they find that both models predict severe distress. In the case of Worldcom,
Altman and Hotchkiss (2006, pg 257) applied the Z” model (more appropriate for non-
manufacturing firms) and the KMV’s EDF to predict the probability of the firm’s failure.
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They found that both models indicated a non-investment-grade company up to 18 months
before the rating agencies downgrade, however, neither would have predicted its default
based on available data and based on adjusted data for improper accounting techniques.
3.11.3 Merton’s probability of default and the Bloomberg probabil-
ity of default
Bloomberg provides daily data on the probability of firm default through its quantitative
default model Bloomberg DRSK. The models provide data on the likelihood of default in
3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years and 5 years. The default
probabilities calculated are categorised into Investment grade (1 to 10), high yield (1 to
6), Distressed securities (1 to 5) and Defaulted debt. The different categories and their
respective default likelihoods are presented in appendix B, Fig. B.4.
In a case study by the data provider, the model compares the credit risk of Petrobas, a South
American firm, as calculated by DRSK compared to the credit rating by Moody’s on 24th
February 2015. The date is important as on this day Moody’s downgraded the firm to a
speculative credit rating. Fitch put the firm on a negative watch from the lowest investment
grade on 3rd February 2015. In comparison, DRSK indicated steep deterioration almost 1
year prior to the downgrades. This can be viewed in Fig. 3.10 where the bloomberg 1 year
probability of default predicts default a lot earlier than the credit rating downgrade.
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Fig. 3.10 Petrobas market capitalisation and Bloomberg 1 year probability of default (Source:
Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
The Bloomberg default likelihood model is based on the Merton distance-to-default model
in addition to relevant economic and statistical factors. The model also adjusts reported fi-
nancials, such as operating leases and pensions or other post-employment benefits (OPEB),
in order to provide comparability across different accounting/business models. Bloomberg
Professional Service (2018) claims that as the model is globally calibrated and retains
region-specific attributes users are able to predict credit risk of same sector peer firms
across industries. The model defines default as ". . . the first of any of the following: failure
to pay interest/principal on an interest-bearing bond or loan, bankruptcy filing or, for
banks, FDIC takeover or government bail-out" (Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018, pg
3).
The Merton (1974) model views a firm as solvent as long as the firm’s assets are larger
than the value of its liabilities. As the firm’s assets are not observable, the model assumes
their value to be the market value of its shares and the debt of a firm. The key argument
of the model is that the equity of the firm is a call option on its assets and the liabilities
is the strike price, allowing the model to assume a value for the assets using the Black
Scholes (1973) option pricing approach. The limitation of this model is that it assumes
the firm can default only at the maturity of its debt, which in reality does not stand true as
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default on debt can occur anytime. The Bloomberg DRSK overcomes this limitation by
treating the equity as a 1-year barrier call option, therefore incorporating the possibility of
default before maturity. This allows the model to calculate the main output of the Merton
model i.e. Distance to Default. Bharath and Shumway (2008), in their study, show that
Distance to Default is not a sufficient statistic in predicting default; therefore, the DRSK
model incorporates some other financials to improve the model performance.
Tudela and Young (2003), a UK study, undertook a research to show the usability of the
Merton-model approach to developing measures of the probability of failure of UK public
listed companies. The paper modifies an underlying assumption of the original Merton
model i.e. the original model assumes default can only take place when the debt repayment
is due however this is modified to default can occur at any point in time and not specifically
at maturity. Kealhofer and Kurbat (2002) (KMV) in an attempt to replicate Moody’s
empirical results, as achieved by Sobehart et al (2000), on the Merton model find that the
Merton model outperforms the rating agency and various accounting ratios. The authors
developed a modified Merton model and applied it to UK non-financial quoted firms over
the period of 1990-2001. The findings of the study show that the model provides a strong
signal of failure one year in advance of default. The model compared to a reduced -form
model (Geroski and Gregg, 1997) outperforms the later model.
Work by Duffie et al. (2007), Pesaran et al. (2006), Bonfim (2009), Lando and Nielsen
(2010), and Tang and Yan (2010) provides empirical evidence that firm-specific factors
alone appear unable to fully explain the variation in corporate default rates and credit
spreads. Carvalho et al. (2014), undertook a study to see if there is a self-fulfilling prophecy
in Credit Rating announcements. The authors use the relationship between credit ratings
and credit default as an example to explain this. Credit Ratings are to predict the future
payment behaviour of the rated firm however a negative announcement relating to the credit
rating has an impact on the firm, which can then translate into the firm finding it difficult
to keep its debt costs low, therefore pushing the firm closer to default. The research finds
that “. . . some negative rating announcements are relevant enough to generate additional
pressure for a default in the rated firm’s obligations.”
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Fig. B.5, B.6 and B.7 (in appendix B) show how early on the Bloomberg default probability
started to increase prior to the default of Eddie Bauer, Lehman Brothers and Oleo e Gas
Partipacoes S.A. Fig. B.8 and B.9 (in appendix B) shows some further examples of
North American and Asian companies that failed and their respective Bloomberg default
probabilities.
3.11.4 Default prediction models in recent literature
Schultz et al (2017) is a key recent literature to this research, as they use the Merton’s
(1974) probability of default as a measure of the likelihood of firm default to characterise
the relationship between corporate governance and the chance of the firm default. The
research involved a study of a sample of the Australian ASX200 index between 2000
and 2007 (the final sample comprised an unbalanced sample of 932 annual firm-years for
222 unique observations). The research commenced with a pooled OLS and fixed-effects
approaches to estimate the model of interest. The results of the testing suggested that the
likelihood of firm failure decreases (increases) as inside ownership (executive fixed pay
and the proportion of non-executive directors on the board) increases. For Robustness
testing the authors employ GMM and they find that once endogeneity is controlled for,
there is no evidence of a significant relationship between the probability of default and the
corporate governance variables.
This research differs from the research by Schultz et al. (2017) as firstly this research uses
the Altman Z-score (an accounting based default probability) and the Bloomberg measures
of default at 1 year and 5 years (developed from the Merton’s distance to default). The
research collects data for the FTSE 100 in the UK between 2013 to 2016 as opposed to
Schultz et al. (2017) focusing on the Australian index ASX200 from 2000 to 2007. The
difference in corporate governance codes of conduct and bankruptcy laws could lead to
different results between the UK and Australia. The corporate governance measures in
the two studies are different as is the definition of the TMT. Finally, this research uses
multilevel modelling for testing the relationship whereas Schultz et al. (2017) used GMM.
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Brown et al. (2011), Christensen et al. (2015), Al-Maskati et al. (2015), Beekes et al.
(2015) and Xu et al. (2015) are some of the many that focus on governance mechanisms
and firms continuing as a going concern. Schultz et al (2017) point out that some of these
research face a sample selection bias as they study the governance mechanisms of failed
firms (e.g. Lee and Yeh, 2004; Chen 2008; Aldamen et al., 2012; Platt and Platt, 2012;
Brédart, 2013, 2014) as opposed to the likelihood of firm default. This research uses
the probability of default similar to Schultz et al. (2017) however does not just rely on
the Merton’s (1974) model but also includes the Altman Z-score as a measure of default
prediction. In addition Schultz et al. (2017) point out that some of these research also
use measures that are discrete in nature and can take on a very small number of values
therefore lacking power to differentiate between firms (e.g. Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003;
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2006; Elbannan, 2009) except for Switzer and Wang (2013a,
2013b) who also use the Merton’s (1974) model to estimate default likelihood. However,
Switzer and Wang (2013a, 2013b) fail to use econometric techniques that take account of
endogeneity concerns identified by Wintoki et al. (2012) which Schultz et al. (2017) are
able to address in their research.
3.11.5 Operationalising the probability of default
Bankruptcy prediction modelling using multivariate analysis commences with Altman’s
(1968) work. The demand from banks to measure non-performing loans, demand from
investors, credit rating agencies, asset managers for failure prediction models, the introduc-
tion of capital adequacy for banks under Basel II requirements led to a boom in bankruptcy
prediction models. Altman (1983, 1993) suggests that the Z-score model can be used by
the management of distressed firms as a guide for a financial turnaround. The different
bankruptcy prediction models developed using different modelling techniques; focus on
different industries and countries. For example, Beaver (1966, 1968) used univariate
analysis for selected ratios, Altman (1968) used multiple discriminant analysis modelling,
Ohlson (1980) used logit modelling and Taffler (1984) developed Z-score model for the
UK.
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Altman et al. (2014) identify accounting-based models, market-based models and hazard
models as the three key models prevailing in the finance literature. Agarwal and Taffler
(2008), undertook a study on the efficacy of accounting based models and market-based
models, found that there was little difference in the predictive power of the two. Bauer
and Agarwal (2014) found that hazard models, that used both accounting and market
information, were superior at bankruptcy prediction for the UK. The Z-score model has
different versions depending on the nature of the firm i.e. Z-score model for public firms,
Z’-score for private firms and Z”-score for non-manufacturing and manufacturing firms.
Altman et al. (2014), reviewed studies comparing accounting based models to market-based
models and hazard models, found that the Altman’s Z-score model generally underper-
formed in four studies, outperformed or provided similar results in two studies. Reisz
and Perlich (2007) found the Altman Z-score model to be a better short-term measure
for bankruptcy than market-based models and Das et al. (2009) found that the Altman
Z-score model performed better than the Merton’s market-based model for CDS spread
estimation. However, it is important to note that the Altman Z-score model is not a pure
accounting-based model as it utilises the market value of equity. Altman et al. (2014)
identify over 30 articles (in their appendices) from leading academic journals that use the
Altman Z-score in different academic contexts and its relevance in bankruptcy prediction.
Krom (2010) used Atman Z-score in a study on turnover of the TMT and board of directors.
Lohrke et al (2004) recommend studying the role of TMT and performance measures
beyond profit and loss, such as indicating proximity to bankruptcy (e.g. Altman Z-score).
Mueller and Barker (1997) used the Altman Z-score as a measure for bankruptcy prediction
in their study of upper echelons and board attributes of turnaround and non-turnaround
declining firms. Barker III et al. (2001), a study on TMT replacement at a sample of
declining firms attempting a turnaround, used Altman’s (1983) bankruptcy prediction
score to measure whether a firm was in imminent danger of bankruptcy. Dunn (2004), a
study on the relationship between TMT duality and the decision to release false financial
information, controlled for distress by using the company’s Altman Z-score. This measure
was also used by Summers and Sweeney (1998) in their study of fraudulent financial
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reporting. Mishra et al. (2000), a study on the effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance,
use the Altman Z-score as a measure for bankruptcy risk.
Schultz et al. (2017) undertook a study of corporate governance attributes and the proba-
bility of firm default. They use the Merton’s (1974) probability of default as a measure of
the likelihood of firm failure in order to characterise the relationship between corporate
governance and the chance of default. Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016), a study on corpo-
rate governance and risk-taking, identify the Altman Z-score (also used by, Houston et al.
2010; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009) and the Merton’s distance to default (also
used by, Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Gropp et al. 2006) as measures for default risk in
bank risk-taking. Bharath and Shumway (2004) critique the KMV measure of bankruptcy
prediction. Bottazzi et al (2011) undertook a study on financial and economic determinants
of firm default and use Distance to Default, developed from Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1974), as a measure of financial soundness. Ting (2011) used the KMV measure
for default prediction in a study of the TMT compensation in China
This research uses the Bloomberg probability of default measure at 1 year and 5 years to
predict the likelihood of firm default. This section provides a summary of a recent case
study provided by Bloomberg Professional Services (2018), assessing a firm’s credit default
risk and supply impacts. The focus of the article is on one of the largest UK construction
firms, Carillion PLC that entered compulsory liquidation on 15 January 2018. It was the
UK’s largest corporate default in a decade, which involved over 43,000 employees, and
over £1.6bn in debts.
Fig. 3.11 Collapse of Carillion plc share price (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
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The focus of the article is on identifying the value of using Bloomberg to measure the risk
of default using Carillion as a case study. The Bloomberg 1 year probability of default
showed that on 13 July 2017, there was a 4.85% probability of Carillion’s default. Fig.
3.11 shows that the point at which the share price of Carillion collapsed the Bloomberg
probability of default had categorised the firm as high yield (HY-5) which is only two
categorises away from distressed. Further adding to its credibility in predicting default.
This was identified because of low earnings and the first of three profit warnings. The
article further identifies the current probability of default and the share price change of
Carillion, selected competitors, suppliers and lenders, leading to Interserve PLC being
monitored by UK government, which currently has a similar likelihood of default of 4.49%
to that of Carillion in July 2017. This data is presented in Fig. B.10 (in appendix B) which
clearly shows a competitor of Carillion in a similar position in January 2018 to that of
Carillion six months prior. Balachandran et al. (2010) used data from the Bloomberg
terminal in a study on the probability of default, excessive risk and executive compensation.
3.12 Conclusion
This chapter provided a review of the UK corporate insolvency system, a background on
the empirical work undertaken in prior TMT literature. The changing role of the CEO
and TMT from powerful individuals with high levels of freedom to heavily compensated
individuals with reduced autonomy and increased scrutiny. Some of the most significant
causes of default identified could be argued were due to weak or inefficient TMT. It
was also found that TMT personal attributes, such as CEO’s past personal default, had
a link with default. Key literature on Corporate Governance and Credit Risk showed
that when advanced statistical modelling is employed the relationship between these two
either does not exists or is not very clear. The results from research in different countries,
such as Australia and North America, also provided different results pointing towards
different corporate governance mechanisms having different results on the firm outcomes.
Empirical research showed organisational failure to be a downward spiral where as a
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weakness develops the tendency for additional problems to occur increases. In order to
escape this downward spiral many researchers have looked to its relationship to the TMT
composition. This chapter explored the concepts of executive motivation, TMT loyalty
and TMT effectiveness within the context of existing empirical work, providing further
development to the theoretical model and hypothesis identified in Chapter 2.
The review of empirical work on executive compensation, a key attribute of executive
motivation, has increased over the years which has also seen the demand in executive skills
changing from firm-specific to more generic skills. This increase in levels of compensation
has been studied within the context of different firm outcomes, mostly firm performance.
This chapter also reviews empirical work linking executive compensation and firm financial
risk and identifies that declining firms have difficulty retaining talented executives. The
study operationalises executive compensation by using executive salary as a short-term
motivation variable and executive bonus as a long-term motivation variable.
Empirical studies focussing on TMT demographics, backgrounds and experiences have
found some link with firm performance. TMT tenure, a key attribute of TMT loyalty,
has witnessed a decline on average since the early 1980s. The spread of tenure within
teams has also been explored to understand the strategic thinking process of TMT teams.
Empirical work has found there to be a link between longer employee tenure, increased
power and increased loyalty.
Attributes of power or effectiveness such as CEO Duality is found to be more common
in some countries than others, specifically it is not very common within the UK listed
companies’ due to the corporate governance guidelines. The relationship between TMT
effectiveness and firm outcomes has been studied through exploring concepts such as
duality, succession and board attributes. Whilst the focus of some empirical work has
been on specifically the CEO’s effectiveness the rest has focussed on board attributes. The
chapter critiques arguments around TMT effectiveness and hypothesises that in order for a
TMT to be effective this has to be done at two levels i.e. the board level and the firm level.
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The size of the board is viewed as a key attribute of TMT board level effectiveness and the
number of employees is viewed as a key attribute of TMT firm level effectiveness.
Finally, this chapter reviewed existing default prediction models and identifies that some
models are more sophisticated and complex and have continued to develop over the years
as technological advancements allow for more real-time data to be incorporated in the
calculations. However, empirical evidence defends the simpler models, such as the Altman
Z-score, which continues to provide strong results. Hence, the Altman Z-score is used as
a measure of the likelihood of firm default along with the Bloomberg default prediction
models based on the original Merton’s distance to default model.
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Chapter 4
Research Methodology and Design
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the key philosophical and methodological arguments within Top
Management Team (TMT) research. It starts by critiquing the key research philosophical
approaches followed by the variations in research strategy. The range of methodological
choices is then discussed within the context of the philosophical and strategic choices. The
chapter then provides an overview of the methodological approach adopted in this study
followed by the research setting and design. A justification for undertaking multilevel
analysis beyond traditional multiple regression is then provided. The population and
sample selection technique are described followed by a review of the key variables in this
study. Finally, the chapter concludes by providing a background on the method of data
analysis and the generalisability, validity and reliability of the findings.
4.2 Research Philosophy
Research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of knowledge.
The nature of knowledge is referred to as Ontology and the development of knowledge
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is referred to as Epistemology. Saunders et al. (2012) present ‘the research onion’ to
examine the different research philosophies and the underlying assumptions. The research
philosophy adopted is important as it contains assumptions about the way in which the
world is viewed.
4.2.1 Philosophical consideration
4.2.1.1 Ontological consideration
In order to understand Ontology, it is important to ask the question “What is reality?”.
Saunders et al. (2012) describe two aspects of ontology, nature of reality, as objectivism
and subjectivism. The relationships and issues between ontology and epistemology emerge
together (Crotty, 1998). Guba and Lincoln (1994, p108) argue that “if, for example, a ‘real’
reality is assumed, the posture of the knower will be one of objective detachment. . . ” The
debate between an objective or subjective ontology relates to how the world is viewed.
Macquarrie (1973) argues that galaxies, trees, rocks etc. would continue to exist even if
there were no human beings. However, Crotty (1998) suggests that the world becomes
meaningful only when meaning-making beings make sense of it.
4.2.1.2 Epistemological consideration
In order to understand Epistemology, it is important to ask the question “What is acceptable
knowledge in a particular field?” Epistemology put simply is how does one know what is
reality. A positivist researcher may put more emphasis on measuring phenomena which
may not be traditionally measurable (human feelings) however an interpretivist researcher
may place more emphasis on the narrative provided to understand a phenomenon such as
human feelings.
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4.2.1.3 Relationship of ontology and epistemology - The paradigm debate
An understanding of the ontology and epistemology subscribed to gives rise to the theoreti-
cal perspective subscribed to for undertaking the chosen research. Theoretical Perspectives
simply are what approach can be used to get knowledge? These perspectives or philosophy
have been broadly categorised in management research as Positivism, Realism, Interpre-
tivism and Pragmatism (Saunders et al., 2012). The table 4.1 below summarises the key
points relating to each perspective and its underlying assumptions.
4.2.2 Philosophical approaches
Kamil (2011) provides a pictorial overview of philosophical standpoints in Management
Research. This is presented in Fig. 4.1 which shows the link between the different research
philosophies, approaches and methodologies.
Fig. 4.1 Philosophical approaches in Management research (Source: Kamil, 2011)
The development of research philosophies through the combination of different epistemo-
logical and ontological stances are presented in table 4.1. It highlights the development of
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and the key points relevant to each research philosophy. In table 4.1, it is important to note
that these boxes are not fixed and should be noted as being fluid. The terms ’Erklaren’ and
’Verstehen’ are German which translate as ’Explain’ and ’Understand’ respectively.
Table 4.1 Research Philosophy summary adopted from Crotty (1998) and Saunders et al. (2012)
Ontology
(nature of
reality)
Epistemology
(what consti-
tutes acceptable
knowledge)
Axiology Theoretical Per-
spective
Key points
Objective
and Inde-
pendent
of social
actors
Objectivism.
Only observable
phenomena can
provide credible
data and facts
Researcher
is inde-
pendent of
data and
maintains
objective
stance
Positivism
(Francis Bacon,
1561-1626; Au-
guste Comte,
1798-1857).
Post-Positivism
(Werner Heisen-
berg, 1901-76;
Niels Bohr, 1885-
1962. Sir Karl
Popper 1902-94)
That tree in the forest is a tree regardless of whether any-
one is aware of its existence or not. Positivism today is
closely linked to empirical science and a logical positivist
is a lover of science. Objects in the world have meaning
prior to, and independently of, any consciousness of them.
Werner Heisenberg and the ‘uncertainty principle’ – impossi-
ble to know both the position and momentum of a subatomic
particle. Niels Bohr. Schrodinger’s cat
Objective
and inde-
pendent
of human
thoughts
and be-
liefs but
interpreted
through
social con-
ditioning
Critical Insuffi-
cient data means
inaccuracies
in sensations.
Phenomena cre-
ate sensations
which are open to
misrepresentation
Researcher
is biased
by world
views,
cultural
experi-
ences and
upbringing
Realism (Direct
Realism and
Critical Realism);
Bhaskar (1989),
Dobson (2002).
Relativism
Direct Realism argues that what the researcher experiences
portrays the world accurately Critical Realism argues that
images of the things in the real world are experienced not
the things directly. A researcher only understands the social
world if they understand the social structures Relativism
refers to ‘the way things are’ is really just ‘the sense we
make of them’
Subjective
and reality
may change
Constructionism
Subjectivism Sub-
jective meanings
and social phe-
nomena. Focus
on the details of
situations and
reality behind the
situations
Researcher
is part
of what
is being
researched
and can-
not be
separated
Interpretivism
(Max weber
1864-1920);
Phenomenology;
Hermeneutics;
Critical Inquiry;
Feminism; Post-
modernism;
Symbolic Interac-
tionism
Constructionism rejects the view of human knowledge and
there is no objective truth waiting to be discovered. Mean-
ing is not discovered but constructed Different people may
construct meaning in different ways even in relation to the
same phenomena i.e. meaning is created out of something
(the object) Interpretivism – Different ways of viewing the
world influences different ways of researching the world
Phenomology refers to how humans make sense of the world
around them Symbolic Interactionism refers to the changing
meaning of the world around by interacting with others and
making meaning of those interactions Hermeneutics is the
science of biblical interpretations
View cho-
sen to best
enable
answering
research
question
Pragmatism
Observable
phenomena
and subjective
meanings can pro-
vide acceptable
knowledge
Researcher
adopting
both ob-
jective and
subjective
points of
view
Pragmatism Most important determinant is the research question If pos-
itivism or interpretivism is not clearly identified then prag-
matism argues that it is appropriate to use a variation in the
epistemology, ontology and axiology
4.2.2.1 Research Philosophy adopted
In the area of research focused on the TMT, as with corporate governance and social
science as a whole, there have been various research methods with different philosophical
underpinnings. In order to select an appropriate research methodology, it is important to
not just look at the research question or the area under investigation, but also consider
126
4.2. Research Philosophy
the philosophical stance of the researcher. It is important to recognise the theoretical
perspective used to answer this research question. This research uses an objectivist
epistemology and a positivistic perspective through experimental design and sampling.
This research embeds the philosophy of positivism to answer the research question similar
to a majority of research within the field of financial distress and TMT attributes. The
answer to this research question exists independent of the understanding of the researcher
i.e. an objective reality and observable phenomena can provide meaningful data and
facts. The phenomena of interest are converted to measurable variables, which provide
meaningful results.
McAuly et al. (2007) argues that positivism is the dominant philosophical stance within
organizational theory and not undertaking research using this philosophical stance requires
the researcher to justify their decision. The positivist approach enables the collection of
quantitative data from a larger sample of firms through secondary sources which is not
affected by any human relationships. On the contrary using an interpretive approach may
require an in-depth study of individual TMT’s of listed organisations. This has been a
frustration for researchers as gaining access to individual TMT’s of listed organisations is
extremely difficult and due to listing requirements around disclosure of information, these
firms would not divulge information freely.
A positivist world today is a ‘mathematised world’ (Crotty, 1998) and Husserl (1970)
attributes this mathematisation to the world of Galileo. Crotty (1998) summarises that
the real world for a Galilean scientist is a quantifiable world. He further argues that
positivism within the social sciences is a less arrogant form of positivism and it talks of
probability rather than certainty and seeks to approximate truth rather than aspiring to
grasp it in its totality or essence. The Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty principle’ argues that the
laws of physics are relative statements and to some extent subjective perceptions rather
than objective certainties. Popper finds scientific knowledge being established by scientists
making guesses and failing to prove the guess wrong, despite efforts to do so (Crotty,1998).
Therefore, challenging the traditional scientific method. Gill and Johnson (2010) further
argue that a positivist researcher will most likely use a highly structured methodology in
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order to facilitate replication. A key advantage is “that there is a point at which an observer
can stand back and objectively or neutrally observe what they understand to be an external
reality” (McAuley et al. 2007:33).
Phenomenology or interpretivism, in contrast to positivism, argues that the world is so-
cially constructed by the subjective interpretations of the people within. This philosophical
approach requires the direct and practical involvement of the researcher with the phenom-
ena under study, where the theory is developed inductively as elements appear through
investigation (Stiles, 2003). Glaser and Strauss (2004) argue that under this philosophical
approach, through the use of approaches such as grounded theory, a greater richness of
data can be achieved as it allows discovery of new ideas and theories. However, compared
to the positivist approach there is the possibility of generating unclear and less precise
credible work, due to the possibility of distortion imposed and values imposed by the
researcher (Evered and Louis, 1991; Easterby-Smith et al., 2012).
The neo-empiricism philosophical position is also known as that of qualitative positivism.
Neo-empiricism accepts the concept of empiricism but rejects falsification to give way for
the induction of theory. Johnson et al. (2006) highlight that the neo-empiricism is often
used to generate a grounded theory that explains and predicts behaviour. Prasad and Prasad
(2002) argue that qualitative positivism assumes reality to be concrete and independent of
the researcher unlike that of phenomenology, however, non-quantitative methods are used
to study the nature of reality.
The critical theory focuses on understanding and attaining "truth" or "reality" by focusing
on social constructions and reflexive communications. Kamil (2011) highlights that critical
realists are of the notion that truth or reality exists but it depends on the subject’s subjective
knowledge in knowing that truth. Therefore, it is vital to start by viewing the world from
the perspective of the subject, taking the subjects subjective knowledge into account, and
then develop an inductive theory which is critical to the behaviour of the subject. Hence,
requiring critical consciousness and participation of all members (Johnson et al., 2006)
and it is given the name of critical theory.
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The postmodernism movement developed as a response to modernism. Where modernism
comprises the positivists philosophy, post modernism lacks clear central hierarchy or
organising principles. Lyotard (1999, p3) argued that the status of knowledge alters and
cannot remain unchanged. Gergen et al. (1992) critiqued most organisational research as
its underlying principles were mechanical models of human behaviour. Therefore, in order
to understand human behaviour a postmodern philosophy is more appropriate. However, it
is difficult to define postmodernism. Best and Kellner (1991, p2) argued that there is no
one definition of postmodern theory and Featherstone (1988, p207) suggested that there
may be as many definitions of postmodern theory as there are post modernists. The central
understanding is that there is no objective truth waiting to be discovered and meaning is
not discovered but instead it is constructed.
To summarise I intend to carry out this research through the Positivistic philosophy using a
deductive approach, secondary data and statistical techniques. This means that I will seek
to make sense of the data objectively as I have an objectivist epistemology. I also have an
objective ontology as I believe reality is out there, independent of the researcher.
4.3 Research strategy
The research aim, objectives and clarity on the theory all help identify the research approach
or strategy that underpins the research. In simple terms, the two research approaches of
deduction and induction are inverses of each other. A deductive research approach allows
the researcher to design a strategy to test hypotheses developed from theory whereas an
inductive research approach allows the researcher to design a strategy that helps develop
theory from data analysed. Saunders et al. (2012) suggest that these research approaches
could be aligned to specific research philosophies i.e. deduction to positivism and induction
to interpretivism, however, doing so would be misleading and have no real practical value.
Bryman and Bell (2007) argue that the choice of induction or deduction research strategy
is key as it is a key factor regarding the relationship between theory and research.
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4.3.1 Deductive approach and Quantitative method
A deductive research approach most commonly involves quantitative research method-
ologies. The deductive approach, as presented in Fig. 4.2, entails the development of a
theoretical structure followed by its testing through empirical observations. The process
of deduction commences through the review of the literature and theoretical reflections,
which develops hypotheses. These concepts within the hypotheses are operationalised to
ensure they are observable. The concepts then observed and measured allow for the testing
of the hypotheses in order to either discard the theory or alternatively creation of unfalsified
laws that explain the past and predict future observations. The observable concepts within
quantitative research can be categorised as Independent variables, Dependent variables
and extraneous variables. Blaikie (2009), identifies the stages of a deductive research
approach as hypothesis setting, using existing literature provide conditions where the
theory is expected to hold, examine and compare the arguments with existing theories,
test the premises by collecting appropriate data and either reject and modify the theory or
accept the theory based on results of the analysis.
Theory
Hypothesis
Observation
Confirmation
Fig. 4.2 Process of Deduction in research developed from Gill and Johnson (2010)
In the quantitative research process, measurement is a key step. The measurement step
allows concepts to be made researchable and links theoretical concepts to empirical
research. The focus of quantitative research involves attempting to establish a causal
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relationship between measures, which are indicative of the underlying concepts. These
concepts are a general reflection of the social world, which are embedded in hypotheses.
These hypotheses are formulated based on theoretical reflection and reviews of the literature.
The concepts need to be made observable to formulate hypotheses in order to then accept
or reject these hypotheses. The Fig. 4.2 provides a diagrammatic representation of the
deduction research strategy.
Amaratunga et al. (2002) argue that the conducting of the research and research analysis
for a quantitative approach is easier than a qualitative approach as the former is highly
structured. Gill and Johnson (2002) highlight that there are some key criticisms of the
deductive research strategy, as it tends to treat human beings separate from their social
contexts. Secondly, it limits the data collection and results in ignoring interesting findings
due to the highly structured nature of the strategy. Thirdly, the researcher is seen as
independent and objective. Finally, measuring a complex phenomenon through a single
variable could be misleading. Easterby-Smith (1991) highlights some of the many strengths
of a quantitative approach:
• comparison and replication
• independence of the observer
• objective measures
• reliability and validity determined more objectively
4.4 Research methods and methodologies
Research methodology is the basis under which the research is carried out. Fig. 4.3 shows
the link between the two extreme research philosophies with that of the different research
methods. Whilst some methods show a clear alignment to a philosophical stance there
are many that can be used by either. It is the selection and use of particular strategies
and techniques to collect and analyse data (Remenyi et al. 1998). The research aim and
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objectives are key to determining the most appropriate methodology to undertake the
research. Amaratunga et al. (2002) argue that there are a limitless number of tactics and
variations to research methods and some may be seen as more scientific than others. A
summary of some of the key methods is shown in the table below.
Fig. 4.3 Research methods and philosophical base (Source: Amaratunga et al., 2002)
Bryman (2003) argues that archival research refers to documents with sources of data that
are historic and present even though the name may suggest otherwise. Archival research
undertaken to study TMT, corporate governance and finance usually takes the form of
secondary data which is analysed using statistical techniques. The presence of present and
historical documents and data allows the researcher to focus on the study over a period of
time or compare between different periods of time.
A key weakness of this method is that the data may not be directly suitable to the focus
of the study. It may also contain missing or inaccurate information as it may not have
been produced for research purposes (Saunders et al., 2012). However, secondary data
methods have the benefits similar to those of the survey methods i.e. its economical, quick
and allow the researcher to generalise the results to the larger population. In addition, it
also overcomes some of the weaknesses of survey methods i.e. the low response rate and
different understanding of respondents. Amaratunga et al. (2002) further highlight that the
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outcome of such methods is a sizeable volume of information that is easily classified by
type, frequency and central tendency. Hakim (2000) further argues that this data allows the
researcher to study the reality relating to the phenomena.
Whilst it lacks the flexibility provided by interviews, participant observations and case
studies a well valid and reliable secondary data approach would provide results that are
generalisable to the larger population. The secondary data method is usually associated
with deduction hence provides results independent of the subjective interpretations of the
researcher and allows for comparison and replication of findings.
4.5 Methodological approach in this research
Nielsen (2010a) undertook a review of sixty TMT journal articles published over a twenty
two year period. The results presented in Fig. 4.4 shows that Upper echelons theory was
most often combined with social psychological theories, followed by strategy processes
and firm internationalisation theory.
Fig. 4.4 Theories used in TMT research (Source: Nielsen, 2010a)
The focus of these studies, presented in Fig. 4.5, was the TMT followed by the TMT and
CEO, TMT and Board; and Business Unit managers. This further emphasises the need for
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studying the independent and interacting effects of TMT, the board of directors and CEOs
and management at lower levels.
Fig. 4.5 Focus of TMT research (Source: Nielsen, 2010a)
In terms of diversity, presented in Fig. 4.6, the majority of studies focused on function,
followed by team tenure, age, educational background, company tenure and elite education.
Non-work related observable aspects, such as gender diversity and national diversity, were
found to be far less studied.
Fig. 4.6 Diversity variables studied in TMT research (Source: Nielsen, 2010a)
In terms of methodology, presented in Fig. 4.7, it was found that quantitative studies
remained dominant with Archival and Survey methods being used for a majority of the
studies and very few used case study or computer simulations.
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Fig. 4.7 Methodological approach employed in TMT research (Source: Nielsena, 2010a)
A majority of these studies used Databases such as Dun and Bradsheet or Standard and
Poors or undertook a survey, followed by interviews with executives and collecting data
from annual reports. This can be seen in Fig. 4.8 where databases were used in 31 studies
followed by surveys in 26 studies.
Fig. 4.8 Data collection method employed in TMT research (Source: Nielsen, 2010a)
In terms of statistical analysis, presented in Fig. 4.9, OLS was the most commonly used
method, followed by structural equation modelling, correlation, Survival analysis, ANOVA
and T-test. A number of studies used lagged dependent variable to ensure the direction
of causality and only a small number of studies using panel datasets used fixed effects or
random effects or pooled OLS.
135
4.5. Methodological approach in this research
Fig. 4.9 Statistical techniques employed to analyse TMT research (Source: Nielsen, 2010a)
A majority of the studies attempted to collect data on all units of a specific industry or index
and only a small number of studies used a random sampling approach. The sample size for
studies undertaking quantitative research varied from 27 to 402 companies with a number
of studies having a sample size of fewer than 100 firms. The investigated companies were
a majority of US-based firms with the only exception of single studies on Canadian and
Dutch firms. Blau index and coefficient of variation are accepted as the norm to study TMT
diversity however, Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) found that different operationalisation
of diversity may lead to different empirical results and false conclusions.
Whilst a few studies used ANOVA techniques, mixed coefficient models were rarely used
in the upper echelons theory and Nielsen (2010a) recommended to pursue further research
using these methods to analyse multilevel relationships and cross-level interactions between
individual, team, firm and industry levels of analysis.
In terms of analysing environmental contexts, such as industry-specific conditions, they
have been studied by splitting the sample according to different industries (Keck, 1997;
Norburn and Birley, 1988) or industry dummies (Krishnan et al., 1997). Carpenter (2002),
used an interaction variable between TMT attributes and environmental attributes. Nielsen
(2010a) recommended that in a cross-sectional sample it would be interesting to use a
random intercept (different intercept for each industry) and a random slope (different slope
for the relationship between TMT attributes and firm-level outcome for each industry).
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Finkelstein and Hambrick (1996) introduce the concept of "supra TMT", i.e. the aggre-
gation of TMT and the board. However, Jensen and Zajac (2004) found no support for
this concept and criticised the use of aggregate-level analysis. Nielsen (2010a) identifies
challenges in TMT research and uses Webb and Coombs (2005) as recommendations to
address these which is shown in Fig. 4.10. A key suggestion is to use hierarchical linear
modelling to address the issues of multilevel analysis within TMT research.
Fig. 4.10 Methodological challenges for TMT research (Source: Nielsen (2010a) adapted from
Ireland, Webb and Coombs (2005))
It is important to note that a researcher may adopt a philosophy or a research may adopt
different philosophies depending on the particular research question to be answered (Saun-
ders et al., 2012). This is known as pragmatism, where the research question determines
the epistemology, ontology and axiology to be adopted. In addition, where the research
question does not clearly suggest the adoption of positivist or interpretivist philosophy
then a pragmatist approach can be adopted which would further justify the use of mixed
methods. According to the ‘onion’ (Saunders et al., 2012), this research adopts a positivism
philosophy, through a deductive approach, utilising a mono experimental methodology on
hierarchical data.
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This research adopts a quantitative research methodology. In the quantitative research
process, measurement is a key step. The measurement step allows concepts to be made
researchable and links theoretical concepts to empirical research. The focus of quantitative
research involves attempting to establish a causal relationship between measures, which
are indicative of the underlying concepts. These concepts are a general reflection of the
social world, which are embedded in hypotheses. These hypotheses are formulated based
on theoretical reflection and reviews of the literature. The concepts need to be made
observable to formulate hypotheses in order to then accept or reject these hypotheses.
This research undertakes a deductive research approach. A deductive research approach
most commonly involves quantitative research methodologies. The deductive approach
entails the development of a theoretical structure followed by its testing through empirical
observations. The process of deduction commences through the review of the literature
and theoretical reflections, which develops hypotheses. These concepts within the hy-
potheses are operationalised to ensure they are observable. The concepts then observed
and measured allow for the testing of the hypotheses in order to either discard the the-
ory or alternatively creation of unfalsified laws that explain the past and predict future
observations. The observable concepts within quantitative research can be categorised
as Independent variables, Dependent variables and extraneous variables. Blaikie (2009),
identifies the stages of a deductive research approach as hypothesis setting, using existing
literature provide conditions where the theory is expected to hold, examine and compare
the arguments with existing theories, test the premises by collecting appropriate data and
either reject and modify the theory or accept the theory based on results of the analysis.
4.6 Research Questions
• Is there a relationship between key TMT attributes and the likelihood of firm financial
distress?
– Is there a relationship between executive motivation and the likelihood of firm
financial distress?
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– Is there a relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of firm financial
distress?
– Is there a relationship between TMT effectiveness and the likelihood of firm
financial distress?
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4.7 Research Objectives
The key objectives of the research are:
1. To critically review and synthesise the literature on key TMT theories.
2. To critically review and synthesise the literature on the TMT and firm performance.
3. To critically review and synthesises literature: establishing the scope, conceptualising
and classifying the determinants of the probability of firm default.
4. To develop a Theoretical model to test the relationship between TMT and the
probability of firm default.
5. To empirically test the theoretical framework model using UK FTSE 100 listed
companies and to test the empirical model on an out of sample case.
6. To identify future corporate governance recommendations for listed companies
facing financial distress. And, to provide recommendations based on the analysis of
the key findings.
4.8 Research Setting
The focus of this research is on the UK corporate climate. Companies listed in the UK are
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) through either membership of the main market
or the alternative market. Companies listed on the LSE become constituents of either the
FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE 350, FTSE All Share and the AIM. This membership to an
Index is based on the market capitalisation of the company. Companies listed on the FTSE
100 are the top 100 companies by market capitalisation listed on the LSE. Companies on
the FTSE 250 are the 101st to 350th largest companies by market capitalisation listed on
the LSE. The FTSE 350 index is a combination of companies on the FTSE 100 and the
FTSE 250. The FTSE all share index constitutes all the companies listed on the main
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market of the LSE. The AIM is the Alternative Investment Market which constitutes
companies that either does not qualify for a full listing on the main market or does not
choose to be listed on the main market.
The first version of the UK corporate governance code was produced in 1992 by the
Cadbury committee and is often referred to as the Cadbury report. The set of principles
developed in this report became part of the LSE’s listing rules and the code also introduced
the principle of ’comply or explain’. The three basic recommendations of the report
focussed on the separation of the CEO and Chairman roles, at least 3 non-executive
directors on the board and the audit committee of each board should compose of non-
executive directors.
There have been a number of revisions to the code over the years and 20 years later, in
2012, the Financial Reporting Council published a revised code UK Corporate Governance
Code. The changes included quality of reporting by the Audit Committees, confirma-
tion by the Board that the annual report and accounts are as a whole fair, balanced and
understandable, and that companies report and explain progress on policies relating to
boardroom diversity. This revised code applies to all companies with a listing on the main
market from accounting periods beginning on or after 1 October 2012.
4.9 Research Design
This research uses secondary data collected from archival sources and analysed using
multiple regression and multilevel modelling. A thorough literature review was undertaken
to identify different relationships that may exist and have an impact on the TMTs of
a firm and the likelihood of firm default. This led to the research focus on key TMT
attributes and the identification of key independent, dependent and control variables. The
control variables in this study are not physical controls such as in experiments where
cases are assigned to a control group and experimental group. Instead, the control of
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extraneous variables is achieved at the data analysis stage through multiple regression (Gill
and Johnson, 2010) and hierarchical or multilevel modelling (Field et al., 2012).
Undertaking simple multiple regression for data that is hierarchical in nature could lead
to misleading or inconsistent results hence a justification for undertaking hierarchical or
multilevel modelling is discussed below. Multilevel modelling is not undertaken as a
replacement for multiple regression instead it is done after undertaking multiple regression
to further understand the relationship within the hierarchical nature of the data and provides
the analysis further robustness.
4.9.1 Justification for using multilevel modelling
Multilevel analysis is a methodology used where the data has a hierarchical structure.
This method of modelling is also often referred to as Linear Mixed Effects modelling
or Hierarchical modelling. The multilevel nature of the data can be as a result sampling
(stratified random sampling) or natural nesting (teams within companies and companies
within years). This type of data is not represented well by traditional multiple regression
analysis and hence the hierarchical linear model is recommended (Hox, 2002; Snijders
and Bosker, 1999; Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). In the real world variables are clustered
or nested within other variables i.e. for this research, variables clustered around or nested
around sector, companies and time periods. The sector, company and time period are the
contextual variables and the dataset can be described as hierarchical data. The hierarchical
structure of the data can be seen in Fig. 4.11. This shows that the sector is a level 3 variable,
company is a level 2 variable and the time period is a level 1 variable. However, the sector
is a variable that is controlled for in the model design.
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Nielsen (2010b) argues that in longitudinal research, where company data is collected over
a number of years, multilevel analysis allows to determine to what extent the observed
effect is "true" between the dependent and independent variables. It is similar to panel
methods where the variability within groups can me modelled and inferences about the
relationship can be drawn from the differences within and between groups.
Field et al. (2012) highlights that contextual variables in the hierarchy introduce depen-
dency in the data i.e. correlation between residuals. Therefore, companies within the same
sector will be similar and time periods within the same company will be similar however
this violates the independence assumption in linear regression.
The interclass correlation (ICC), is a gauge of whether a contextual variable has an effect on
the outcome. The variability within sectors, for example, is small and variability between
sectors is large so the ICC will be large. Conversely, if the variability within sectors is
large and that the variability between sectors is small so the ICC will be small.
Field et al. (2012) highlights a few benefits of multilevel modelling:
• Multilevel modelling allows the modelling of variability in regression slopes, which
allows to overcome the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes
• Multilevel modelling allows to model for the violation of the assumption of indepen-
dence where ordinary regression fails
• And, multilevel data does not require complete data, balanced dataset design, and
parameters are estimated successfully with available data. Whereas, traditional
designs require cases with missing observations to be omitted.
Field et al. (2012) further highlights that a vast majority of academic research treats
variables as fixed effects. Fixed effects, however, can only be generalised to the situations
in the experiment and Random effects can be generalised beyond the situations in the
experiment (provided that the situations are representative). In ordinary regression, it is
assumed that intercepts and slopes are fixed. However, multilevel modelling allows the
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introduction of the intercept and slope to be random i.e. to vary across contexts. In the
random intercept model, the models within the different contexts have the same shape but
are located in different geometric space (have different intercepts). This random intercept
model is similar to the fixed effects approach in panel methods (Raudenbush and Bryk,
2002; Snijders and Bosker, 1999).
In the random slope model, when the regression assumption of homogeneity of regression
slopes is not tenable, the models within the different contexts converge on a single intercept
but have different slopes. However, it would be unusual to assume random slopes without
random intercepts as variability in the slopes would create variability in the intercepts.
Therefore, the most realistic situation is to assume that both intercepts and slopes vary
around the overall model.
Nielsen (2010b) argues that multilevel analysis is more appropriate than traditional re-
gression analysis for data with hierarchical (nested) structure. This allows the research to
acknowledge that observations within a group (team, company or sector) are more similar
to each other than observations from different groups.
4.10 Population, sample and sampling techniques
Polit and Beck (2004) population as the entire set of objects have some common char-
acteristic. The population of this study is all publicly listed companies in the UK. They
further argue that the population of interest to the researcher, to which the findings may
be generalised, is known as the target population. The target population of this study is
all publicly listed companies. The authors define an accessible population as a subsection
of the population, fixed in time and space. The accessible population of this study is
the publicly listed companies on the FTSE 100 index. As secondary data for the FTSE
100 companies are easily available from the Bloomberg database the census technique of
sampling was employed for this study.
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The research studies companies listed on the FTSE 100 index as of 31st December 2016.
The data was collected for all sectors except the financial sector. The observations for
the financial sector were not included in the study due to their unique nature, financing,
regulation, minimum capital requirements, recent scandals/fines (PPI) and senior leader
recruitment criteria etc. This is supported by studies undertaken by Shyam-Sunder and
Myers (1999), Rajan and Zingales (1995), Kisgen (2006, 2009), Ozkan (2000, 2001 and
2002) and Bevan and Danbolt (2004) who also excluded financial firms, such as banks,
insurance agencies and other financial firms. The period of the study is from 2013 to 2016
as the revision to the corporate governance code for 2012 applied to listed companies in
their reporting from the financial year end 2013. Fig. 4.12 highlights key revisions to
the UK Corporate governance code over the past 25 years. The data collection period
for this study commences when the key revision relating to boardroom diversity was
introduced and the data collection period ends when a consultation for a comprehensive
code review commenced. The year 2013 also marks the end of a 20 year period since the
initial introduction of the UK corporate governance code in 1992.
Fig. 4.12 Key revisions to the UK Corporate Governance Code (Source: FRC, 2018)
In addition the dataset prior to 2013 had many missing observations for multiple variables.
The data for the study was collected from the Bloomberg database and a random check of
this data was conducted with company annual reports to check its validity and reliability.
A complete data set without any missing observations were available for the FTSE 100
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firms with the oldest firm-year being 2013. A further filter was applied to remove financial
firms, which takes the final number of firm-year observations to 259.
In comparison to previous studies, focusing on TMT and organizational outcomes (firm
performance) this study covers a suitable database in terms of length of period and number
of firms. Table 4.2 provides a summary of population, sample sizes and the period of the
study for a few key articles.
Table 4.2 Sample sizes in previous studies (Source:Authors own collection)
Year Author Number of
Firms/Firm-
years
Period of Study Key features
1993 Gilson and Vetsuypens 77 firms 1981 to 1987 Publicly traded firms
1993 Haleblian and Finkel-
stein
47 firms - -
2000 Kilduff et al 35 firms - Simulated firms from 159 managers
2002 Carpenter 472 firm-
years
1990 to 1997 -
2002 Carpenter and Sanders 199 firms - 250 firms from S&P 500, final sample 199
2003 Collins and Clark 73 firms - High technology firms
2004 Carpenter and Sanders 224 firms - US multinationals
2008 Goll et al. - 1972 to 1995 Longitudnal study
2008 Cannella et al. 207 firms - US firms from 11 industries
2009 Boone and Hendriks 33 firms - Information technology
2010b Nielsen 165 firms - Swiss listed firms
2010 Annique - 2007 to 2009 Western European firms
2011 Ting 433 firms 2001 to 2005 Chinese firms
2012 Dezsö and Ross - 15 years S&P 500 firms
2013 Nielsen and Nielsen 146 firms 2001 to 2008 Swiss firms from 32 industries
2016 Tanikawa and Jung 744 firms - Japanese manufacturing firms
2017 Georgakakis et al. 347 firm-
years
2005 to 2009 International firms
2017 Tanikawa et al. 867 firms - Korean manufacturing firms
2017 Schultz et al. 222 firms 2000 to 2007 Australian firms
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Large datasets could raise issues, as the variables under consideration may not remain
consistent over the entire period of the study. The dataset was collected using Bloomberg
add-in for excel and then sorted for individual companies over different periods.
4.11 Measures and justification of variables
This section focusses on highlighting the concepts, identifying and defining variables used
to measure the concepts and specifying the models used in the study. The section starts
by identifying, defining the dependent variables, followed by identifying, defining the
independent variables, then identifying, and defining the control variables. The control
variables are those, which have been identified in the prior literature, theoretically and
empirically, to have an impact on firm outcomes and specifically the probability of default.
Schultz et al. (2017) quote that the relationship between the probability of default and
corporate governance can be viewed as follows:
Probability o f de f ault = f (Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Control Variables)
The section below provides a discussion on the probability of default, the independent
variables used in the study and the control variables. This section highlights the variables
selected to measure the concepts underlying the research question and test the hypotheses.
4.11.1 Dependent Variables
This research uses the Altman Z-score, Bloomberg probability of default measure at 1
year and 5 years to predict the likelihood of firm default. As discussed earlier the Altman
Z-score is the accounting based default prediction model and the two Bloomberg measures
are based on the Merton (1974) default prediction model which is the market-based model.
Here, the 1-year measure provides the likelihood of default in the short-term and the 5-year
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measure provides the likelihood of default in the longer term. The three measures for the
likelihood of firm default are defined as follows:
Accounting measure o f probability o f de f ault = Altman Zscore
Short Term market measure o f probability o f de f ault =
Bloomberg 1year probability o f de f ault
Long Term market measure o f probability o f de f ault =
Bloomberg 5year probability o f de f ault
The Altman Z-score is widely used as a measure for predicting firm default within corporate
governance literature (Krom,2010; Lohrke et al., 2004; Mueller and Barker, 1997; and
Barker III et al., 2001; Mishra et al., 2000). The Altman Z-score has also been used as
a control variable by Dunn (2004) in financial reporting research and accounting fraud
research by Summers and Sweeney (1998).
The Merton (1974) likelihood of default prediction has been used as a measure for risk-
taking within the corporate governance literature (Srivastav and Hagendorff, 2016; Hagen-
dorff and Vallascas,2011; Gropp et al. 2006). In addition, it has been used as a measure for
default prediction within corporate governance (Schultz et al. 2017), TMT compensation in
China (Ting, 2011) and studies on financial and economic determinants of default (Bottazzi
et al. 2011). A majority of these studies calculate the Merton (1974) probability of default
manually for the sample however there are studies such as the Schultz (2017) that use
the Bloomberg probability of default measure as this is calculated based on the Merton’s
(1974) model and is readily available for individuals and institutions that subscribe to the
Bloomberg terminal.
149
4.11. Measures and justification of variables
4.11.2 Independent Variables
The independent variables in this study are to measure the concept of executive motivation,
TMT loyalty and TMT effectiveness. The executive motivation is broken down into short-
term and long-term motivation and TMT effectiveness is broken down into board level
effectiveness and firm-level effectiveness.
4.11.2.1 Executive Motivation
Executive salary, bonus, remuneration or compensation have been used in several TMTs
and corporate governance studies. Schultz et al. (2017) use remuneration as one of the
three broad types (board structure, remuneration and ownership structure) of internal
corporate governance mechanisms in their study of board attributes and the likelihood of
firm default. Corporate governance and default literature have commonly used the fixed
pay (salary) and variable pay (bonus, share options etc.) for executives, non-executives
or both in their study of corporate governance variables (e.g. Schultz et al., 2017; Cao
et al., 2015; Platt and Platt, 2012; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Gilson
and Vetsuypens, 1993). There have been some variations in the precise measure used in
corporate governance and firm performance literature i.e. CEO salary and bonus (Jensen
and Murphy, 1990), CEO and next four highest-paid executives salary, options, common
stock (Wright et al., 2007), percentage of total compensation in salary and bonus (Mehran,
1995), natural-log of the sum of all forms of compensation granted to the top four non-CEO
executives (Carpenter and Sanders, 2004).
This research breaks down executive motivation into short-term motivation and long-term
motivation as follows:
Short Term Executive motivation = (CEO Salary+CFO Salary)/2
Long Term Executive motivation = (CEO Bonus+CFO Bonus)/2
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4.11.2.2 Management Team Loyalty
Tenure is often used to measure and linked to attributes such as power (Cao et al., 2015),
loyalty (Loveman, 1998), patriotism (Hambrick and Fukutomi, 1991; Pfeffer, 1981).
Tenure is also often used as a key measure in financial fraud literature (Daboub et al.,
1995), to assess TMT competency (Vainieri et al., 2017), to assess TMT golden parachutes
(Singh and Harianto, 1989) and in corporate governance literature as a control variable
(Dunn, 2004; Hambrick et al., 2015) to control for key TMT attributes.
This research measures TMT loyalty as follows:
Top Management Team loyalty=(CEO Tenure+CFO Tenure+Chairperson Tenure)/3
4.11.2.3 TMT Effectiveness
Several studies have used board size (number of directors on the board) as a measure of
board effectiveness or board independence such as Schultz et al (2017), Yermack (1996),
Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992). In addition, similar measures in addition
to the one above were also noted in corporate governance and default literature (Switzer
and Wang, 2013a, 2013b; Brédart, 2013, 2014; Platt and Platt, 2012; Aldamen et al. 2012;
Fich and Slezak, 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006). Board size has also been used in
corporate governance and default literature (Schultz et al. 2017), financial fraud literature
(Dunn, 2004), to measure for board effectiveness (Guest, 2009, Cao et al., 2015) and board
efficiency (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen 1993)
The number of employees is often used as a measure for the operational size of the firm
(Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990; O’Reilly III et al. 1988; Richard and Johnson, 2001;
Youndt et al., 1996). The number of employees has also been used as a measure for firm
size when studying the effectiveness of coordination and communication (Blau, 1968;
1970; 1972; Klatzsky, 1970, Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). The number of employees in
this research is not a measure of the size of the firm directly however as a measure of
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the TMT’s effectiveness at the firm level. An increase in firm size leads to problems of
coordination and communication, which in turn points to as the number of employees
increases the TMT is likely going to be more ineffective at the firm level.
This research breaks down TMT effectiveness into effectiveness at board level and effec-
tiveness at firm level as follows:
Top Management Team e f f ectiveness at board level =
Number o f directors on the board
Top Management Team e f f ectiveness at f irm level =
Number o f Employees
4.11.3 Control Variables
This research includes variables shown in prior research (Cao et al., 2015; Wang and Lin,
2010; Klock et al., 2005; Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003) to have an effect on the dependent
and independent variables of interest. These variables are defined and discussed in the
sections to follow.
4.11.3.1 Sector
Cao et al. (2015) control for macroeconomic variables and industry-level variables by
adding year dummies to the regression model and industry dummies, defined by SIC
codes. Previous literature has shown sector (Chava and Jarrow, 2004) and macroeconomic
conditions (Duffie et al. 2007) to play an important role in corporate bankruptcy prediction
models. Wang and Lin (2010), control for the industry in a study of corporate governance
and risk of default. Schultz et al. (2017) include time and industry dummy variables to
account for any correlations across firms such as business cycle effects. Klock et al. (2005)
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control for industry effects by categorising the data into separate industries using the SIC
code.
This research uses the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) to categorise firms
in different sectors.
4.11.3.2 Profitability
Guest (2009) uses ROA to measure profitability, Barker III and Patterson Jr (1996), a study
on the perception of organisational problems by long-tenured TMTs versus short-tenured
teams, used return on assets as a control variable to measure profitability. Mishra et al.
(2000), a study on the effectiveness of CEO pay-for-performance, use industry-adjusted
return on equity as a measure of performance. O’Reilly III et al. (1988), a study examining
economic and psychological factors influencing CEO compensation, use the return on
equity as a measure of profitability. Klock et al. (2005) use return on assets (ROA) as
a measure to control for profitability. Performance of firms has been analysed using
market-based measures (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007; Gregory, 1997; Agrawal et al. 1992)
and accounting-based measures (Dickerson et al., 1997).
This research measures profitability as follows:
Pro f itability = (Return on Assets+Return on Equity)/2
4.11.3.3 Firm Size
Guest (2009) uses market capitalisation as a measure of the firm’s financial size. Cao
et al. (2015) control for firm’s equity size defined as a natural logarithm of the market
capitalisation of a firm’s equity divided by the total index market capitalisation. They
expected the default risk to decrease with an increase in firm size. Wang and Lin (2010),
control for firm size using market capitalisation in a study of corporate governance and
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risk of default. The book value of assets has also been used to control for firm size, which
is also the book value of equity plus liabilities (Klock et al., 2005; Schultz et al., 2017).
Hartzell and Starks (2003), a study investigating Institutional Investors and Executive
Compensation, use the market capitalization as a measure of firm size.
This research uses the market value of equity as a measure for the financial firm size and
shareholder influence. This is not a measure of physical firm size but the value of the
firm or the size of the firm in monetary terms. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) indicate that
economies of scale in underwriting credit would indicate that firm size would be positively
associated with credit rating i.e. higher the credit rating the less likely the firm to default
and hence they use size as a control variable.
This research measures firm size as follows:
Firm Size = (Number o f Shares∗Share Price)
4.11.3.4 Gearing
Guest (2009) uses Total Debt divided by Total Debt + Total Equity to measure gearing.
Schultz et al. (2017) use debt to the total value of firm assets as a measure for leverage
(total firms’ assets is also the book value of equity). Klock et al. (2005) use long-term debt
to total assets as a measure to control for leverage. This research uses the debt to market
value of equity as a measure of gearing.
This research measures gearing as follows:
Gearing = Book value o f Debt/Market value o f Equity
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4.12 Summary of variables and abbreviations
The dependent, independent, control and other variables in this study are presented below.
• Dependent Variables
– Bloomberg 1 year probability of default
– Bloomberg 5 year probability of default
– Altman Zscore probability of default
• Independent Variables
– Average CEO and CFO Salary
– Average CEO and CFO Bonus
– Average CEO, CFO and Chairman Tenure
– Number of Employees
– Size of Board
• Control Variables
– Sector
– Market Capitalisation
– Gearing (Debt to Equity ratio)
– Average Performance (Return on Asset and Return on Equity)
• Other Variables
– CEO Shareownership
– CFO Shareownership
– Chairman Shareownership
– CEO Gender
– Chairman Gender
– Number of female executives on the board and CEO Duality
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Table B.1, in appendix B, provides a summary of variables used in the key literature and
table B.2 provides a full list of variables and abbreviations used in this study. The table 4.3
below provides a list of the key variables and their abbreviations.
Table 4.3 List of key variables and their abbreviations (Source: Author’s own collection)
Variable Code Variable Name
bb1y Bloomberg 1 year probability of default
bb5y Bloomberg 5 year probability of default
altmanz Altman Z-score probability of default
employees Number of employees
mcap Market Capitalisation
boardsize Number of directors on the board
performance Average profitability derived from Return on asset and Re-
turn on equity
gearing Debt to Equity ratio
salarya Average Salary of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Finance Officer
bonusa Average Bonus of the Chief Executive Officer and Chief
Finance Officer
tenurea Average Tenure of the Chief Executive Officer, Chief Fi-
nance Officer and the Chairman
sector Sector classified as per GICS code
salarya22 Quadratic term for the average salary variable
bonusa22 Quadratic term for the average bonus variable
tenurea22 Quadratic term for the average tenure variable
boardsize22 Quadratic term for the number of directors variable
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4.13 Method of data collection
This section provides an overview of the key lessons from the pilot study, the process and
method for data collection and the justification for the variables used.
4.13.1 Learning from the pilot undertaken
A pilot study was undertaken early on in the research process which provided key lessons
for the research. A summary of the pilot study is presented in the appendix A.3. Some
detail on the pilot study process has been provided in the appendices. Below are some of
the key learnings achieved from the pilot study:
• Calculation of key variables such as average salary, average bonus, average tenure
etc.
• Selection of the time period and index for the study
• Consistency of the Bloomberg database and company annual report data
• Non-selection of some variables as they were not valid for the UK corporate climate
such as the size of director’s photograph in the annual report, FT press mentions etc.
• The choice of Boardex and CapitalIQ as a database for further research around
director networks
• Complexity of including a failed firm with non-failed firms in the existing research
design
This helped develop the research further and had an influence on the data collection and
analysis process. This data collection process is discussed in further detail in the below
section.
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4.13.2 Data collection process
The basic relationship of interest in the study expressed as a simple formula is:
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize
+ mcap + performance + gearing + sector
Bloomberg 5 year probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize
+ mcap + performance + gearing + sector
Altman Z-score probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize +
mcap + performance + gearing + sector
This is the probability of a firm defaulting predicted by the salary paid to the CEO and
CFO, the bonus paid to the CEO and CFO, the term of the CEO, CFO and Chairperson, the
number of employees in the firm and the number of directors on the board of the firm. The
set of independent variables or predictors can also be termed as ’the fixed effects’ which
becomes more useful during the analysis of the models.
The above simple formula includes the control variables that could also predict the proba-
bility of default but does not include other influencing factors that cannot be controlled.
The factors that cannot be controlled for is represented by the error term epsilon (ε) in the
below formula:
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize
+ mcap + performance + gearing + sector + ε
Bloomberg 5 year probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize
+ mcap + performance + gearing + sector + ε
Altman Z-score probability of default = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize +
mcap + performance + gearing + sector + ε
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This epsilon allows the formula to capture for ’the random factors’. The formula is a
depiction of the linear model that this study aims to develop and breaks the right into
the ’structural’ or ’systematic’ part of the model (the fixed effects) and the ’random’ or
’probabilistic’ part of the model.
The following transformations were undertaken:
• Bloomberg 1 year was transformed to reduce the number of decimal places
• Bloomberg 5 year was transformed to reduce the number of decimal places
• Atlman Zscore was transformed to convert negative values to positive
• Total Bonus was transformed to amend any 0 to 1
• Performance was transformed to convert negative values to positive
• Company and Sector were defined as factors on R
The linear regression models were run on the dataset with missing data and on the dataset
with listwise deletion of missing data for Robustness checking. The results are very similar
with the significance of the gearing variable for model 1 (Bloomberg 1 year) becoming
non-significant and the significance for the variable number of employees for model 2
(Altman Z-Score) becoming non-significant. The results below are based on the dataset
without missing data (listwise deletion).
In the tables below, similar models are developed for each Dependent variable and the
models are as follows:
Dependent Variables: Bloomberg 1 year probability of default; Bloomberg 5 year probabil-
ity of default; and Altman Z-score
• Model (1):
Control variables only: Market Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing; and Sector
• Model (2):
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Predictor Variables only: Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO
and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees;
Board Size
• Model (3):
Contorl and Predictor Variables: Market Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing;
Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average
Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees; Board Size
• Model (4):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Salary: Average Salary squared; Market
Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO);
Average Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman);
Number of Employees; Board Size
• Model (5):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Bonus: Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus squared; Average
Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of
Employees; Board Size
• Model (6):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Tenure: Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO);
Average Tenure squared; Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of
Employees; Board Size
• Model (7):
Introducing Quadratic term for Board size:Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO);
Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees; Board Size;
Board Size squared.
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bb1y2 = salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
bb5y2 = tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 +
sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
altmanz2 = salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + ε
The above equation represents a linear model. In this, the contextual variables are company
and time periods. As it may be expected that the effect of the independent variables on the
likelihood of default to vary as a function of which company the TMT belong to and which
year the companies belong to. Therefore, it would be important to allow the model to
represent the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood different across different
companies and different time periods.
The overall fit of a multilevel model is tested using a chi-square ratio test similar to that in
logistics regression. The higher the value of the log-likelihood the better the model. In
addition, Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC)
can be used to compare models. Field et al. (2012) explains AIC as a goodness-of-fit
measure that takes into account how many parameters have been estimated and BIC as
a measure similar to AIC that corrects more harshly for the number of parameters being
estimated (which should be used for larger sample sizes and a small number of parameters).
The lower the AIC and BIC the better the model.
It is recommended to start with a ‘basic’ model with all fixed parameters and then adding
random coefficients as appropriate (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Twisk, 2006). In addition,
centring could help multilevel models to be more stable however there is no correct choice
between not centring, group mean centring or grand mean centring (Kreft et al. 1995).
Therefore, for Robustness the mixed models are developed and tested using the raw data
and centred data.
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The first step is to ascertain if there is variation over contexts. This is done by fitting a
baseline model of the intercept only and a model is fitted to allow the intercepts to vary over
contexts. A comparison of these two models shows whether the allowing the intercepts to
vary improves the models.
The intercept only model is as follows:
bb1yinterceptonly<-gls(bb1y2 1,method="ML")
bb5yinterceptonly<-gls(bb5y2 1,method="ML")
altmanzinterceptonly<-gls(altmanz2 1,method="ML")
The model fitted to allow intercepts to vary over contexts is as follows:
bb1yintercept<-lme(bb1y2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
bb5yintercept<-lme(bb5y2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
altmanzintercept<-lme(altmanz2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
4.14 Research Hypotheses
The theoretical and empirical literature review provide justification for the development of
the research hypotheses. Fig. 4.14 provides a simple diagrammatic representation. The
hypotheses tested in the research are as follows:
Hypothesis 1a There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
H1a (i) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
accounting measure for firm financial distress
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H1a (ii) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
short-term market measure for firm financial distress
H1a (iii) There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
long-term market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 1b There is a negative relationship between executive long-term motivation
and the likelihood of firm financial distress
H1b (i) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the accounting measure for firm financial distress
H1b (ii) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the short-term market measure for firm financial distress
H1b (iii) There is negative relationship between executive long-term motivation and
the long-term market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 2 There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of
firm financial distress
H2 (i) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the accounting
measure for firm financial distress
H2 (ii) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the short term
market measure for firm financial distress
H2 (iii) There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the long term
market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3a There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
H3a (i) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
accounting measure for firm financial distress
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H3a (ii) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the short
term market measure for firm financial distress
H3a (iii) There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the long
term market measure for firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3b There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the likelihood of firm financial distress
H3b (i) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the accounting measure for firm financial distress
H3b (ii) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the short term market measure for firm financial distress
H3b (iii) There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the long term market measure for firm financial distress
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4.15. Ethical consideration
4.15 Ethical consideration
The research uses secondary data available in the public domain and primarily collected
through the Bloomberg database. Sheffield Hallam University subscribes to Bloomberg
and has the permission to allow staff and students to use the data for research purposes.
The research was approved by the Research Ethics Committee, Sheffield Hallam Universty,
United Kingdom. The researcher also undertook the EPIGEUM research ethics and
integrity online course to better undertake ethical consideration of the research.
4.16 Method of data analysis
This section provides a detailed discussion of the stages involved in the data analysis
process for this research. The section summarises the key variables of interest followed
by a discussion of the methodological approach employed. This is then followed by a
discussion on the multiple regression model development processes and a discussion on
multilevel modelling. Another key part of this section is the discussion of the regression
assumptions. As the models developed through multiple and multilevel regression are
’models’ there are a number of assumptions that have to hold in order for the results to be
valid. The section provides an overview of these assumptions, their testing and the steps
that were carried out if any assumptions were violated.
4.16.1 Stages of data analysis
The key variables in this study are presented in table 4.4. It is important to note that
the three different default probability variables are not aggregated together but are used
to develop three different models to allow the research to draw comparisons and further
understand the relationship of interest in the short-term, long-term and with accounting
information.
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Table 4.4 Variables in this study (Source: Author’s own collection)
Dependent
Variables:
BB1y probability of de-
fault
BB5y Probability of De-
fault
Altman Z-score proba-
bility of default
Independent
Variables:
Average Salary Average Salary Average Salary
Average Bonus Average Bonus Average Bonus
Average Tenure Average Tenure Average Tenure
Number of Employees Number of Employees Number of Employees
Board Size Board Size Board Size
Control
Variables:
Market Capitalisation Market Capitalisation Market Capitalisation
Profitability Profitability Profitability
Gearing Gearing Gearing
Sector Sector Sector
The research analysis process, presented in Fig. 4.15, commences with a descriptive
univariate and bivariate analysis. The univariate analysis allows the research to better
understand the structure and nature of the data to ensure the multivariate analysis is robust.
The bivariate analysis allows the research to understand key relationships that may exist
between two variables of interest. This is then followed by multiple linear regression
(OLS) with missing data and without missing data. A comparison of these models allows
the research to provide robust results and not draw false conclusions due to missing data.
Once the OLS model is established then the quadratic terms of interest are introduced to
develop polynomial models. The quadratic terms allow the research to test for a curvilinear
relationship within a linear model. This is then followed by testing key linear regression
assumptions. The assumptions tested are homoscedasticity, the absence of collinearity, the
linearity of residuals, correlations, homogeneity of variances, the normality of residuals,
influential data points, outliers and independence of residuals. This is then followed by
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the testing for multilevel modelling using an intercept-only model and comparing it to a
random intercept model. The significance testing between these models is done by using
AIC, BIC and Loglik. This is followed by introducing the fixed effects to the model and
then the random effects to the model.
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Descriptive analysis -
Univariate and Bivari-
ate. Average, Standard
Deviation, Correlation
Multiple Linear
Regression - OLS
With missing data and
without missing data
Multiple Linear
Regression- OLS
with Quadratic terms
Homoscedasticity
Absence of
Collinearity
Linearity
Correlation
Homogeneity
of Variance
Normality Assumption
Normality of residuals
Influential data points
Outliers
Independence
Test for Multilevel
modelling – Intercept
only vs Random
Intercept (ANOVA
–AIC, BIC, Loglik)
Add Fixed effects
Add Random effects
Fig. 4.14 Methodological Approach employed (Source: Author’s own collection)
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Once the above steps are completed then the models shown in table 4.5 are developed to
ensure the multilevel analysis is robust. In model 1, 4, 7 and 10 only the time period is
introduced as a random intercept. In model 2, 5, 8 and 11 only the company is introduced
as a random intercept. And in models 3, 6, 9 and 12 both time period and company are
introduced as random intercepts. This is initially done for the null model, followed by the
control variables only model, predictor variables only model and the full model (i.e. the
control and predictor variables introduced). These 12 models are developed separately
for each dependent variable i.e. Bloomberg 1 year, Bloomberg 5 year and Altman z-score
probability of default.
Table 4.5 Multilevel modelling approach (Source: Author’s own collection)
Random Intercept Null Model Control
Variables
only Model
Predictor
Variables
only Model
Full Model
Time 1 4 7 10
Company 2 5 8 11
Time and Company 3 6 9 12
The research uses 4 distinct econometric approaches each involving a different set of
assumptions to estimate the dependent variables. This is done separately for each of the
dependent variables to allow comparison of estimates and findings between models. Some
econometric models are employed to facilitate comparison with literature (e.g. Schultz et
al., 2017; Aldamen et al., 2012; Fich and Slezak, 2008; Klock et al., 2005) whilst some
other robust econometric models are employed to address independence concerns, the
variability of intercepts and variability of slopes.
This research commences with an OLS model, followed by the introduction of quadratic
terms to the OLS model. In addition, the random intercept model is introduced to allow
intercepts to vary followed by a random intercept and random slope model to allow both
intercepts and slopes to vary.
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In the real world, variables are clustered and nested within other variables. In this research,
the variables are clustered or nested around sector, companies and time periods. These
being the contextual variables as the dataset is hierarchical. The sector is controlled for in
the OLS models however different companies and time periods are difficult to control for
in OLS. Therefore, multilevel modelling is used to allow for variability between companies
and time periods. In OLS, it is assumed that intercepts and slopes are fixed, however,
independent variables effect on the dependent variable may vary for different companies
and time periods and the effect of specific variables of interest may be different for different
companies and time periods. Multilevel modelling models this variability by allowing
intercepts to vary and slopes to vary.
The linear models are constructed as follows:
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default = Average TMT Salary + Average TMT Bonus +
Average TMT Tenure + Number of Employees Size of the board+ ε
Bloomberg 5 year probability of default = Average TMT Salary + Average TMT Bonus +
Average TMT Tenure + Number of Employees Size of the board+ ε
Altman Z-score probability of default = Average TMT Salary + Average TMT Bonus +
Average TMT Tenure + Number of Employees Size of the board+ ε
This is the relationship of interest for the research i.e. specific TMT attributes and the
likelihood of the firm failing whilst controlling the effect of key variables.
In addition, to the above mentioned fixed effects quadratic terms for key fixed effects are
introduced to the OLS model. This allows for the testing of a curvilinear relationship
of key fixed effects within the OLS model. After constructing the final OLS models a
test to see if the intercepts vary across contexts is undertaken. This is done by fitting a
baseline model with an intercept only and a model where the intercept is allowed to vary
across contexts. These two are compared to test if allowing the intercepts to vary across
contexts improves the model. The fixed effects are introduced to the model allowing for
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intercepts to vary across contexts, specifically the companies and time periods. Winter
(2013) argues that by undertaking a company-analysis (averaging over time), by-time
variation is disregarded, and conversely, in the time-analysis, by-company variation is
disregarded. Mixed models account for both sources of variation in a single model. Finally,
key fixed effects of interests to each of the three dependent variables are modelled to have
a random slope, this model is called the random intercept and random slope model.
4.16.2 Multiple Linear Regression assumptions
The multiple regression assumptions and multilevel modellign assumptions were tested
as per the guidance provided by Field et al. (2012) and Winter (2013). The assumptions
were tested using a combination of graphs and figures and the complete R-code for this
is available in the appendix C. Winter (2013) highlights the key assumptions of multiple
linear regression also apply to multilevel modelling and the assumptions are tested in the
same manner. The findings of the assumptions test are discussed in this section.
4.16.2.1 Normality
The assumption of normality is the least important assumption as per Winter (2013). This
assumption was tested with histograms, graphical plots and the skew and kurtosis values.
In a normal distribution, the Skew and Kurtosis should be zero where a positive skew
indicates a pile-up of a score to the left and a negative skew indicates a pile-up of a score
to the right. Positive kurtosis indicates a pointy curve and negative kurtosis indicates a flat
curve. The values show performance and average salary with a normal curve however only
salary shows a normal point. The other variables are all positively skewed with a pointed
curve. In a sample of more than 200, it is important to look at the shape of the distribution
and to look at the value of skew and kurtosis rather than calculate their significance. In
addition, breaking down the observations into the number of years shows a big reduction
in skewness and kurtosis, reducing the positive skew and extreme peak. The Shapiro-Wilk
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test shows that all variables are not normal however in a large dataset the Shapiro-Wilk
test will easily be significant (Field, 2012).
Field et al. (2012) further argues that according to the central limit theorem as the sample
size becomes greater, the sampling distribution has a normal distribution with a mean close
to the population mean. Therefore as the sample is 207 observations without missing data
(greater than 30 or sometimes 40 for central limit theorem) the sampling distribution has
a normal distribution with mean approximately similar to the population mean. Wilcox
(2005) found that with heavy tailed distributions require larger samples (more than previous
40) to invoke the central limit theorem. Finally, the histogram of the residuals all shows a
near normal distribution.
4.16.2.2 Homogeneity of variance or Homoskedasticity or absence of hetroskedas-
ticity
In order to test the homogeneity of variance the Levene’s test is used across the year,
the company and the sector. The test shows that for the BB1y dependent variable, the
sector does not have a significant Levene’s score, therefore, variances are not significantly
different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable. However, for the
company and the year, the Levene’s test is significantly different and the assumptions of
homogeneity of variance have been violated.
For the BB5y dependent variable, the year does not have a significant Levene’s score,
therefore, variances are not significantly different and the assumption of homogeneity
of variance is tenable. However, for the company and the sector, the Levene’s score is
significantly different and the assumptions of homogeneity of variance have been violated.
For the Altman Z-score dependent variable, the sector, the year and the company do
not have a significant Levene’s score, therefore, variances are not significantly different
and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable. This was also done for other
variables in the study. Where this assumption is violated log transformation may help,
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however, in a large sample Levene’s test can be significant even when group variances are
not very different therefore it should be interpreted in conjunction with the variance ratio.
Field (2012) recommends that multilevel modelling allows the modelling of variability in
regression slopes which overcomes the assumption of homogeneity of regression slopes.
4.16.2.3 Transformation of data
Transformation of the data represents a more normal distribution and may help overcome
the violation of the homogeneity of variance assumption, however, this may not be useful
in modelling. Glass et al. (1972) argued that "the payoff of normalising transformations in
terms of more valid probability statements is low, and they are seldom considered to be
worth the effort" (p241) (Field et al., 2012, p193). In addition, by transforming the data the
hypothesis being tested changes and the consequence of applying the wrong transformation
could be worse than the consequence of analysing untransformed scores.
4.16.2.4 Absence of collinearity and Correlations
If fixed effects are correlated then the research could focus on a few meaningful fixed
effects and drop the others or undertake dimension reduction techniques such as principal
component analysis. A correlation matrix was undertaken for all key variables used in
the regression modelling to test for collinearity. The Pearson correlations, Kendall and
Spearman’s correlations were used for this purpose. The signs of the effect size between
variables for parametric (Pearson) and non-parametric (Kendall and Spearman) is the
same for all relations but the following: bonus-Altman, gearing-salary, boardsize-tenure,
mcap-gearing, boardsize-performance, boardsize-gearing. The correlation matrix and the
findings of key correlations between variables have been discussed in chapter 5.
174
4.16. Method of data analysis
4.16.2.5 Linearity
The traditional multiple regression models and the multilevel models are in effect linear
models and hence it is important to test for linearity. If the linearity assumption is
broken then it may indicate that an important fixed effect has been missed. The linearity
assumptions hold as per the residual plot for all regression models.
4.16.2.6 Absence of influential data points
The presence of influential data points or outliers can have an influence on the models and
the analysis of the findings. Whilst it is not recommended to remove the influential data
points from the study one way to overcome this assumption is to run the models with the
data points and without the data points. A comparison of the two would provide a more
robust analysis of the findings and an understanding of the effect of the influential data
points. In order to identify influential data points the Cook’s D-value was used and for
outliers the Bonferonrti p-value was used. Running regression again without influential
data points improves the regression models or increases the significance of particular
variables or agrees with regression with influential data points.
4.16.2.7 Independence
Finally, as per Winter (2013), the most important assumption of linear regression is the
assumption of Independence. The Durbin Watson test was used to check if this assumption
is violated. The nature of the data collected shows that this assumption is violated and this
is also shown through the Durbin Watson test. The recommendation is that if this test is
violated then using multilevel modelling helps resolve this query.
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4.17 Generalisability, Validity and Reliability
The section below discusses the generalisability, validity and reliability of the methodolog-
ical process and the findings to the research setting.
4.17.1 Generalisability
Saunders et al. (2012) argue that in order for the findings to be generalisable the sample
should be selected carefully and of sufficient size. A study is externally valid if it describes
the true state of affairs outside its own setting. This study focuses on the FTSE 100 firms
and hence the findings should, in theory, be only generalisable to the FTSE 100 firms.
Whilst there may be some similarities between the FTSE 100 and non-FTSE 100 listed
firms the key difference would lie in their market capitalisation. This study controls for the
effect of market capitalisation on the dependent variable and hence the findings may also
be relevant to non-FTSE 100 listed firms. However, the findings should not be generalised
to financial firms as these have specifically not been studied in this research due to their
unique regulatory structure.
4.17.2 Validity
Validity is important in quantitative research as only valid results can be interpreted and
generalised (Newton, 2009). A study is internally valid if it describes the true state of
affairs within its own setting (Saunders et al., 2012). The validity of the results helps avoid
findings down to chance. This is done by ensuring a representative sample is used for the
study. The study uses all non-financial FTSE 100 firms since the introduction of the board
diversity revision to the Corporate Governance Code. This helps the study ensure that
the findings remain valid to the research setting of interest. The sample selection process
was free from bias as all the firms of interest were selected and only those firm-years with
missing data have been omitted.
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In addition, it is important to ensure that the variables employed in the study are also valid.
The measure that an instrument measures what it is supposed to (Black and Champion,
1976,p232-234). In other words, validity also refers to the accuracy of the measurement
process (Gill and Johnson, 2010). The variables used in this study have been selected
through precedence i.e. they have been employed in previous studies to measure similar
phenomena to that of interest in this study. This discussion is provided in Chapter 3 where
operationalising each of the phenomena of interest is presented through a detailed literature
review.
A pilot study was also undertaken on a random selection of 10 companies from the FTSE
100 index outside the period of study to ensure the data collection process was suitable. The
learnings from this were highlighted in section 4.12.1 and helped strengthen the process.
It also provided confirmation that the data available from the Bloomberg database was
accurate as the pilot study data was collected manually from annual reports and compared
to the data on the Bloomberg database.
4.17.3 Reliability
Gill and Johnson (2010) argue that the research should use a highly structured methodology
to facilitate replication to ensure reliability. Reliability is the ability to measure consistently
(Black and Champion, 1976, p232-234) however it does not imply validity i.e. a reliable
measure is measuring something consistently but it may not be measuring what it is meant
to be. The findings in this study are compared to previous studies to provide reliability
to the results. This ensures that where multiple researchers have shown a measure to
consistently measure a phenomenon this research provides similar results in a different
setting. In addition, the pilot study also provides a check of the reliability of the measures
as the data was collected for a random sample of 10 FTSE 100 firms prior to 2012.
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4.18 Conclusion
This chapter discussed the key philosophical and methodological arguments within TMT
research. A review of the ontological and epistemological consideration provides an
understanding of the different philosophical approaches. This research employs the
positivism philosophy using a deductive research strategy. It is then concluded that a
quantitative research methodology would be the most appropriate approach to testing
the research hypotheses. This chapter provides a review of the most common research
methodologies employed in management research and archival study through the use of
secondary data proves to be the most appropriate approach. A key literature to this research
that undertakes a review of previous literature on corporate governance and TMT shows
that the most common statistical technique employed is that of regression. The literature
provides a strong argument for multilevel analysis (hierarchical linear modelling) as the
most appropriate statistic technique to understand the different levels present within the
modern complex organisation.
This chapter further provides a justification for multilevel modelling and sets the back-
ground for the data collection processes i.e. population, sample, time period and a jus-
tification of the variables selected to measure the key attributes in the research. The
dependent variables selected are: Bloomberg 1-year probability of default, Bloomberg
5-year probability of default and the Altman Z-score. The Independent variables selected
are: Executive Salary (short-term motivation), Executive Bonus (long-term motivation),
TMT Tenure (TMT loyalty), Size of the board (TMT board level effectiveness) and number
of employees (TMT firm level effectiveness). The control variables selected are: Sector,
Profitability, Firm size and Gearing. In addition, this chapter detailed the stages undertaken
in the data collection process, the model development process and the data analysis process.
Finally, the basic assumptions of multiple linear regression are tested and reviewed in this
chapter to ensure a more valid, robust and generalisable results are achieved.
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Chapter 5
Presentation of results
5.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the findings of the research. It starts by providing the results of the
descriptive analysis of the dataset. This is then followed by a correlation matrix of the key
variables. The chapter then provides the results of the descriptive analysis of the categorical
variables. This is followed by the linear regression models. For each of the dependent
variables, there are respective sections that discuss in detail the model development process
and present the results of the final multiple regression models. These are then further
analysed through multilevel analysis. Initially, the test for multilevel modelling is presented
followed by the random intercept model. The chapter then provides significance testing
of the random intercept model followed by the final random intercept and random slope
model and its significance.
5.2 Descriptives
This section presents the descriptive findings of all the variables of interest first sorted by
year and then by sector. The initial discussion is of the descriptives of the raw variables
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i.e. where no further transformations or changes to the variables were employed. The
section on the transformed descriptives presents the descriptive statistics of the transformed
variables i.e. the variables were transformed for the purpose of this study.
5.2.1 Descriptives by year
Table 5.1 provides the average mean statistic for all the variables sorted by each year in the
study. This allows the study to understand any yearly trends that may be present within the
data and if the year of data collection has any abnormal effect on the data. The average
salary of the CEO (£928,957) is much higher than the average salary of the CFO (£571,550)
within the sample. However, this trend is not visible for the average compensation. The
average compensation received by the CFO (£2,060,681) is almost the same as the average
compensation of the CEO (£2,026,490). This indicates the presence of high bonuses being
paid to the CFO. The compensation of the CFO is only higher than the CEO for 2013 and
2014. In the period 2015 and 2016 the compensation of the CEO is higher than the CFO.
The actual salary of the CEO is volatile whereas that of the CFO grows year on year for
the final three years. Both the CEO and CFO salary declined from 2013 to 2014.
The average tenure of the CEO, CFO and Chairman for the entire sample is very close
between 4.7 and 5 years. However, between 2014 and 2016 the tenure of the CEO was
higher than the tenure of the CFO and the tenure of the Chairman.
The share ownership by the CEO, CFO and Chairman within the sample showed a clear
divide between the level of ownership between the Chairman and the other two executives.
The data was only available for the two most recent years and this showed that the Chairman
on average (1.5%) held a higher percentage of shares than the CEO (0.1%) and CFO (0.6%).
However, an interesting observation in 2016 was that the CFO held an equal number of
shares to the Chairman and higher than the CEO.
A comparison of the change in the average number of employees and the market capitalisa-
tion year on year shows an interesting trend. A change in the average number of employees
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for a year compared to the average for the sample did not relate to a simultaneous change
in the average market capitalisation for the year compared to the average for the sample.
In 2013, the average number of employees was lower than the sample average whereas the
average market capitalisation for 2013 was much higher than the sample average. In 2016,
the average market capitalisation was similar to the sample average, however, the average
number of employees was much higher.
The average board size and the average number of female executives remained constant over
the period of the study. The average probability of default as predicted by the Bloomberg
measure showed an increase in the likelihood of default of the firm (as predicted by the 1
year and 5 year measures) however the likelihood of default as predicted by the Altman
Z-score showed a decrease in the likelihood from 2013 to 2014 followed by a similar
trend to the Bloomberg measure. The Debt to Equity ratio is a measure of the firms
gearing and the Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) are measures of firm
performance.
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics split by each year (Source: Author’s own collection, created using
data collected from Bloomberg)
Statistic 2013 Mean 2014 Mean 2015 Mean 2016 Mean Total Mean
Salary_CEO 936,930.50 900,174.70 926,571.60 951,481.10 928,957.70
Comp_CEO 1,997,353.00 1,955,408.00 2,099,455.00 2,046,782.00 2,026,490.00
Salary_CFO 582,960.00 553,724.80 560,554.10 589,261.90 571,550.20
Comp_CFO 2,247,577.00 2,012,734.00 2,029,582.00 1,974,289.00 2,060,681.00
Tenure_CEO 4.756 5.137 4.83 5.359 5
Tenure_CFO 4.73 4.905 4.823 4.98 4.9
Tenure_Chair 4.829 4.468 4.586 4.995 4.7
Share_CEO N/A N/A 0.126 0.119 0.1
Share_CFO N/A N/A 0.06 0.88 0.6
Share_Chair N/A N/A 2.172 0.883 1.5
No_Employees 58,219.76 55,885.22 55,826.84 68,376.17 59,160.30
Market_Cap 31,779.56 29,741.38 25,855.31 28,492.11 28,885.30
Board_Size 10.78 10.625 10.567 10.522 10.6
No_female_exec 1.086 1.078 1.254 1.217 1.2
BB_1Y 0.0005 0.0005 0.001 0.001 0.001
BB_5Y 0.01 0.01 0.012 0.013 0.01
Altman_Zscore 4.289 4.575 4.436 3.997 4.3
Debt_Equity 81.454 128.215 119.331 107.858 110.3
ROA 7.443 7.157 6.196 5.196 6.5
ROE 19.016 17.54 18.979 16.86 18.1
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5.2.2 Descriptives by Sector
Table 5.2 provides the average mean statistic for all the variables sorted by each sector
in the study. This allows the study to understand any trends within sectors that may be
present. The sector breakdown shows that the CEO and CFO receive the highest average
salary and compensation within Energy whereas the lowest CEO salary and compensation
are within Real Estate and the lowest CFO salary and compensation are within Information
Technology. The average salary and compensation for the CEO and CFO were also
quite low within these two sectors. The Information Technology sector also saw the
shortest average individual tenures for the CEO and CFO. The shortest average Chairman
tenure was in the Healthcare sector. Whilst the longest average CEO tenure was in Real
Estate (interesting as the lowest salary and compensation for the CEO is in this sector),
longest average CFO tenure within Energy and the longest average Chairman tenure within
Information Technology.
The least number of shares owned by the CEO and CFO was within the Energy sector
(the highest remunerated, salary and compensation, sector) which was also very low for
the Chairman. The least number of shares owned by the CEO and CFO was within the
Telecommunications sector. The CEO within the Materials sector owned the most number
of shares within their firm and the Top Management Team (TMT) within the Consumer
Discretionary sector had high levels of share ownership within their firm, the highest levels
for the CFO and Chairman.
A comparison of the average number of employees and the firm market capitalisation shows
some further interesting results. From the above results it would be incorrect to assume
that there is a direct relationship between the size of the firm (market capitalisation) and the
number of employees. The sector with the highest number of employees was Consumer
Staples and the sector with the highest market capitalisation was Energy. Whereas the
sector with the smallest number of employees was Real Estate and the lowest average
market capitalisation was Information Technology.
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The board size for most of the sectors remained around an average of 10, however, the
highest number of members on a board was within the Energy sector and the lowest within
the Information Technology sector (a similar trend to market capitalisation).
The average number of female executives remained low throughout with the least being in
the Energy sector (highest market capitalisation and highest remunerated sector) and the
most in the Health Care sector.
The probability of default as measured by the Bloomberg 1 year (the higher the measure the
higher the likelihood of default) measure shows a stable average across industries (the score
for individual companies, however, is to 10 decimal places) with the lowest probability
of default being within Health Care sector. This was also consistent (very low for Health
Care) with the Bloomberg 5 year (the higher the measure the higher the likelihood of
default) measure where the lowest probability of default was within the Real Estate sector.
The highest probability of default as per this measure was the Telecommunication Services.
The Altman Z-score probability of default (the lower the measure the higher the likelihood
of default) put the Consumer Discretionary at the highest score indicating the safest sector
comparatively and showed similar results to the previous two measures for the Health
Care sector. The Altman Z-score also put Telecommunication sector as the riskiest sector
similar to the Bloomberg measures.
The telecommunications sector was also the highest geared (measured by Debt/Equity)
sector followed by Utilities and the least geared sector was the Energy sector. The ROA
and ROE show on average the most profitable sector as Telecommunications and Health
Care whereas the least profitable as the Energy sector.
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5.2.3 Transformed Descriptives by year
The variables were transformed to create company and team level variables. Table 5.3
provides the average mean statistic for the transformed variables sorted by each year in the
study. The variables performance is an average of the ROA and ROE, the gearing is the
Debt to Equity ratio, the average salary is an average of the combined salary of CEO and
CFO, the average bonus is an average of the difference between combined compensation
and the combined salary of the CEO and CFO, and the average tenure is the average
of the combined tenure of the CEO, CFO and Chairperson. The variables only include
observations with data available for the full firm-year and where there is missing data the
firm-year has been removed from the dataset.
The average probability of default as predicted by the Bloomberg 1 year likelihood of
default remains constant and the Bloomberg 5 year probability of default shows a steady
increase (however the measure is to 10 decimal places). The Altman Z-score probability of
default shows a volatile trend over the four years with the likelihood of default increasing
in 2013 and 2015. The average number of employees and market capitalisation shows
a consistent trend to the findings earlier i.e. in 2013 the average number of employees
was below the sample average, however, the market capitalisation for the same year was
above the sample average. The average number of employees for the period between 2014
and 2015 shows a very big increase whereas the average market capitalisation continues
to fall. The average number of executives on the board remains constant year on year
to the sample average. The average performance of the firms remains constant for the
first two periods with a small decline followed by a big increase in the final year. The
average gearing shows an increasing trend over the period of the study. The increasing
trend is also visible for the average salary and average bonus, however, in the 2016 period,
there is a decline from the previous year. This is interesting as this is the period where the
performance on average has increased, the average number of employees has decreased,
the market capitalisation has increased the likelihood of default (Altman Z-Score) remains
constant, indicating that the salary and bonus may be a reflection of the previous period’s
performance. This may also indicate that firms heavily reduce the number of employees
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Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of transformed variables split by each year (Source: Author’s own
collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Statistic Total Mean 2013 Mean 2014 Mean 2015 Mean 2016 Mean
bb1y2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
bb5y2 0.01 0.011 0.01 0.012 0.012
altmanz2 4.3 3.912 4.716 4.037 4.274
employees2 62,163.40 47,792.98 74,423.18 76,010.35 48,027.73
mcap2 31,745.20 41,290.49 33,199.09 22,977.31 31,290.16
boardsize2 10.6 10.523 10.611 10.648 10.691
performance2 12.7 12.551 12.286 11.352 14.366
gearing2 97 78.854 93.196 104.524 111.642
salarya2 1,023,741.00 978,798.40 1,000,732.00 1,081,499.00 1,025,577.00
bonusa2 1,102,989.00 1,013,434.00 1,070,234.00 1,212,841.00 1,098,938.00
tenurea2 5 4.906 4.837 5.358 4.826
after a period of declined performance and declined market capitalisation. The average
tenure shows a volatile trend over the period, however, the period from 2015 to 2016 shows
a much bigger decline following the similar trends discussed earlier.
5.2.4 Transformed Descriptives by sector
Table 5.4 provides the average mean statistic for the transformed variables sorted by each
sector in the study. A sector breakdown of the likelihood of default as predicted by the
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default shows that the least likely firms to default on
average belong to the real estate sector, followed by Health Care and Utilities. The results
for the other sector remain consistent (however the score is measured to 10 decimal places).
The Bloomberg 5-year probability of default shows consistent results to the Bloomberg 1
year probability of default i.e. the Real Estate industry to be the least likely firm to default
and Telecommunication Services the most likely firm to default. The Altman Z-score
probability of default puts the firms in the Energy sector followed by Telecommunication
Services as the most likely to default and the firms in the Industrials (with similar average
scores for Real Estate and Utilities) as the least likely to default.
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The average number of employees is the lowest in the Materials sector (whereas the lowest
market capitalisation is in the Information Technology sector) and the highest number
of employees and market capitalisation in the Telecommunication Services sector. An
interesting finding is that the two sectors with the lowest average market capitalisation,
Information Technology and Health Care, has a much higher than the average number of
employees (2nd and 3rd highest average number of employees).
The smallest board size is within the Health Care sector (2nd lowest market capitalisation)
and the biggest board size is in the Energy sector (2nd highest market capitalisation). The
least profitable sector on average was the Telecommunication services (followed closely
by the Materials and Industrials sectors) and the most profitable sector was the Real Estate
Sector (followed by Energy and Utilities sectors). The average gearing was the lowest
in the Consumer Discretionary and Materials sectors and the highest gearing was in the
Information Technology and Energy sectors.
The sector, Information Technology, with the lowest average salary (CEO and CFO) and
lowest average bonus (CEO and CFO) also had the lowest average tenure (CEO, CFO and
Chairman). The Energy sector had the highest average salary (CEO and CFO) and the
highest average bonus (CEO and CFO) whereas the Health Care had the highest average
tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman) which had a similarly average to sample average salary
(CEO and CFO) and average bonus (CEO and CFO).
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5.3 Correlation matrix
Pairwise and Listwise deletion provide similar results for correlation between variables
(Table 5.5 presents the correlation matrix created through pairwise deletion). The correla-
tion matrix shows a significant association between the three measures of the probability
of firm default. The association between Altman Z-score and the two Bloomberg measures
is a significant moderate to low negative association as the score is inverse i.e. a higher
Altman Zscore refers to a lesser likelihood of default but a higher Bloomberg score is a
higher likelihood of default. The average salary (CEO and CFO) does not have a significant
correlation to the Bloomberg likelihood of default measures however it has a significant
weak to low negative association with the Altman Z-score i.e the higher the average salary
(CEO and CFO) the higher the likelihood of that firm defaulting as measured by the Altman
Z-score. The average bonus (CEO and CFO) does not have a significant association to the
Altman Z-score but has a significant weak to low negative association to the Bloomberg
likelihood of default measures i.e. The higher the average bonus (CEO and CFO) the lower
the likelihood of default of that firm as measured by the Bloomberg probability of default.
The average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman) has a similar association (significant weak
to low negative) as average bonus to the Bloomberg and Altman Zscore i.e. the higher the
average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman) the lower the likelihood of default as predicted
by the Bloomberg likelihood of default measures. The board size has a weak to low
association with all three measures of the likelihood of default and the association is a
significant positive association with the Bloomberg probability of default and a significant
negative association with the Altman Z-score probability of default. The significance of
the association with the long-term (bb5y) probability of default is not as strong as the short
term (bb1y) probability of default. The association states that the bigger the size of the
board the higher the likelihood of default. The average number of employees has a weak to
low association with all three measures of the likelihood of default and the association is a
significant positive association with the Bloomberg probability of default and a significant
negative association with the Altman Z-score probability of default. The association states
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that the higher the average number of employees in the firm the higher the likelihood of
default.
Market capitalisation does not have a significant association with the Bloomberg probability
of default measures. However, the association with the Altman Z-score is a significant
weak to low association i.e. the higher the market capitalisation of the firm the higher
the likelihood of default for the firm. The average firm performance has a weak to low
association with all three measures of the likelihood of default and the association is a
significant negative association with the Bloomberg probability of default and a significant
positive association with the Altman Z-score probability of default. The association states
that the higher the average firm performance the lower the likelihood of default.
The average salary (CEO and CFO) has a significant moderate to low positive association
with average bonus (CEO and CFO), size of the board and market capitalisation and a
significant weak to low positive association with the number of employees i.e. firms with
higher average salaries (CEO and CFO) are more likely to pay higher average bonuses,
have bigger average board sizes, have more average number of employees and have a
larger market capitalisation. The average bonus (CEO and CFO) has a significant moderate
to low association with the size of the board and the market capitalisation and a significant
weak to low positive association with the average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman), firm
performance and the number of employees i.e. firms paying higher bonuses are more likely
to have bigger board sizes, larger market capitalisations, and longer average tenure (CEO,
CFO and Chairman). The average size of the board has a significant positive moderate to
low association with the market capitalisation of the firm and a significant weak to low
association with the average number of employees in a firm i.e. firms with large board
sizes are more likely to have larger market capitalisations and larger average number of
employees. The average number of employees has a significant positive weak to low
association to market capitalisation i.e. firms with a larger number of employees are more
likely to have larger market capitalisations.
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5.4 Categorical Variables Descriptives
This section provides a descriptive analysis of the categorical variables collected in this
study. The below Table 5.6 shows a breakdown of the average number of firm-years per
company in the study, therefore it would be incorrect to draw strong conclusions from
analysing particular sectors specifically Information Technology and Telecommunication
Services.
Table 5.6 Number of firm year observations in each sector (Source: Author’s own collection,
created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Sector Number firm years
Consumer Discretionary 68
Consumer Staples 31
Energy 12
Health Care 16
Industrials 54
Information Technology 8
Materials 25
Real Estate 16
Telecommunication Services 8
Utilities 20
The Table 5.7 below shows that the gender of the CEO and the gender of the Chairman for
a vast majority of the firm years is male, identifying a clear underrepresentation of females
at the TMT level of a firm.
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Table 5.7 Gender of the CEO and the Chairman (Source: Author’s own collection, created using
data collected from Bloomberg)
Gender Number of firm years (CEO) Number of firm years (Chairman)
Male 222 228
Female 13 8
Missing 23 22
This under-representation is further visible at the board level of the firm, as shown in Table
5.8, for over half the firm years there is only one female board member or none.
Table 5.8 Number of female executives on the board (Source: Author’s own collection, created
using data collected from Bloomberg)
Number of female exec-
utives on board
Number of firm years
0 94
1 65
2 45
3 16
4 8
5 5
6 2
Missing 23
An analysis of the CEO duality variable in Table 5.9 shows that the role of the CEO and
Chairman is only combined for 2 firm years.
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Table 5.9 Duality of CEO (Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from
Bloomberg)
CEO Duality Number of firm years
CEO and Chairperson role separate 234
CEO and Chairperson role combined 2
Missing 22
A breakdown, in table 5.10, of the number of female executives by sector shows that
female representation at board level is highest in the Consumer Staples and Utilities sector
and the lowest in Energy and Materials sector.
Table 5.10 Number of female executives on the board in each sector (Source: Author’s own
collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Sector .00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 Total
Consumer Discretionary 54.2% 10.2% 16.9% 10.2% 5.1% 3.4% 100.0%
Consumer Staples 25.0% 46.4% 7.1% 10.7% 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 100.0%
Energy 75.0% 25.0% 100.0%
Health Care 6.3% 12.5% 43.8% 25.0% 12.5% 100.0%
Industrials 30.8% 34.6% 26.9% 1.9% 3.8% 1.9% 100.0%
Information Technology 57.1% 14.3% 28.6% 100.0%
Materials 59.1% 22.7% 9.1% 9.1% 100.0%
Real Estate 50.0% 28.6% 21.4% 100.0%
Telecommunication Services 62.5% 37.5% 100.0%
Utilities 29.4% 47.1% 11.8% 5.9% 5.9% 100.0%
40.0% 27.7% 19.1% 6.8% 3.4% 2.1% 0.9% 100.0%
A breakdown of the number of female executives on the board by specific years, shown
in Table 5.11, points to a slow but steady decline in the number of firm-years that has no
female representation at the board level.
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Table 5.11 Number of female executives on the board split by each year (Source: Author’s own
collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
.00 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00
2013 43.1% 24.1% 20.7% 6.9% 3.4% 1.7% 100.0%
2014 43.8% 29.7% 10.9% 9.4% 3.1% 3.1% 100.0%
2015 38.8% 28.4% 19.4% 4.5% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 100.0%
2016 32.6% 28.3% 28.3% 6.5% 4.3% 100.0%
Total 40.0% 27.7% 19.1% 6.8% 3.4% 2.1% 0.9% 100.0%
The correlation between the number of female executives and the variables of the study,
presented in Table 5.12, shows that there exists a significant weak to low negative associa-
tion with the Altman Z-score probability of default, the average bonus (CEO and CFO)
and the average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman) i.e. as the number of female executives
increases there is a higher likelihood of a higher probability of default (measured by
the Altman Z-score), lower average bonus and lower average tenure. These results are
consistent for both pairwise and listwise deletion.
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Table 5.12 Correlation of variables with the number of female executives on the board (Source:
Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Number of female executives on the board 1
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default 0.06
Bloomberg 5 year probability of default 0.083
Altman Zscore probability of default −.146∗∗
Average CEO and CFO Salary 0.058
Average CEO and CFO Bonus −0.116∗
Average CEO, CFO and Chairman Tenure −.161∗∗
Board of Directors size 0.006
Number of Employees -0.032
Market Capitalisation -0.031
Performance 0.001
Note: ** Correlation significant at 0.05 level. * Correlation significant at 0.10 level
5.5 Linear Model
The basic relationship of interest in the study expressed as a simple formula is:
bb1y = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance + gearing
+ sector
bb5y = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance + gearing
+ sector
altmanz = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance +
gearing + sector
This is the probability of a firm defaulting predicted by the salary paid to the CEO and
CFO, the bonus paid to the CEO and CFO, the term of the CEO, CFO and Chairperson, the
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number of employees in the firm and the number of directors on the board of the firm. The
set of independent variables or predictors can also be termed as ’the fixed effects’ which
becomes more useful during the analysis of the models.
The above simple formula does not include the control variables that could also predict
the probability of default but it also does not include other influencing factors that cannot
be controlled. The factors that cannot be controlled for is represented by the error term
epsilon (ε) in the below formula:
bb1y = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance + gearing
+ sector + ε
bb5y = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance + gearing
+ sector + ε
altmanz = salary + bonus + tenure + employees + boardsize + mcap + performance +
gearing + sector + ε
This epsilon allows the formula to capture for ’the random factors’. The formula is a
depiction of the linear model that this study aims to develop and breaks the right into
the ’structural’ or ’systematic’ part of the model (the fixed effects) and the ’random’ or
’probabilistic’ part of the model.
The following transformations were undertaken:
• Bloomberg 1 year was transformed to reduce the number of decimal places
• Bloomberg 5 year was transformed to reduce the number of decimal places
• Atlman Zscore was transformed to convert negative values to positive
• Total Bonus was transformed to amend any 0 to 1
• Performance was transformed to convert negative values to positive
• Company and Sector were defined as factors on R
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The linear regression models were run on the dataset with missing data and on the dataset
with listwise deletion of missing data for Robustness checking. The results are very similar
with the significance of the gearing variable for model 1 (Bloomberg 1 year) becoming
non-significant and the significance for the variable number of employees for model 2
(Altman Z-Score) becoming non-significant. The results below are based on the dataset
without missing data (listwise deletion).
Dependent Variables: Bloomberg 1 year probability of default; Bloomberg 5 year probabil-
ity of default; and Altman Z-score
• Model (1):
Control variables only: Market Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing; and Sector
• Model (2):
Predictor Variables only: Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO
and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees;
Board Size
• Model (3):
Contorl and Predictor Variables: Market Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing;
Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average
Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees; Board Size
• Model (4):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Salary: Average Salary squared; Market
Capitalisation; Performance; Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO);
Average Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman);
Number of Employees; Board Size
• Model (5):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Bonus: Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus squared; Average
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Bonus (CEO and CFO); Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of
Employees; Board Size
• Model (6):
Introducing Quadratic term for Average Tenure: Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO);
Average Tenure squared; Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of
Employees; Board Size
• Model (7):
Introducing Quadratic term for Board size:Market Capitalisation; Performance;
Gearing; Sector; Average Salary (CEO and CFO); Average Bonus (CEO and CFO);
Average Tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman); Number of Employees; Board Size;
Board Size squared.
5.6 Bloomberg 1 year probability of default linear regres-
sion
The linear regression model for the Bloomberg 1 year probability of default is presented in
Table 5.13. The variables were entered using a forward and backward selection criteria
and this process is presented in Table 5.14. The results for each individual model are
presented in Table B.3 (appendix B). The multiple R-squared shows that 12.6%, 12.6%
and 24% of the variance in the data is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3)
respectively. The adjusted R-squared shows that 7.1%, 10.4% and 17.1% of the variance in
data is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3) respectively after accounting
for the different predictor variables. The models are significant with a p-value<0.01, i.e.
this shows that the null hypothesis (the predictors have no effect on the dependent variable)
is rejected and the predictor variables affect the dependent variable is more likely and
hence the results are statistically significant.
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A linear model of the control variables, predictor variables and all variables as a function
of the probability of the firm defaulting is constructed. The model (1) is significant
(F(12,194)=2.321, p<0.01), model (2) (F(5,201)=5.809, p<0.01) and (F(17,189)=3.508,
p<0.01).
The coefficients for the model (1) shows that the control variable market capitalisation
(p<0.05) and firm performance (p<0.01) are significant and negative. The level of firm
gearing does not have a significant effect on the short-term likelihood of firm default. As
the market capitalisation and firm performance increases, the short-term likelihood of firm
default reduces.
The coefficients for the model (2) shows that the predictor variables average bonus (CEO
and CFO), the number of employees and the size of the board are significant (p<0.01). The
effect of the average bonus is negative and the effect of the number of employees and the
size of the board is positive for the short-term likelihood of firm default. An increase in the
average bonus has an effect of reducing the short-term likelihood of firm default and an
increase in the number of employees and the size of the board has an effect of increasing
the likelihood of firm default.
This relationship continues in the full model (control and predictor variables) where average
salary and average tenure does not have a significant effect on the short-term likelihood of
firm default. Introducing a quadratic term for average salary has an interesting effect in
the model (4). The coefficients show that the quadratic term for average salary (p<0.05),
average salary (p<0.10), average bonus (p<0.01), number of employees (p<0.01) and board
size (p<0.01) are significant predictors of the bloomberg 1 year probability of default and
only market capitalisation is a significant control variable (p<0.01). The average salary
and average bonus have a negative effect on the short-term likelihood of default i.e. as
the salary and bonus increases the short-term likelihood of default decreases. However,
the quadratic term for average salary has a positive effect on the short-term likelihood of
default i.e. as the salary further increases the likelihood of default increases. The effect
of average salary prior to introducing the quadratic term was positive. The number of
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employees and the size of the board has a positive effect on the short-term likelihood of
default a relationship consistent with the previous models.
Introducing a quadratic term for the bonus to the full model and for tenure to the full model
does not have any significant effect on the dependent variable. Introducing a quadratic
term for board size to the full model has a significant effect on the short-term likelihood of
default however the board size has a non-significant effect, which points to a curvilinear
relationship. This model has a Multiple R-squared of 25.8% and an Adjusted R-squared
of 18.7%. In this model, average bonus (p<0.05), average tenure (p<0.1), number of
employees (p<0.01) and the quadratic term for board size (p<0.05) are significant.
The final model for the dependent variable Bloomberg 1 year probability of default through
backward selection criteria is:
The multiple R-squared shows that 26.71% of the variance in the dataset is explained
by the model and the Adjusted R-squared shows that 19.69% variance in the dataset,
accounting for the predictor variables, (or population) is explained by the model. The
model is significant, (F(18,188)=3.806, p<0.01), this shows that the null hypothesis (the
predictors have no effect on the dependent variable) is rejected and the predictor variables
affect the dependent variable is more likely and hence the results are statistically significant.
The coefficients shows that the quadratic term for average salary (p<0.05), average salary
(p<0.10), average bonus (p<0.01), number of employees (p<0.01) and quadratic term for
board size (p<0.10) are significant predictors and market capitalisation (p<0.01) and firm
performance (p<0.10) are a significant control variables. The average salary and average
bonus have a negative effect on the short-term likelihood of default i.e. as the salary and
bonus increases the short-term likelihood of default decreases.
However, the quadratic term for average salary has a positive effect on the short-term
likelihood of default i.e. as the salary further increases the likelihood of default increases.
The number of employees has a positive effect on the short-term likelihood of default a
relationship consistent with the previous models. However, board size has a negative effect
and the quadratic term for board size has a positive effect on the short-term likelihood of
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Table 5.13 Bloomberg 1 year probability of default linear model (Source: Author’s own collection,
created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Dependent variable:
bb1y2
salarya22 0.00000000003∗∗
(0.00000000001)
salarya2 −0.00006877825∗
(0.00004099092)
bonusa2 −0.00002747005∗∗∗
(0.00000922038)
employees2 0.00021047920∗∗∗
(0.00006307133)
boardsize2 −19.77452000000
(16.47660000000)
mcap2 −0.00071369280∗∗∗
(0.00025322820)
performance2 −0.61283790000∗
(0.36170870000)
gearing2 0.05121867000
(0.05716328000)
sector2Consumer Staples 29.83848000000
(19.89414000000)
sector2Energy 172.52690000000∗∗∗
(47.81197000000)
sector2Health Care 15.86751000000
(24.47906000000)
sector2Industrials 38.95238000000∗∗
(16.15355000000)
sector2Information Technology −7.04648200000
(35.37228000000)
sector2Materials 18.93932000000
(25.72511000000)
sector2Real Estate −1.13484900000
(26.47722000000)
sector2Telecommunication Services 85.64431000000∗∗
(34.50114000000)
sector2Utilities 23.94857000000
(23.26272000000)
boardsize22 1.22696400000∗
(0.65105530000)
Constant 223.29290000000∗∗
(101.66870000000)
Observations 207
R2 0.26707950000
Adjusted R2 0.19690620000
Residual Std. Error 72.78631000000 (df = 188)
F Statistic 3.80600200000∗∗∗ (df = 18; 188)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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default. This points to a curvilinear effect of the board size on the short-term likelihood
of default. An initial increase in the board size has an effect of reducing the likelihood of
default however eventually as the board size further increases it has the effect of increasing
the likelihood of short-term default.
Table 5.14 Variables entered in each linear model for Bloomberg 1 year probability of default
(Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Capitalisation * * * * * * * *
Firm Performance * * * * * * * *
Gearing * * * * * * * *
Sector * * * * * * * *
Average Salary * * * * * * * *
Average Bonus * * * * * * * *
AverageTenure * * * * * * *
Number of Employees * * * * * * * *
Size of Board * * * * * * * *
Quadratic Average Salary * * *
Quadratic Average Bonus * *
Quadratic Average Tenure * *
Quadratic Size of Board * * *
5.7 Bloomberg 5 year probability of default linear regres-
sion
The linear regression model for the Bloomberg 5 year probability of default is presented in
Table 5.15. The variables were entered using a forward and backward selection criteria
and this process is presented in Table 5.16. The results for each individual model are
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presented in Table B,4 (appendix B). The multiple R-squared shows that 18.3%, 8.8% and
26% of the variance in the data is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3)
respectively. The adjusted R-squared shows that 13.3%, 6.5% and 19.4% of the variance in
data is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3) respectively after accounting
for the different predictor variables. The models are significant with a p-value<0.01, i.e.
this shows that the null hypothesis (the predictors have no effect on the dependent variable)
is rejected and the predictor variables affect the dependent variable is more likely and
hence the results are statistically significant.
A linear model of the control variables, predictor variables and all variables as a function
of the probability of the firm defaulting is constructed. The model (1) is significant
(F(12,194)=3.636, p<0.01), model (2) (F(5,201)=3.874, p<0.01) and (F(17,189)=3.91,
p<0.01).
The coefficients for the model (1) shows that the control variable market capitalisation
(p<0.05), firm performance (p<0.01) and firm gearing (p<0.05) are significant. Market
capitalisation and firm performance have a negative effect and firm gearing has a positive
effect on the long-term probability of firm default. As the market capitalisation and firm
performance increases, the long-term likelihood of firm default reduces and as the firm
gearing levels increase the long-term probability of default decreases.
The coefficients for the model (2) shows that the predictor variables average bonus (CEO
and CFO), average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman), the number of employees and size
of the board are significant (p<0.05). The effect of average bonus and average tenure is
negative and the effect of the number of employees and the size of the board is positive
for the long-term likelihood of firm default. An increase in the average bonus and average
tenure has an effect of reducing the long-term likelihood of firm default and an increase in
the number of employees and the size of the board has an effect of increasing the long-term
likelihood of firm default.
This relationship continues in the full model (control and predictor variables) however
average bonus and average salary does not have a significant effect on the long-term
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likelihood of firm default. The coefficients show that the quadratic term for average salary,
a quadratic term for the average bonus to the full model and for tenure to the full model
does not have any significant effect to the dependent variable. Introducing a quadratic term
for board size to the full model has an interesting effect on the model. This model has a
multiple R-squared of 28.91% and an Adjusted R-squared of 22.11% i.e. 22.11% of the
variance in the dataset is explained by the model after adjusting for the predictors. The
model is significant with a p-value<0.01 (F(18,188)=4.248).
The coefficients for average salary and average bonus are not significant predictors. Average
tenure (p<0.05), number of employees (p<0.05), size of the board (p<0.05) and a quadratic
term for board size (p<0.01) are significant. Average tenure and the size of the board have
a negative effect on the long-term likelihood of default and the number of employees and
the quadratic term for the size of the board has a positive effect of the long-term likelihood
of the firm. This effect for board size was positive prior to introducing the quadratic term.
An increase in the average tenure and the size of the board has an effect of decreasing the
long-term likelihood of the firm default. An increase in the number of employees has an
effect of increasing the long-term likelihood of firm default. The significant relationship of
the quadratic term for board size shows that initially as the board size increases there is
an effect of decreasing the long-term likelihood of firm default however as the board size
further continues increases it has an effect of increasing the long-term likelihood of firm
default.
The final model for the dependent variable Bloomberg 5 year probability of default through
backward selection criteria is:
The multiple R-squared shows that 28.39% of the variance in the dataset is explained
by the model and the Adjusted R-squared shows that 22.36% variance in the dataset,
accounting for the predictor variables, (or population) is explained by the model. The
model is significant, (F(16,190)=4.707, p<0.01), this shows that the null hypothesis (the
predictors have no effect on the dependent variable) is rejected and the predictor variables
affect the dependent variable is more likely and hence the results are statistically significant.
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Table 5.15 Bloomberg 5 year probability of default linear model (Source: Author’s own collection,
created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Dependent variable:
bb5y2
tenurea2 −36.09553000000∗∗∗
(12.13332000000)
employees2 0.00074315720∗∗
(0.00035266070)
boardsize2 −224.89810000000∗∗
(94.10512000000)
mcap2 −0.00333510500∗∗
(0.00133753300)
performance2 −5.56615600000∗∗∗
(2.03897300000)
gearing2 0.54003820000
(0.33138470000)
sector2Consumer Staples 48.43210000000
(111.76850000000)
sector2Energy 641.68170000000∗∗
(250.61740000000)
sector2Health Care −64.79212000000
(138.38920000000)
sector2Industrials 189.33860000000∗∗
(92.46182000000)
sector2Information Technology −125.83120000000
(207.05820000000)
sector2Materials 87.04490000000
(131.40540000000)
sector2Real Estate −296.91350000000∗
(151.67140000000)
sector2Telecommunication Services 569.52110000000∗∗∗
(195.05800000000)
sector2Utilities 128.76880000000
(135.68790000000)
boardsize22 10.85706000000∗∗∗
(3.78705900000)
Constant 2,775.89500000000∗∗∗
(587.54070000000)
Observations 207
R2 0.28386590000
Adjusted R2 0.22355980000
Residual Std. Error 423.07150000000 (df = 190)
F Statistic 4.70708900000∗∗∗ (df = 16; 190)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The coefficients show that the average tenure (p<0.01), number of employees (p<0.05),
board size (p<0.05) and quadratic term for board size (p<0.01) are significant predictors of
the bloomberg 5 year probability of default and market capitalisation (p<0.05) and firm
performance (p<0.01) are significant control variables. Average tenure and board size have
a negative effect on the long-term likelihood of the firm and the number of employees has
a positive effect on the long-term likelihood of firm default. An increase in the average
tenure and board size has an effect of decreasing the long-term likelihood of firm default
and an increase in the number of employees has the effect of increasing the long-term
likelihood of firm default. However, the quadratic term for board size has a positive effect
on the long-term likelihood of default i.e. as the board size further increases the likelihood
of default increases.
Table 5.16 Variables entered in each linear model for Bloomberg 5 year probability of default
(Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Capitalisation * * * * * * * *
Firm Performance * * * * * * * *
Gearing * * * * * * * *
Sector * * * * * * * *
Average Salary * * * * * * *
Average Bonus * * * * * * *
AverageTenure * * * * * * * *
Number of Employees * * * * * * * *
Size of Board * * * * * * * *
Quadratic Average Salary * *
Quadratic Average Bonus * *
Quadratic Average Tenure * *
Quadratic Size of Board * * *
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5.8 Altman Z-score probability of default linear regres-
sion
The linear regression model for the Bloomberg 1 year probability of default is presented in
Table 5.17. The variables were entered using a forward and backward selection criteria and
this process is presented in Table 5.18. The results for each individual model are presented
in Table B.5 (appendix B). The multiple R-squared shows that 22.9%, 9% and 31.34% of
the variance in the data is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3) respectively.
The adjusted R-squared shows that 18.13%, 6.83% and 25.17% of the variance in data
is explained by the model (1), model (2) and model (3) respectively after accounting for
the different predictor variables. The models are significant with a p-value<0.01, i.e. this
shows that the null hypothesis (the predictors have no effect on the dependent variable) is
rejected and the predictor variables affect the dependent variable is more likely and hence
the results are statistically significant.
A linear model of the control variables, predictor variables and all variables as a function
of the probability of the firm defaulting is constructed. The model (1) is significant
(F(12,194)=2.321, p<0.01), model (2) (F(5,201)=5.809, p<0.01) and (F(17,189)=3.508,
p<0.01).
The coefficients for the model (1) shows that the control variable market capitalisation
(p<0.05), firm performance (p<0.01) and firm gearing (p<0.01) are significant. Market
capitalisation and firm gearing have a negative effect on the Altman Z-score probability
of default and firm performance has a positive effect on the Altman Z-score probability
of default. An increase in the market capitalisation and firm gearing has the effect of
increasing the probability of default as predicted by Altman Z-score and an increase in the
firm performance decreases the probability of default as predicted by Altman Z-score.
The coefficients for the model (2) shows that the predictor variables average salary (CEO
and CFO), average bonus (CEO and CFO) and the size of the board are significant (p<0.01).
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The effect of average salary and size of the board has a negative effect and average bonus
has a positive effect on Altman Z-score probability of firm default. An increase in the
average salary and board size has an effect of increasing the likelihood of a firm defaulting
as predicted by the Altman Z-score and an increase in the average bonus has an effect of
reducing the likelihood of firm default as predicted by Altman Z-score.
This relationship continues in the full model (control and predictor variables) where market
capitalisation, average tenure (CEO, CFO and Chairman) and the number of employees
does not have a significant effect on the probability of default as predicted by the Altman
Z-score. Introducing a quadratic term for average salary, average bonus and average tenure
to the full model does not have any significant effect on the dependent variable. However,
Introducing a quadratic term for board size to the full model has an interesting effect
on the probability of default predicted by Altman Z-score. This model has a multiple
R-squared of 33.1% and an Adjusted R-squared of 26.7% i.e. 26.7% variance in the dataset
is explained by the model adjusted for the number of predictors. The coefficients show
that the control variable market capitalisation does not have a significant effect on the
probability of default and firm performance and firm gearing have a significant effect on the
probability of default. However, average salary (p<0.01), average bonus (p<0.05), board
size (p<0.05) and the quadratic term for board size (p<0.05) are significant predictors. The
coefficient for average salary has a negative effect on the Altman Z-score i.e. an increase
in the average salary has the effect of increasing the likelihood of default as predicted by
Altman Z-score. The coefficient for bonus has a positive effect on the Altman Z-score i.e.
an increase in the bonus has the effect of reducing the likelihood of default. Board size has
a positive effect on the Altman Z-score, however, the quadratic term for Board size has
a negative effect on the Altman Z-score. The effect of board size prior to introducing a
quadratic term was negative. This shows that as the board size initially increases it has the
effect of reducing the likelihood of default and a further increase in the board size has the
effect of increasing the likelihood of default.
The final model for the dependent variable Altman Z-score probability of default through
backward selection criteria is:
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Table 5.17 Altman Z-score probability of default linear model (Source: Author’s own collection,
created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Dependent variable:
altmanz2
salarya2 −0.00000262429∗∗∗
(0.00000061212)
bonusa2 0.00000083736∗∗
(0.00000037508)
boardsize2 1.30471300000∗
(0.66782120000)
mcap2 −0.00000668868
(0.00001017278)
performance2 0.03603481000∗∗
(0.01455350000)
gearing2 −0.01002075000∗∗∗
(0.00230397100)
sector2Consumer Staples −0.50844460000
(0.80112020000)
sector2Energy −2.32954900000
(1.92069800000)
sector2Health Care −0.35762990000
(0.99187040000)
sector2Industrials −0.45308040000
(0.64339310000)
sector2Information Technology −1.10054400000
(1.42648100000)
sector2Materials 2.56904600000∗∗∗
(0.97234290000)
sector2Real Estate −4.31732600000∗∗∗
(1.05571400000)
sector2Telecommunication Services −4.25384300000∗∗∗
(1.40325300000)
sector2Utilities −0.73645750000
(0.92445200000)
boardsize22 −0.05763511000∗∗
(0.02644429000)
Constant −0.29671320000
(4.10686100000)
Observations 207
R2 0.32652020000
Adjusted R2 0.26980620000
Residual Std. Error 2.96421700000 (df = 190)
F Statistic 5.75730400000∗∗∗ (df = 16; 190)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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The multiple R-squared shows that 32.65% of the variance in the dataset is explained
by the model and the Adjusted R-squared shows that 26.98% variance in the dataset,
accounting for the predictor variables, (or population) is explained by the model. The
model is significant, (F(16,190)=5.757, p<0.01), this shows that the null hypothesis (the
predictors have no effect on the dependent variable) is rejected and the predictor variables
affect the dependent variable is more likely and hence the results are statistically significant.
The coefficients show that average salary (p<0.001), average bonus (p<0.05), board size
(p<0.1 and the quadratic term for board size (p<0.05) are significant predictors of the
Altman z-score probability of default and firm performance (p<0.05) and firm gearing
(p<0.001) are significant control variables. The average salary has a negative effect on
the likelihood of default and average bonus and board size has a positive effect on the
likelihood of default i.e. an increase in the average salary has the effect of increasing the
likelihood of default and an increase in the average bonus and board size has the effect
of decreasing the likelihood of default. However, the quadratic term for board size has a
negative effect on the likelihood of default i.e. a further increase in the board size has an
effect of increasing the likelihood of default increases.
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Table 5.18 Variables entered in each linear model for Altman Z-score probability of default (Source:
Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Market Capitalisation * * * * * * * *
Firm Performance * * * * * * * *
Gearing * * * * * * * *
Sector * * * * * * * *
Average Salary * * * * * * * *
Average Bonus * * * * * * * *
AverageTenure * * * * * * *
Number of Employees * * * * * * *
Size of Board * * * * * * * *
Quadratic Average Salary * *
Quadratic Average Bonus * *
Quadratic Average Tenure * *
Quadratic Size of Board * * *
A summary of the three dependent variables final polynomial models’ coefficient effects
are presented in Table 5.19 as follows:
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Table 5.19 Variables entered in final linear regression models (Source: Author’s own collection,
created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Variables BB1Y BB5Y Altman Z-score
Market Capitalisation - - -
Firm Performance - - +
Gearing + + -
Sector * * *
Average Salary - -
Average Bonus - +
AverageTenure -
Number of Employees + +
Size of Board - - +
Quadratic Average Salary +
Quadratic Average Bonus
Quadratic Average Tenure
Quadratic Size of Board + + -
The variables where the effect on the dependent from Bloomberg’s likelihood of default
and Altman Z-score’s likelihood of default changes is when a quadratic term for that
variable is introduced.
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5.9 Multilevel Linear Modelling (Linear Mixed Effects)
bb1y2 = salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
bb5y2 = tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 +
sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
altmanz2 = salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + ε
The above equations represent a linear model. In this, the contextual variables are company
and time periods. As it may be expected that the effect of the independent variables on
the likelihood of default to vary as a function of which company the TMT belong to and
which year the companies belong to. Therefore, it would be important to allow the model
to represent the effect of the independent variables on the likelihood of default across
different companies and different time periods.
The overall fit of a multilevel model is tested using a chi-square ratio test similar to that
in logistics regression. The higher the value of the log-likelihood the better the model.
In addition, AIC and BIC can be used to compare models. Field et al. (2012) explains
AIC as a goodness-of-fit measure that takes into account how many parameters have been
estimated and BIC as a measure similar to AIC that corrects more harshly for the number
of parameters being estimated (which should be used for larger sample sizes and a small
number of parameters. The lower the AIC and BIC the better the model.
It is recommended to start with a ‘basic’ model with all fixed parameters and then adding
random coefficients as appropriate (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002; Twisk, 2006). In addition,
centring could help multilevel models to be more stable, however, there is no correct choice
between not centring, group mean centring or grand mean centring (Kreft et al. 1995).
Therefore, for Robustness the mixed models are developed and tested using the raw data
and centred data.
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The first step is to ascertain if there is variation over contexts. This is done by fitting a
baseline model of the intercept only and a model is fitted to allow the intercepts to vary over
contexts. A comparison of these two models shows whether the allowing the intercepts to
vary improves the models.
The intercept only model is as follows:
bb1yinterceptonly<-gls(bb1y2 1,method="ML")
bb5yinterceptonly<-gls(bb5y2 1,method="ML")
altmanzinterceptonly<-gls(altmanz2 1,method="ML")
The model fitted to allow intercepts to vary over contexts is as follows:
bb1yintercept<-lme(bb1y2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
bb5yintercept<-lme(bb5y2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
altmanzintercept<-lme(altmanz2 1, random= 1|id2/t2,method="ML")
A comparison of the above two models shows that a model allowing intercepts to vary
over contexts significantly improves the intercept-only model. This can be seen in Tables
5.20, 5.21 and 5.22, where the models allowing the intercepts to vary is significantly better
than the model of the intercept only for all three dependent variables. Therefore, it can be
concluded that intercepts vary significantly across different companies and time periods
and multilevel modelling should be pursued.
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5.10 Random Intercept model
bb1y2 = salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
bb5y2 = tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 +
sector2 + boardsize22 + ε
altmanz2 = salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + ε
In the equation above, the variables to the right of ‘=’ are the fixed effect (systematic) and
‘ε’ is the error term that represents the deviations from the predictions due to random factors
that are not controlled. Winter (2013) call this random part also the ‘probabilistic’ or
‘stochastic’ part of the equation. The next step is to break the ‘ε’ down and add complexity
to it. In the Linear Mixed Effects modelling the systematic part of the model remains
unchanged from the linear models and only the random aspects of the model are changed.
In the data collected, there were multiple responses from each company. This violates
the independence assumption for linear modelling as multiple responses from the same
company cannot be regarded as independent of each other. Each company’s probability of
default is slightly different and this is a unique factor that affects all responses from the same
company thus making the different responses inter-dependent rather than independent.
This is addressed by adding a ‘random effect’ for each company, which assumes a different
‘baseline’ likelihood of default value for each company. Therefore, a company may have
a mean likelihood of default different from the mean likelihood of default from another
company.
In addition, there were multiple responses for each time period. This also violates the
independence assumption of linear modelling as multiple responses from the same year
cannot be regarded as independent from each other. Each year’s likelihood of default is
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slightly different and this is a unique factor that affects all responses from the same time
period thus making the different responses inter-dependent rather than independent.
This is addressed by adding a ‘random effect’ for each year, which assumes a different
‘baseline’ likelihood of default value for each year. Therefore, a time period may have a
mean likelihood of default different from the mean likelihood of default from another time
period.
These individual differences are modelled by assuming a different intercept for each
company and each time period. The mixed model assigns a different intercept value for
each company and each time period and estimates these intercepts. These random effects
give structure to the error term ‘ε’, which in the linear model was something that could
not be controlled or understood and was a constant across the board. This combination of
‘fixed effects’ and ‘random effects’ in the model is referred to as mixed models.
This updates the formula to (summary of the model is in the appendices):
bb1y2 salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
bb5y2 tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
altmanz2 salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
The ‘(1|id2) + (1|t2)’ tells the model to assume a different intercept for each company and
each time period. The error term ‘ε’ still remains as there still remains ‘random’ differences
that cannot be controlled. Winter (2013) argues that by undertaking a company-analysis
(averaging over time), by-time variation is disregarded, and conversely, in the time-analysis,
by-company variation is disregarded. Mixed models account for both sources of variation
in a single model.
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5.11 Significance test of Random Intercept model
In order to test the significance of the model, attaining the p-value is not as straightforward
as a linear model. Winter (2013) recommends using the Likelihood Ratio Test as a means
to attain p-values. The logic of the likelihood test is to compare two models with each
other i.e. the model without the factor of interest (null model) and the model with the
factor of interest. A fixed effect is significant if the difference between the likelihood of
the two models is significant.
In order to show model development and to test model significance, we start with the null
model, followed by the control model and compare these to the final model. The results
of the comparison of these models to ascertain the significant improvement in the model
is presented in Tables 5.23, 5.24 and 5.25. The results show that the control models and
the full models are a significantly better fit than the null model for all three dependent
variables.
The null model:
bb1y2 1 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
bb5y2 1+ (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
altmanz2 1 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
The control model:
bb1y2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
bb5y2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
altmanz2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
The final model:
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bb1y2 salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
bb5y2 tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
altmanz2 salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (1|id2) + (1|t2) + ε
An additional argument, REML=FALSE is included, as it is necessary to compare models
using the likelihood ratio test (Pinheiro and Bates, 2000; Bolker et al., 2009). This final
model can also be called a Random intercept model.
Table 5.23 Bloomberg1 year Random Intercept: Null vs Control vs Final model (Source: Author’s
own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
bb1y.null 4 530.39 543.72 -261.20 522.39
bb1y.null2 16 538.06 591.39 -253.03 506.06 16.33 12 0.1766
bb1y.model2f 22 523.43 596.75 -239.72 479.43 26.63 6 0.0002
Table 5.24 Bloomberg5 year Random Intercept: Null vs Control vs Final model (Source: Author’s
own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
bb5y.null 4 493.64 506.97 -242.82 485.64
bb5y.null2 16 491.42 544.74 -229.71 459.42 26.23 12 0.0100
bb5y.model2f 19 487.52 550.84 -224.76 449.52 9.90 3 0.0195
Table 5.25 Altman Zscore Random Intercept: Null vs Control vs Final model (Source: Author’s
own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
altmanz.null 4 267.41 280.74 -129.70 259.41
altmanz.null2 16 257.91 311.24 -112.96 225.91 33.50 12 0.0008
altmanz.model2f 20 258.34 325.00 -109.17 218.34 7.57 4 0.1087
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5.12 Random Intercept and Random Slope model
The random intercept model accounts for baseline-difference in the likelihood of default
but assumes the effect of the fixed effects is going to be the same for all companies and the
different time periods.
In the BB1Y dependent variable model, the average bonus is a fixed effect of interest due
to the significance of its coefficient in the linear model.
bb1y2 salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + (bonusa2|id2) + (bonusa2|t2) + ε
In the BB5Y dependent variable model, average tenure is a fixed effect of interest due to
the significance of its coefficient in the linear model.
bb5y2 tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (tenurea2|id2) + (tenurea2|t2) + ε
In the AltmanZ dependent variable model, the average salary is a fixed effect of interest
due to the significance of its coefficient in the linear model.
altmanz2 salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (salarya2|id2) + (salarya2|t2) + ε
The assumption from the above is that average bonus (for bb1y), average tenure (bb5y)
and average salary (AltmanZ) does not have a different effect for different companies
and different time periods. In the random slope model, company and time periods have
different intercepts and the above variables are allowed to have different slopes in their
respective models.
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5.13 Significance test of Random Intercept and Random
Slope model
Once again, we compare the final random slopes model, to the null random slope model
and the control random slope model using the likelihood test ratio to get p-values.
The null model:
bb1y2 1 + (bonusa2|id2) + (bonusa2|t2) + ε
bb5y2 1+ (tenurea2|id2) + (tenurea2|t2) + ε
altmanz2 1 + (salarya2|id2) + (salarya2|t2) + ε
The control model:
bb1y2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (bonusa2|id2) + (bonusa2|t2) + ε
bb5y2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (tenurea2|id2) + (tenurea2|t2) + ε
altmanz2 mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + (salarya2|id2) + (salarya2|t2) + ε
The final model:
bb1y2 salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + perfor-
mance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 + (bonusa2|id2) + (bonusa2|t2) + ε
bb5y2 tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (tenurea2|id2) + (tenurea2|t2) + ε
altmanz2 salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2
+ boardsize22 + (salarya2|id2) + (salarya2|t2) + ε
222
5.14. Conclusion
The results of the comparison of these models to ascertain the significant improvement
in the model is presented in Tables 5.26, 5.27 and 5.28. The results show that the control
models and the full models are a significantly better fit than the null model for all three
dependent variables. Research in fields such as ecology (Schielzeth and Forstmeier, 2009)
and psycholinguistics (Barr et al. 2013) have shown via simulations that mixed models
without random slopes are anti-conservative or they have relatively high type I error, i.e.
find a lot of significant results that are actually due to chance. Barr et al. (2013) also
recommend including random slopes for all fixed effects that are important for the overall
interpretation of the study.
Table 5.26 Bloomberg 1 year Random Intercept and Random Slope: Null vs Control vs Final
model (Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
bb1y.nullr 8 498.43 525.09 -241.22 482.43
bb1y.controlr 20 504.73 571.38 -232.36 464.73 17.71 12 0.1249
bb1y.model2fr 26 482.15 568.80 -215.07 430.15 34.58 6 0.0000
Table 5.27 Bloomberg 5 year Random Intercept and Random Slope: Null vs Control vs Final
model (Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
bb5y.nullr 8 493.21 519.88 -238.61 477.21
bb5y.controlr 20 491.80 558.45 -225.90 451.80 25.42 12 0.0130
bb5y.model2fr 24 484.99 564.97 -218.49 436.99 14.81 4 0.0051
Table 5.28 Altman Zscore Random Intercept and Random Slope: Null vs Control vs Final model
(Source: Author’s own collection, created using data collected from Bloomberg)
Df AIC BIC logLik deviance Chisq Chi Df Pr(>Chisq)
altmanz.nullr 8 260.03 286.69 -122.02 244.03
altmanz.controlr 20 255.23 321.88 -107.61 215.23 28.81 12 0.0042
altmanz.model2fr 24 244.87 324.85 -98.43 196.87 18.36 4 0.0010
5.14 Conclusion
This chapter provided the results of the descriptive analysis of the dataset followed by a
correlation matrix of the key variables. The average executive salary and average executive
bonus showed an increasing trend each year with a sharp decline in 2016. This is an
interesting period as the number of employees decreased the profitability and market
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capitalisation increased. A descriptive of the sectors showed that Information Technology,
Energy and Health Care are sectors deviating from the mean. The correlation matrix
identified a significant correlation between executive bonus and the short-term and long-
term probability of default. Whereas salary has a significant correlation to the accounting
probability of default. The TMT tenure also has a significant correlation to the short-term
and long-term probability of default. The board size and the number of employees have a
significant correlation to all three measures of the likelihood of default. The descriptive of
the categorical variables showed that there is significant under representation of females
on the top two positions and on the board within the UK FTSE 100 companies. And it is
extremely rare for the role of the CEO and Chairman to be combined into a single position
within these firms.
The final OLS linear regression models were developed through a forward and backward
selection criterion. The key finding within the final OLS regression models for each of
the three dependent variables was the existence of a curvilinear relationship with key
predictors. The the board size of a firm showed a significant curvilinear relationship to all
three measures of default prediction. The executive salary showed a significant curvilinear
relationship to the short-term market probability of default only. This chapter provided
results to conclude that multilevel modelling should be pursued as it is found that the
intercepts vary significantly across different companies and different time period for all
three dependent variables. The random intercept model, which models for a different
intercept for each company and each time period, developed was a significant improvement
to the null model. The random intercept and slope model further developed showed that
allowing executive bonus (for the short-term probability of default), top management
tenure (for the long-term probability of default) and executive salary (for the accounting
probability of default) to have different slopes for each company and each time period
further improved the models significantly.
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Chapter 6
Analysis and Discussion
6.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the findings presented in chapter 5 within the context
of findings in the previous academic work. It starts by providing a summary of key
features from the literature reviewed previously and comparing these key features to the
existing study. It then summarises the key models developed in this study and provides
a background to the analysis undertaken. This is followed by an analysis of the findings
of the Top Management Team (TMT) attributes of interest in this study i.e. executive
motivation, TMT loyalty and TMT effectiveness. In order to achieve a more robust analysis
of these findings, the findings of the control variables are also analysed and compared to
that of previous literature.
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6.2 Summary of Key Literature
This section is a summarised journal of key literature relevant to this study and where
relevant similarities exist these have been highlighted. Further detail on the findings within
these academic pieces of work is presented in appendix A.4.
Schultz et al. (2017) provide an Australian study that uses the Merton’s (1974) distance
to default measure the probability of firm default similar to this study. Once endogeneity
issues are addressed by econometric models they find no relationship between probability
of default and corporate governance mechanisms
Wright et al. (2007) provide a US study of TMT incentives and firm risk-taking. The
authors measure risk-taking as a lagged standard deviation of quarterly return on assets
(ROA) and lagged standard deviation of monthly total return to shareholders. The models
developed by the authors have a low R-squared similar to this study. They conclude
that managerial incentives do matter as they significantly impact subsequent corporate
risk-taking
Balachandran et al. (2010) provide a US study on the relationship between equity-based
incentive and the probability of default. The results find that equity-based pay increases
the probability of default while non-equity based pay decreases the probability of default.
Ting (2011) provide a Chinese study on the relationship between TMT turnover and firm
default risk. The study uses the KMV model to measure the probability of default which is
based on the Merton’s (1974) model similar to this study. The models developed by the
authors have a low R-squared similar to this study.
Loveman (1998) undertook a US Study on Retail Banking on employee satisfaction,
customer loyalty and firm performance. He argued in favour of tenure as a proxy for
loyalty similar to this study and used tenure to measure both employee and customer
loyalty.
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Dunn (2004) undertook a US study on the impact of Insider power on fraudulent financial
reporting. The author uses the Altman Z-score to predict the likelihood of default similar
to this study. In addition, the models developed by the author has a low adjusted R-squared
similar to this study.
Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) provide a Swiss study on the relationship between TMT
diversity and firm performance. The authors use p-value <.10 for significance testing
similar to this study and the models developed have a large intercept and small coefficients
similar to this study. The study also uses the hierarchical linear model similar to this study.
Cao et. al (2015) provide a US study on the relationship between corporate governance and
default risk. The study uses an unbalanced sample of firms per year and sector similar to
this study. The authors use distance to default developed from the work of Merton (1974)
similar to this study. The study uses CEO tenure as a measure for CEO power and finds
that the percentage of female directors has a significant negative correlation to CEO Tenure
Platt and Platt (2012) provide a US study on corporate board attributes and bankruptcy
using an unbalanced data set categorised by the number of years and sector which is similar
to this study.
Fich and Slezak (2008) provide a US study on governance attributes ability to avoid
bankruptcy and the power of financial/accounting information to predict bankruptcy. The
authors use an unbalanced panel data similar to this study. The models developed by the
authors has a low R-squared similar to this study. Finally, the authors use the Altman
Z-score to predict bankruptcy similar to this study
Guest (2009) undertook a UK study on the impact of board size on firm performance. This
is a large study that spans a large number of years. The study has a low adjusted R-squared
similar to this study.
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Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) provide a US study focussing on the TMT tenure and
organisational outcomes. The author’s developed models have a low R-squared similar to
this study.
O’Reilly III et al. (1988) provide a US study examining economic and psychological
factors that influence the setting of CEO compensation. The models developed by the
authors have a low adjusted R-squared similar to this study.
Richard and Johnson (2001) provide a US study that tests whether strategic human resource
management effectiveness significantly affects firm performance. The study employs a
hierarchical regression analysis to test a hypothesis similar to this study. The regression
models developed by the authors has a low R-squared similar to this study.
Boone et al. (2007) provide a US study of industrial firms examining the determinants of
corporate board size and composition. The models developed by the authors has a low
adjusted R-squared similar to this study.
Kallunki and Pyykö (2012) provide a Finnish study on the relationship between direc-
tor personal default and firm financial distress. The authors use two different default
probabilities (Altman and Ohlson) and develope two different models similar to this study.
Switzer et al. (2018) provide a study of non-North American financial firms looking at the
relationship between corporate governance and default risk. The study uses CDS spreads
and the Bloomberg probability of default (similar to this study) two different measures
to develop different models similar to this study. The study has a low R-squared similar
to this study. The authors collected the data from the Bloomberg database similar to this
study.
Switzer and Wang (2013a) undertook a US study exploring the relationship between credit
risk and corporate governance structures. The models developed by the author had a low
adjusted R-squared similar to this study. The authors use the Merton (1974) model similar
to this study. This is one of the few studies that collect data for the CFO (similar to this
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study) however this is the CFO’s age. The authors use the Bloomberg database to collect
the data similar to this study.
Table 6.2 summarises the above journal of key literature into key themes relevant to this
research.
Table 6.2 Summary of key literature (Source: Author’s own collection)
Elements
in this research
Supported
by key literature
Merton’s Distance to
Default/ KMV/ Bloomberg probability of default
Schultz et al.
(2017); Ting (2011); Cao et al. (2015); Switzer et al. (2018); Switzer and
Wang (2013a); Switzer and Wang (2013b)
Altman Z-score
probability of default
Fich and Slezak
(2008); Kallunki and Pyyko (2012)
Use two default
prediction methods in same study
Kallunki and Pyyko
(2012); Switzer et al. (2018)
TMT elements and
different variants of Default
- Corporate
Governance
- TMT Incentives
-TMT Turnover
- Director personal
default
- Probability of
Default
- Firm Risk taking
- Credit Risk
- Bankruptcy
-Major corporate
failure
Schultz et al.
(2017); Wright et al. (2007); Balachandran et al. (2010); Platt and Platt
(2012); Cao et. al (2015); Kallunki and Pyyko (2012); Switzer et al. (2018);
Switzer and Wang (2013a); Switzer and Wang (2013b); Daily and Dalton (1994);
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992)
TMT elements and
different variants of firm performance
- TMT Diversity
-TMT
Internationalisaton
- TMT competencies
- Board Size
-TMT Tenure
- CEO Compensation
- HR effectiveness
- Board
size/structure
- Power Dimensions
- Executive pay
Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013); Nielsen (2010b); Vainieri et al. (2017); Guest (2009); Finkelstein and
Hambrick (1990); O’Reilly III et al. (1988); Richard and Johnson (2001);
Boone et al. (2007); Linck et al. (2008); Finkelstein (1992); Bebchuck and
Grinstein (2005)
Low Rsquare or adjusted
Rsquare (TMT research)
<.10 p-values
used in study
Small Coefficients
Large Intercepts
Wright et al. (2007);
Dunn (2004); Fich and Slezak (2007); Guest (2009); Finkelstein and Hambrick
(1990); O’Reilly III et al. (1988); Richard and Johnson (2001); Boone et al.
(2007); Switzer et al. (2018); Switzer and Wang (2013a)
Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013); Nielsen (2010b); Switzer et al. (2018)
Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013)
Unbalanced firms per
year and sector
Hierarchical
regression analysis
Cao et al. (2015);
Platt and Platt (2012); Fich and Slezak (2007)
Richard and Johnson
(2001)
Tenure as
Power/Loyalty
CFO included in
study
Loveman (1998); Cao
et al. (2015)
Switzer and Wang
(2013a)
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The 4 econometric models developed for each of the three dependent variables (Bloomberg
1 year, Bloomberg 5 year and Altman Z-score) are presented in tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5. In
each of the tables, the Pooled OLS model is the final Ordinary Least Square regression
model. The Polynomial OLS model is the final Ordinary Least Square regression model
which includes any additional significant quadratic terms for variables with a curvillinear
relationship. The Random Intercept Model is a development to the Polynomial model,
using hierarchical/multilevel modelling, where only the intercepts are allowed to vary
for each year and each company. The Random Intercept and Random Slope model is a
developement to the Random Intercept model where key variables of interest are allowed
to have different slopes. The Rsquared and the adjusted Rsquared show how the fit of the
model improves from the Pooled OLS to the Polynomial OLS.
The signicant improvement in AIC, BIC and LogLik scores shows that the Random
Intercept model is a better fit than the null model and the Random Intercept and Random
Slope model is a better fit than the Random Intercept model.
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6.4 Background to the analysis
Multilevel models are also known as hierarchical models from the structure of the data
and the hierarchy of the model. In addition, data that is not fully ordered or in a clear
hierarchy can also be modelled through non-nested models. Multilevel models can be used
for causal inference, prediction and descriptive modelling. For certain kinds of predictions,
multilevel models are essential, as classical regression would fail to make predictions for a
new individual within a new group as there would be no indicator for the new group in the
model however multilevel model handles this seamlessly. Key difference between classical
linear regression and hierarchical/multilevel modelling are presented in table 6.6.
Table 6.6 Classical Linear Regression modelling vs Multilevel/Hierarchial Modelling (Source:
Adapted from Gelman (2008))
Classical Regression Multilevel/Hierarchical Modelling
Not wise to use many predictors as estimates would be unre-
liable
All the predictors can be included
Necessary to address any collinearity Coefficients to each batch of indicators are fit to a probability
distribution
Estimates of varying effects can be noisy, especially when
there are few observations per group
Allows to estimate these interactions to the extent supported
by the data
Classical estimation just using local information can be es-
sentially useless if the sample size within groups is small
Allows estimation of group averages and group-level effects
compromising between the overly noisy within-group esti-
mate and the oversimplified regression estimate that ignores
group indicators
If a model ignores group effects and it will tend to understate
the error in predictions for new groups. If a model includes
group effects, there is no automatic way of getting predic-
tions for new groups. A two-stage regression can be used to
forecast for a new group however it can be difficult or even
impossible if sample sizes are small in some groups
Allows forecasting even if sample sizes are small in some
groups and fully accounts for uncertainty at both levels in a
two-stage regression
Problems of overfitting by using ordinary least squares or
maximum likelihood for datasets collected with inherent
multilevel structure
Satisfies statistical theory – sampling or Bayesian - which
states that inference about dataset inherently multilevel
should include the factors used in the design of data col-
lection
No pooling ignores information within datasets and can
give unacceptably variable inferences. Complete pooling
supresses variation that can be important
Allows modelling through partial pooling which is preferred
Including predictors at two different levels is extremely dif-
ficult specially when the sample sizes for some groups is
small
Provides a coherent model which simultaneously incorpo-
rates both individual and group level models.
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The models presented in tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 are presented below as equations.
OLS (Full Model)
OLS Model 1
Bb1y = – 2.9748e+01 + 7.087e-06.salary – 2.422e-05.bonus – 3.280e+00.tenure + 1.729e-
04.employees + 1.006e+01.boardsize – 6.946e-04.mcap – 6.439e-01.performance + 4.105e-
02.gearing + factor.(sector) + error
OLS Model 2
Bb5y = 1.113e+03 + 6.075e-05.salary – 7.556e-05.bonus – 2.613e+01.tenure + 6.436e-
04.employees + 4.6121e+01.boardsize – 4.439e-03.mcap – 4.633e+00.performance +
5.657e-01.gearing +factor.(sector) + error
OLS Model 3
Altmanz = 8.154e+00 – 2.459e-06.salary + 9.160e-07bonus – 2.855e-02.tenure –2.456e-
06.employees –2.741e-01. boardsize – 1.986e-06.mcap + 3.240e-02.performance – 9.698e-
03.gearing + factor.(sector) + error
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Polynomial (Forward/Backward Selection)
Polynomial Model 1
Bb1y = 2.233e+02 – 6.878e-05 . salary+ 2.565e-11 . salaryq – 2.747e-05 . bonus +
2.105e-04 . employees + 1.227e+00 . boardsizeq – 1.977e+01 . boardsize – 7.137e-04 .
mcap – 6.128e-01 . performance + 5.122e-02 . gearing + factor . (sector) + error
Polynomial Model 2
Bb5y = 2.776e+03 – 3.610e+01 . tenure + 7.432e-04 . employees – 2.249e+02 . boardsize
+ 1.086e+01 . boardsizeq – 3.335e-03 . mcap – 5.566e+00 . performance + 5.400e-01 .
gearing + factor . (sector) + error
Polynomial Model 3
Altmanz = -2.967e-01 – 2.624e-06 . salary + 8.374e-07 . bonus + 1.305e+00 . boardsize
– 5.764e-02 . boardsizeq – 6.689e-06 . mcap + 3.603e-02 . performance – 1.002e-02 .
gearing + factor . (sector)
The Intercepts: If a company has a value of 0 for all its predictors then the predicted
probability of default for the company as per each of the polynomial models will be its
intercept in the model, respectively 2.233e+02%, 2.776e+03% and -2.967e-01 Z-score.
This would be a meaningless prediction as a company with a value of 0 for all the predictors
included in the model would fail to exist.
In order to undertake Linear Mixed Effects (LME), all the variables were scaled to provide
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. A robustness check of the scaled variables and
raw variables OLS regressions were compared and the results were consistent. Whilst the
coefficients differed as expected the significance and the sign of the relationship remained
consistent.
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The research used R (R Core Team, 2012) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2014) to perform a
linear mixed effects analysis of the relationship between the probability of default and
the Executive motivation, TMT loyalty and TMT Effectiveness. The complete R code
developed by the author for this study is presented in appendix C. As Fixed Effects, Salary,
Bonus, Tenure, Board Size and Number of employees were entered with their quadratic
terms. As Random effects, there were intercepts for companies and years, as well as
by-company and by-years random slopes for the effect of probability of default. Visual
inspection of residual plots did not reveal any obvious deviations from homoscedasticity or
normality. The model significance (p-values) was obtained by the likelihood ratio test of
the full model with the effects in question against the model without the effect in question
(Winter, 2014).
Allowing regression coefficients to vary across companies and time periods (Random
Intercept Model – RIM)
RIM Model 1
BB1y = – .30758 – 0.48653.Salary + 0.65933.Salaryq – 0.25571.bonus + 0.27317.employ-
ees – 0.60979.boardsize + 0.82858.boardsizeq – 0.45198.mcap – 0.06885.performance +
0.01668.gearing + factor(sector) + (1|company) + (1|year)
RIM Model 2
BB5y = – 0.18920 – 0.16017.tenure + 0.18857.employees – 0.88027.boardsize + 1.00456.board-
sizeq– 0.44167.mcap – 0.0860.performance + 0.06282.gearing + factor(sector) + (1|com-
pany) + (1|year)
RIM Model 3
Altmanz = 0.12721 – 0.09720.salary + 0.01520.bonus – 0.19517.boardsize + 0.11315.board-
sizeq + 0.09127.mcap + 0.06651.performance – 0.15583.gearing + factor(sector) + (1|com-
pany) + (1|year)
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The random intercept and random slope models below are models where the subjects
are not only allowed to have differing intercepts but also where they are allowed to have
different slopes for the effect of Bonus (for Bloomberg 1 year), Tenure (for Bloomberg
5 year) and Salary (for Altman Z-score). These specific variables were selected to allow
them to have different slopes for each subject due to the significance of their effect in the
Ordinary Least Square and Polynomial regression models.
RISM Model 1
BB1y = – .16918 – 0.53290.Salary + 0.82431.Salaryq – 0.17680.bonus + 0.28532.employ-
ees – 0.98265.boardsize + 1.16087.boardsizeq – 0.43390.mcap – 0.08967.performance +
0.03705.gearing + factor(sector) + (bonus|company) + (bonus|year)
RISM Model 2
BB5y = – 0.17279 – 0.16907.tenure + 0.13731.employees – 0.90205.boardsize + 1.06175.board-
sizeq – 0.44283.mcap – 0.07939.performance + 0.08452.gearing + factor(sector) + (tenure|company)
+ (tenure|year)
RISM Model 3
Altmanz = 0.30923 – 0.22128.salary + 0.04563.bonus – 0.03438.boardsize – 0.07930.board-
sizeq + 0.09332.mcap + 0.07211.performance – 0.15579.gearing + factor(sector) + (salary|company)
+ (salary|year)
6.5 Motivation
This section analyses the findings of the relationship between executive motivation and
the likelihood of default. The section discusses the findings of short-term (Salary) and
long-term (Bonus) motivation, highlights they key significant relationships found in this
study and discusses this within the context of findings from the previous key literature.
239
6.5. Motivation
6.5.1 Short-term motivation (Salary)
This section analyses the findings of salary as a short-term measure of motivation and
discusses them within the context of findings from previous studies. Table 6.7 summarises
these findings and identifies key literature in support of or against these findings. The
CEO and CFO average salary show a significant negative correlation with the accounting
probability of default. This relationship is interesting as an increase in the average salary
increases the probability of default predicted by the Altman Z-score. This could indicate
that poor performance is being rewarded by paying the CEO and CFO higher salaries or
pointing towards the inefficient market for executive salaries. However, it is more likely
that firms that are struggling are more likely to pay higher salaries to attract talent in order
to turnaround the business. There is a significant positive correlation between CEO and
CFO salary and CEO and CFO Bonus. This shows that the higher paid CEO and CFO also
received higher bonuses. Firms paying higher salaries to executives for their talent were
also rewarding them with higher bonuses or higher paid executives were demanding higher
bonuses. There is a significant positive correlation between the board size and the average
salary paid to the CEO and CFO. Nielsen (2010b) found similar results (significant positive
correlation) between average executive compensation (salary and bonus) and TMT size.
This is interesting as with an increase in board size one would expect increased scrutiny of
the executive compensation levels.
However, this relationship could also indicate that firms that are able to afford an increased
number of directors on their board were also able to afford higher salaries or with an
increased number of directors on the board it is likely to be more inefficient in scrutinising
executive reward. The number of employees has a significant positive correlation to
the average CEO and CFO salary. Nielsen (2010b) found a similar significant positive
correlation between executive compensation and the number of employees and O’Reily III
et al. (1988) found a similar significant correlation between CEO salary and the number of
employees. Firms that require a larger number of employees operationally were paying
their CEO and CFO higher salaries as an indicator for a larger representation. However,
some sectors do require a larger number of employees such as retail which could affect this
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correlation. Finally, the correlation matrix shows a significant positive correlation between
market capitalisation and the average salary of the CEO and CFO. This result would be
expected as larger firms by market capitalisation paid the executives higher salaries to
reflect the added responsibility.
O’Reilly et al. (1988) found CEO salary to have a significant positive correlation to
ROE which is inconsistent to the results of this research which indicates a non-significant
negative relationship of CEO and CFO salary with performance. This is consistent with
the findings of Finkelstein (1992) who found structural power (where compensation was
a key latent variable) had a non-significant correlation to ROE. The research also finds
that the CEO and CFO salary has a non-significant negative correlation to CEO CFO
and Chairman tenure. O’Reilly et al. (1988) also found a non-significant correlation
between CEO salary and tenure, however, the relationship was positive. They also found
the number of employees, ROE and CEO tenure to be non-significant predictors of CEO
compensation where the number of employees had a negative relationship and the other
two a positive relationship. Bebchuck (2005) found ROA to be a significant positive
predictor of CEO compensation, CEO non-equity based compensation and executive non-
equity based compensation. However, they find that the ROA is a non-significant positive
predictor of executive compensation.
The OLS models show that the average salary of the CEO and CFO is only a significant
predictor for the accounting probability of default. It is not a significant predictor for the
short-term and long-term market probability of default. The OLS model 3 shows that a
£1 increase in the average salary of the CEO and CFO would increase the accounting
probability of default by 2.459e-06 units. This points to the significance of the salary
to the historic performance of the firm and that the salary does not act as a significant
motivation for the CEO and CFO to influence the likelihood of default. Schultz et al.
(2017) found executive fixed pay to be a significant positive predictor of default in the OLS
model. However, once catering for endogeneity through econometric modelling found this
relationship to be non-significant. Nielsen (2010b) found executive compensation to be a
significant positive predictor of firm performance. However, she included both salary and
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bonus within the measure of compensation. The significance of CEO and CFO salary as a
predictor of default is also supported by Wright et al. (2017), Balachandran et al. (2010)
and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992).
However, they found the predictor to have a negative relationship to default whereas this
research finds salary to have a positive relationship to the accounting probability of default.
Wright et al. (2017) found average TMT salary to be a significant negative predictor to
risk-taking. Balachandaran et al. (2010) found non-equity pay to be a significant negative
predictor for default. Hambrick and D’Aveni found compensation to be a significant
negative predictor up to 4 years prior to bankruptcy. Schultz et al. (2017) found executive
fixed pay to have a non-significant positive relationship with default within the Pooled
Dynamic OLS and Fixed Effects panel models and then found the executive fixed pay to
have a non-significant negative relationship within the GMM and Dynamic Sys. GMM
models. This helps argue the need to explore a curvilinear relationship between executive
salary and default rather than a linear relationship.
Polynomial model 1 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, a £1 increase in CEO and CFO average salary would decrease the short-
term market probability of default by 6.878e-05 units. However, due to the curvilinear
relationship of salary in polynomial model 1, after a point, a £1 increase in CEO and CFO
average salary would have a 2.565e-11 units increase in the short-term market probability
of default. This relationship is also highlighted in polynomial model 3 which points to a
2.624e-06 units increase in the accounting probability of default for every £1 increase in
average CEO and CFO salary.
The average CEO and CFO salary and its quadratic term is a non-significant positive
predictor for the Bloomberg 5-year probability of default which is consistent with the
findings of Schultz et al. (2017). Hence, it can be concluded that average CEO and CFO
salary do not have an effect on the long-term probability of default.
The Random Intercept Models (RIM) show that average CEO and CFO salary (standardized)
maintains a significant curvilinear relationship to the short-term market probability of
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default however average salary is no longer a significant predictor for the accounting
probability of default. The RIM Model 1 shows that comparing companies with the
same value for other predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in average salary would
decrease the short-term market probability of default by 0.48653 standard deviations. This
relationship is curvilinear, therefore eventually a 1 standard deviation increase in average
salary would increase the short-term market probability of default by 0.65933 standard
deviations. The RIM Model 2 shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in salary increases
the accounting probability of default by .09720 standard deviations.
The Random Intercept and Slope Model (RISM) shows that the average CEO and CFO
salary is a significant predictor for the short-term market probability of default and the
accounting probability of default. RISM Model 1 shows a significant curvilinear relation-
ship whereas RISM Model 3 shows a significant linear relationship. RISM Model 1 shows
that, comparing companies with the same value for other predictors, a 1 standard deviation
increase in the average salary would decrease the short-term probability of default by
0.53290 standard deviations and after a certain point a further 1 standard deviation increase
in the average salary would increase the short-term probability of default by 0.82431
standard deviations. RISM Model 3, shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in the salary
would increase the accounting probability of default by 0.22128 standard deviations.
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Table 6.7 Key literature linked to findings relating to salary in this study (Author’s own collection)
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
Altman Z Negative correlation
CEO CFO Bonus Positive correlation
Board size Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
Employees Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
O’Reilly III et al.
(1988)
Market Capitalisation Positive Correlation
Altman Z OLS, Polynomial, RISM Negative Predictor Schultz et al. (2017);
Nielsen (2010b)
Wright et al. (2017);
Balachandran et al.
(2010); Hambrick and
D’Aveni (1992)
BB1y Polynomial, RIM and RISM Curvilinear predictor
BB5y Non-significant positive Schultz et al. (2017)
6.5.2 Long-term Motivation (Bonus)
This section analyses the findings of bonus as a long-term measure of motivation and
discusses them within the context of findings from previous studies. Table 6.8 summarises
these findings and identifies key literature in support of or against these findings. CEO
and CFO average bonus has a significant negative correlation with the short-term market
probability of default and the long-term market probability of default. The correlation with
the Altman Z-score is non-significant positive. All these three measures indicate that as
the average CEO and CFO bonus increases the probability of default of the firm decreases.
This would support the argument that executives are rewarded for good performance and
reducing the firm’s exposure to default. However, the results are not consistent with Wright
et al. (2017) who found a non-significant positive correlation between the probability of
default and TMT bonus. There is a significant positive correlation between CEO and CFO
salary and CEO and CFO Bonus. This shows that the higher paid CEO and CFO also
received higher bonuses. Firms paying higher salaries to executives for their talent were
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also rewarding them with higher bonuses or higher paid executives were demanding higher
bonuses.
The CEO CFO and Chairman average tenure have a significant positive correlation to the
CEO and CFO average bonus. This indicates that as the average tenure increases the bonus
paid to the CEO and CFO increases as well. The tenure of the TMT would increase as the
firm continues to perform each year leading to the TMT achieving the targets and bonus
being paid. With each bonus met the next bonus would traditionally have to be higher to
act as a motivational factor to ensure future targets are continuously met.
The correlation matrix also shows a significant positive correlation between CEO and
CFO average bonus and the board size. As the number of directors on a board increases
the bonus paid to the CEO and CFO increases. Nielsen (2010b) found similar results
(significant positive correlation) between average executive compensation (salary and
bonus) and TMT size. This is interesting as with an increase in board size one would
expect increased scrutiny of the executive compensation levels.
However, this relationship could also indicate that firms that are able to afford an increased
number of directors on their board were also able to afford higher salaries or with an
increased number of directors on the board it is likely to be more inefficient in scrutinising
executive reward.
The number of employees has a significant positive correlation to the average CEO and
CFO bonus. Nielsen (2010b) found a similar significant positive correlation between
executive compensation and TMT and O’Reily III et al. (1988) found a similar significant
correlation between executive compensation and the number of employees. Firms that
require a larger number of employees operationally were paying their CEO and CFO higher
bonuses as an indicator for a larger representation. However, some sectors do require a
larger number of employees such as retail which could affect this correlation.
The correlation matrix also shows a significant positive correlation between market capi-
talisation and the average bonus of the CEO and CFO. This result would be expected as
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larger firms by market capitalisation paid the executives higher salaries to reflect the added
responsibility.
In addition, the results show a significant positive correlation of CEO and CFO bonus to
the firm performance which is supported by findings from Nielsen (2010b), O’Reilly III
et al. (1988) and Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005). The results indicate that as the firm
performance increases CEO and CFO are rewarded with higher bonuses for providing the
improved performance. Alternatively, a higher bonus is provided as a motivational factor
to ensure improved performance. Nielsen (2010b) found a significant positive correlation
between executive compensation to ROA. O’Reilly III et al. (1988) found a significant
correlation between CEO salary and ROE. Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005) find ROA to
be a significant positive predictor of CEO compensation. However, they find that ROA is
not a significant predictor of Executive compensation. This is supported by the findings of
Finkelstein (1992) who found that structural power, which includes compensation as a key
latent variable, has a non-significant correlation to ROE.
An interesting finding of the correlation matrix is the significant negative correlation
between the number of female executives on the board and CEO and CFO bonus. This
variable is not explored further in the modelling as the number of missing observations
were considerably higher than that of all other variables. This points towards a relationship
where if the number of female members of the board increased it led to a decline in the
bonuses paid to the CEO and CFO. A board that actively pursues to increase a wider
representation, by including more female directors, is aiming to be an efficient board. And
as the board tries to operate more efficiently they are able to scrutinise the performance of
the firm and that portion influenced by the CEO and CFO. This could lead to key strategic
decisions on executive compensation scrutiny.
The OLS model shows that the average CEO and CFO bonus is a significant predictor for
the short-term market and accounting probability of default. OLS model 1 shows that a
£1 increase in the average CEO and CFO bonus would decrease the short-term market
probability of default by 2.422e-05 units and decrease the accounting probability of default
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(OLS model 3) by 9.1600e-07 units. This highlights that bonus is significant to the short-
term performance of the firm and the historic performance of the firm but not significant to
the long-term performance of the firm. This is supported by Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992),
who found compensation to be a significant negative predictor of the probability of default
up to 4 years prior to bankruptcy. Balachandran et al. (2010) found non-equity pay is a
significant negative predictor and equity-based pay is a significant positive predictor of the
probability of default. However, Wright et al. (2007) also found the average TMT bonus to
have a non-significant positive relation to risk-taking. Fick and Slezak (2008) found CEO
bonus to not be a statistically significant predictor of the probability of default. Schultz
et al. (2017) found similar results where executive variable pay was a non-significant
predictor of the probability of default. These results could indicate that the executives were
taking on more risk to increase firm performance and as firm performance increases the
likelihood of default decreased.
Nielsen (2010b) found executive compensation, which included both salary and bonus,
to be significant positive predictors of firm performance. Indicating that an increase in
executive compensation would lead to an increase in the firm’s performance. Bebchuck and
Grinstein (2005) found ROA to be a significant positive predictor for CEO and Executive
non-equity based compensation. However, O’Reilly et al. (1988) found that the number of
employees, ROE and CEO tenure were not significant predictors of CEO compensation.
Polynomial model 1 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, a £1 increase in the average bonus of the CEO and CFO decreases the short-
term market probability of default by 2.747e-05 units. This relationship is also seen in
the polynomial model 3 where a £1 increase in the average bonus of the CEO and CFO
decreases the accounting probability of default by 8.374e-07 units.
Polynomial model 2, excludes both average CEO and CFO salary and bonus as they are
not significant predictors of the long-term market probability of default. This shows
that whilst Salary and Bonus are significant to motivate the executive in the short-term
there is no significant long-term effect of these on the probability of default. In addition,
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the accounting measure of the probability of default is significantly influenced by the
salary and bonus of the executives. This highlights that historical performance of the firm
influences the probability of default and the motivation provided to the CEO and CFO.
The Random Intercept Models (RIM) show that average CEO and CFO bonus (standardized)
maintains a significant relationship to the short-term market probability of default however
average bonus is no longer a significant predictor for the accounting probability of default.
The RIM Model 1 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other predictors,
a 1 standard deviation increase in average bonus would decrease the short-term market
probability of default by 0.25571 standard deviations. This relationship is supported
by RIM Model 3, where a 1 standard deviation increase in average bonus increases the
accounting probability of default by 0.01520 standard deviations.
The Random Intercept and Slope Model (RISM) shows that the average CEO and CFO
bonus is not a significant predictor for the short-term market probability of default and
the accounting probability of default. RISM Model 1 shows that comparing companies
with the same value for other predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in the average
bonus would decrease the short-term probability of default by 0.17680 standard deviations.
RISM Model 3, shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in the bonus would decrease the
accounting probability of default by 0.04563 standard deviations.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) found the team compensation was substantially lower (from
t-4) for bankrupt firms, the percentage of the team with core function was lower in the
bankrupt firms and the failing firms has smaller teams with fewer outside directors.
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Table 6.8 Key literature linked to findings relating to bonus in this study (Author’s own collection)
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
BB1y Negative correlation Wright et. al (2017)
BB5y Negative correlation Wright et. al (2017)
CEO CFO Salary Positive correlation
CEO CFO Chairman Tenure Positive correlation
Board Size Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b)
Number of Employees Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
O’Reilly III et al.
(1988)
Market Capitalisation Positive correlation
Firm Performance Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
O’Reilly et al. (1988);
Bebchuck and Grinstein
(2005)
Female Executives on Board Negative correlation
BB1y OLS, Polynomial, RIM and RISM Negative predictor Balachandran et. al
(2010); Hambrick and
D’Aveni (1992)
Schultz et. al (2017);
Wright et al. (2017);
Balachandran et al.
(2010); Fich and Slezak
(2008)
BB5y Non-significant negative predictor Schultz et. al (2010)
Altman OLS, Polynomial Positive predictor Balachandran et. al
(2010); Hambrick and
D’Aveni (1992)
6.6 Loyalty
This section analyses the findings of the relationship between TMT loyalty and the like-
lihood of default. The section discusses the findings of tenure as a measure of loyalty,
highlights they key significant relationships found in this study and discusses this within
the context of findings from the previous key literature.
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6.6.1 Tenure
This section analyses the findings of tenure as measure of loyalty and discusses them
within the context of findings from previous studies. Table 6.9 summarises these findings
and identifies key literature in support of or against these findings.
CEO, CFO and Chairman tenure have a significant negative correlation with the short-term
market probability of default and the long-term market probability of default. This shows
that as the average tenure of the CEO, CFO and Chairman increases the probability of
default decreases. Indicating either that the TMT gained experience within the firm helps
reduce the likelihood of default. Alternatively, it indicates that with an increase in tenure
the TMT work towards making the firm safer in return making their jobs safer and not
working towards maximising shareholders wealth.
The CEO CFO and Chairman average tenure have a significant positive correlation to the
CEO and CFO average bonus. This indicates that as the average tenure increases the bonus
paid to the CEO and CFO increases as well. The tenure of the TMT would increase as the
firm continues to perform each year leading to the TMT achieving the targets and bonus
being paid. With each bonus met the next bonus would traditionally have to be higher to
act as a motivational factor to ensure future targets are continuously met.
The research finds a significant negative correlation between TMT tenure and firm gearing
level. This indicates that the firm relies less on debt finance to finance their activities as
the average tenure of the CEO, CFO and Chairman increases. This was supported by
the findings of Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) who found a significant negative correlation
between TMT tenure and leverage. The TMT is relying more on equity finance to reduce
the risk associated with debt financing. However, the cost of debt is cheaper than the cost
of equity and therefore could adversely affect shareholder wealth.
An extremely interesting finding is, the number of female executives on the board has a
significant negative correlation to the TMT tenure. Cao et al. (2015) had similar findings
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where they found a significant negative correlation between the percentage of female
directors and CEO tenure. Whilst the number of observations with missing data is high,
however, a similar finding to previous literature provides this result with relevance. This
shows that as the number of female executives on the boards increases the tenure of the
CEO, CFO and Chairman decreased. A board that actively pursues to increase a wider
representation, by including more female directors, is aiming to be an efficient board. And
as the board tries to operate more efficiently they are able to scrutinise the performance of
the firm and that portion influenced by the CEO, CFO and Chairman. This could lead to
key strategic decisions influencing efficient TMT appraisals and replacement.
The correlation matrix shows a non-significant positive correlation between CEO, CFO
and Chairman tenure and the size of the board. However, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) and
Cao et al. (2015) found this relationship to be a non-significant positive correlation.
In addition, the research finds the correlation between tenure and market capitalisation to
be non-significant negative which is inconsistent with the results of Boone et al. (2007)
who found a significant positive correlation. Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) find a significant
negative correlation between TMT tenure and the number of employees, which was
inconsistent with the results, non-significant positive correlation, in this study. However,
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) did provide similar results where they found a significant
positive correlation between the number of employees and TMT tenure.
Finally, the correlation matrix shows a non-significant positive correlation between tenure
and firm performance, which is consistent with the findings of Vainieri et al. (2017).
Loveman (1998), used tenure as a proxy for employee satisfaction and found a slight
relationship with firm performance. However, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) and Finkelstein
and Hambrick (1990) found TMT tenure and firm performance to have a significant positive
and significant negative correlation respectively.
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) also found that TMT tenure was a significant positive
predictor of strategic persistence i.e. as the tenure increased the strategic persistence of the
firm increased. This supports the findings of Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) who found TMT
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tenure to be a significant positive predictor of firm performance. Dunn (2004) also found
that as Director tenure increased the likelihood of fraud within the firm decreased.
The OLS models show that average CEO, CFO and Chairman tenure is a significant
predictor for only the long-term market probability of default. OLS model 2 shows that
a 1-year increase in the average CEO, CFO and Chairman tenure would decrease the
long-term market probability of default by 2.613e+01 units. This highlights that the TMT
tenure does not have a significant impact on the historical probability of default and the
short-term probability of default. However, as the TMT tenure increases, they are able to
have a significant effect on the probability of default in the longer term. This finding is
supported by Fich and Slezak (2008) who found CEO tenure to be a significant negative
predictor of the probability of default. Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) also found TMT
tenure to be a significant negative predictor 4 years, 3 years and 2 years prior to bankruptcy.
However, Cao et al. (2015) found CEO tenure to be a non-significant positive predictor of
the probability of default in the OLS model. They find this relationship becomes significant
positive when they undertake a Hazard analysis.
Polynomial model 2 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, a 1-year increase in the average tenure of the CEO, CFO and Chairman decreases
the long-term market probability of default by 3.610e+01 units. The variable tenure is not
a significant predictor for the short-term market probability of default (polynomial model
1) and the accounting probability of default (polynomial model 3). This shows that loyalty
measured by tenure does not significantly affect the short-term market measure for the
probability of default. The TMT is not able to significantly affect the performance of the
firm in the short-term however, they are able to affect the long-term market measure for
the probability of default. In addition, the historic performance of the firm does not have a
significant effect on the tenure of the TMT.
The Random Intercept Models (RIM) show that average CEO, CFO and Chairman tenure
(standardized) maintains a significant relationship to the long-term market probability of
default. The RIM Model 2 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other
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predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in average tenure would decrease the long-term
market probability of default by 0.16017 standard deviations.
The Random Intercept and Slope Model (RISM) show that average CEO, CFO and Chair-
man tenure (Standardized) is a significant predictor of the long-term market probability
of default. The RISM Model 2 shows that comparing companies with the same value for
other predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in the average CEO, CFO and Chairman
tenure would decrease the long-term market probability of default by 0.16907 standard
deviations.
Kiel and Nicholson (2003), an Australian study, found that on average non-executive
directors made up 69% of the board and 23% of firms had CEO duality (role of chairman
and CEO combined). Carson (2002), an Australian study, found that, 76% of firms had a
non-executive chairman, 69% of firms have non-executive board directors, average number
of executive directors was 1.97, 75% of firms were audited by ‘Big 6’, 84% of firms
had an audit committee, 57% had a remuneration committee and 17% had a nomina-
tions committee. He concluded that the audit committee was a developed governance
mechanism, remuneration committees were developing and nominations committee were
underdeveloped. Collier and Gregory (1999) found that CEO duality and presence of
executive directors on the audit committee had a negative effect on the audit committee
activity. Garrow (2012) identified that there was little to no research on the relationship of
the joint tenure of Chairman and CEO and its effect on firm performance.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) found that CEO Dominance (t-5, t-4 and t-3) was signifi-
cantly higher for bankrupt firms, the average tenure was significantly shorter for bankrupt
firms and there were no differences in team heterogeneity.
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Table 6.9 Key literature linked to findings relating to tenure in this study (Author’s own collection)
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
BB1y Negative correlation
BB5y Negative correlation
CEO CFO Bonus Positive correlation
Gearing Negative correlation Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013)
Female executives on board Negative correlation Cao et al. (2015)
BB5y OLS, Polynomial, RIM and RISM Negative predictor Fich and Slezak (2008),
Hambrick and D’Aveni
(1992)
Cao et al. (2015)
6.7 Effectiveness
This section analyses the findings of the relationship between TMT effectiveness and
the likelihood of default. The section discusses the findings of Board-level effectiveness
(Board Size) and Firm-level effectiveness (Number of employees), highlights they key
significant relationships found in this study and discusses this within the context of findings
from the previous key literature.
6.7.1 Board Level Effectiveness (Board Size)
This sub-section analyses the findings of board size as a measure of board level effectiveness
and discusses them within the context of findings from previous studies. Table 6.10
summarises these findings and identifies key literature in support of or against these
findings. Cao et al. (2015) and Platt and Platt (2015) found the mean number of directors
on boards in their study to be similar to this study i.e. between 10 and 11.
The number of directors on the board has a significant positive correlation with the short-
term market probability of default, the long-term market probability of default. This
relationship is also seen with the accounting probability of default, where board size has
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a significant negative correlation to the Altman Z-score. This shows that for all three
measures of default as the size of the board increases it correlates to an increase in the
likelihood of default. This indicates that bigger board sizes could lead to inefficiencies
leading to a decline in the firm causing an increase in the probability of default.
The results also show a significant positive correlation of the board size to the CEO and
CFO salary and CEO and CFO bonus. As the number of directors on a board increases
the average salary and bonus paid to the CEO and CFO increases. Nielsen (2010b) found
similar results (significant positive correlation) between average executive compensation
(salary and bonus) and TMT size. This is interesting as with an increase in board size
one would expect increased scrutiny of the executive compensation levels. However, this
relationship could also indicate that firms that are able to afford an increased number of
directors on their board were also able to afford higher salaries or with an increased number
of directors on the board it is likely to be more inefficient in scrutinising executive reward.
The board size has a significant positive correlation to the number of employees. This result
is supported by the findings of Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) and Nielsen (2010b). Both
these studies find that the TMT size has a significant positive correlation to the number of
employees. This shows that as the number of employees in a firm increases they increase
the number of directors on the board. The board size has a significant positive correlation
to the market capitalisation. This result was supported by Boone et al. (2007) who found
firm size to be a significant positive predictor of board size. This helps to argue that firms
that are larger in size operationally (number of employees) and as per investment (market
capitalisation) employ a larger number of directors.
The results also show a non-significant positive correlation between board size and firm
performance. Similar results were found by Nielsen (2010b). She found a significant
positive correlation between TMT size and ROA. Switzer and Wang (2013a) found board
size has a significant positive correlation to ROA. However, they found TMT size to be
a non-significant positive predictor of firm performance. However, Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013) found the TMT size to be a significant positive predictor of firm performance and
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a significant positive correlation between the two. Guest (2009) found board size to be
a significant negative predictor of firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q and Share return).
Switzer et al. (2018) found board size to have a significant negative correlation to ROA.
Interestingly, Boone et al. (2007) find ROA to be a significant negative predictor of board
size. This shows that as firms improve performance, the number of directors on the board
reduces and as the firm performance declines, the firm employs more directors on the
board to help turn it around. However, a positive correlation between performance and
number of directors points towards larger board sizes help improve firm performance.
The correlation matrix also finds a non-significant negative correlation between board
size and gearing. The direction of the relationship in this finding is supported by Switzer
et al. (2018) and Switzer and Wang (2013a). They found gearing to have a significant
negative correlation with board size. Interestingly, Linck et al. (2008) find gearing to be a
significant positive predictor of board size. As firms employ greater use of debt financing
the size of the board increases. This could relate to the agency problem where firms with a
larger board size will work towards ensuring shareholder wealth is maximised and hence
employing a larger amount of debt finance for investment. Alternatively, this could relate
to covenants or monitoring devices employed by providers of debt finance that require their
representation on the board in return for the investment. However, a negative correlation
between board size and gearing indicates that larger board sizes prefer the reduction in
debt financing and increase in equity financing, which is more expensive for the firm
leading to possibly a reduction in shareholder wealth but also reducing the risk of the
firm. The board size has a non-significant positive correlation to the average CEO, CFO
and Chairman Tenure. However, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) find a significant negative
correlation between TMT size and TMT tenure and Cao et al. (2015) finds a significant
negative correlation between board size and CEO tenure.
Finally, the findings show a non-significant positive correlation between board size and
the number of female executives on the board. This finding is supported by Cao et al.
(2015) who found a significant positive correlation between board size and percentage of
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female directors. This indicates that large boards are more inclusive and more likely to
have increased female representation.
The OLS models show that the number of directors on the board has a significant effect on
the short-term and long-term market probability of default. However, it is not a significant
predictor for the accounting probability of default. OLS model 1 shows that an increase in
the size of the board by 1 director increases the short-term market likelihood of default
by 1.006e+01 units and this relationship is stronger in the long-term. The OLS model 2
shows that an increase in the size of the board by 1 director increases the long-term market
likelihood of default by 4.612e+01 units. This shows that the size of the board influences
the likelihood of default for the firm in the short-term and long-term, however, the historic
performance of the firm is not affected by the size of the board. This result is supported
by the findings of Cao et al. (2015), who found that whilst in the OLS model board size
was a significant negative predictor however once employing hazard analysis (econometric
modelling) board size becomes a significant positive predictor. This is also supported by
Fich and Slezak (2008), who found the board size to be significantly positively related to
the probability of default and Switzer et al. (2018).
Switzer et al. (2018) found board size to be a significant positive predictor to the probability
of default (Bloomberg 5 year). However, Schultz et al. (2017) found board size to be a
non-significant predictor of default across all their models. This was supported by Ting
(2011); Platt and Platt (2012); Switzer and Wang (2013a); Switzer and Wang (2013b);
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992). Ting (2011) found board size to have a significant negative
relationship, Platt and Platt (2012) found smaller board sizes were associated with bankrupt
firms, Switzer and Wang (2013a) found board size to be a significant negative predictor
of credit risk, Switzer and Wang (2013b) found board size to be a significant negative
predictor for financial firms’ probability of default and Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992)
found board size to be a significant negative predictor 1 year prior to bankruptcy. These
results provide a strong rationale to explore a curvilinear relationship of board size with
the probability of default rather than a traditional linear relationship.
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In the polynomial models, Board Size is a key predictor of the likelihood of default as
evidenced by it being a significant predictor in all three polynomial models. In addition, all
three polynomial models show that the size of the board has a curvilinear relationship to
the likelihood of default.
Polynomial model 1 shows that comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, an increase in the board size by 1 director initially increases the short-term
likelihood of default by 1.227e+00 units and after a point, a further increase in the board
size by 1 director decreases the short-term likelihood of default by 1.977e+01 units.
However, this relationship is reversed when we focus on the long-term market probability
of default. This is visible in polynomial model 2, where an initial increase in the board
size by 1 director decreases the market probability of default by 2.249e+02 units and
after a point, an increase in the board size by 1 director increases the long-term market
probability of default by 1.086e+01 units. Polynomial model 3, provides similar results
to the long-term market probability of default. An Increase in the board of director size
by 1 director, in polynomial model 3, decreases the accounting probability of default
by 1.305e+00 units and after a point, an increase in the board of directors by 1 director
increases the accounting probability of default by 5.764e-02 units.
The Random Intercept Models (RIM) show that board size (standardized) maintains a
significant curvilinear relationship to the short-term and long-term market probability of
default. However, the relationship with the accounting probability of default is no longer
significant. RIM Model 1 shows that, comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in the board size initially would decrease the
short-term probability of default by 0.60979 standard deviations and after a certain point an
increase in the board size by 1 standard deviation would increase the short-term probability
of default by 0.82858 standard deviations. This relationship is further emphasised in RIM
Model 2, where a 1 standard deviation increase in board size initially would decrease
the long-term market probability of default by 0.88027 standard deviations and after a
certain point a further increase in the board size by 1 standard deviation would increase the
long-term market probability of default by 1.00456 standard deviations.
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The Random Intercept and Slope Models (RISM) show that board size (standardized)
maintains a significant curvilinear relationship to the short-term and long-term market
probability of default. However, the relationship with the accounting probability of default
is no longer significant. The RISM Model 1 shows that, comparing companies with the
same value for other predictors, a 1 standard deviation increase in the board size initially
would decrease the short-term market probability of default by 0.98265 standard deviations
and after a certain point a further 1 standard deviation increase in the board size would
increase the short-term market probability of default by 1.16087 standard deviations. This
relationship further continues in the RISM Model 2, where initially a 1 standard deviation
increase in the board size would decrease the long-term market probability of default by
0.90205 standard deviations and after a certain point a further 1 standard deviation increase
in the board size would increase the long-term market probability of default by 1.06175
standard deviations. The relationship of board size with the accounting probability of
default is not a significant curvilinear relationship. The RISM Model 3, shows that this
relationship is now negative i.e. a one standard deviation increase in the board size would
increase the accounting probability of default initially by 0.03438 standard deviations and
after a certain point by 0.07930 standard deviations.
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Table 6.10 Key literature linked to findings relating to board size in this study (Author’s own
collection)
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
BB1y Positive correlation
BB5y Positive correlation
AltmanZ Negative correlation
CEO CFO salary Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b)
CEO CFO Bonus Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b)
Number of employees Positive correlation Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013); Nielsen (2010b)
Market Capitalisaiton Positive correlation Boone et al. (2007)
BB1y OLS Positive predictor Cao et al. (2015);
Fich and Slezak (2008);
Switzer et al. (2018)
Schultz et al. (2017);
Ting (2011); Cao et al.
(2015); Switzer and
Wang (2013a); Switzer
and Wang (2013b);
Hambrick and D’Aveni
(1992); Platt and Platt
(2012);
BB1y Polynomial, RIM and RISM Curvilinear predictor
BB5y OLS Positive predictor Cao et al. (2015);
Fich and Slezak (2008);
Switzer et al. (2018)
Schultz et al. (2017);
Ting (2011); Cao et al.
(2015); Switzer and
Wang (2013a); Switzer
and Wang (2013b);
Hambrick and D’Aveni
(1992); Platt and Platt
(2012);
BB5y Polynomial, RIM and RISM Curvilinear predictor
Altman Polynomial Curvilinear predictor
6.7.2 Firm Level Effectiveness (Number of Employees)
This section analyses the findings of the number of employees as a measure of firm-level
effectiveness and discusses them within the context of findings from previous studies.
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Table 6.11 summarises these findings and identifies key literature in support of or against
these findings.
The number of employees has a significant positive correlation to the short-term market
probability of default and the long-term market probability of default. This relationship is
also seen with the accounting probability of default i.e. a significant negative correlation to
the Altman Z-score. This shows that as the number of employees in a firm increases the
probability of the firm defaulting across all measures of default increases. This provides
support to the argument that as the number of employees increases the TMT may struggle
to be effective due to inefficiencies resulting from the large employee base to manage
which may lead to an increase in the likelihood of default.
The number of employees has a significant positive correlation to the average CEO and
CFO salary and average CEO and CFO Bonus. Nielsen (2010b) found a similar significant
positive correlation between executive compensation (salary and bonus) and the number of
employees and O’Reily III et al. (1988) found a similar significant correlation between
executive compensation (salary and bonus) and the number of employees. Firms that
require a larger number of employees operationally were paying their CEO and CFO
higher salaries as an indicator for a larger representation. However some sectors do require
a larger number of employees such as retail, which could affect this correlation.
The board size has a significant positive correlation to the number of employees. This result
is supported by the findings of Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) and Nielsen (2010b). Both
these studies find that the TMT size has a significant positive correlation to the number of
employees. This shows that as the number of employees in a firm increases they increase
the number of directors on the board.
Finally, market capitalisation has a significant positive correlation to the number of em-
ployees. This indicates that as firms increase in investment size the number of employees
increases. Market capitalisation is a reflection of a firms financial size as the higher the
market capitalisation the bigger the company financially. The number of employees is a
reflection of the operational size of firm. The higher the number of employees the bigger
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the firms operations. The findings here shows that there is a significant positive correlation
between a firms financial size and a firms operational size.
CEO, CFO and Chairman Tenure have a non-sig positive correlation with the number of
employees. This is consistent with the findings of Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) who
found the number of employees has a significant positive correlation to the TMT tenure.
This indicates that the tenure of the executives is longer in firms that are operationally
larger. However, Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) found a significant negative correlation
between TMT tenure and the number of employees. The findings of this research also
show a non-significant negative correlation between firm performance and the number of
employees.
In addition, Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990), found the number of employees to be a
non-significant positive predictor of strategic persistence i.e. as the number of employees
increased the firm was increasingly more persistent with their strategy. Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013), Nielsen (2010b) and Richard and Johnson (2001) all found evidence to support
a positive correlation between measures of firm performance (ROA and ROE) with the
number of employees. Therefore, indicating an increase in firm performance correlated
with an increase in the number of employees.
The OLS models show that the average number of employees has a significant effect on
the short-term and long-term market probability of default. This finding is supported by
Memba and Job (2013) found employees to be the second highest ranked item likely to
affect financial distress within a firm. Richard and Johnson (2001) found the number
of employees to be a non-significant negative predictor of firm performance. Therefore,
indicating an increase in the number of employees leads to a decrease in firm performance.
However, Nielsen (2010b) and Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) found the number of employees
to be a significant positive predictor of firm performance. The number of employees is
not a significant predictor for the accounting probability of default. OLS model 1 shows
that an increase in the average number of employees by 1 increases the short-term market
likelihood of default by 1.729e-04 units and this relationship is stronger in the long-term.
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The OLS model 2 shows that an increase in the number of employees by 1 increases the
long-term market likelihood of default by 6.436e-04 units. This shows that the number of
employees influences the likelihood of default for the firm in the short-term and long-term,
however, the historic performance of the firm is not affected by the number of employees.
Wright et al. (2007) found a significant negative relationship between different measures
of risk-taking and the number of employees which is inconsistent with the findings of this
research.
In the polynomial models, the number of employees is a significant predictor for the
short-term market probability of default only and it is not a significant contributor to the
long-term market probability of default and the accounting probability of default.
Polynomial model 1 shows that, comparing companies with the same value for other
predictors, an increase in the average number of employees by 1 increases the short-
term market probability of default by 2.105e-04 units. This shows that in the short-term
TMT effectiveness firm-wide measured by the number of employees has an effect on the
short-term market probability of default.
The Random Intercept Models, show that the number of employees is a significant predictor
for the short-term and long-term market probability of default. RIM Model 1, shows that
a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of employees would increase the short-
term probability of default by 0.27317 standard deviations. This relationship is further
emphasised by the RIM Model 2, where a 1 standard deviation in the number of employees
would increase the probability of default by 0.18857 standard deviations.
The Random Intercept and Slope models (RISM) show that the number of employees
is a significant predictor for the short-term market probability of default however not a
significant predictor for the long-term market probability of default. The RISM Model 1,
shows that a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of employees would increase the
short-term market probability of default by 0.28532 standard deviations. The RISM Model
2, shows a similar relationship where a 1 standard deviation increase in the number of
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employees would increase the long-term market probability of default by 0.13731 standard
deviations.
Table 6.11 Key literature linked to findings relating to the number of employees in this study
(Author’s own collection)
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
BB1y Positive correlation
BB5y Positive correlation
AltmanZ Negative correlation
CEO CFO Salary Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
O’Reilly III et al.
(1988)
CEO CFO Bonus Positive correlation Nielsen (2010b);
O’Reilly III et al.
(1988)
Boardsize Positive correlation Nielsen and Nielsen
(2013); Nielsen (2010b)
Market Capitalisation Positive correlation
BB1y OLS, Polynomial, RIM, RISM Positive predictor Memba and Job (2013);
Richard and Johnson
(2001)
Wright et al. (2007)
BB5y OLS, Polynomial, RIM Positive predictor Memba and Job (2013);
Richard and Johnson
(2001)
Wright et al. (2007)
6.8 Control Variables
This section analyses the findings of the control variables and discusses them within the
context of findings from previous studies. Table 6.12 summarises these findings and
identifies key literature in support of or against these findings.
The Market capitalisation has a significant negative correlation to the Altman Z-score and
a significant positive correlation to the executive salary, exceutive bonus and the size of
the board. Boone et al. (2007) found market capitalisation to be a significant positive
predictor of board size. This shows that the larger the firm financial size the probability
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of default is higher. The correlation also shows that the larger the firm financial size the
higher the executive salary, bonus and bigger the board size. The regression models show
that market capitalisation is a significant negative predictor for the Bloomberg 1 year and
Bloomberg 5 probability of default across all regression models. Cao et al (2015) however
find market capitalisation to be a significant positive predictor of default. This is consistant
with the findings by Schultz et al. (2017) who initially found firm size to give inconsistent
findings i.e. it was a negative predictor in the OLS and GMM and positive predictor in
the Dynamic OLS and Dynamic GMM. However, once they controlled for endogneity in
the fixed panel model the results show market capitalisation to be a significant negative
predictor of default. This is consistent with the findings of this study. This indicates that
an increase in the market capitalisation decreases the short-term and long-term market
probability of default.
This research finds firm performance to have a significant negative correlation to the
Bloomberg 1 year and Bloomberg 5 year probability of default and a significant positive
correlation to the Altman Z-score and executive bonus. This is consitent with the findings
of Daily and Dalton (1994) Ting (2011), Switzer and Wang (2013a) and Switzer and
Wang (2013b) who found firm performance to be a significant negative predictor of
default. Switzer et al. (2018) also found ROA to be a significant negative predictor of
the Bloomberg 5 year probability of default similar to this study. This shows that as
firm performance improves the probability of the firm’s default predicted by all measures
decreases. This relationship continues in to the regression models where firm performance
is a significant negative predictor for the Bloomberg 1 year and 5 year probability of default
and a significant positive predictor for the Altman Z-score.
The level of the firm’s gearing has a significant positive correlation to the Bloomberg 5
year probability of default and firm performance and a significant negative correlation to
the Altman Z-score and TMT tenure. This is consistent with previous literature that has
found gearing to have a significant positive relationship to default (Balachandran et al.,
2010; Ting, 2011; Cao et al., 2015; and Schultz et al., 2017). This shows that as the tenure
of the TMT increases the gearing level decreases indicating that the TMT are showing
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more preference to equity to finance projects than debt. This behaviour could be explained
by the relationship gearing has in turn with the likelihood of default i.e. as the level of
gearing increases the long-term probability of default and the accounting probability of
default indicate an increase in default risk. This could point towards the existence of the
agency problem as the increase in TMT tenure leads to their preference for a safer working
enviornment at the expense of reduced risk and return. The relationship between gearing
and long-term market probability of default and accounting probability of default continues
into the regression models. However, Schultz et al. (2017) find that the relationship
between gearing and default is not significant once they control for endogeneity.
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Table 6.12 Key literature in support or against Control Variable findings
Variable Significant Relationship Literature Support Literature Against
Market Capitalisation and Alt-
manZ
Negative correlation
Market Capitalisation and
CEO CFO Salary
Positive correlation
Market Capitalisation and
COE CFO Bonus
Positive correlation
Market Capitalisation and
board size
Positive correlation Nielsen and Nielsen (2013);
Nielsen (2010b); Boone et al.
(2007)
Performance and BB1y Negative correlation Daily and Dalton (1994)
Performance and BB5y Negative correlation Daily and Dalton (1994)
Performance and AltmanZ Positive correlation Daily and Dalton (1994)
Performance and CEO CFO
Bonus
Positive correlation
Gearing and BB5y Positive correlation
Gearing and AltmanZ Negative correlation
Gearing and CEO CFO Chair-
man Tenure
Negative correlation
Gearing and Performance Positive correlation Nielsen and Nielsen (2013);
Nielsen (2010b); Guest
(2009)
Market Capitalisation and
BB1y
Negative predictor Schultz et al. (2017) Cao et al. (2015)
Performance and BB1y Negative predictor Ting (2011); Switzer et. al
(2018); Switzer and Wang
(2013a); Switzer and Wang
(2013b); Daily and Dalton
(1994)
Market Capitalisation and
BB5y
Negative predictor Schultz et al. (2017) Cao et al. (2015)
Performance and BB5y Negative predictor Ting (2011); Switzer et. al
(2018); Switzer and Wang
(2013a); Switzer and Wang
(2013b); Daily and Dalton
(1994)
Gearing and BB5y Positive predictor Schultz et al. (2017); Bal-
achandra et al. (2010); Ting
(2011); Cao et al. (2015);
Switzer et. al (2018)
Performance and AltmanZ Positive predictor Ting (2011); Switzer et. al
(2018); Switzer and Wang
(2013a); Switzer and Wang
(2013b); Daily and Dalton
(1994)
Gearing and AltmanZ Negative predictor Schultz et al. (2017); Bal-
achandra et al. (2010); Ting
(2011); Cao et al. (2015);
Switzer et. al (2018)
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6.9 Conclusion
This chapter undertook an analysis of the findings presented in chapter 5 within the context
of findings in the previous academic work. This chapter provided a comparison of Classical
Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical modelling which showed that where the data is
nested within different levels undertaking just classical regression does not provide accurate
results and it is more appropriate to undertake multilevel modelling.
The findings for executive salary, a measure of short-term motivation, showed that the
results are consistent with a majority of prior literature and provides a unique contribution
regarding its curvilinear relationship to the short-term probability of default which had
not been document before. Executive bonus, a measure of long-term motivation, provided
results consistent with a majority of existing empirical work however a key contribution
was the non-existence of a significant relationship of this measure to the long-term market
probability of default which is similar to the findings of Schultz et al. (2010; 2017). TMT
tenure, a measure of loyalty, showed a significant relationship to the long-term market
probability of default consistent with a majority of existing literature however the lack of a
significant relationship to the short-term market and accounting probability of default was
a significant contribution. The effect of board size of the firm, a measure of the TMT board
level effectiveness, was a significant finding as it helped explain the inconsistent findings
and debates in existing empirical work. The number of employees, a measure of the TMT
firm level effectiveness, showed a significant relationship to the market based measures of
the probability of default, which was consistent with a majority of the existing empirical
work. However, the lack of a significant relationship to the accounting probability of
default was interesting as it helps understand the relevance of this to market sentiment.
Finally, this chapter provided a discussion of the findings of the control variables within the
context of prior academic findings as robustness checks. This provided further evidence on
the validity and reliability of the findings discussed.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion and Recommendations
7.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by restating the research aim and the research hypothesis. The previous
chapter discusses the findings of this research and the implications of the findings within
the existing literature. This chapter presents the contributions of the research with a
focus on its key findings, the limitations of this research and recommendations for further
research.
7.2 Research aim and hypotheses
7.2.1 Aim
The overall aim of the research is to explore the relationship between the Top Management
Team (TMT) attributes and the probability of firm default.
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7.2.2 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1a There is no relationship between executive short-term motivation and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 1b There is a negative relationship between executive long-term motivation
and the likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 2 There is a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and the likelihood of
firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3a There is no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and the
likelihood of firm financial distress
Hypothesis 3b There is a positive relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and
the likelihood of firm financial distress
7.3 Contribution of this research
The literature review in chapter 2 provides the background to the development of a
theoretical framework and shows how existing theories fit together to provide a theoretical
model. The literature review in chapter 3 identifies many gaps in the current state of
knowledge and understanding of the relationship between key TMT attributes and the
probability of the firm default in the UK, in contrast to the advanced state of literature
in the US. This research attempts to reduce this gap in the literature by undertaking an
empirical research on the relationship between TMT attributes and the probability of firm
default. This is an important contribution to the field of TMT research and firm outcomes
and specifically the inclusion of the CFO within the definition of the TMT. The role of
the CFO has rarely been studied within Corporate Governance and this is rarer within the
UK Corporate Governance literature. The literature review identifies the most studied firm
outcomes within corporate governance and TMT literature are financial outcomes. Hence,
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it is vital that the executive that has direct responsibility for the firm finances should be
included within the definition of the TMT when studying financial outcomes. This study is
the first of its kind to focus on the relationship between TMT attributes and the probability
of firm default where the CFO is included in the TMT definition.
The development of the theoretical model will contribute significantly to the development
of theory within corporate governance. Corporate governance and TMT theories have been
slow to update and reflect on the global financial crisis of 2007. This trigger has shown
behaviours and attributes routinely criticised within the press and media which has brought
about a new decade of executives and non-executives within publicly listed companies.
The model provides a framework that focuses on attributes of individuals within the TMT
but also on the team as a whole which has rarely been done for the UK. The theoretical
model developed provides a framework from where further developments can be made to
reflect the relationship between firm outcomes and key TMT attributes.
The contribution of this thesis can be viewed from various perspectives. It presents an
overview of how the TMT of a firm influence firm outcomes through the theoretical
framework, and provides a comprehensive examination of the relationship of specific
attributes on the probability of firm default. The major contribution of this research is this
default prediction model using TMT attributes. The empirical work is validated by an out
of sample test on a recently defaulted firm and the success of this model at predicting a
higher default probability than existing market and accounting based models one year prior
to the default.
The empirical work uses both market and accounting-based measures for default prediction
which is rarely undertaken unless specifically for the purposes of comparing the perfor-
mance of the different default prediction models. This allows this research to understand
the specific relationship of TMT attributes to accounting measures of default prediction
and compare and contrast this to the relationship to market-based measures of default
prediction.
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The model provides a new and unique tool for shareholders to assess the default likelihood
of the firm using management characteristic. This allows the shareholders to make an
informed judgement on the risk appetite of their portfolios. In addition, the model would
also provide a framework which the remuneration committee and nominations committee of
the firm can use to set executive remuneration contracts and appointments. The significance
of the role of the CFO identified in this research and the model allows firms and future
corporate governance codes to specifically focus on this executive.
In summary, the research makes the following contributions:
• The proposed theoretical framework brings existing theories together and provides a
framework for the further development of future theories, which has been validated
by the empirical evidence;
• The inclusion of the CFO within the definition of the TMT and their specific impact
on the default probability of the firm;
• The inclusion of both market based and accounting-based measures of default
prediction to compare and contrast the relationship of TMT attributes to each of
these measures;
• The combination of specific individual executive and non-executive attributes and
overall team attributes, which shows how individual and team attributes affect the
default probability of the firm;
• The findings of this study provide listed firms outside the FTSE 100 in the UK with
a framework to examine their TMT remuneration and appointments by undertaking
an out of sample test of the model on a recently failed UK FTSE 350 firm;
• The findings provide the shareholders, the remuneration committee and nominations
committee with a framework to predict the default probability of the firm using TMT
attributes;
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• The research findings make an important contribution to literature within corporate
governance and provides a strong case for future corporate governance regulations
to specifically address the role of the CFO.
7.4 Summary of key findings
This section summarises some of the key findings of this research on the relationship
between TMT motivation, loyalty and effectiveness with the probability of firm default.
7.4.1 Motivation
The research shows that salary as a short-term motivator for the executives is significant for
the accounting and short-term market probability of default. The increase in salary shows
an increase in the accounting probability of default. The relationship to the short-term
market probability of default is interesting as there is a curvilinear relationship. This shows
that an initial increase in salary leads to a decline in the short-term market probability of
default however as the rate of salary increases the short-term market probability of default
starts to increase. The research also finds that for the long-term market measure of default
salary does not have any significant effect.
Bonus as a long-term motivator for the executives is significant for the accounting and short-
term market measure of default. The increase in bonus shows a decrease in the accounting
probability of default and the short-term market probability of default. In addition, results
for the long-term market probability of default does not show any significant relationship.
This, therefore, requires careful attention from shareholders and non-executive directors as
executive bonus fail to achieve the objective of aligning executive objectives with longer-
term objectives of the shareholder and the organisation. Executives are ensuring that the
likelihood of default for the firm reduces to ensure that it continues to remain in existence
and they are able to achieve their bonuses.
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7.4.2 Loyalty
A key finding of this research is that tenure as a measure of loyalty has a significant
relationship to the long-term market measure of default. It does not show any significant
relationship to the accounting likelihood of default and the short-term market likelihood
of default. This shows that as the tenure of the TMT increases they were able to reduce
the long-term market likelihood of default of the firm. This is interesting as longer tenure
TMT’s were strategically focussing on the long-term health of the organisation. This also
shows that the TMT need to be in tenure for sometime before being able to affect the
likelihood of default and that being in a short or long-tenured TMT fails to affect the
accounting probability of default or the short-term market probability of default.
7.4.3 Effectiveness
A significant finding of the research is the relationship of the size of the board as a measure
of TMT board level effectiveness with all three measure of default prediction. There is a
significant curvilinear effect of the size of the board to all the default predicting models
i.e. accounting, short-term and long-term. This is interesting as it does not show that large
board sizes were able to use the varied experience and expertise to reduce the likelihood
of default or increase the likelihood of default. Instead, it shows that for the short-term
market probability of default increase in the board size led to an increase in the probability
of default however at higher levels of increase in the board size decreased the likelihood of
default. This was inverse for the long-term market probability of default which showed
that an initial increase in the size of the board decreased the likelihood of default and at
higher levels, an increase in the board size increased the likelihood of default. The findings
for the long-term market probability of default supported the findings of the accounting
probability of default which had similar results.
This is interesting as this shows that as board sizes get bigger and gain a wider range
of expertise and experience they focus more on ensuring the long-term health of the
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organisation which may be at the expense of the short-term health of the organisation.
However, there comes a time where the board is too large and the focus then turns to the
short-term health of the organisation at the expense of its long-term health. The may also
point to the effectiveness the TMT have when the board size is increasing but smaller, as
they effectively use the resource (experience and expertise) available however they find it
difficult when this gets too large and possibly supporting the argument that then getting
decisions through the board is more inefficient.
The number of employees is a significant positive predictor for the short-term and long-
term market probability of default. This shows that as the number of employees increases
it has the effect of increasing the likelihood of default. This could point toward firms that
are operationally larger in size have a higher probability of default. The argument here
is that as the number of employees increases the firm becomes more complex to run and
it is harder for the TMT to be effective at the firm level. The TMT is not able to run the
organisation more efficiently possibly due to the increase in the number of levels within
the organisation and decisions may take longer to be made and implemented due to the
number of employees that have to support the implementation or planning. Whilst, the
number of employees is not a significant predictor of the accounting probability of default
however, a significant negative correlation does indicate. Pointing to a similar relationship
that as the number of employees increases the likelihood of default of the firm increases.
7.4.4 Probability of default measures
Another key finding of this research appears from the use of three different measures of
default prediction allowing for a comparison across the different results. The different
measures of probability of default used in this study i.e. Bloomberg 1 year probability of
default, Bloomberg 5 year probability of default and the Altman Z-score all show similar
results for a majority of the variables. However, they show very interesting results for the
short-term motivation of the executives and the board level effectiveness of the TMT.
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The short-term motivation of the executives measured by the average salary shows a
significant curvilinear relationship to the short-term market probability of default whereas
it is a non-significant positive predictor for the long-term market probability of default.
The short-term motivation of the executives also has a negative effect on the accounting
probability of default. This is interesting as it shows that in the short-term a constant
increase in salary does not have an effect of always reducing the likelihood of default.
Whereas an increase in short-term motivation has the effect of increasing the accounting
probability of default and the long-term probability of default shows a similar sign, whilst
not significant. One could argue that as executives receive higher salaries they take on more
risky investments or are able to manipulate the accounting information to portray riskier
investments. However, a constant increase in the default likelihood also points to firms
paying the executives higher salaries to turn a firm around when the accounting information
points to higher default likelihood. The short-term probability of default further shows that
this higher salaries will only help up to a point after which a higher salary is detrimental.
As pointed out earlier the board size has a curvilinear relationship to all three measures
of default i.e. the TMT effectiveness at board level has a curvilinear relationship to the
likelihood of default. However, the relationship to the accounting probability of default
and the long-term market probability of default is inverse compared to the short-term
market probability of default. In the short-term, an increase in the board size increases
the likelihood of default and after a point, a further increase in board size decreases the
likelihood of default. This is inverse for the long-term and accounting probability of
default. An initial increase in the board size decreases the likelihood of default, however, a
further increase in board size increases the likelihood of default. This shows that when a
firm is in difficult larger board sizes are beneficial which allows the utilisation of a wide
range of expertise on the board to turn the firm around. However, a larger board size causes
inefficiencies in decision making in the long-term as indicated by the other two measures.
This measure and variable need careful attention from regulators and shareholders as for
the long-term success of the organisation there is an ideal number of directors on the board
for each individual organisation. Which is opposed to popular belief that more directors on
the board are more beneficial.
276
7.5. Limitations of the research
7.5 Limitations of the research
This study recognises a number of limitations as any other research. The study was limited
to the UK FTSE 100 firms and hence caution must be exercised when generalising its
findings. The theoretical model identifies key TMT attributes that influence the firm
outcome and specifically default probability of the firm, however, there are potentially
other attributes which could change over time such as management fads.
The study has some methodological limitations. The quantitative approach provides a
wide scope for investigation, but perhaps far less detailed, whereas qualitative research
could provide a narrower but more exhaustive scope. A quantitative study was the most
suited methodology for this study for the purpose and aim of the research. The lack of
sufficient literature within the UK context further favours the use of quantitative methods
to get a wider overview. Although every effort was made to ensure a wide range of theories
were reviewed when developing the theoretical framework, it could be those other theories
which should have formed part of the framework had been overlooked. However, a number
of theories that were reviewed have not been included in the theoretical framework as they
are not directly relevant to the scope of the study and these are evidence in the section
"other theories".
7.6 Recommendations for further research
The limitations discussed in the previous section identify the way to further research.
Specifically, related research that can build on these research findings can be undertaken in
a number of ways in order to overcome the limitations outlined above. Further research to
extend the scope of this study in order to gain a wider understanding is recommended.
This research fills the gap in the literature on the relationship between TMT attributes and
the likelihood of default for UK listed firms. It is recommended that future research is
undertaken on the comparative study between countries with differing corporate governance
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regimes to further develop on the findings of this study. Specifically, a comparative study
between the US (a rules bases corporate governance approach such as the Sarbanes Oxley)
and the UK (a principal based corporate governance approach such as ’comply or explain’).
It is further recommended that the theoretical model developed is tested on a sample of
failed firms vs a matched sample of non-failed firms to further the findings of this research.
This would also allow the model to be further revised and developed to more accurately
predict the likelihood of default using TMT attributes. The aim of this study was to
understand the relationship and hence it was more appropriate to use default probabilities,
however, to further develop the model into default prediction it is recommended to test the
model on failed firms vs non-failed firms.
Future research should also specifically focus on key relationships and the combined
attributes of the CEO, CFO and Chairperson. This will allow for a further understanding
of how the CFO specifically influences the CEO and Chairperson and how their combined
relationship affects firm outcomes.
A study comparing the performance of the accounting based default prediction, market-
based default prediction and the management based default prediction (presented in this
study) should be undertaken to identify the performance of each of these models in
predicting default.
Methodologically, some further work through a survey by the TMT would provide a good
understanding of the findings of the study. However, it would be extremely difficult to get a
reasonable response rate to the survey from the TMT of a listed firm. Additionally, focusing
on behavioural aspects of the TMT by undertaking a factor analysis through the creation
of factors by combining a number of variables would further aid in the understanding of
the findings of this research.
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7.7 Thesis summary
This PhD research investigates the effects of the key TMT attributes on the probability
of a firm’s default. The study is motivated by the main research question: Is there a
relationship between the key TMT attributes and the likelihood of firm financial distress?
Specifically, the study pursues motivation, loyalty and effectiveness as the key attributes to
analyse. It was hypothesised that there is: no relationship between executive short-term
motivation and firm financial distress, a negative relationship between executive long-term
motivation and firm financial distress, a negative relationship between TMT loyalty and
firm financial distress, no relationship between TMT board level effectiveness and firm
financial distress, no relationship between TMT firm level effectiveness and firm financial
distress. Synthesising the Behavioural theory of the firm, Upper Echelons theory, Resource
Based View, Agency theory, Stewardship theory, Stakeholder theory and Seasons of tenure
this research built and tested a theoretical model. The Literature on TMT and financial
distress has focussed almost exclusively on the role of the CEO or different definitions of
the TMT however; the role of the CFO is very rarely studied. This research argues that the
role of the CFO is extremely important when a firm faces financial difficulties and is key
to the definition of TMT that influence the financing decisions of the firm. In addition, this
research uses both accounting based measures and market based measures for predicting
the likelihood of default whereas a majority of the literature in this field has used either
accounting based measures or market based measures.
Previous research indicates that the effect of TMT remuneration and tenure on firm
performance is positive and this relationship is clear when focussing on bonuses, however,
the literature on cash remuneration provides mixed results. The effect of board size and the
size of the firm has also provided mixed results within the literature. The model addresses
major gaps in the literature by defining executives as the CEO and CFO and by defining
the TMT as the CEO, CFO and Chairman. In addition, there is very little literature on the
effect of TMT attributes on financial distress or the likelihood of financial distress for the
UK, which is addressed by this research. This research uses multilevel modelling on a
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hierarchical dataset to address some of the limitations of previous research by modelling
for the variability of regression intercepts and slopes and addressing the violation of the
independence assumption. The most important contribution is the contribution of the
research to the UK corporate governance code to ensure a better understanding of the
effect of the key attributes and the role played by the CFO. Using a sample of UK listed
companies, on the FTSE 100, excluding the financial sector, for the period 2013 to 2016,
this research uses OLS regression, Polynomial regression, Random Intercept model and
Random Intercept and Random slope models as robustness checks to test the theoretical
model developed. The independent variables in the study are Salary, Bonus, Tenure, Board
Size and Number of employees. The dependent variables in the study are Altman Z-score,
Bloomberg 1 year probability of default (BB 1Y) and Bloomberg 5-year probability of
default (BB5Y). The control variables in the study are Sector, Market Capitalisation,
Gearing and Performance. In addition to these variables, a select number of variables
were studied at the descriptive stage that emerged from prior literature: Share ownership,
Gender, Number of female executives on the board and CEO Duality.
The findings from the research illustrate that for the short-term market measure for the
probability of firm default (BB 1Y): Salary and Board Size have a significant curvilinear
relationship, the bonus has a significant negative relationship and number of employees has
a significant positive relationship. Tenure is not a significant predictor for the short-term
market measure for the probability of default. For the long-term market measure for the
probability of default (BB 5Y): Salary and Bonus are not significant predictors, tenure
has a significant negative relationship, number of employees has a significant positive
relationship and board size has a significant curvilinear relationship. For the accounting
measure for the probability of default (Altman Z-score): Salary has a significant negative
relationship to the probability of default, bonus has a significant positive relationship to the
probability of default, board size has a significant curvilinear relationship to the probability
of default and tenure and numbers of employees are not significant predictors. The study
concludes that there is a relationship between key TMT attributes and the likelihood of
default. The effect of the attributes varies for the short-term, long-term and accounting
measures of the probability of firm financial distress. The study provides models that
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will be key to future governance to ensure a financially healthier corporate environment,
designing optimal executive contracts and remuneration, and timely response to signs of
financial weakness.
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Supporting Material
A.1 UK Corporate Governance
The UK corporate Governance code is divided into Leadership, Effectiveness, Account-
ability, Remuneration and Relations with Shareholders. The Financial Reporting Council
(2014) highlighted the following key changes to the most recent ‘revised code’: Going
concern, risk management and internal control; Remuneration; Shareholder engagement;
and Other issues which included the ‘tone from the top’ of the company in terms of its
culture and values. Below is a summary of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2014):
Section A Leadership
– The company should be headed by an effective board which is responsible for
its long-term success
– There should be clear division of responsibility between the running of the
board and the executive responsibility of running the company’s business
– The chairman is responsible to lead the board and ensuring its effectiveness
– Non-executive directors should constructively challenge and help develop
strategy
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Section B Effectiveness
– The board and its committees should have the appropriate balance of skills,
experience, independence and knowledge of the company
– There should be a formal, rigorous and transparent procedure to appoint new
directors
– Directors should be able to allocate sufficient time to the company
– Directors should receive an induction and regularly update and refresh their
skills and knowledge
– The Board should be supplied with information in a timely manner
– The Board should undertake a formal annual evaluation of its own performance
– All directors should be submitted for re-election at regular intervals
Section C Accountability
– The Board should present a fair, balance and understandable assessment of the
company’s position and prospects
– The Board is responsible in determining the principle risk it is willing to take
to achieve its objective
– The Board should establish formal and transparent arrangement for considering
how they should apply the corporate reporting, risk management and internal
control principles and for maintaining an appropriate relationship with the
auditor
Section D Remuneration
– The remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term success of the
company and performance-related pay should be transparent, stretching and
rigorously applied
– The procedure for developing policy on executive remuneration and fixing of
individual directors’ remuneration should be formal and transparent
Section E Relations with Shareholders
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– The Board as a whole has responsibility for ensuring that a satisfactory dialogue
with shareholders takes place
– General meetings should be used to communicate with investors and encourage
their participation
A.2 Other Theories
This section discusses some of the other Management and Leadership theories reviewed
for the purposes of this research.
A.2.1 Development of Leadership theories
The initial leadership theories commence with the Trait Approach. This can be traced
back to the early 1900s to 1940s which argues that leaders are born and individuals that
possessed the correct qualities and traits are better suited to the role (Fleenor, 2006).
Gardner (1989) undertook a study of a large number of leaders and concluded that some
attributes appear to make leaders successful in any situation. However, the problem with
such traits was that they were often perceived as "male" traits. This is supported by the
19th-century idea of the great man theory argued by Thomas Carlyle in the early 1840s.
He argued that the history of the world is a biography of great men and these individuals
shaped history through their personal attributes. Leaders have certain traits which make
them good leaders e.g. intelligence, persistence, confidence which further implied that
people with these traits can lead in any situation. However, Herpet Spencer in the 1860s
argued that these individuals were products of their social environment. In addition, there
is no clear agreement on what these traits are.
The Ohio State University undertook a series of studies on leadership styles in the 1950s
and narrowed leadership behaviour into two dimensions, Consideration and Initiating
Structure (Stogdill, 1974). The level of consideration is the sensitivity to the relationship
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and the social needs of employees and the level of Initiating Structure is the emphasis on
task performance and achieving goals. Burnes (2004) highlights the leadership styles as
categorised by Kurt Lewin in 1939. These are authoritarian/autocratic, democratic and
Laissez-Faire (Lewin et al. 1939). The authoritarian/autocratic is where the power is with
the manager who makes most of the decisions himself, Democratic is where the employees
have more freedom and participate in the decision making and Laissez-Faire is where the
leader does not interfere in the decision making but is available for advice.
Fiedler (1967) proposed the contingency theory of leadership. Miner (2005) explains
the two major stages of development in the contingency theory i.e. the exploration stage
in the early 1950s to 1960s and the second stage which began with the statement of
the contingency theory. The early stage argued that different situations require different
leadership styles and the leader must change his behaviour to suit the situation. Fidler’s
(1967) contingency theory proposed that the leadership effectiveness was influenced by
three key variables i.e. if the task is structured or unstructured, the leader’s power position
and the nature of the leader and follower relationship.
However, criticism of the theory states that it fails to consider other factors that affect a
situation such as culture and stress. In addition, it is argued that it is not reasonable to
assume that leaders can adapt their styles to different contexts. A leader that changes styles
may not inspire confidence or trust.
Hersey and Blanchard (1969) developed a lifecycle theory of leadership which was renamed
to the situational leadership in 1977. The theory categorises leadership styles based on
four behaviours i.e. Telling, Selling, Participating and Delegating. This is contrasted
by the transformational leadership theory from the 1980s. Hucynski (2013:673) defines
transformational leadership as a behaviour where the leader treats the relationship with
employees in terms of motivation and commitment, influencing and inspiring them to
give more compliance to improve organisational performance. The four components of
transformational leadership are intellectual stimulation, idealised influence, individualised
consideration and inspirational motivation. However, this has been criticised by some as a
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variation to the great man theory, it ignores context and may promote organisation change
at a too rapid pace as there should be a balance between change and continuity.
Distributed leadership emerged in the early 2000s. Huczynski (2013, p675) describes
distributed leadership as an informal and spontaneous collective exercise of leadership
behaviours by staff at all levels of an organisation. It may involve many people, shared,
be impermanent and move from one individual to another. It is better suited to flatter
structures that hierarchical structures which move away from command and control and
moving towards creating a vision, coaching, teamwork and empowerment.
A.2.2 Narcissism, Hubris and Animal Spirits
"The leader himself need love no one else; he may be of a masterful nature, absolutely
narcissistic, self-confident and independent." (Freud [Translator Strachey], 2011)
Agency theory argues that the objectives of the principal (shareholder) and the agent
(manager) are not aligned and mechanisms need to be in place to provide protection to
shareholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, stewardship theory argues that the objectives of
the managers as stewards of the shareholders are aligned (Donaldson and Davis, 1991).
Roll (1986) argues that managers intend to be honourable stewards for the shareholders
however hubris, which is overconfidence, leads to managers making incorrect decisions.
Gregory (1997) argues that within the M&A context, hubris and behavioural theories of
management are possible explanations for M&A outcomes.
Narcissism is seen as a personality trait (Campbell et al., 2005), which has its origins in
Greek mythology, characterised by a sense of personal superiority (Campbell et al. 2004),
desire for power (Emmons, 1987) and confirmation of their superiority (Bogart et al., 2004).
Oesterle et al. (2016), a study of German manufacturing firms, analysed the relationship
between CEOs narcissistic tendency and their internationalisation decisions. They found
that CEOs with a high degree of narcissism tend to increase business internationalisation.
The authors highlight the use of Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI), a forty-item
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choice method, to measure narcissism in psychology, however the difficulties around
response rates by CEOs and bias they choose an alternate method. An alternative to this
method is the measurement technique adapted from Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007).
The authors calculate the following four indicators to measure narcissism: size of the
CEO’s photograph in the company’s annual report; number of times the CEO’s name
was mentioned in the press release divided by the number of words in the article; CEO’s
cash compensation divided by that of the next highest cash compensated executive; and
the CEO’s non-cash compensation divided by the next highest non-cash compensated
executive. A similar index has also been used in research by Engelen et al (2015) and
Gerstner et al (2013).
Bono and Ilies (2006) identified a positive link between leader emotions and follower
mood and found that charismatic leadership is linked to organisational success. This
positive firm performance linked to positive employees’ mood emerging from positive
leadership was also supported by Sy et al. (2005). Maccoby (2000) highlights that a CEO
having narcissistic traits could be productive as long as they have trusted colleagues to
help avoid the limitations and negatives of the trait. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) used
an examination of the incidence of CEO photographs in annual reports, CEO prominence
in company reports and a comparison of CEO compensation with the second highest paid
executive to measure narcissism.
Hubris, like narcissism, has its origins in Greek mythology which refers to exaggerated
self-confidence or pride (Hayward and Hambrick, 1997). Roll (1986), argues that ‘hubris’
or extreme self-belief leads to management paying higher for M&A targets. He further
suggests that when acquisitions fail to create shareholder value, hubris explains why
managers do not abandon this transaction. Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007, developed
from Hayward and Hambrick (1997), distinguished between hubris and narcissism and
suggest that narcissism is a more ingrained trait than hubris.
Garrow and Valentine (2012) list several studies that use an induction process to link CEO
hubris as a possible contributor to poor M&A outcomes (Sharma and Ho, 2002; Gregory,
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1997). Many researchers argued the difficulty with measuring hubris (Tichy, 2001; Sirower,
1997) and whilst Roll (1986) argued that confidence is a manifestation of Hubris some
argued that overconfidence is better explained by the Agency theory. Billett and Qian
(2008) found that acquirers with no acquisition history showed no sign of hubris.
Hubris (Roll, 1986) was found to influence managerial actions (Sharma and Ho, 2002;
Gregory, 1997) and narcissism (Higgs, 2009) or animal spirits (Akerlof and Shiller, 2009)
was found to be a more dominant influence than hubris on managerial behaviour.
Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) in a study of corporate bankruptcies found that weak Top
Management Teams (short-tenured or few outside directors) fail to identify the seriousness
of problems or fail to monitor the implementation plans.
“Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which
will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirits –
of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction and not as the outcome of a weighted
average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” (Keynes, 1936,
p161)
Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p.13) focussed on confidence as a key component of animal
spirits and argued that when people are confident they behave in a certain way. They
argued that ‘animal spirits’ was a restless and inconsistent element in the economy. Garrow
and Valentine (2012) applied the idea of a restless and inconsistent element in the economy
to that of a firm. Akerlof and Shiller (2009, p132) further argue that the volatility in share
prices was as a result of both rational and irrational behaviours.
Roll (1986), argues that ‘hubris’ or extreme self-belief leads to management paying higher
for M&A targets. He further suggests that when acquisitions fail to create shareholder
value, hubris explains why managers do not abandon this transaction. Chatterjee and
Hambrick (2007, developed from Hayward and Hambrick (1997), distinguished between
hubris and narcissism and suggest that narcissism is a more ingrained trait than hubris.
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Bono and Ilies (2006) identified a positive link between leader emotions and follower mood
and found that charismatic leadership is linked to organisational success. This positive
firm performance linked to positive employees’ mood emerging from positive leadership
was also supported by Sy et al. (2005). Maccoby (2000) highlights that a CEO having
narcissistic traits could be productive as long as they have trusted colleagues to help avoid
the limitations and negatives of the trait.
Garrow (2012) list several studies that use an induction process to link CEO hubris as
a possible contributor to poor M&A outcomes (Sharma and Ho, 2002; Gregory, 1997).
Many researchers argued the difficulty with measuring hubris (Burner, 2004; Tichy, 2001;
Sirower, 1997) and whilst Roll (1986) argued that confidence is a manifestation of Hubris
some argued that overconfidence is better explained by the Agency theory. Billett and Qian
(2008) found that acquirers with no acquisition history showed no sign of hubris.
Chatterjee and Hambrick (2007) used an examination of the incidence of CEO photographs
in annual reports, CEO prominence in company reports and a comparison of CEO com-
pensation with the second highest paid executive to measure narcissism.
A.3 Pilot study
The pilot study shows that the findings are consistent and free from measurement error.
The test measures are consistent over time, equivalent (two items measure same concepts
at same level of difficulty) and internally consistent (items assess same concept).
The pilot study commenced with all listed companies on the London stock exchange
as on January 2007. The companies were then further filtered down to only focus on
companies with a market capitalisation of over £50m in 2007 (some further filters applied
were country of origin: UK and Market: UK Listed). Random numbers were assigned
to the list and an initial sample of 10 companies were selected to undertake a pilot study.
The period of the study was from 2007 (year selected as the year the global financial crisis
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was triggered) to 2012 (the date the doctoral study commenced). This highlighted that
due to a few companies being acquired in this period there was only partial data available
for some companies therefore the pilot sample was then increased to a further random
sample of 5 companies making the original pilot sample of 15 companies. The list also
included investment trust and other financial firms that are not structured from a governance
perspective as a usual business (i.e. a CEO and CFO do not exist for these firms and they
have an investment management firm running them). Hence, these companies were then
dropped taking the final sample of the pilot to 8 companies.
After a discussion with the supervision team a further 3 companies that had failed during
this period were included. These companies were selected by going through the random
companies list and checking their status on the ‘Companies House’ website. A company
would only be included in the final sample if it had failed in one of the years of the study
except for in year T0 (i.e. 2007). This led to the final sample equating to 11 companies
altogether with complete years’ data for 8 and partial years’ data for the 3 failed companies.
The measures selected for the variables identified through the theoretical framework
(PHIMALE model) were identified using a mix of measures used in previous research
and the researchers own subjective judgement. It was assumed that during the process
of the pilot study some further measures may be identified to include in the final study
and many measures may be dropped due to them not being relevant for the UK Corporate
Governance environment. The data collected is from multiple secondary sources i.e.
Bloomberg database, Bloomberg website (Capital IQ by S&P data), FT.com and the
individual firm’s annual reports for the 6 years. This has provided the pilot with a total of
48 observations (i.e. 8 companies for 6 years).
Theoretically, using a range of sources for data should not influence the study as all these
databases access and provide only public information therefore they should be consistent
however, practically there have been some discrepancies between databases and where
possible data available through the company’s website or annual report have been used in
those instances. This nevertheless highlights a very commonly discussed demerit of using
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secondary data. However, this research would like to highlight the benefit of using multiple
sources as being able to verify the data and be able to access some database proprietary
measures which may not have been possible if relying on only one source.
The Bloomberg probability of default (at 3m, 6m, 9m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y and 5y) for each
individual company were collected on a daily basis. The yearly average and standard
deviation was then calculated in order to match the time interval of the dependent variable
to the time intervals of the independent variables (which are annually). Some further
alternatives to this method (calculating the yearly average) were considered and will be
discussed at a later stage.
FT.com was used to identify number of press reports that contained the full name of the
director combined with the name of the company. As some searches returned with 0
reports the validity of this data was checked by undertaking a ‘Google’ search for the same
term during the same period and this also returned 0 results. This is used as one of a few
measures of Hubris, along with the number of times their last name appears in the annual
report and the relationship score as available through Bloomberg website (Accessed from
Capital IQ). The FT article would help measure a director’s overall hubris as a result of
their popularity in the media and the annual report search would help measure their Hubris
as a result of their popularity within the firm. Initially the size of the picture of the director
in the annual report was also selected as a measure for Hubris (as this has been used in
previous research), however the pilot very early on showcased that the size of the image
and its existence within the annual report of the sample was the same for all directors
irrespective of their role within the firm. Therefore, this measure will not be used within
the final study.
Qualification which seems like a simple measure to use becomes more complex the further
its looked into. An initial discussion with colleagues who are holders of professional
qualifications from a range of professional bodies raised some key issues, namely (ranking
of the professional bodies, time when the qualification was completed as more recently
some may debate the exams are less challenging than they have been previously, standing of
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the University where a Masters or MBA was gained, what would a professional qualification
equate to i.e. a Masters or a doctorate or in between and a professional qualification in a
relevant field vs a doctorate in a completely irrelevant field etc.). One other difficulty with
this measure is that in a majority of the cases this is unlikely to change on a year on year
basis.
The measure Team Tenure was calculated as the maximum time the three individuals in
their roles simultaneously were a team within that company. i.e. Individual A, B and C
were individually in term for 2,3, and 5 years therefore the team tenure was calculated to
be the 2 years.
Director transaction as a variable was added to see the relationship between the position
change of the director and the likelihood of default. This data is available on a quarterly
basis and specifically makes available the quarter in which there was a change to the
directors holding. This could be compared to the respective quarters default rate for the
company.
The directors ages were collected from the Bloomberg executive profile webpages as of
2016 and then manually calculated to give their ages in the years between 2007 to 2012.
A downside of the measure Relationship (as measured through Capital IQ) is that the CEO
CFO and Chairman could have relationships with each other and therefore impacting the
data in addition this data is as of the current year and not for the respective years in study.
Therefore, their relationships/networking would most likely have been very different back
in the period of the study.
Ethnicity/Place of birth initial data was collected from the Bloomberg database; however,
data was only available for 3 directors from the sample.
Data Preparation
Overall, there were 55 observations of 11 companies.
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ChMBC (Chair is a Member of a board committee) - This variable was removed as the
response was a ’yes’ for the entire sample
CFOMBC (CFO is a Member of a board committee) - This variable was removed as there
were only 3 observations where this was a ’yes’
No_CFOMBC (Number of committee CFO is a member) - This variable was removed as
there were only 3 observations
Outside Directorship, variables were removed, as currently the data for this is unaccessible.
This data is accessible via BOARDEX
CFOCBC (CFO Chair of a board committee) - This variable was removed as there was
only one observation where this was a ’yes’
FInt - This variable was removed, as it is not very useful in a longitudinal study
Chair/CEO/CFO Ethnicity - This variable was removed as data was only available for 3
executives via Bloomberg and will be included again when access to Boardex is available.
Number of years International Experience - This variable data was not collected, as it
requires trolling through the CVs of each individual executive
Chair/CEO/CFO Acquisition Experience - This variable data was not collected as it requires
trolling the CVs of each individual executive and after discussion will be replaced with the
variable Firm Acquisition Experience
ChGen (Chair Gender) - This variable was removed, as there were only two observations
where the executive was female
CEOGen (CEO Gender) - This variable was removed, as there were only three observations
where the executive was female
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CFOGen (CFO Gender) - This variable was removed, as there were only two observations
where the executive was female
Chair/CEO/CFO/Team Relationship Capital IQ measure - This variable has been retained
for the pilot study however, this will be replaced by Boardex networking score when access
to that database is available. The Capital IQ score is for the executive in 2016 only and not
for each of the respective years in study. In addition, the networking score only takes into
account each individual’s current network with other executives on all boards
Coding completed and values assigned to CEO Duality, CEOMBC, ChCBC, CEOCBC,
Maj_TBC, Maj_TBC_List, ChQual, CEOQual and CFOQual
A.4 Findings in the literature
(2) Schultz et al. (2017)- Australian study using Merton’s distance to default Once
endogeneity issues are addressed by econometric models they find no relationship between
probability of default and corporate governance mechanisms – This finding is rejected by
the study Executive fixed pay significant positive relationship (OLS) Executive variable pay
non-significant negative relationship (OLS, Pooled Dynamic OLS, Fixed Effects, Dynamic
sys. GMM) Executive fixed pay non-significant positive relationship (Pooled Dynamic
OLS, Fixed Effects panel) Executive fixed pay non-significant negative relationship (GMM,
Dynamic sys. GMM) Board Size non-significant positive relationship (OLS, Pooled
Dynamic OLS, Fixed Effects, GMM, Dynamic sys. GMM) Firm size non-significant
negative (OLS, GMM) Firm size non-significant positive (Pooled Dynamic OLS, Dynamic
sys. GMM) Firm size significant negative (Fixed Effects Panel) Leverage significant
positive relationship (OLS, Fixed Effects) Leverage non-significant positive relationship
(Pooled Dynamic OLS, GMM, Dynamic sys. GMM)
(4*) Wright et al. (2007) – A US study of Top Management Team incentives and firm
risk taking Risk taking was measured as a lagged standard deviation of quarterly return
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on assets (ROA) and lagged standard deviation of monthly total return to shareholders.
Initial models have a low R-squared similar to the study. They conclude that managerial
incentives do matter as they significantly impact subsequent corporate risk taking Average
Top Management Team bonus has a non-significant positive relationship to both measures
of risk taking Total Number of employees has a significant negative relationship to both
measures of risk taking Average Top Management Team Salary has a significant negative
relationship to both measures of risk taking
(Columbia business school research paper) Balachandran et al. (2010) – A US study
on the relationship between equity-based incentive and the probability of default. The
results find that equity based pay increase the probability of default while non-equity based
pay decreases probability of default. Equity pay has a significant positive relationship
Non-equity pay has a significant negative relationship Leverage has a significant positive
relationship
(2) Ting (2011) – A Chinese study on the relationship between Top Management Team
turnover and firm default risk. The study uses the KMV model to measure the probability
of default. A low R-squared similar to the study Debt Equity ratio has a significant positive
relationship ROA has a significant negative relationship Board of Directors Size has a
significant negative relationship
(4) Loveman (1998) – A US Study within Retail Banking on employee satisfaction,
customer loyalty and firm performance. Argue in favour of tenure as a proxy for loyalty
similar to the study Find a slight relationship between employee satisfaction and firm
performance
(4*) Dunn (2004) – A US study on the impact of Insider power on fraudulent financial
reporting. Adjusted R-squared low similar to this study Director Tenure has a significant
negative relationship Number of directors on boards non-significant positive relationship
Altman Z-score non-significant positive relationship
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(4*) Nielsen and Nielsen (2013) – A Swiss study on the relationship between Top Manage-
ment Team diversity and firm performance. P-value used to <.10 similar to the study and
large intercept and small coefficients similar to the study. The study uses hierarchial linear
model similar to this study TMT Tenure significant negative correlation with leverage
TMT Tenure significant negative correlation with number of employees TMT Size signifi-
cant positive correlation with number of employees Return on Assets (ROA) significant
negative correlation with leverage ROA significant positive correlation with number of
employees TMT size significant negative correlation with TMT Tenure ROA significant
positive correlation with TMT Size ROA significant positive correlation with TMT Tenure
Leverage is a significant negative predictor in all models Number of employees is a
significant positive predictor in final model TMT Size significant positive predictor in final
model TMT Tenure significant positive predictor in final model
(3) Nielsen (2010b) – A Swiss study on the effects of Top Management Team interna-
tionalisation and firm performance. TMT Size has a significant correlation to number of
employees Average Executive Compensation has a significant positive correlation to TMT
Size Average Executive Compensation has a significant positive correlation to the number
of employees Average Executive Compensation has a significant positive correlation to
ROA Return on Assets has a significant positive correlation to TMT Size Return on Assets
has a significant positive correlation to number of employees Leverage has a significant
negative correlation to ROA
TMT size is a non-significant positive predictor Executive compensation (Salary+Bonus)
is a significant positive predictor Number of Employees is a significant positive predictor
Return on Assets is a significant positive predictor Leverage is a non-significant positive
predictor
(3) Cao et. al (2015) – A US study on the relationship between corporate governance and
default risk. The study uses unbalanced sample of firms per year and sector similar to this
study. Use distance to default developed from the work of Merton (1974). The study uses
CEO tenure as a measure for CEO power Average board size similar to this study Board
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Size has a significant negative correlation to CEO Tenure Board Size has a significant
positive correlation to percentage of female directors Percentage of female directors has a
significant negative correlation to CEO Tenure Board size is a significant positive predictor
(Hazard analysis) CEO Tenure is a significant positive predictor (Hazard analysis) Gearing
is a significant positive predictor (Hazard analysis and OLS) Market Capitalisation is a
significant positive predictor (Hazard analysis) Boardsize is a significant negative predictor
(OLS) CEO tenure is a non-significant positive predictor (OLS) Industry include as factor
in the regression similar to the study
(3) Platt and Platt (2012) – A US study on corporate board attributes and bankruptcy using
an unbalanced data set categorised by number of years and sector which is similar to
this study. Board size – Average board size similar to this study Smaller board size are
significantly associated with bankrupt firms
(3) Fich and Slezak (2008) – A US study on governance attributes ability to avoid
bankruptcy and the power of financial/accounting information to predict bankruptcy –
Unbalanced panel data similar to this study- Low R-squared similar to the study. Use Alt-
man Z-score to predict bankruptcy similar to this study Board size significantly positively
related to probability of bankruptcy CEO Bonus is not statistically significant CEO Tenure
is a significant negative predictor
(1.921 IF) Vainieri et al. (2017) – An Italian study of the healthcare industry, investigated
the relationship between top management competencies and organisational performance
TMT Tenure has a non-significant positive relationship
(3) Guest (2009) – A UK study on the impact of board size on firm performance. This is a
large study that spans a large number of years – The study has a low adjusted R-squared
similar to this study Board Size is a significant negative predictor of firm performance
(ROA, Tobin’s Q, Share return) Market Capitalisation is a significant positive predictor
of firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q, Share return) Gearing is a significant negative
predictor of firm performance (ROA, Tobin’s Q, Share return)
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(4*) Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) – A US study focussing on the top management team
tenure and organisational outcomes. R-squared low similar to this study Top Management
Team tenure significant negative correlation to ROE Number of employees significant
positive correlation to Top Management Team tenure Top Management Team tenure
is a significant positive predictor of strategic persistence Number of employees non-
significant positive predictor of strategic persistence Return on Equity non-significant
positive predictor of strategic persistence
(4*) O’Reilly III et al. (1988) – A US study examining economic and psychological factors
that influence the setting of CEO compensation. Low adjusted Rsquared similar to this
study CEO Salary significant positive correlation to ROE CEO Salary significant positive
correlation to number of employees CEO salary non-significant positive correlation to CEO
tenure Number of employees is a non-significant negative predictor of CEO compensation
ROE non-significant positive predictor of CEO compensation CEO Tenure non-significant
positive predictor of CEO compensation
(3) Richard and Johnson (2001) – A US study that tests whether strategic human resource
management effectiveness significantly affects firm performance. Study employs hierarchi-
cal regression analysis to test hypothesis similar to this study. Low R squared similar to
this study Non-significant positive correlation between ROE and number of employees
Number of employees is a non-significant negative predictor of firm performance
(4*) Boone et al. (2007) – A US study of industrial firms examining the determinants of
corporate board size and composition. Low adjusted Rsquared similar to this study. Market
Capitalisation and gearing have a significant positive correlation Market Capitalisation has
a significant positive correlation to CEO Tenure Firm size is a significant positive predictor
of board size ROA is a significant negative predictor of board size
(4*) Linck et al. (2008) – A US study examining corporate board structure trends and
determinants. Gearing is a significant positive predictor of board size
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(4) Kallunki and Pyyko (2012) – A Finnish study on the relationship between director
personal default and firm financial distress. Use two different default probabilities (Altman
and Ohlson) in two different models similar to this study.
(Interdisciplinary) Memba and NyanumbaJob (2013) – A Kenyan study analysing the
causes of financial distress and its effects on firms. Management Turnover and Management
replacement highest rank item likely to affect financial distress. Employees second highest
ranked item likely to affect financial distress.
(3)Switzer Tu Wang (2016) – A study of non-North American financial firms looking
at the relationship between corporate governance and default risk. The study uses CDS
spreads and the Bloomberg probability of default (similar to this study) two different
measures in different models similar to this study. R squared very low similar to this
study. Data collected from Bloomberg similar to this study. Rsquared is increased on
baseline model by including dummy variables to address outliers Return on Assets has
a significant (<.10) correlation to Gearing Gearing has a significant negative correlation
to Board Size Board size has a significant negative correlation to ROA Board size is a
significant positive predictor for BB5Y (OLS) ROA is a significant negative predictor for
BB5Y (OLS) Leverage is a significant positive predictor for BB5y (OLS)
(3) Switzer and Wang (2013) – A US study exploring the relationship between credit risk
and corporate governance structures. Adjusted Rsquared very low similar to this study.
Uses the Merton (1974) model similar to this study. This study includes the CFO age
as a variable Board size is a significant negative predictor ROA is a significant negative
predictor Gearing is a non-significant positive predictor Older CFOs are associated with
lower credit risk
(Non ranked theoretical journal) Switzer and Wang (2013) – A US study exploring the
relationship between credit risk and corporate governance structures for financial and
non-financial firms. Data collected from Bloomberg similar to this study. Board size has a
significant positive correlation to ROA Board size has a significant negative correlation
to gearing Board size is a significant negative predictor for Financial firms probability of
337
A.4. Findings in the literature
default ROA is a significant negative predictor for industrial firms probability of default
Leverage is a non-significant positive predictor
(4*) Daily and Dalton (1994) – A US study examining the relationship among corporate
governance structures and bankruptcy. Performance has a significant negative correlation
to bankruptcy Gearing has a non-significant positive correlation to bankruptcy Profitability
is a significant negative predictor
(4*) Finkelstein (1992) – A US study on the power dimensions of the top management
team. Structural power (including compensation as a latent variable) has a non-significant
correlation to ROE
(4*) Hambrick and D’Aveni (1992) – A US study exploring top management team attributes
associated with major corporate failure. Board Size is a significant negative predictor 1
year prior to bankruptcy Compensation is a significant negative predictor up to 4 years
prior to bankruptcy Tenure is a significant negative predictor 4, 3 and 2 years prior to
bankruptcy
(2) Bebchuck and Grinstein (2005) - A US study examining the growth of executive pay
empirically and theoretically. ROA is a significant positive predictor for CEO compen-
sation ROA is a non-significant positive predictor for Executive compensation ROA is a
significant positive predictor for CEO equity based compensation ROA is a significant
positive predictor for Executive equity based compensation ROA is a significant positive
predictor for CEO non-equity based compensation ROA is a significant positive predictor
for Executive non-equity based compensation
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Appendix B
Graphs and Tables
Fig. B.1 Annual Receivership, Administration and CVA in England and Wales (Source: The
Insolvency Service, 2014)
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Fig. B.2 Compulsory Liquidations vs Creditors Voluntary Liquidations between 1960 and 2013
(Source: The Insolvency Service, 2014)
Fig. B.3 Receivership, Administration and CVA between 1987 and 2013 (Source: The Insolvency
Service, 2014)
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Fig. B.4 Bloomberg default likelihood categorisation (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service,
2018)
Fig. B.5 Eddie Bauer default probability (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
Fig. B.6 Lehman Brothers default probability (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
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Fig. B.7 Oleo e Gas Partipacoes S.A default probability (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service,
2018)
Fig. B.8 Examples of North American companies with high default probabilities and subsequent
corporate actions (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
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Fig. B.9 Examples of Chinese, Japanese and Korean companies with high default probabilities and
subsequent corporate actions (Source: Bloomberg Professional Service, 2018)
Fig. B.10 Carillion plc’s competitors, suppliers and lenders default probability (Source: Bloomberg
Professional Service, 2018)
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Table B.2 Variable abbreviations (Source: Author’s own collection)
Variable Code Variable Name
bb1y Bloomberg 1 year probability of default
bb5y Bloomberg 5 year probability of default
altmanz Altman Z-score probability of default
Salary_CEO Salary of the Chief Executive Officer
Comp_CEO Compensation of the Chief Executive Officer
Salary_CFO Salary of the Chief Financial Officer
Comp_CFO Compensation of the Chief Financial Officer
Tenure_CEO Tenure of the Chief Executive Officer
Tenure_CFO Tenure of the Chief Financial Officer
Tenure_Chair Tenure of the Chairman
Share_CEO Shareholding by the Chief Executive Officer
Share_CFO Shareholding by the Chief Financial Officer
Share_Chair Shareholding by the Chairman
No_Employees Number of Employees
Market_Cap Market Capitalisation
Board_Size Number of Directors on the board
No_female_exec Number of female executives on the board
Debt_Equity Debt to Equity ratio
ROA Return on Asset ratio
ROE Return on Equity ratio
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Appendix C
R Code
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setwd("C:/Users/ sbsfb /Desktop/OneDrive − Sheffield Hallam University /USB/
Recovered/FIROZ/PhD/MaD/Draft/Final")
#to tell R wherer the packages are located
# if package is not found after installation
. libPaths ("C:/Users/ sbsfb /Desktop/OneDrive − Sheffield Hallam University /USB/
Recovered/FIROZ/PhD/MaD/Draft/R")
#################check linear models as the model names are same
df <− read.csv ("tmtdatav2 .csv" , header= TRUE)
names (df)
company<−df[,4]
bb1y<−df[,25]*100000 #reduce number of decimal places
bb5y<−df[,26]*100000 #reduce number of decimal places
altmanz<−df[,27]+2 #remove negative z−score
salaryt <−df[,9]
bonust<−df[,7]−df[,9]+1#removed 0 by adding 1
tenuret <−df[,12]+df[,13]+df [,14]
employees<−df[,18]
mcap<−df[,19]
boardsize<−df[,20]
performance<−(df[,30]+df [,31]) /2+70#removed negatives by adding 70
gearing<−df[,29]+1
sector <−df[,6]
salarya <−salaryt /2
bonusa<−bonust/2
tenurea<−tenuret/3
id<−df[,1]
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t<−df[,2]
install .packages(" stargazer ")
library ( stargazer )
var<−cbind.data.frame(t,sector ,bb1y,bb5y,altmanz, salaryt ,bonust , tenuret ,
employees,mcap,boardsize ,performance,gearing , salarya ,bonusa, tenurea )
stargazer (var, type = "html" , title =" Descriptive statistics " , digits =1, out="
descriptive with missing .htm")
stargazer (df , type = "html" , title =" Descriptive statistics " , digits =1, out="
descriptive with missing all .htm")
#################################Descriptives
###########################################
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Consumer Discretionary") , title ="Consumer
Discretionary" , type="html",out="Sec1.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Consumer Staples"), title ="Consumer Staples", type=
"html",out="Sec2.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Energy"), title ="Energy",type="html",out="Sec3.htm
")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Health Care") , title ="Health Care", type="html",out
="Sec4.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector ==" Industrials ") , title =" Industrials " , type="html",out
="Sec5.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Information Technology"), title ="Information
Technology",type="html",out="Sec6.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Materials") , title ="Materials " , type="html",out="
Sec7.htm")
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stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Real Estate ") , title ="Real Estate " , type="html",out
="Sec8.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector =="Telecommunication Services") , title ="
Telecommunication Services" , type="html",out="Sec9.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , sector ==" Utilities ") , title =" Utilities " , type="html",out="
Sec10.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Consumer Discretionary") , title ="Consumer
Discretionary" , type="html",out="Sec11.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Consumer Staples"), title ="Consumer Staples", type
="html",out="Sec12.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Energy"), title ="Energy",type="html",out="Sec13.
htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Health Care") , title ="Health Care", type="html",out
="Sec14.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector ==" Industrials ") , title =" Industrials " , type="html",out
="Sec15.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Information Technology"), title ="Information
Technology",type="html",out="Sec16.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Materials") , title ="Materials " , type="html",out="
Sec17.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Real Estate ") , title ="Real Estate " , type="html",out
="Sec18.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector =="Telecommunication Services") , title ="
Telecommunication Services" , type="html",out="Sec19.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, sector ==" Utilities ") , title =" Utilities " , type="html",out="
Sec20.htm")
stargazer (subset(df , t=="12/31/2013"), title ="2013",type="html",out="t1 .htm")
stargazer (subset(df , t=="12/31/2014"), title ="2014",type="html",out="t2 .htm")
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stargazer (subset(df , t=="12/31/2015"), title ="2015",type="html",out="t3 .htm")
stargazer (subset(df , t=="12/31/2016"), title ="2016",type="html",out="t4 .htm")
stargazer (subset(var, t=="12/31/2013"), title ="2013",type="html",out="t11.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, t=="12/31/2014"), title ="2014",type="html",out="t12.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, t=="12/31/2015"), title ="2015",type="html",out="t13.htm")
stargazer (subset(var, t=="12/31/2016"), title ="2016",type="html",out="t14.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Consumer Discretionary") , title ="Consumer
Discretionary" , type="html",out="Sec21.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Consumer Staples"), title ="Consumer Staples", type
="html",out="Sec22.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Energy"), title ="Energy",type="html",out="Sec23.
htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Health Care") , title ="Health Care", type="html",
out="Sec24.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector ==" Industrials ") , title =" Industrials " , type="html",
out="Sec25.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Information Technology"), title ="Information
Technology",type="html",out="Sec26.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Materials") , title ="Materials " , type="html",out="
Sec27.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Real Estate ") , title ="Real Estate " , type="html",
out="Sec28.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector =="Telecommunication Services") , title ="
Telecommunication Services" , type="html",out="Sec29.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , sector ==" Utilities ") , title =" Utilities " , type="html",out="
Sec30.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , t=="12/31/2013"), title ="2013",type="html",out="t21.htm")
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stargazer (subset(var2 , t=="12/31/2014"), title ="2014",type="html",out="t22.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , t=="12/31/2015"), title ="2015",type="html",out="t23.htm")
stargazer (subset(var2 , t=="12/31/2016"), title ="2016",type="html",out="t24.htm")
stargazer (subset(bb1y,==" Utilities ") , title =" Utilities " , type="html",out="Sec30.
htm")
#########################Multiple linear regression
############################
company<−factor(company)
#average variables for salary , bonus and tenure (used instead of total as same
significance )
aacon.lm<−lm(bb1y~mcap+performance+gearing+sector)
aa . lm<−lm(bb1y~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize)
ba.lm<−lm(bb1y~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize+mcap+performance+
gearing+sector)
summary(aacon.lm)
summary(aa.lm)
summary(ba.lm)
stargazer (aacon.lm,aa . lm,ba.lm,type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression with
missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg1.htm")
cacon.lm<−lm(bb5y~mcap+performance+gearing+sector)
ca . lm<−lm(bb5y~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize)
da.lm<−lm(bb5y~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize+mcap+performance+
gearing+sector)
summary(cacon.lm)
summary(ca.lm)
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summary(da.lm)
stargazer (cacon.lm,ca . lm,da.lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression with
missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg2.htm")
eacon.lm<−lm(altmanz~mcap+performance+gearing+sector)
ea . lm<−lm(altmanz~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize)
fa . lm<−lm(altmanz~salarya+bonusa+tenurea+employees+boardsize+mcap+
performance+gearing+sector)
summary(eacon.lm)
summary(ea.lm)
summary(fa.lm)
stargazer (eacon.lm, ea . lm,fa . lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression with
missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg3.htm")
#remove missing data
y1<−1*is.na(employees)+1*is.na(mcap)+1*is.na(boardsize)+1*is .na(performance)+1
*is .na(gearing)+1*is .na(altmanz)
company2<−company[y1<1]
bb1y2<−bb1y[y1<1]
bb5y2<−bb5y[y1<1]
altmanz2<−altmanz[y1<1]
salaryt2 <−salaryt[y1<1]
bonust2<−bonust[y1<1]
tenuret2 <−tenuret[y1<1]
employees2<−employees[y1<1]
mcap2<−mcap[y1<1]
boardsize2<−boardsize[y1<1]
performance2<−performance[y1<1]
gearing2<−gearing[y1<1]
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sector2 <−sector[y1<1]
salarya2 <−salarya[y1<1]
bonusa2<−bonusa[y1<1]
tenurea2<−tenurea[y1<1]
id2<−id[y1<1]
t2<−t[y1<1]
# quadratic term
salarya22<−salarya2^2
bonusa22<−bonusa2^2
tenurea22<−tenurea2^2
boardsize22<−boardsize2^2
# quadratic term for boardsize is a good variable to introduce
var2<−cbind.data.frame(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,salaryt2 ,bonust2, tenuret2 ,
employees2,mcap2,boardsize2,performance2,gearing2 , salarya2 ,bonusa2,tenurea2
)
stargazer (var2 , type = "html" , title =" Descriptive statistics " , digits =1, out="
descriptive with missing2.htm")
correlation .matrix1<−cor(var2)
stargazer ( correlation .matrix1 , type="html",out="cor2.htm")
dfmissing<−cbind.data.frame(company2,bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,salarya2,bonusa2,
tenurea2,employees2,mcap2,boardsize2,performance2,gearing2 , sector2 , id2 , t2 ,
salarya22 ,bonusa22,tenurea22)
#id2 and comapny2 are same
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#adding quadratic term for salary has no significant effect however bonus and
tenure has a significnat effect
# introducing a quadratic term for total salary for the linear models has a
significant effect to the BB1y
#however no significant effect on BB5y and Altman Z−score. The model with the
quadratic salary for BB1y
#has both salary and salary ^2 as significant predictors .
#average variables for salary , bonus and tenure (used instead of total as same
significance )
a1acon.lm<−lm(bb1y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
a1a.lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2)
b1a.lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2+
performance2+gearing2+sector2)
b1aqs.lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya22+salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
b1aqb.lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa22+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
b1aqt . lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea22+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
b1aqbs.lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
boardsize22+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
b1afull . lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2
+performance2+gearing2+sector2+salarya22+bonusa22+tenurea22+boardsize22)
b1afinal . lm<−lm(bb1y2~salarya22+salarya2+bonusa2+employees2+boardsize2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+boardsize22)
summary(a1acon.lm)
summary(a1a.lm)
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summary(b1a.lm)
summary(b1aqs.lm)
summary(b1aqb.lm)
summary(b1aqt.lm)
summary(b1aqbs.lm)
anova(b1a.lm,b1aq.lm)
stargazer (a1acon.lm,a1a.lm,b1a.lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression
without missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg4.htm")
stargazer (a1acon.lm,a1a.lm,b1a.lm, b1aqs.lm,b1aqb.lm,b1aqt . lm,b1aqbs.lm, b1afull
. lm, b1afinal . lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression without missing
data" , digits =9, out="Reg4v1.htm")
# introducing quadratic terms for bonus and tenure has no significant
contribution to the model however
# introducing salary significantly improves the model # seems like a good model
c1acon.lm<−lm(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
c1a.lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2)
d1a.lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2+
performance2+gearing2+sector2)
d1qs.lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya22+salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
d1qb.lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa22+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
d1qt . lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea22+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
d1qbs.lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
boardsize22+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
d1afull . lm<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2
+performance2+gearing2+sector2+salarya22+bonusa22+tenurea22+boardsize22)
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d1afinal . lm<−lm(bb5y2~tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 +
performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22)
summary(c1acon.lm)
summary(c1a.lm)
summary(d1a.lm)
summary(d1qs.lm)
summary(d1qb.lm)
summary(d1qt.lm)
anova(d1a.lm,d1q.lm)
stargazer (c1acon.lm,c1a.lm,d1a.lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression
without missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg5.htm")
stargazer (c1acon.lm,c1a.lm,d1a.lm, d1qs.lm, d1qb.lm, d1qt . lm,d1qbs.lm, d1afull .
lm, d1afinal . lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression without missing
data" , digits =9, out="Reg5v1.htm")
# introducing quadratic terms for salary , tenure and bonus has no significant
contribution to the model however
e1acon.lm<−lm(altmanz2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
e1a.lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2)
f1a . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2+
performance2+gearing2+sector2)
f1qs . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya22+salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
f1qb. lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa22+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
f1qt . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea22+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2)
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f1qbs . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2
+performance2+gearing2+sector2+boardsize22)
f1afull . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+salarya22+bonusa22+tenurea22+
boardsize22)
f1afinal . lm<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+boardsize2+mcap2+performance2+
gearing2+sector2+boardsize22)
summary(e1acon.lm)
summary(e1a.lm)
summary(f1a.lm)
summary(f1qs.lm)
summary(f1qb.lm)
summary(f1qt.lm)
anova(f1a.lm,f1q. lm)
stargazer (e1acon.lm,e1a.lm,f1a . lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression
without missing data" , digits =9, out="Reg6.htm")
stargazer (e1acon.lm,e1a.lm,f1a . lm, f1qs . lm, f1qb. lm, f1qt . lm,f1qbs . lm, f1afull .
lm, f1afinal . lm, type = "html" , title ="Linear Regression without missing
data" , digits =9, out="Reg6v1.htm")
# introducing a quadratic term for bonus and tenure has a significant impact on
the model but salary has no significant
#impact
# introducing a quadratic term for average salary for the linear models has no
significant effect to the BB1y and BB5y models however
#the effect on Altman Z−score is significant . The model with the quadratic
salary for altman z−score has both salary and salary ^2 as significant
# predictors .
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########################################################################################
#Regression assumptions (andy field )
##############assumption of normality with charts ##############
library (ggplot2)
hist (bb1y2)
qplot (sample=bb1y2,stat="qq")
# positively skewed more companies less likely to fail
hist (bb5y2)
qplot (sample=bb5y2,stat="qq")
# slight positive skew more companies less likely to fail
hist (altmanz2)
qplot (sample=altmanz2,stat="qq")
# slight positive skew however more companies les likely to fail
hist (mcap2)
qplot (sample=mcap2,stat="qq")
# positive skew with more smaller companies
hist (performance2)
qplot (sample=performance2,stat="qq")
#normal curve however some extreme observations
hist (gearing2)
qplot (sample=gearing2,stat="qq")
# positive skew with more companies with lower gearing
hist ( salarya2 )
qplot (sample=salarya2, stat="qq")
#normal distribution
hist (bonusa2)
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qplot (sample=bonusa2,stat="qq")
#normalish distribution with few extremely high bonus
hist ( tenurea2 )
qplot (sample=tenurea2,stat="qq")
#normalish distribution
hist (employees2)
qplot (sample=employees2,stat="qq")
#extreme figures with a positive skew
hist ( boardsize2 )
qplot (sample=boardsize2,stat="qq")
#normalish distribution
hist ( salarya22 )
qplot (sample=salarya22, stat="qq")
#normalish distribution
hist (bonusa22)
qplot (sample=bonusa22,stat="qq")
# positive skew with many at lower end and a few at higher end
hist ( tenurea22)
qplot (sample=tenurea22,stat="qq")
# positive skew with many at lower end and a few at higher end
##############assumption of normality with numbers##############
install .packages("psych")
library (psych)
round(describe(cbind(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,mcap2,performance2,gearing2, salarya2 ,
bonusa2,tenurea2 ,employees2,boardsize2 , salarya22 ,bonusa22,tenurea22) ) ,
digits =1)
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describe <−round(describe(cbind(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,mcap2,performance2,
gearing2,salarya2 ,bonusa2,tenurea2 ,employees2,boardsize2 , salarya22 ,bonusa22,
tenurea22) ) , digits =1)
write . table ( describe , file ="describe . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=F)
install .packages("pastecs")
library ( pastecs )
round(stat .desc(cbind(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,mcap2,performance2,gearing2, salarya2
,bonusa2,tenurea2 ,employees2,boardsize2 , salarya22 ,bonusa22,tenurea22) , basic
=FALSE,norm=TRUE),digits=1)
stat .desc<−round(stat.desc(cbind(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,mcap2,performance2,
gearing2, salarya2 ,bonusa2,tenurea2 ,employees2,boardsize2 , salarya22 ,bonusa22,
tenurea22) , basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE),digits=1)
write . table ( stat .desc , file =" stat .desc . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=F)
#skew and kurtosis should be zero in normal distribution . positive skew
indicate a pile up of score
#to the left negative skew indicate a pile up to the right
# positive kurtosis indicate a pointy curve and negative kurtosis indicates a
flat curve
#values closer to zero indicate normality
#describe − shows performance and average salary with a normal curve however
only average salary shows a normal point
#The other variables are all positively skewed with a pointed curve
#in a sample of more than 200 is is important to look at the shape of the
distribution and to look at the value of skew and kurtosis
# rather than calculate their significance
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# descriptive statistics by year
by(data=bb1y2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=bb1y2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew
by(data=bb5y2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=bb5y2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew
by(data=altmanz2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=altmanz2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew
#The above three show that breaking down the observation into number of years
shows a big reduction in skewness and kurtosis
#reducing the positive skew and extreme peak
by(data=salarya2 , INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=salarya2 , INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
#normalish curve and peak
by(data=bonusa2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=bonusa2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
#normal curve and peak for one year and positive skew and peaked for three
years
by(data=tenurea2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=tenurea2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew and peaked slightly
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by(data=employees2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=employees2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew and peaked slightly
by(data=boardsize2, INDICES = t2, FUN=describe)
by(data=boardsize2, INDICES = t2, FUN=stat.desc,basic=FALSE,norm=TRUE)
# positive skew and peaked slightly
#not sure what the relevance of this is
y1<−subset(t2, t2=="1")
y2<−subset(t2, t2=="2")
y3<−subset(t2, t2=="3")
y4<−subset(t2, t2=="4")
#shaprio test
shapiro . test (bb1y2)
shapiro . test (bb5y2)
shapiro . test (altmanz2)
shapiro . test (mcap2)
shapiro . test (performance2)
shapiro . test (gearing2)
shapiro . test ( salarya2 )
shapiro . test (bonusa2)
shapiro . test ( tenurea2 )
shapiro . test (employees2)
shapiro . test ( boardsize2 )
#as per this test all not normal however large datasets will easily have a
significant
#shapiro .wilk test
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#However, according to the central limit theorem as the sample size becomes
greater
#the sampling distribution has a normal distribution with a mean closer to the
poppulation mean
# therefore we can assume that as the sample size is 207 wihtout missing
# observations ( greater than 30 for central limit theorem) the sampling
distribution
#has a normal distribution with a mean approximately similar to the poppulation
mean
##############testing for homogeneity of variance##############
install .packages("car")
library ( car )
#Levene’s test
leveneTest (bb1y2,t2)
leveneTest (bb1y2,id2)
leveneTest (bb1y2,sector2 )
#sector2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are not
significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however id2 and t2 is
significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
leveneTest (bb5y2,t2)
leveneTest (bb5y2,id2)
leveneTest (bb5y2,sector2 )
#t2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are not
significantly different
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#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however id2 and
sector is significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
leveneTest (altmanz2, t2 )
leveneTest (altmanz2, id2)
leveneTest (altmanz2, sector2 )
#t2 , id2 and sector2 are not significant leveneTest scores therefore the
variances are not significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable
leveneTest ( salarya2 , t2 )
leveneTest ( salarya2 , id2)
leveneTest ( salarya2 , sector2 )
#id2 and t2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are
not significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however sector2 is
significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
leveneTest (bonusa2,t2 )
leveneTest (bonusa2,id2)
leveneTest (bonusa2, sector2 )
#id2 and t2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are
not significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however sector2 is
significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
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leveneTest ( tenurea2 , t2 )
leveneTest ( tenurea2 , id2)
leveneTest ( tenurea2 , sector2 )
#t2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are not
significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however id2 and
sector2 is significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
leveneTest ( boardsize2 , t2 )
leveneTest ( boardsize2 , id2)
leveneTest ( boardsize2 , sector2 )
#t2 , id2 and sector2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the
variances are not significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable
leveneTest (employees2,t2)
leveneTest (employees2,id2)
leveneTest (employees2,sector2 )
#id2 and t2 is not significant leveneTest scores therefore the variances are
not significantly different
#and the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tenable however sector2 is
significantly
# different and the assumption of homogeneity of variance has been violated
#In large samples Levene’s Test can be significant even when group variances
are not very different
# therefore it should be interpreted in conjunction with the variance ratio
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############################Transformation of data
############################
lnbb1y2<−log(bb1y2)
hist (lnbb1y2)
qplot (sample=lnbb1y2)
lnbb5y2<−log(bb5y2)
hist (lnbb5y2)
qplot (sample=lnbb5y2)
lnaltmanz2<−log(altmanz2)
hist (lnaltmanz2)
qplot (sample=lnaltmanz2)
lnsalarya2 <−log(salarya2)
hist ( lnsalarya2 )
qplot (sample=lnsalarya2)
lnbonusa2<−log(bonusa2)# not normal
hist (lnbonusa2)
qplot (sample=lnbonus2)
sqbonusa2<−sqrt(bonusa2)# better than above
hist (sqbonusa2)
qplot (sample=sqbonusa2)
lntenurea2 <−log(tenurea2)
hist ( lntenurea2 )
qplot (sample=lntenurea2)
lnboardsize2 <−log(boardsize2)
hist ( lnboardsize2 )
qplot (sample=lnboardsize2)
lnemployees2<−log(employees2)
hist (lnemployees2)
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qplot (sample=lnemployees2)
lnmcap2<−log(mcap2)
hist (lnmcap2)
qplot (sample=lnmcap2)
lnperformance2<−log(performance2)# not normal
hist (lnperformance2)
qplot (sample=lnperformance2)
sqperformance2<−sqrt(performance2)# better than above
hist (sqperformance2)
qplot (sample=sqperformance2)
lngearing2<−log(gearing2)
hist ( lngearing2 )
qplot (sample=lngearing2)
###########The above is not useful in modelling############
#Glass,Peckham and Sanders (1972) , ’ the payoff of normalizing transformations
in terms of more valid probability statements
#is low, and they are seldom considered to be worth the effort ’(p241) − page
193 (andy field − jane superbrain 5.1)
#Wilcox(2005) found that with heavy tailed distributions requir larger samples(
more than previous 40) to invoke
# central limit theorem
#by transforming the data you change the hypothesis being tested
#The consequence of applying the wrong transformation could be worse than the
consequence of analysing untransformed scores
#use robust methods or bootstrap
# bootstrap (Efron and Tibshirani , 1993) − It estimates the properties of the
sampling distribution from the sample data
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#The sample data is treated as a poppulation from which smaller samples are
taken − for a gentle introduction
#Wright, London and Field (2011)
#############################Correlation
#####################################################
cordf<−data.frame(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,salarya2,bonusa2,tenurea2 , boardsize2 ,
employees2,mcap2,performance2,gearing2, salarya22 ,bonusa22,tenurea22)
install .packages("Hmisc")
library (Hmisc)
install .packages("ggm")
library (ggm)
install .packages("polycor")
library (polycor)
install .packages("ppcor")
library (ppcor)
c1<−cor(cordf,method="pearson")
round(c1,2)
write . table (c1, file ="c1pearson. txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=F)
c2<−cor(cordf,method="spearman")
round(c2,2)
write . table (c2, file ="c1spearman.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=F)
c3<−cor(cordf,method="kendall")
round(c3,2)
write . table (c3, file ="c1kendall . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=F)
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#the sign of the effect size between variables for parametric (pearson) and non
−parametric(kendall−spearman) is the same for all relationship but the
following
#bonus−altmanz;gearing−salary;boardsize−tenure;mcap−gearing;boardsize−
performance; boardisize−gearing
#Howell(1997:293) Kendall’s statstic is actually a better estimate than
spearman
#p−value
cor . test (bb1y2,bb5y2,method="pearson")
cor . test (bb1y2,bb5y2,method="spearman")
cor . test (bb1y2,bb5y2,method="kendall")
# partial correlation − correlation between two variables in which the effects
of other variables (on both variables ) are held constant
pcor ()
pcor . test (bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2)
#example of controlling variables
#pcor. test (bb1y2,bonusa2,cordf [, c("bb5y2","altmanz2"," salarya2 ") ])
#part /semi−partial correlation − correlation between two variables in which the
effects of other variables (on only one variable ) is held constant
spcor . test (bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2)
#example of controlling variabls
#spcor . test (bb1y2,bonusa2,cordf [, c("bb5y2","altmanz2"," salarya2 ") ])
# Correlation coefficients are effect sizes , so these can be interpreted without
needing p−values
#because p−values are related to sample size
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########################################################################################
#bodo winter tutorial 1 and other sources for regression assumption testing or
regression diagnostics
#
#######################################################################################
# testing assumptions
#*** linearity ***
#bodowinter
plot ( fitted (a1acon.lm), residuals (a1acon.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (a1a.lm), residuals (a1a.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (b1a.lm), residuals (b1a.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (b1aqs.lm), residuals (b1aqs.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (b1aqb.lm), residuals (b1aqb.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (b1aqt . lm), residuals (b1aqt . lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (c1acon.lm), residuals (c1acon.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (c1a.lm), residuals (c1a.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (d1a.lm), residuals (d1a.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (d1qs.lm), residuals (d1qs.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (d1qb.lm), residuals (d1qb.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (d1qt . lm), residuals (d1qt . lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (e1acon.lm), residuals (e1acon.lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (e1a.lm), residuals (e1a.lm))# linearity assumption holds
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plot ( fitted ( fa . lm), residuals (f1a . lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (f1qs . lm), residuals (f1qs . lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted (f1qb. lm), residuals (f1qb. lm))# linearity assumption holds
plot ( fitted ( f1qt . lm), residuals ( f1qt . lm))# linearity assumption holds
# https : / / biologyforfun .wordpress.com/2014/04/16/checking−glm−model−
assumptions−in−r/
#do two at a time i .e . par and plot function
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (a1acon.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (a1a.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (b1a.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (b1aqs.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (b1aqb.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (b1aqt . lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (c1acon.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (c1a.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (d1a.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (d1qs.lm)
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par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (d1qb.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (d1qt . lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (e1acon.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (e1a.lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (f1a . lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (f1qs . lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot (f1qb. lm)
par(mfrow=c(2,2))
plot ( f1qt . lm)
#http : / /www.statmethods.net/ stats / rdiagnostics .html
library ( car )
crPlots (a1acon.lm)
crPlots (a1a.lm)
crPlots (b1a.lm)
crPlots (b1aqs.lm)
crPlots (b1aqb.lm)
crPlots (b1aqt . lm)
crPlots (c1acon.lm)
crPlots (c1a.lm)
crPlots (d1a.lm)
crPlots (d1qs.lm)
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crPlots (d1qb.lm)
crPlots (d1qt . lm)
crPlots (e1acon.lm)
crPlots (e1a.lm)
crPlots (f1a . lm)
crPlots (f1qs . lm)
crPlots (f1qb. lm)
crPlots ( f1qt . lm)
# sector being skipped in ceresplots
ceresPlots (a1acon.lm)
ceresPlots (a1a.lm)
ceresPlots (b1a.lm)
ceresPlots (b1aqs.lm)
ceresPlots (b1aqb.lm)
ceresPlots (b1aqt . lm)
ceresPlots (c1acon.lm)
ceresPlots (c1a.lm)
ceresPlots (d1a.lm)
ceresPlots (d1qs.lm)
ceresPlots (d1qb.lm)
ceresPlots (d1qt . lm)
ceresPlots (e1acon.lm)
ceresPlots (e1a.lm)
ceresPlots (f1a . lm)
ceresPlots (f1qs . lm)
ceresPlots (f1qb.lm)
ceresPlots ( f1qt . lm)
# if linearity assumption borken then :
#might have missed an important fixed effect
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#perform nonlinear transformation e.g. by taking the log transform
#non linear transformation of fixed effects e .g. add iv and ivsquared
# if seeing stripes then probably dealing with categorical data , use logistics
regression
#***absence of collinearity ***
install .packages("Hmisc")
install .packages("ggplot2")
install .packages("munsell")
library (Hmisc)
library (ggplot2)
library (munsell)
library ( car )
cor .my.df<−cbind(salarya2,bonusa2,tenurea2, boardsize2 ,employees2)
rcorr (cor .my.df) # not working
#http : / /www.statmethods.net/ stats / rdiagnostics .html
# >2 problem?
vif1<−vif(a1acon.lm)
write . table ( vif1 , file ="vif1 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
vif2<−sqrt(vif(a1acon.lm))>2
write . table ( vif2 , file ="vif2 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
vif3<−vif(a1a.lm)
vif4<−sqrt(vif(a1a.lm))>2
vif5<−vif(b1a.lm)
vif6<−sqrt(vif(b1a.lm))>2
vif7<−vif(b1aqs.lm)
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vif8<−sqrt(vif(b1aqs.lm))>2
vif9<−vif(b1aqb.lm)
vif10<−sqrt(vif(b1aqb.lm))>2
vif11<−vif(b1aqt.lm)
vif12<−sqrt(vif(b1aqt . lm))>2
vif13<−vif(c1acon.lm)
vif14<−sqrt(vif(c1acon.lm))>2
vif15<−vif(c1a.lm)
vif16<−sqrt(vif(c1a.lm))>2
vif17<−vif(d1a.lm)
vif18<−sqrt(vif(d1a.lm))>2
vif19<−vif(d1qs.lm)
vif20<−sqrt(vif(d1qs.lm))>2
vif21<−vif(d1qb.lm)
vif22<−sqrt(vif(d1qb.lm))>2
vif23<−vif(d1qt.lm)
vif24<−sqrt(vif(d1qt . lm))>2
vif25<−vif(e1acon.lm)
vif26<−sqrt(vif(e1acon.lm))>2
vif27<−vif(e1a.lm)
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vif28<−sqrt(vif(e1a.lm))>2
vif29<−vif(f1a. lm)
vif30<−sqrt(vif(f1a . lm))>2
vif31<−vif(f1qs. lm)
vif32<−sqrt(vif(f1qs . lm))>2
vif33<−vif(f1qb.lm)
vif34<−sqrt(vif(f1qb. lm))>2
vif35<−vif(f1qt . lm)
vif36<−sqrt(vif( f1qt . lm))>2
write . table ( vif3 , file ="vif3 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif4 , file ="vif4 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif5 , file ="vif5 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif6 , file ="vif6 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif7 , file ="vif7 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif8 , file ="vif8 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif9 , file ="vif9 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif10 , file ="vif10 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif11 , file ="vif11 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif12 , file ="vif12 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif13 , file ="vif13 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif14 , file ="vif14 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif15 , file ="vif15 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif16 , file ="vif16 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif17 , file ="vif17 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif18 , file ="vif18 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
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write . table ( vif19 , file ="vif19 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif20 , file ="vif20 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif21 , file ="vif21 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif22 , file ="vif22 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif23 , file ="vif23 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif24 , file ="vif24 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif25 , file ="vif25 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif26 , file ="vif26 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif27 , file ="vif27 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif28 , file ="vif28 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif29 , file ="vif29 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif30 , file ="vif30 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif31 , file ="vif31 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif32 , file ="vif32 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif33 , file ="vif33 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif34 , file ="vif34 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif35 , file ="vif35 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
write . table ( vif36 , file ="vif36 . txt " , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
# if fixed effects are correlated :
#could focus on few fixed effects that you know are not correlated
#which one is the most meaningful and drop the others
#dimension reduction techniques such as Principal Component Analysis
#***homoskedasticity or "absence of hetroskedasticity "***
#use plot from linearity as it lays the graph in 4 different boxes same plots
#http : / /www.statmethods.net/ stats / rdiagnostics .html
380
#Breusch−Pagan test; it was independently suggested by Cook and Weisberg (1983)
ncvTest(a1acon.lm)
ncvTest(a1a.lm)
ncvTest(b1a.lm)
ncvTest(b1aqs.lm)
ncvTest(b1aqb.lm)
ncvTest(b1aqt . lm)
ncvTest(c1acon.lm)
ncvTest(c1a.lm)
ncvTest(d1a.lm)
ncvTest(d1qs.lm)
ncvTest(d1qb.lm)
ncvTest(d1qt . lm)
ncvTest(e1acon.lm)
ncvTest(e1a.lm)
ncvTest(f1a . lm)
ncvTest(f1qs . lm)
ncvTest(f1qb. lm)
ncvTest( f1qt . lm)
spreadLevelPlot (a1acon.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (a1a.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (b1a.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (b1aqs.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (b1aqb.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (b1aqt . lm)
spreadLevelPlot (c1acon.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (c1a.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (d1a.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (d1qs.lm)
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spreadLevelPlot (d1qb.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (d1qt . lm)
spreadLevelPlot (e1acon.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (e1a.lm)
spreadLevelPlot (f1a . lm)
spreadLevelPlot (f1qs . lm)
spreadLevelPlot (f1qb. lm)
spreadLevelPlot ( f1qt . lm)
# if plot is hetroskedastic or not homoskedastic:
#log−transform could help here
#weighted least squares?
#***normality of residuals ***
# least important assumption
hist ( residuals (a1acon.lm))
hist ( residuals (a1a.lm))
hist ( residuals (b1a.lm))
hist ( residuals (b1aqs.lm))
hist ( residuals (b1aqb.lm))
hist ( residuals (b1aqt . lm))
hist ( residuals (c1acon.lm))
hist ( residuals (c1a.lm))
hist ( residuals (d1a.lm))
hist ( residuals (d1qs.lm))
hist ( residuals (d1qb.lm))
hist ( residuals (d1qt . lm))
hist ( residuals (e1acon.lm))
hist ( residuals (e1a.lm))
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hist ( residuals (f1a . lm))
hist ( residuals (f1qs . lm))
hist ( residuals (f1qb. lm))
hist ( residuals ( f1qt . lm))
# all showing normalish residuals
qqnorm(residuals(a1acon.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(a1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(b1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(b1aqs.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(b1aqb.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(b1aqt.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(c1acon.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(c1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(d1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(d1qs.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(d1qb.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(d1qt.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(e1acon.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(e1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(f1a.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(f1qs.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(f1qb.lm))
qqnorm(residuals(f1qt.lm))
#***absence of influential data points ***
# defbetaPlots is not in the bodowinter tutorial
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dfbeta (a1acon.lm)
dfbeta (a1a.lm)
dfbeta (b1a.lm)
dfbeta (b1aqs.lm)
dfbeta (b1aqb.lm)
dfbeta (b1aqt . lm)
dfbeta (c1acon.lm)
dfbeta (c1a.lm)
dfbeta (d1a.lm)
dfbeta (d1qs.lm)
dfbeta (d1qb.lm)
dfbeta (d1qt . lm)
dfbeta (e1acon.lm)
dfbeta (e1a.lm)
dfbeta (f1a . lm)
dfbeta (f1qs . lm)
dfbeta (f1qb. lm)
dfbeta ( f1qt . lm)
dfbetaPlots (a1acon.lm)
dfbetaPlots (a1a.lm)
dfbetaPlots (b1a.lm)
dfbetaPlots (b1aqs.lm)
dfbetaPlots (b1aqb.lm)
dfbetaPlots (b1aqt . lm)
dfbetaPlots (c1acon.lm)
dfbetaPlots (c1a.lm)
dfbetaPlots (d1a.lm)
dfbetaPlots (d1qs.lm)
dfbetaPlots (d1qb.lm)
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dfbetaPlots (d1qt . lm)
dfbetaPlots (e1acon.lm)
dfbetaPlots (e1a.lm)
dfbetaPlots (f1a . lm)
dfbetaPlots (f1qs . lm)
dfbetaPlots (f1qb. lm)
dfbetaPlots ( f1qt . lm)
# https : / / cran . r−project .org /web/packages/ olsrr / vignettes / intro .html
install .packages("glue")
library (glue)
install .packages(" olsrr ")
library ( olsrr )
#remove sector as the graphs is not relevant with it
ols_dfbetas_panel(a1acon.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(a1a.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(b1a.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(b1aqs.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(b1aqb.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(b1aqt . lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(c1acon.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(c1a.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(d1a.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(d1qs.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(d1qb.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(d1qt . lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(e1acon.lm)
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ols_dfbetas_panel(e1a.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(f1a . lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(f1qs . lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(f1qb.lm)
ols_dfbetas_panel(f1qt . lm)
#check if dfbeta higher than slope
#run analysis without influential datapoints
#dat2=my.df[−61,][−148,][−150,](this is how to delete specific data points )
#running regression again without influential points as per Cook’s D value
improves the regression models or increases significance of particular
variables or agrees with regression with influential points
#http : / /www.statmethods.net/ stats / rdiagnostics .html
#Cook’s D value >4/(n−k−1)
cutoff1 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(a1acon.lm$coefficients)−2))
cutoff2 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(a1a.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff3 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(b1a.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff4 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(b1aqs.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff5 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(b1aqb.lm$coefficients)−2))
cutoff6 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(b1aqt.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff7 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(c1acon.lm$coefficients)−2))
cutoff8 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(c1a.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff9 <−4/((nrow(df)−length(d1a.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff10<−4/((nrow(df)−length(d1qs.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff11<−4/((nrow(df)−length(d1qb.lm$coefficients)−2))
cutoff12<−4/((nrow(df)−length(d1qt.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff13<−4/((nrow(df)−length(e1acon.lm$coefficients)−2))
cutoff14<−4/((nrow(df)−length(e1a.lm$coefficients )−2))
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cutoff15<−4/((nrow(df)−length(f1a.lm$ coefficients )−2))
cutoff16<−4/((nrow(df)−length(f1qs.lm$ coefficients )−2))
cutoff17<−4/((nrow(df)−length(f1qb.lm$coefficients )−2))
cutoff18<−4/((nrow(df)−length(f1qt.lm$ coefficients )−2))
plot (a1acon.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff1 )
plot (a1a.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff2 )
plot (b1a.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff3 )
plot (b1aqs.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff4 )
plot (b1aqb.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff5 )
plot (b1aqt . lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff6 )
plot (c1acon.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff7 )
plot (c1a.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff8 )
plot (d1a.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff9 )
plot (d1qs.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff10 )
plot (d1qb.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff11 )
plot (d1qt . lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff12 )
plot (e1acon.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff13 )
plot (e1a.lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff14 )
plot (f1a . lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff15 )
plot (f1qs . lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff16 )
plot (f1qb. lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff17 )
plot ( f1qt . lm, which=4, cook. levels =cutoff18 )
#run analysis without influential datapoints as highlighted in plots above
# influence plot
influencePlot (a1acon.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="
Circle size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
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influencePlot (a1a.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (b1a.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (b1aqs.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (b1aqb.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (b1aqt . lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (c1acon.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="
Circle size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (c1a.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (d1a.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (d1qs.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (d1qb.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (d1qt . lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (e1acon.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="
Circle size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (e1a.lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (f1a . lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot (f1qs . lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
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influencePlot (f1qb. lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
influencePlot ( f1qt . lm,id .method="identify" , main="Influence Plot" , sub="Circle
size is proportial to Cook’s Distance" )
# outliers
#http : / /www.statmethods.net/ stats / rdiagnostics .html
#Bonferonni p−value for most extreme observations
outlierTest (a1acon.lm)
outlierTest (a1a.lm)
outlierTest (b1a.lm)
outlierTest (b1aqs.lm)
outlierTest (b1aqb.lm)
outlierTest (b1aqt . lm)
outlierTest (c1acon.lm)
outlierTest (c1a.lm)
outlierTest (d1a.lm)
outlierTest (d1qs.lm)
outlierTest (d1qb.lm)
outlierTest (d1qt . lm)
outlierTest (e1acon.lm)
outlierTest (e1a.lm)
outlierTest (f1a . lm)
outlierTest (f1qs . lm)
outlierTest (f1qb. lm)
outlierTest ( f1qt . lm)
#run analysis without influential datapoints
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#QQ plot for studentized residuals
qqPlot(a1acon.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(a1a.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(b1a.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(b1aqs.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(b1aqb.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(b1aqt . lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(c1acon.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(c1a.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(d1a.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(d1qs.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(d1qb.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(d1qt . lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(e1acon.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(e1a.lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(f1a . lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(f1qs . lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot(f1qb. lm,main="QQ Plot")
qqPlot( f1qt . lm,main="QQ Plot")
#leverage plots
leveragePlots (a1acon.lm)
leveragePlots (a1a.lm)
leveragePlots (b1a.lm)
leveragePlots (b1aqs.lm)
leveragePlots (b1aqb.lm)
leveragePlots (b1aqt . lm)
leveragePlots (c1acon.lm)
leveragePlots (c1a.lm)
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leveragePlots (d1a.lm)
leveragePlots (d1qs.lm)
leveragePlots (d1qb.lm)
leveragePlots (d1qt . lm)
leveragePlots (e1acon.lm)
leveragePlots (e1a.lm)
leveragePlots (f1a . lm)
leveragePlots (f1qs . lm)
leveragePlots (f1qb. lm)
leveragePlots ( f1qt . lm)
#***independence***
#most important assumption
# if violated then resolve this using mixed models
#durbinWatsonTest is not required as there is clear lack of independece but
test agrees with this
durbinWatsonTest(a1acon.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(a1a.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(b1a.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(b1aqs.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(b1aqb.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(b1aqt . lm)
durbinWatsonTest(c1acon.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(c1a.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(d1a.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(d1qs.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(d1qb.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(d1qt . lm)
durbinWatsonTest(e1acon.lm)
durbinWatsonTest(e1a.lm)
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durbinWatsonTest(f1a . lm)
durbinWatsonTest(f1qs . lm)
durbinWatsonTest(f1qb. lm)
durbinWatsonTest( f1qt . lm)
#gvlma performs a global validation of linear assumptions as well separate
evaluation of skewness, kurtosis , and heteroskedasticity
install .packages("gvlma")
library (gvlma)
gvmodel1<−gvlma(a1acon.lm)
summary(gvmodel1)
gvmodel2<−gvlma(a1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel2)
gvmodel3<−gvlma(b1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel3)
gvmodel4<−gvlma(c1acon.lm)
summary(gvmodel4)
gvmodel5<−gvlma(c1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel5)
gvmodel6<−gvlma(d1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel6)
gvmodel7<−gvlma(e1acon.lm)
summary(gvmodel7)
gvmodel8<−gvlma(e1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel8)
gvmodel9<−gvlma(f1a.lm)
summary(gvmodel9)
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########################Multilevel modelling (Andy Field)
############################################
library (nlme)
install .packages("xtable")
library ( xtable )
#check to see if multi level modelling is required as does the intercept vary
across contexts (time / year)
bb1yinterceptonly <−gls(bb1y2~1,method="ML")
summary(bb1yinterceptonly)
bb1yrandominterceptonly<−lme(bb1y2~1,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb1yrandominterceptonly)
anova1<−anova(bb1yinterceptonly,bb1yrandominterceptonly)
xanova1<−xtable(anova1)
print . xtable (xanova1, type="html", file ="xanova1.htm")
#AIC, BIC lower for random model and loglik higher significant result
bb5yinterceptonly <−gls(bb5y2~1,method="ML")
summary(bb5yinterceptonly)
bb5yrandominterceptonly<−lme(bb5y2~1,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb5yrandominterceptonly)
anova2<−anova(bb5yinterceptonly,bb5yrandominterceptonly)
xanova2<−xtable(anova2)
print . xtable (xanova2, type="html", file ="xanova2.htm")
#AIC, BIC lower for random model and loglik higher significant result
altmanzinterceptonly <−gls(altmanz2~1,method="ML")
summary(altmanzinterceptonly)
altmanzrandominterceptonly<−lme(altmanz2~1,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(altmanzrandominterceptonly)
anova3<−anova(altmanzinterceptonly,altmanzrandominterceptonly )
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xanova3<−xtable(anova3)
print . xtable (xanova3, type="html", file ="xanova3.htm")
#AIC, BIC lower for random model and loglik same non− significant result
#Based on above there is significant variance in intercepts between years for
the BB1y and BB5y dependent variables
#whereas the variance in intercepts between years for the altmanz score as
dependent variable is non− significant
#This provides confirmation to proceed with multilevel modelling for BB1y and
BB5y and revert to linear modeling for
#altmanz score − using sector as the context between which intercepts vary we
find that the model is significantly better
#only for the altmanz score and non− significant for BB1y and BB5y
#adding fixed effects
bb1yrandominterceptcontrol <−lme(bb1y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2,
random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb1yrandominterceptcontrol)
bb1yrandominterceptpredict <−lme(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb1yrandominterceptpredict)
bb1yrandominterceptfull <−lme(bb1y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="ML
")
summary(bb1yrandominterceptfull)
bb1yrandominterceptfull2 <−lme(bb1y2~salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 +
employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 +
boardsize22 ,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb1yrandominterceptfull2)
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anova4<−anova(bb1yrandominterceptonly,bb1yrandominterceptcontrol,
bb1yrandominterceptfull2 )
xanova4<−xtable(anova4)
print . xtable (xanova4, type="html", file ="xanova4.htm")
#The results show that adding just the controls as fixed effects significantly
improves the model as there is an increase
#in the logLik . Furthermore when the predictor variables are added to the
control model the full model is significant better
#than the control model as evidenced by an increase in the logLik
stargazer ( bb1yrandominterceptcontrol , bb1yrandominterceptpredict ,
bb1yrandominterceptfull )
bb5yrandominterceptcontrol <−lme(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2,
random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb5yrandominterceptcontrol)
bb5yrandominterceptpredict <−lme(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+
boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(bb5yrandominterceptpredict)
bb5yrandominterceptfull <−lme(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="ML
")
summary(bb5yrandominterceptfull)
bb5yrandominterceptfull2 <−lme(bb5y2~tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2
+ performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 ,random=~1|id2,method="
ML")
summary(bb5yrandominterceptfull2)
anova5<−anova(bb5yrandominterceptonly,bb5yrandominterceptcontrol,
bb5yrandominterceptfull2 )
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xanova5<−xtable(anova5)
print . xtable (xanova5, type="html", file ="xanova5.htm")
#The results show that adding just the controls as fixed effects significantly
improves the model as there is an increase
#in the logLik . Furthermore when the predictor variables are added to the
control model the full model is significant better
#than the control model as evidenced by an increase in the logLik
stargazer ( bb5yrandominterceptcontrol , bb5yrandominterceptpredict ,
bb5yrandominterceptfull )
altmanzrandominterceptcontrol <−lme(altmanz2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+
sector2,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(altmanzrandominterceptcontrol)
altmanzrandominterceptpredict <−lme(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+
employees2+boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="ML")
summary(altmanzrandominterceptpredict)
altmanzrandominterceptfull <−lme(altmanz2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2
+salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2,random=~1|id2,method="
ML")
summary(altmanzrandominterceptfull)
altmanzrandominterceptfull2 <−lme(altmanz2~salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 +
mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 ,random=~1|id2,
method="ML")
summary(altmanzrandominterceptfull2)
anova6<−anova(altmanzrandominterceptonly,altmanzrandominterceptcontrol ,
altmanzrandominterceptfull2 )
xanova6<−xtable(anova6)
print . xtable (xanova6, type="html", file ="xanova6.htm")
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#The results show that adding just the controls as fixed effects significantly
improves the model as there is an increase
#in the logLik . Furthermore when the predictor variables are added to the
control model the full model is significant better
#than the control model as evidenced by an increase in the logLik
stargazer ( altmanzrandominterceptcontrol , altmanzrandominterceptpredict ,
altmanzrandominterceptfull )
#############################add random slope for indivdual companies
bb1yaddrandomslope<−lme(bb1y2~salarya22 + salarya2 + bonusa2 + employees2 +
boardsize2 + mcap2 + performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 ,
random=~salarya2|id2 ,method="ML")
summary(bb1yaddrandomslope)
anova7<−anova(bb1yrandominterceptfull2,bb1yaddrandomslope)
xanova7<−xtable(anova7)
print . xtable (xanova7, type="html", file ="xanova7.htm")
bb5yaddrandomslope<−lme(bb5y2~tenurea2 + employees2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 +
performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 ,random=~id2|t2,method="ML"
)
summary(bb5yaddrandomslope)
anova8<−anova(bb5yrandominterceptfull2,bb5yaddrandomslope)
xanova8<−xtable(anova8)
print . xtable (xanova8, type="html", file ="xanova8.htm")
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altmanzaddrandomslope<−lme(altmanz2~salarya2 + bonusa2 + boardsize2 + mcap2 +
performance2 + gearing2 + sector2 + boardsize22 ,random=~id2|t2,method="ML
")
summary(altmanzaddrandomslope)
anova9<−anova(altmanzrandominterceptfull2,altmanzaddrandomslope)
xanova9<−xtable(anova9)
print . xtable (xanova9, type="html", file ="xanova9.htm")
#adding a random slope for individual companies does not provide a significant
improvement to the model without a random slope
############################adding random slope for sector
#bb1yaddrandomslopesector<−lme(bb1y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2,random=~sector2|t2,method
="ML")
#summary(bb1yaddrandomslopesector)
#anova8<−anova(bb1yrandominterceptfull,bb1yaddrandomslopesector)
#xtable (anova8)
#bb5yaddrandomslopesector<−lme(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2,random=~sector2|t2,method
="ML")
#summary(bb5yaddrandomslopesector)
#anova9<−anova(bb5yrandominterceptfull,bb5yaddrandomslopesector)
#xtable (anova9)
#adding a random slope for different sectors does not provide a significant
improvement to the model without a random slope
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###########################adding a quadratic term for salary
# bb5yrandominterceptfull2 <−lme(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+salarya22,random=~1|t2,
method="ML")
#summary(bb5yrandominterceptfull2)
#anova( bb5yrandominterceptfull , bb5yrandominterceptfull2 )
# including a quadratic term for salary has no significant effect on the
bb1yrandomintercept full model however it is a significant predictor
#for the bb5yrandomintercept model and improves the model significantly
#adding a random slope for individual companies to the quadratic model has no
significant effect to the model
###################introducing interaction terms − do this
################################
# introducing an interaction between market capitalisation and number of
employees
#bb1yinteractmcapemployees<−lme(bb1y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2:employees2,random=
~1|t2,method="ML")
#summary(bb1yinteractmcapemployees)
#anova( bb1yrandominterceptfull ,bb1yinteractmcapemployees)
#bb5yinteractmcapemployees<−lme(bb5y2~mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+
salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+employees2+boardsize2+mcap2:employees2,random=
~1|t2,method="ML")
#summary(bb5yinteractmcapemployees)
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#anova( bb5yrandominterceptfull ,bb5yinteractmcapemployees)
#BB1y shows a significant improvement to model by introducing the interaction
term however this is not true for the BB5y model
###############################growth model−not sure if to include
###################################
###############################bb1y
##############################################
# growthintercept <−gls(bb1y2~1, method="ML")
#allow intercept to vary across contexts i .e . comapnies
#growthrandomintercept<−lme(bb1y2~1,random=~1|id2,method="ML",control=list(
opt="optim"))
#adding in time as fixed effect
#growthtimeri<−lme(bb1y2~t2,random=~1|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="optim
"))
# introducing random slope
#growthtimers<−lme(bb1y2~t2,random=~t2|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="optim
"))
#covariance structure
#corAR1()− used when time points are equally spaced
#corCAR1() − time points are not equally spaced
#corARMA() − allows the correlation structure to involve a moving average of
error variance
#growtharmodel<−lme(bb1y2~t2,random=~t2|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="
optim"), correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#anova( growthintercept , growthrandomintercept , growthtimeri , growthtimers ,
growtharmodel)
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# all the models show a significant improvement at each step however the
autoregressive model does not show a significant
#improvement to the model before it however it is a significant improvement to
the random intercept only model
#adding higher−order polynomials
#growthtimequadratic<−lme(bb1y2~t2+I(t2^2),random=~t2|id2,method="ML",control
=list(opt="optim") , correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#growthtimecubic<−lme(bb1y2~t2+I(t2^2)+I(t2^3),random=~t2|id2,method="ML",
control=list(opt="optim") , correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#anova( growthintercept , growthrandomintercept , growthtimeri , growthtimers ,
growtharmodel,growthtimequadratic ,growthtimecubic)
#summary(growthtimecubic)
#the results show adding higher−order polynomials does not significantly
improve the model
###############################bb5y
##############################################
# growthintercept5 <−gls(bb5y2~1, method="ML")
#allow intercept to vary across contexts i .e . comapnies
#growthrandomintercept5<−lme(bb5y2~1,random=~1|id2,method="ML",control=list(
opt="optim"))
#adding in time as fixed effect
#growthtimeri5<−lme(bb5y2~t2,random=~1|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="optim
"))
# introducing random slope
#growthtimers5<−lme(bb5y2~t2,random=~t2|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="
optim"))
#covariance structure
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#corAR1()− used when time points are equally spaced
#corCAR1() − time points are not equally spaced
#corARMA() − allows the correlation structure to involve a moving average of
error variance
#growtharmodel5<−lme(bb5y2~t2,random=~t2|id2,method="ML",control=list(opt="
optim"), correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#anova( growthintercept5 ,growthrandomintercept5 , growthtimeri5 ,growthtimers5 ,
growtharmodel5)
# all the models show a significant improvement at each step
#adding higher−order polynomials
#growthtimequadratic5<−lme(bb5y2~t2+I(t2^2),random=~t2|id2,method="ML",
control=list(opt="optim") , correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#growthtimecubic5<−lme(bb5y2~t2+I(t2^2)+I(t2^3),random=~t2|id2,method="ML",
control=list(opt="optim") , correlation =corAR1(0,form=~t2|id2))
#anova( growthintercept5 ,growthrandomintercept5 , growthtimeri5 ,growthtimers5 ,
growtharmodel5,growthtimequadratic5 ,growthtimecubic5)
#summary(growthtimecubic)
#the results show adding higher−order polynomials does not significantly
improve the model
####################Reporting multilevel models#################
#The relationship between surgery and quality of life showes a significant
variance in intercepts across participants , SD=5.48
#(95% CI:3.31, 9.07) , X^2(1) = 107.65, p<.0001. In addition , the slopes varied
across participants , SD= 5.42 (3.13,9.37) ,
# X^2 (2) = 38.87, p<.0001, adn the slopes and intercepts were negatively and
significantly correlated , cor=−.95(−.99,−.60).
################################################################
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##################For the model itself #########################
#Report the results in the text with b−values, ts ,and degrees of freedom for the
fixed effects , and then report parameters for
#the random effects in the text as well . Produce a table of parameters as you
would for regression .
#Quality of life before surgery significantly predicted quality of life after
surgery , b=0.31, t (262) = 5.75,p<.001,
#surgery did not significantly predict quality of life , b=−3.19,t(262)=−1.46,p
=.15, but the reason for surgery ,
#b=−3.52,t(262)=−3.08,p<.01, and the interaction of the reason for surgery and
surgery ,b=4.22, t (262)=2.48,p<.05, both did
# significantly predict quality of life . This interaction was broken down by
conducting seperate multilevel models on the
#’ physical reason’ and ’ attractiveness reason ’. The models specified wer the
same as the main model but excluded
#the main effect and interaction term involving the reason for surgery . These
analyses showed that for those operated on only
#to cahnge their appearence, surgery almost significantly predicted quality of
life , b=−4.31, t (87)=−1.89,p=.06: quality of life
#was lower after surgery compared to the control group. However, for those who
had surgery to solve a physical problem , surgery
#did not significantly predict quality of life ,b=1.20, t (166)=0.57,p=.57. The
interaction effect , therfore , reflets the difference
#in slopes for surgery as a predictor of quality of lifein those who had
surgery for physical problems ( slight positive slope )
#and those who had surgery purely for vanity (a negative slope ) . ***include
table ***
###############################################################
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#bodowinter tutorial 2
install .packages("lme4")
library ("lme4")
# error message some predictor variables are on very different scales : consider
rescaling (check this ! )
my.df=data.frame(bb1y2,bb5y2,altmanz2,salarya2,bonusa2,tenurea2 ,employees2,
mcap2,boardsize2,performance2,gearing2 , sector2 , id2 , t2 , salarya22 , boardsize22
)
scalevars <−c("bb1y2","bb5y2","altmanz2"," salarya2 " , "bonusa2"," tenurea2" , "mcap2
","boardsize2" , "employees2","performance2","gearing2" , " salarya22 " , "
boardsize22")
my.dfs<−my.df
my.dfs[ scalevars ]<−lapply(my.dfs[scalevars ], scale )
#averages show 0 for above variables
#random interecepts for company and time
bb1y.company.null=lmer(bb1y2~(1|id2), data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.company.null)
stargazer (bb1y.company.null,type = "html" , title ="BB1y null model company
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb1ycompanynull.htm")
bb1y.time.null=lmer(bb1y2~(1|t2) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.time.null)
stargazer (bb1y.time.null , type = "html" , title ="BB1y null model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ytimenull .htm")
bb1y.null=lmer(bb1y2~(1|id2) +(1| t2 ) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.null)
stargazer (bb1y.null , type = "html" , title ="BB1y null model company and time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ycompanytimenull.htm")
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bb1y.company.null2=lmer(bb1y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2), data=my.
dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.company.null2)
stargazer (bb1y.company.null2,type = "html" , title ="BB1y control model company
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb1ycompanynull2.htm")
bb1y.time. null2=lmer(bb1y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2) , data=my.dfs[
scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.time.null2)
stargazer (bb1y.time. null2 , type = "html" , title ="BB1y control model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ytimenull2.htm")
bb1y.null2=lmer(bb1y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2)+(1| t2 ) , data=my.
dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.null2)
stargazer (bb1y.null2 , type = "html" , title ="BB1y control model company and time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ycompanytimenull2.htm")
bb5y.company.null=lmer(bb5y2~(1|id2), data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.company.null)
stargazer (bb5y.company.null,type = "html" , title ="BB5y null model company
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb5ycompanynull.htm")
bb5y.time.null=lmer(bb5y2~(1|t2) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.time.null)
stargazer (bb5y.time.null , type = "html" , title ="BB5y null model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ytimenull .htm")
bb5y.null=lmer(bb5y2~(1|id2) +(1| t2 ) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.null)
stargazer (bb5y.null , type = "html" , title ="BB5y null model company and time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ycompanytimenull.htm")
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bb5y.company.null2=lmer(bb5y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2), data=my.
dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.company.null2)
stargazer (bb5y.company.null2,type = "html" , title ="BB5y control model company
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb5ycompanynull2.htm")
bb5y.time. null2=lmer(bb5y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2) , data=my.dfs[
scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.time.null2)
stargazer (bb5y.time. null2 , type = "html" , title ="BB5y control model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ytimenull2.htm")
bb5y.null2=lmer(bb5y2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2)+(1| t2 ) , data=my.
dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.null2)
stargazer (bb5y.null2 , type = "html" , title ="BB5y control model company and time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ycompanytimenull2.htm")
altmanz.company.null=lmer(altmanz2~(1|id2) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=
FALSE)
summary(altmanz.company.null)
stargazer (altmanz.company.null,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ null model
company random intercept" , digits =9, out="altmanzcompanynull.htm")
altmanz.time.null=lmer(altmanz2~(1| t2 ) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.time.null)
stargazer (altmanz.time.null , type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ null model time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="altmanztimenull .htm")
altmanz. null=lmer(altmanz2~(1| id2) +(1| t2 ) , data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=
FALSE)
summary(altmanz.null)
stargazer (altmanz. null , type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ null model company and
time random intercept " , digits =9, out="altmanzcompanytimenull.htm")
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altmanz.company.null2=lmer(altmanz2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2) ,
data=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.company.null2)
stargazer (altmanz.company.null2,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ control model
company random intercept" , digits =9, out="altmanzcompanynull2.htm")
altmanz.time. null2=lmer(altmanz2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2 ) , data=
my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.time.null2)
stargazer (altmanz.time. null2 , type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ control model time
random intercept " , digits =9, out="altmanztimenull2 .htm")
altmanz. null2=lmer(altmanz2~performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2) +(1| t2 ) , data
=my.dfs[ scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.null2)
stargazer (altmanz. null2 , type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ control model company
and time random intercept " , digits =9, out="altmanzcompanytimenull2.htm")
xanova10<−anova(bb1y.company.null,bb1y.company.null2)
write . table (xanova10, file ="xanova10.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova11<−anova(bb5y.company.null,bb5y.company.null2)
write . table (xanova11, file ="xanova11.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova12<−anova(altmanz.company.null,altmanz.company.null2)
write . table (xanova12, file ="xanova12.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova13<−anova(bb1y.time.null,bb1y.time.null2)
write . table (xanova13, file ="xanova13.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova14<−anova(bb5y.time.null,bb5y.time.null2)
write . table (xanova14, file ="xanova14.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova15<−anova(altmanz.time.null,altmanz.time. null2 )
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write . table (xanova15, file ="xanova15.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova16<−anova(bb1y.null,bb1y.null2)
write . table (xanova16, file ="xanova16.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova17<−anova(bb5y.null,bb5y.null2)
write . table (xanova17, file ="xanova17.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova18<−anova(altmanz.null,altmanz.null2)
write . table (xanova18, file ="xanova18.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
# full model with company intercept
bb1y.company.model=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.company.model)
stargazer (bb1y.company.model,type = "html", title ="BB1Y Predict variables
model company random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb1ypredictcompany.htm")
bb1y.company.model2=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[scalevars],
REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.company.model2)
stargazer (bb1y.company.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB1Y Full model company
random intercept", digits =9, out="bb1yfullcompany.htm")
bb5y.company.model=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.company.model)
stargazer (bb5y.company.model,type = "html", title ="BB5Y Predict variables
model company random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb5ypredictcompany.htm")
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bb5y.company.model2=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[scalevars],
REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.company.model2)
stargazer (bb5y.company.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB5Y Full model company
random intercept", digits =9, out="bb5yfullcompany.htm")
altmanz.company.model=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+
boardsize2+employees2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.company.model)
stargazer (altmanz.company.model,type = "html", title ="AltmanZ Predict variables
model company random intercept" , digits =9, out="altmanzpredictcompany.htm
")
altmanz.company.model2=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+
boardsize2+employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2), data=my.dfs[
scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.company.model2)
stargazer (altmanz.company.model2,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ Full model
company random intercept" , digits =9, out="altmanzfullcompany.htm")
xanova19<−anova(bb1y.company.model, bb1y.company.model2)
write . table (xanova19, file ="xanova19.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova20<−anova(bb5y.company.model,bb5y.company.model2)
write . table (xanova20, file ="xanova20.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova21<−anova(altmanz.company.model,altmanz.company.model2)
write . table (xanova21, file ="xanova21.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
# full model with time intercept
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bb1y.time.model=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.time.model)
stargazer (bb1y.time.model,type = "html" , title ="BB1Y Predict variables model
time random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ypredicttime .htm")
bb1y.time.model2=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars],
REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.time.model2)
stargazer (bb1y.time.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB1Y Full model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1yfulltime .htm")
bb5y.time.model=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.time.model)
stargazer (bb5y.time.model,type = "html" , title ="BB5Y Predict variables model
time random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ypredicttime .htm")
bb5y.time.model2=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars],
REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.time.model2)
stargazer (bb5y.time.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB5Y Full model time random
intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5yfulltime .htm")
altmanz.time.model=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.time.model)
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stargazer (altmanz.time.model,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ Predict variables
model time random intercept " , digits =9, out=" altmanzpredicttime .htm")
altmanz.time.model2=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars],
REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.time.model2)
stargazer (altmanz.time.model2,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ Full model time
random intercept " , digits =9, out=" altmanzfulltime .htm")
xanova22<−anova(bb1y.time.model, bb1y.time.model2)
write . table (xanova22, file ="xanova22.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova23<−anova(bb5y.time.model,bb5y.time.model2)
write . table (xanova23, file ="xanova23.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova24<−anova(altmanz.time.model,altmanz.time.model2)
write . table (xanova24, file ="xanova24.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
# full model with both intercept
bb1y.model=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.model)
stargazer (bb1y.model,type = "html" , title ="BB1Y Predict variables model
company and time random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb1ypredictcompanytime.
htm")
bb1y.model2=lmer(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[
scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.model2)
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stargazer (bb1y.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB1Y Full model company and time
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb1yfullcompanytime.htm")
bb5y.model=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb5y.model)
stargazer (bb5y.model,type = "html" , title ="BB5Y Predict variables model
company and time random intercept " , digits =9, out="bb5ypredictcompanytime.
htm")
bb5y.model2=lmer(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[
scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(bb1y.model2)
stargazer (bb5y.model2,type = "html" , title ="BB5Y Full model company and time
random intercept" , digits =9, out="bb5yfullcompanytime.htm")
altmanz.model=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.model)
stargazer (altmanz.model,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ Predict variables model
company and time random intercept " , digits =9, out="
altmanzpredictcompanytime.htm")
altmanz.model2=lmer(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+(1|id2)+(1|t2), data=my.dfs[
scalevars ], REML=FALSE)
summary(altmanz.model2)
stargazer (altmanz.model2,type = "html" , title ="AltmanZ Full model company and
time random intercept " , digits =9, out="altmanzfullcompanytime.htm")
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xanova25<−anova(bb1y.model, bb1y.model2)
write . table (xanova25, file ="xanova25.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova26<−anova(bb5y.model,bb5y.model2)
write . table (xanova26, file ="xanova26.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
xanova27<−anova(altmanz.model,altmanz.model2)
write . table (xanova27, file ="xanova27.txt" , sep="," ,quote=FALSE,row.names=T)
#***http : / /ase . tufts .edu/gsc / gradresources /guidetomixedmodelsinr/mixed%20
model%20guide.html
#***to get p−values in lme models use Anova function in car package
#Analysis of Deviance table ( type II wald chisquare tests )
library ( car )
Anova(bb1y.company.model)
Anova(bb1y.time.model)
Anova(bb1y.model)
install .packages("xtable")
library ( xtable )
xtable (Anova(bb1y.company.model))
xtable (Anova(bb1y.time.model))
xtable (Anova(bb1y.model))
Anova(bb5y.company.model)
Anova(bb5y.time.model)
Anova(bb5y.model)
xtable (Anova(bb5y.company.model))
xtable (Anova(bb5y.time.model))
xtable (Anova(bb5y.model))
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Anova(altmanz.company.model)
Anova(altmanz.time.model)
Anova(altmanz.model)
xtable (Anova(altmanz.company.model))
xtable (Anova(altmanz.time.model))
xtable (Anova(altmanz.model))
Anova(bb1y.company.model2)
Anova(bb1y.time.model2)
Anova(bb1y.model2)
xtable (Anova(bb1y.company.model2))
xtable (Anova(bb1y.time.model2))
xtable (Anova(bb1y.model2))
Anova(bb5y.company.model2)
Anova(bb5y.time.model2)
Anova(bb5y.model2)
xtable (Anova(bb5y.company.model2))
xtable (Anova(bb5y.time.model2))
xtable (Anova(bb5y.model2))
Anova(altmanz.company.model2)
Anova(altmanz.time.model2)
Anova(altmanz.model2)
xtable (Anova(altmanz.company.model2))
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xtable (Anova(altmanz.time.model2))
xtable (Anova(altmanz.model2))
# significance testing
#need a better understanding of model selection through AIC, BIC and loglik
anova(bb1y.company.null,bb1y.company.model)#sig model improvement with
predictors
anova(bb1y.company.null,bb1y.time.model)#no sig model improvement
anova(bb1y.company.null,bb1y.model)#sig model improvement with predictors
anova(bb1y.time.null ,bb1y.company.model)#sig model improvement with predictors
anova(bb1y.time.null ,bb1y.time.model)#sig model improvement with predictors
anova(bb1y.time.null ,bb1y.model)#sig model improvement with predictors
anova(bb1y.null ,bb1y.company.model)#no sig model improvement
anova(bb1y.null ,bb1y.time.model)#no sig model improvement
anova(bb1y.null ,bb1y.model)#sig model improvement with predictors
anova(bb1y.time.model,bb1y.company.model)#model sig improvement with company
as intercept
anova(bb1y.time.model,bb1y.model)#model sig improvement with both intercept
anova(bb1y.model,bb1y.company.model)#model with both intercept better than
model with company intercept
coef(bb1y.model)
anova(bb1y.company.null2,bb1y.company.model2)#full model with company intercept
sig better than control with company
anova(bb1y.company.null2,bb1y.time.model2)#full model with time intercept sig
better than control with company
anova(bb1y.company.null2,bb1y.model2)#full model with both intercept sig better
than control with company
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anova(bb1y.time.null2 ,bb1y.company.model2)#full model with company intercept
sig better than control with time
anova(bb1y.time.null2 ,bb1y.time.model2)#full model with time intercept sig
better than control with time
anova(bb1y.time.null2 ,bb1y.model2)#full model with both intercept sig better
than control with time
anova(bb1y.null2 ,bb1y.company.model2)#no sig improvement in model
anova(bb1y.null2 ,bb1y.time.model2)#no sig improvement in model
anova(bb1y.null2 ,bb1y.model2)#full model with both intercept sig better than
control with both intercept
anova(bb1y.time.model2,bb1y.company.model2)#full model with company intercept
better than full model with time
anova(bb1y.time.model2,bb1y.model2)# full model with both intercept better than
full model with time intercept
anova(bb1y.model2,bb1y.company.model2)#full model with both intercept better
than company
coef(bb1y.model2)
anova(bb5y.company.null,bb5y.company.model)
anova(bb5y.company.null,bb5y.time.model)
anova(bb5y.company.null,bb5y.model)
anova(bb5y.time.null ,bb5y.company.model)
anova(bb5y.time.null ,bb5y.time.model)
anova(bb5y.time.null ,bb5y.model)
anova(bb5y.null ,bb5y.company.model)
anova(bb5y.null ,bb5y.time.model)
anova(bb5y.null ,bb5y.model)
anova(bb5y.time.model,bb5y.company.model)
anova(bb5y.time.model,bb5y.model)
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anova(bb5y.model,bb5y.company.model)
coef(bb5y.model)
anova(bb5y.company.null2,bb5y.company.model2)
anova(bb5y.company.null2,bb5y.time.model2)
anova(bb5y.company.null2,bb5y.model2)
anova(bb5y.time.null2 ,bb5y.company.model2)
anova(bb5y.time.null2 ,bb5y.time.model2)
anova(bb5y.time.null2 ,bb5y.model2)
anova(bb5y.null2 ,bb5y.company.model2)
anova(bb5y.null2 ,bb5y.time.model2)
anova(bb5y.null2 ,bb5y.model2)
anova(bb5y.time.model2,bb5y.company.model2)
anova(bb5y.time.model2,bb5y.model2)
anova(bb5y.model2,bb5y.company.model2)
coef(bb5y.model2)
anova(altmanz.company.null,altmanz.company.model)
anova(altmanz.company.null,altmanz.time.model)
anova(altmanz.company.null,altmanz.model)
anova(altmanz.time.null ,altmanz.company.model)
anova(altmanz.time.null ,altmanz.time.model)
anova(altmanz.time.null ,altmanz.model)
anova(altmanz.null ,altmanz.company.model)
anova(altmanz.null ,altmanz.time.model)
anova(altmanz.null ,altmanz.model)
anova(altmanz.time.model,altmanz.company.model)
anova(altmanz.time.model,altmanz.model)
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anova(altmanz.model,altmanz.company.model)
coef(altmanz.model)
anova(altmanz.company.null2,altmanz.company.model2)
anova(altmanz.company.null2,altmanz.time.model2)
anova(altmanz.company.null2,altmanz.model2)
anova(altmanz.time. null2 ,altmanz.company.model2)
anova(altmanz.time. null2 ,altmanz.time.model2)
anova(altmanz.time. null2 ,altmanz.model2)
anova(altmanz.null2 ,altmanz.company.model2)
anova(altmanz.null2 ,altmanz.time.model2)
anova(altmanz.null2 ,altmanz.model2)
anova(altmanz.time.model2,altmanz.company.model2)
anova(altmanz.time.model2,altmanz.model2)
anova(altmanz.model2,altmanz.company.model2)
coef(altmanz.model2)
# interesting tutorial https : / /www.zoology.ubc.ca/~schluter /R/ fit −model/
################################princeton##############################
# https : / /www.princeton.edu/~otorres /Panel101R.pdf
#panel methods
library ( foreign )
coplot (bb1y2~t2|id2 , type="l" ,data=my.df)
coplot (bb1y2~t2|id2 , type="b",data=my.df)
coplot (bb5y2~t2|id2 , type="l" ,data=my.df)
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coplot (bb5y2~t2|id2 , type="b",data=my.df)
coplot (altmanz2~t2 | id2 , type="l" ,data=my.df)
coplot (altmanz2~t2 | id2 , type="b",data=my.df)
install .packages("gplots")
library ( gplots )
plotmeans(bb1y2~id2, main="Heterogeineity across companies", data=my.df)
plotmeans(bb1y2~t2, main="Heterogeineity across years" , data=my.df)
plotmeans(bb5y2~id2, main="Heterogeineity across companies", data=my.df)
plotmeans(bb5y2~t2, main="Heterogeineity across years" , data=my.df)
plotmeans(altmanz2~id2, main="Heterogeineity across companies", data=my.df)
plotmeans(altmanz2~t2, main="Heterogeineity across years" , data=my.df)
ols1<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2, data=
my.df)
summary(ols1)
ols2<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2, data=
my.df)
summary(ols2)
ols3<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df)
summary(ols3)
ols4<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+mcap2
+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df)
summary(ols4)
ols5<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+mcap2
+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df)
summary(ols5)
ols6<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df)
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summary(ols6)
fixed .dum1<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+factor(company2)−1,data=my.df)
summary(fixed.dum1)
fixed .dum2<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+factor(company2)−1,data=my.df)
summary(fixed.dum2)
fixed .dum3<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+factor(company2)−1,data=my.df)
summary(fixed.dum3)
fixed .dum4<−lm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(company2)−1,data=my.df)
summary(fixed.dum4)
fixed .dum5<−lm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(company2)−1,data=my.df)
summary(fixed.dum5)
fixed .dum6<−lm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(company2)−1,data=
my.df)
summary(fixed.dum6)
install .packages("plm")
library (plm)
fixed1<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
summary(fixed1)
fixed2<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
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summary(fixed2)
fixed3<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2 +bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
summary(fixed3)
fixed4<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "within")
summary(fixed4)
fixed5<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "within")
summary(fixed5)
fixed6<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2 +bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2",
"t2"), model = "within")
summary(fixed6)
fixef ( fixed1 )
fixef ( fixed2 )
fixef ( fixed3 )
fixef ( fixed4 )
fixef ( fixed5 )
fixef ( fixed6 )
#null ols better than fixed
pFtest ( fixed1 , ols1 )
pFtest ( fixed2 , ols2 )
pFtest ( fixed3 , ols3 )
pFtest ( fixed1 , ols4 )
pFtest ( fixed2 , ols5 )
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pFtest ( fixed3 , ols6 )
random1<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
summary(random1)
random2<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
summary(random2)
random3<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
summary(random3)
random4<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "random")
summary(random4)
random5<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "random")
summary(random5)
random6<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2",
"t2"), model = "random")
summary(random6)
phtest ( fixed1 ,random1)#fixed better
phtest ( fixed2 ,random2)#fixed better
phtest ( fixed3 ,random3)#random better
phtest ( fixed4 ,random4)#fixed better
phtest ( fixed5 ,random5)#fixed better
phtest ( fixed6 ,random6)#random better
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# testing for time fixed effects
fixed . time1<−plm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+factor(t2),data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time1)
fixed . time2<−plm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+factor(t2),data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time2)
fixed . time3<−plm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+factor(t2),data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time3)
fixed . time4<−plm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(t2),data=my.df,
index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time4)
fixed . time5<−plm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(t2),data=my.df,
index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time5)
fixed . time6<−plm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2+factor(t2),data=my.df,
index=c("id2","t2"),model="within")
summary(fixed.time6)
#null is that no time−fixed effects needed
pFtest ( fixed . time1, fixed1 )
pFtest ( fixed . time2, fixed2 )
pFtest ( fixed . time3, fixed3 )
pFtest ( fixed . time4, fixed4 )
pFtest ( fixed . time5, fixed5 )
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pFtest ( fixed . time6, fixed6 )
#use time fixed effects
plmtest ( fixed1 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))
plmtest ( fixed2 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))
plmtest ( fixed3 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))#use fixed effects
plmtest ( fixed4 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))
plmtest ( fixed5 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))
plmtest ( fixed6 ,c("time") , type=("bp"))#use fixed effects
pool1 <− plm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model="pooling")
summary(pool1)
pool2 <− plm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model="pooling")
summary(pool2)
pool3 <− plm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model="pooling")
summary(pool3)
pool4 <− plm(bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model
="pooling")
summary(pool4)
pool5 <− plm(bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model
="pooling")
summary(pool5)
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pool6 <− plm(altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2", "t2"), model
="pooling")
summary(pool6)
#null is no panel effect and OLS is better
plmtest (pool1, type=c("bp"))
plmtest (pool2, type=c("bp"))
plmtest (pool3, type=c("bp"))
plmtest (pool4, type=c("bp"))
plmtest (pool5, type=c("bp"))
plmtest (pool6, type=c("bp"))
fixed1<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
fixed2<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
fixed3<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2 +bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
fixed4<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "within")
fixed5<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2+
mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model
= "within")
fixed6<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2 +bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2+mcap2+performance2+gearing2+sector2, data=my.df, index=c("id2",
"t2"), model = "within")
# test of independence is that residuals across entities are not correlated
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# if cross−sectional dependence exists http : / /fmwww.bc.edu/repec/bocode/x/xtscc
_paper.pdf
pcdtest ( fixed1 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed1 , test = c("cd") )
pcdtest ( fixed2 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed2 , test = c("cd") )
pcdtest ( fixed3 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed3 , test = c("cd") )
pcdtest ( fixed4 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed4 , test = c("cd") )
pcdtest ( fixed5 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed5 , test = c("cd") )
pcdtest ( fixed6 , test = c("lm"))
pcdtest ( fixed6 , test = c("cd") )
# applies to macro panel with long time series not a problem in micro panels
with very few years
pbgtest ( fixed1 )
pbgtest ( fixed2 )
pbgtest ( fixed3 )
pbgtest ( fixed4 )
pbgtest ( fixed5 )
pbgtest ( fixed6 )
#null is that the series has a unit root ( i .e .non−stational ) .
# if unit root is present you can take the first difference of the variable
panel.my.df<−plm.data(my.df,index=c("id2","t2"))
install .packages(" tseries ")
library ( tseries )
adf . test (panel.my.df$bb1y2, k=2)
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adf . test (panel.my.df$bb5y2, k=2)
adf . test (panel.my.df$altmanz2, k=2)
#null is homoskedasticity
library ( lmtest )
bptest (bb1y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2 + factor(
id2), data = my.df, studentize =F)
bptest (bb5y2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2 + factor(
id2), data = my.df, studentize =F)
bptest (altmanz2~salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2 +
factor(id2), data = my.df, studentize =F)
# heteroskedasticity use robust covariance matrix
# controlling for heteroskedasticity :random effects
random1<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
coeftest (random1)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC(random1,type="HC3"))
t (sapply(c("HC0","HC1","HC2","HC3","HC4"), function (x) sqrt (diag(vcovHC(
random1,type=x)))))
# controlling for heteroskedasticity : fixed effects
fixed1<− plm (bb1y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
coeftest ( fixed1 )
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC)
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC(fixed1,method="arellano"))
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcov(fixed1 , type="HC3"))
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t (sapply(c("HC0", "HC1", "HC2", "HC3", "HC4"), function(x) sqrt(diag(vcovHC(
fixed1, type = x)) ) ) )
# controlling for heteroskedasticity :random effects
random1<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2
, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
coeftest (random1)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC(random1,type="HC3"))
t (sapply(c("HC0","HC1","HC2","HC3","HC4"), function (x) sqrt (diag(vcovHC(
random1,type=x)))))
# controlling for heteroskedasticity : fixed effects
fixed1<− plm (bb5y2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+employees2,
data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
coeftest ( fixed1 )
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC)
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC(fixed1,method="arellano"))
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcov(fixed1 , type="HC3"))
t (sapply(c("HC0", "HC1", "HC2", "HC3", "HC4"), function(x) sqrt(diag(vcovHC(
fixed1, type = x)) ) ) )
# controlling for heteroskedasticity :random effects
random1<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2+bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "random")
coeftest (random1)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC)
coeftest (random1,vcovHC(random1,type="HC3"))
t (sapply(c("HC0","HC1","HC2","HC3","HC4"), function (x) sqrt (diag(vcovHC(
random1,type=x)))))
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# controlling for heteroskedasticity : fixed effects
fixed1<− plm (altmanz2 ~ salarya2 +bonusa2+tenurea2+mcap2+boardsize2+
employees2, data=my.df, index=c("id2","t2"), model = "within")
coeftest ( fixed1 )
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC)
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcovHC(fixed1,method="arellano"))
coeftest ( fixed1 ,vcov(fixed1 , type="HC3"))
t (sapply(c("HC0", "HC1", "HC2", "HC3", "HC4"), function(x) sqrt(diag(vcovHC(
fixed1, type = x)) ) ) )
install .packages(" stargazer ")
library ( stargazer )
citation ()
citation ("lme4")
citation ("nlme")
citation ("plm")
citation (" leaps")
citation ("gvlma")
citation ("car")
citation ("quantmod")
citation ("xts")
citation ("TTR")
citation (" foreign ")
citation ("Hmisc")
citation ("ggplot2")
citation ("munsell")
citation ("FactoMineR")
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citation (" scatterplot3d ")
citation ("psych")
citation ("nFactors")
citation ("sem")
citation (" matrixcalc ")
citation ("glue")
citation (" olsrr ")
citation (" stargazer ")
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